AN ALTERNATIVE MODEL AND IDEOLOGY OF COMMUNICATION
FOR AN ALTERNATIVE TO POLITENESS THEORY

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Brown & Levinson opened their 1987 commentary on their theory of politeness by reemphasizing not only that their framework presumed “that Grice’s theory of conversational implicature and the framework of maxims that give rise to such implicatures is essentially correct” (p. 3), but also that their theory presupposed “the other great contribution by Grice, namely his account of the nature of communication as a special kind of intention designed to be recognized by the recipient” (p. 7; cf. Levinson 1983: 16-18; 1995: 227-232). Brown & Levinson also closed their 1987 commentary with a projection for future development of their theory:

Social interaction is remarkable for its emergent properties which transcend the characteristics of the individuals that jointly produce it; this emergent character is not something for which our current theoretical models are well equipped. Workers in artificial intelligence have already detected a paradigm clash between ‘cognitivism’ and ‘interactionism’, and noted the failure of the former paradigm to account for interactional organization (see ... Suchman, [1987]); our own account suffers from the same dose of ‘cognitivism’. Work on interaction as a system thus remains a fundamental research priority, and the area from which improved conceptualizations of politeness are most likely to emerge. (1987: 48)

One straightforward implication of juxtaposing this opening reemphasis and this closing projection is that an improved conceptualization of politeness will require a theoretical model of interaction other than the Gricean account of communication presupposed in Brown & Levinson’s theory. In this paper I identify three broad patterns in the accounts of communication constituted by scholars in talking about language use: accounts in terms of conduits, in terms of code-using, and in terms of interactional achievement. I associate each account with a theoretical model of interaction, identified respectively as the information transmission, the encoding/decoding, and the co-constituting models of communication. Grice accounted for communication in terms of encoding-decoding, and I indicate why such an account is ill equipped for conceptualizing the emergent properties of human interaction, and hence untenable as the basis for an improved conceptualization of politeness. I provide an outline of the co-constituting model as a distinct alternative model that arises from “work on interaction as a system,” and that addresses emergence in interaction. The co-constituting model of communication has implications for a number of issues in language pragmatics, but I employ it here as the basis for sketching an alternative conceptualization of politeness consistent with Brown & Levinson’s projection.
The model also provides insights into the conceptualization of ideology developed by Althusser (1971) and others, namely, that in the very processes of interacting with one another, whether in day to day affairs or in scholarly exchanges, individuals are constituting and maintaining ideologies. All interaction, whether regarding theoretical models of communication or conceptualizations of politeness, is thus inherently ideological.

1. Three Patterns in Accounts of Communication: Ideologies and Associated Models

The co-constituting model of communication to be developed below implies that what individual human beings know is co-constituted in inter-action with other human beings, and that as humans come into contact with one another over time, across the multiplicity of events in which they co-constitute interpretings in talk-in-inter-action, they can be seen to socially construct certain knowings.[1] Applied recursively, these assumptions imply that the theoretical models of communication that scholars employ in examining language use are themselves co-constituted in inter-action, so that over time (and space) they become social constructions (see Krippendorff 1984, 1989, 1993, 1994, on the necessity of this recursive move in studying communication and on its implications). More specifically, whether we are scholars or ordinary folk, and whether the models of communication we employ are explicit or implicit, our models are co-constituted and co-maintained in talking with and in writing/reading with one another.[2] In other words, because they are co-constituted in face-to-face inter-action and thus become social constructions, models of communication are no different from any of the other ‘furnishings’ of our worlds that we conjointly talk into cognizance and significance, or as some would say into ‘existence.’

Given that the models of communication we employ in studying language use are co-constituted in academic talk and scholarly writing/reading, it is apparent that those models also comprise ideologies. That is, following the arguments of Althusser (1971), Lannamann (1994), Shi-Xu (1994), and others, an ideology is not an abstract structure residing in an individual’s consciousness, such that it might be said to guide or determine personal action or to be revealed in one’s talk. Rather, an ideology is co-constituted in the material practices of persons as they inter-act with one another in particular situations at particular times. Ideology “emerges between positioned subjects as they work to construct meaning” (Lannamann 1994: 139), where that meaning “does not preexist interaction but is realized ‘in the process of active, responsive understanding’ (Volosinov, 1973, p. 102)” (Lannamann 1994: 140). Thus as pairs of scholars inter-act with one another, co-constituting and co-maintaining a model of communication or of politeness, they also co-constitute an ideology. And as groups of scholars inter-act over time and space in the multi-party exchange that is academic discourse, they can be seen to socially construct both models and ideologies of communication, and more specifically, both models and ideologies of politeness.

In what follows, I abstract three general patterns from accounts of communication I see being co-constituted among scholars concerned with language use, and I associate each of these patterns with a theoretical model of communication. Consistent with the view of ideology outlined above, the patterns I see being co-constituted in accountings are not ideologies per se, but rather abstractions I have formed as an observer of and participant in numerous ‘ideologies-realized-in-inter-action.’ One implication of this view of ideology
is that ideologies (and models) co-constituted in inter-action will differ across pairs and groups of persons, and will involve contradictions and ambiguities that often go unrecognized. Following Lannamann (1994: 139), ideologies “are produced in interactions that are filled with contradictions and uncertainty. As Billig et al. (1988) put it, ‘Ideology does not imprint single images but produces dilemmatic quandaries’ (p. 46). Ideological practices, then, are more like arguments between people than instruction sets held the heads of cultural members.” Because diversity, contradiction, and ambiguity are to be expected as scholars co-constitute accounts and hence ideologies of communication, and because I attempt to make explicit what is often implicit in inter-action, the three patterns in accounts which I abstract below may not fit perfectly with any given pair or group’s account and ideology. Krippendorff (1993) has identified a range of accounts and ideologies of communication and has examined their entailments. My more particular concerns in Section 1 are to sketch three such accounts and ideologies, and to identify the problematic entailments of the Gricean account that grounds Brown & Levinson’s model of politeness. In Section 2 I outline the co-constituting model of communication that grounds the alternative conceptualization of politeness sketched in Section 3. In Section 4.0, I reflect again on models and ideologies as co-constituted, whether they be of communication or of politeness.

1.1. Accounts and ideologies of conduits, and the information transmission model

In much of the inter-action I observe among ordinary folk, and in some of the inter-action I see among scholars studying language use (the non-ordinary folk), I find persons co-constituting and co-maintaining in their talk both accounts and ideologies of communication that describe language structures, i.e., words, phrases, sentences, etc., as ‘conveying’ meanings, ideas, concepts, knowledge, or other psychological states, or as transferring information from one person to another, with the assumption that the words or sentences themselves serve as the carriers, vehicles, transmitters, or conduits for the meanings or information. Reddy (1979) identified the pattern apparent in these ways of talking as the ‘conduit metaphor’ for communication, and demonstrated that a great many of the ways people commonly talk in English about the use of language in communicating are consistent with this pattern. Even a cursory examination of talk and writing/reading about language use reveals that among ordinary folk, as well as among scholars, the co-constituting and co-maintaining of conduit metaphor ideologies of communication is pervasive in everyday talk in most Western languages and cultures. That these ideologies are largely implicit makes them no less important or influential. They are alive, though perhaps not well.

The theoretical model of communication associated with conduit metaphor accounts and ideologies will be identified here as the ‘information transmission model.’ Reddy (1979) is one among many who have argued that it is wholly inadequate as an explanation of communication (Cartier, 1963, is but one early example). Meanings, ideas, psychological states, or information are not phenomena that can move in space-time between persons (other than by telepathy, which I exclude). I have argued elsewhere (Arundale 1991) that although ‘information’ does have a technical definition within information theory, discussions of language use in communication uniformly employ the term uncritically, as
a synonym for ‘meaning’ or ‘knowledge,’ (e.g., Grice 1989: Ch. 2). Indeed, even within information theory ‘information’ is defined only with respect to the properties of a specific sender or receiver—only matter or energy is transmitted physically from sender to receiver. The information transmission model has broad appeal because it appears to explain the process by which we attain the presumed end state of communication—shared ‘information’ across persons. But even the briefest critical examination reveals the model to be untenable as an explanation of human communicating using language (see Arundale, 1991, for a more detailed discussion).

1.2. Accounts and ideologies of code-using, and the encoding/decoding model

In some of the inter-action I see among ordinary folk, and in much of the inter-action I observe among scholars studying language use, I find persons co-constituting and co-maintaining in their talk both accounts and ideologies of communication that describe senders (rather than words) as having meanings, ideas, concepts, or psychological states that they desire potential receivers to have as well, which leads them to encode a signal using the language structures they know, and to send that signal to the receivers. Receivers then employ their knowledge of the language structures to decode the signal and thereby recover the senders’ meanings or psychological states. As Sperber & Wilson (1986: 4) elaborated the description, “as long as the devices [the senders and receivers] are in order and the codes are identical at both ends, successful communication is guaranteed.” The pattern apparent in these ways of talking has been given many labels, for it is evident when one reads Aristotle’s and Locke’s writing, Saussure’s lectures, and the work of a great many Western scholars who examine language use. Reddy (1979) labeled this pattern the ‘toolmaker metaphor’ for communication, but because his ‘tools’ are the meanings people build rather than the language codes they employ, I believe it more precise to refer to the pattern as the ‘code-using metaphor’ for communication. Both ordinary folk and scholars co-constitute and co-maintain code-using metaphor ideologies of communication in many different forms, sometimes implicitly, but quite often explicitly in talk about language use. Again, diversity across these ideologies is to be expected, as is the occurrence of talk and of writing/reading in which a code-using ideology and a conduit ideology are co-constituted concurrently. Where both patterns are evident, the contradictions and ambiguities that result may well go unrecognized, as I have argued is the case in Grice’s work (Arundale 1991).

The theoretical model of communication associated with code-using metaphor accounts and ideologies will be identified here as the ‘encoding/decoding model’ because it explains communicating in terms of the cognitive operations both of a sender who begins with a meaning and employs a code to create a signal, and of a receiver of that signal who reverses the coding process and ends with a meaning or other psychological state that reproduces the sender’s. The model has numerous variants (and names), but is distinct from the information transmission model in that only energy or matter moves between persons—meanings or psychological states are not seen as transmittable. The signal may be blocked or be corrupted by noise during transmission, but assuming there is a coded signal present, the transmission process is conceptualized as an event with a specific beginning and ending in time, such that once the receiver has processed the currently available signal, he/she is
assumed to have recovered the sender’s meanings, and the act of communication is thereby complete. Most scholars studying language use view the signal transmission process as unproblematic, and are concerned primarily with describing the cognitive operations of senders during encoding and/or of receivers during decoding. And most scholars’ variants of the encoding/decoding model conceptualize the encoding process as intentional in one or both of two senses: first, variants that employ ‘intentions as causes’ explain the sender’s initiating of the encoding process as caused by a conscious or unconscious need, drive, or decision to act to attain some end state, and may also explain the effects on the receiver that follow decoding as caused by the sender’s signal; second, variants of the model that employ Gricean ‘reflexive intentions’ hold that in encoding something, the sender intends the receiver to attribute to the sender the sender’s intention to produce a response in the receiver (Grice 1989: 213-223), and may also hold that decoding involves or is dependent upon the receiver’s recognition of the sender’s intention (Levinson 1995: 228-231). I believe it evident that the encoding/decoding model is at present the predominant model of communication in linguistics and in language pragmatics (or LP). It is the model that informs both Grice’s and Searle’s work (Arundale 1991), and as such is the model that grounds Brown & Levinson’s politeness theory.

Among the many authors who have examined the encoding/decoding model, Akmajian et al. (1980) argued that the code-using model is far too simplistic to account for utterance production and comprehension because it explains encoding and decoding as strictly linear and sequential processes, contrary to empirical evidence. Reddy (1979) maintained that senders and receivers seldom if ever share identical code to meaning correspondences, which implies that the receiver is unlikely ever to recover the same meaning and intention the sender had. Harris (1996: 89) examined what he termed the ‘telementation’ and ‘fixed code’ doctrines and concluded that in addition to generating the “problem of how A and B [or any observer] can ever be sure they are attaching the same meanings to the same words, and hence how ‘a language’ (=code) ever comes into existence in the first place, the telementation-cum-fixed-code model at the same time serves implicitly to validate the metalanguage that the philosopher and the linguist wish to use for their respective purposes.” According to Harris, that metalanguage is fundamentally flawed. And Sperber & Wilson (1986) have argued that encoding/decoding cannot adequately explain human communication, even when it is elaborated with an account of receiver inferences based on meanings produced in decoding. Such elaboration is “what most pragmatists have done” (Sperber & Wilson 1986: 24), which explains why the encoding/decoding model at present predominates in LP (cf. Arundale 1991).

But there are other problems, as well. Conceptualizing communication as encoding/decoding presumes that language acts are separate, time delimited units that begin as the encoding of a specific signal starts and end as the decoding of that signal ceases. Given this presumption, scholars who employ the model uniformly treat language acts as singular, isolated, and self contained events. Brown & Levinson (1987: 84, 232) recognized that this ‘act-by-act’ treatment of language use was a problematic aspect of the Gricean/Searlean framework in which they developed politeness theory. Good (1990), Schegloff (1984b; 1988b), and others have critiqued the act-by-act view as inadequate even to describe, much less to explain the dynamic evolution of ordinary talk-in-inter-action. In addition, the encoding/decoding model is incapable of explaining most contextual effects, because context is not coded in producing the signal. To these problems I would
add the observation (due initially to Levinson, personal communication, July 18, 1989) that discussions of ‘intention’ in encoding/decoding (and other) models not infrequently employ the concept inconsistently or uncritically. This is especially true in light of philosophical treatments of the concept (e.g., Anscombe 1957) and of careful studies of the problems of linking intention to language use (e.g., Bavelas 1991; Bilmes 1986; cf. Levinson 1995: 231-232). Attempts to address any of these issues require constructing separate, supplementary theoretical frameworks because the basic model is too simplistic.

Having rejected the encoding/decoding model, Sperber & Wilson (1986) developed an alternative, fully ‘inferential’ model of communication in which the receiver’s recognition of the speaker’s intention to inform (or to make assumptions ‘manifest’ to) a receiver is the central criterion for communication. In their model, encoding/decoding processes still operate, but are seen as ‘subservient’ to inferential processes (1986: 27,176). Sperber & Wilson’s model allowed them to address a variety of contextual effects (because potentially anything represented as part of a communicator’s cognitive environment can generate contextual implications), and to avoid the ‘same meaning’ problem (because the sender and receiver’s cognitive environments are unlikely to be identical). But in place of the older model’s receiver recovery of the same meaning as the speaker, Sperber & Wilson substituted the receiver’s recognition of the speaker’s ‘intention to make manifest’ as the criterion for communication, so that the model remains subject to the problems of linking intention to language use, including how participants or observers can know that intention recognition has occurred. Their model also provides no basis for explaining how a language could come into existence in the first place. And because Sperber & Wilson’s model assumes that processes of encoding/decoding remain operative, even though subservient to inferential processes, it is no surprise that it retains the encoding/decoding model’s fundamental assumption about how language acts are processed, namely, on an act-by-act basis as singular, isolated, self contained units. Attempts to deal with any of these issues of the encoding/decoding model left unaddressed in Sperber & Wilson’s formulation would also require constructing separate, supplemental frameworks, because they framed their model of communication explicitly in cognitive terms.

In short, although Sperber & Wilson made major revisions to the inferential aspects of Grice’s framework, they retained the Gricean cognitively based account of communication as recognition of the speaker’s intention in producing isolated, bounded speech acts. These same aspects of the Gricean encoding/decoding account underlie Brown & Levinson’s politeness theory, and their critique is another in the set of critiques of this model that has accumulated over four decades. Brown & Levinson made evident that it is the encoding/decoding model’s linear, isolated-act-by-isolated-act treatment of language use, together with its dependence upon and privileging of cognitive explanations, that make it incapable of explaining the emergent properties evidenced in ordinary interaction. In view of Brown & Levinson’s projection, neither Grice’s nor Sperber & Wilson’s accounts of communication will suffice as bases for an improved conceptualization of politeness (cf. Jary 1998). Despite the history of critiques, I see at least four reasons why the encoding/decoding model, and the code-using ideology associated with it, continue to have such wide appeal and to be employed explicitly and implicitly in discussing language use. First, the model provides an explanation of communication that is consistent with Western concepts of linear sequences of cause and effect. Second, the model is fully consistent with Western and specifically Cartesian views of individuals as psychological monads, who are
positioned with respect to one another as subject and object (Stewart 1995), an assumption that leads to conceptualizing communication as a matter of a subject’s acting upon or sharing with an object so that the object’s understanding comes to conform with the subject’s. Third, the act-by-act nature of the model corresponds closely to the sentence-by-sentence structure of writing and reading, and thus reflects yet one more instance of the pervasive ‘written language bias’ in linguistics and language study (Linell 1982). Finally, the encoding/decoding model continues in use because we as scholars studying language use are only beginning to co-constitute viable alternative models and ideologies.

1.3. Accounts and ideologies of interactional achievement, and the co-constituting model

In almost none of the inter-action I observe among ordinary folk, and in only some of the inter-action I see among scholars studying language use, I find persons co-constituting and co-maintaining in their talk both accounts and ideologies of communication that describe individuals as conjointly formulating the meanings or interpretings that arise in their conversations, and as recognizing that although these interpretings are psychological states that reside in individuals, they are actively initiated, developed, and changed in time, in and through the actions of co-present others. Scholars co-constituting these ideologies characterize communication, and more specifically conversation (including both verbal and nonverbal elements), as incrementally accomplished or achieved in action between persons, rather than as the meshing of two individuals’ separate cognitive plans or schemas. Conversations are thus inter-actional events during which participants incrementally co-constitute a sequence of actions in which each new action is contingent on past and possible future actions of other participants (cf. Schegloff 1981). Like the conversations in which they arise, then, the interpretings participants formulate are also seen as co-constituted, rather than as individual psychological attainments.

The pattern apparent in these ways of talking about communication has been given a number of labels, though I believe the terms ‘interactional achievement’ as employed in conversation analysis to be particularly descriptive (Schegloff 1981). Ideologies of communication as interactional achievement are co-constituted and co-maintained in different forms and with varying degrees of explicitness within several different communities of scholars, as for example among ethnographers and conversation analysts (Heritage 1984), some social and clinical psychologists (Watzlawick et al. 1967), communication researchers (Krippendorff 1970, and Pearce & Cronen 1980, being but exemplars), and certain other disciplinary groups (Jacoby & Ochs 1995) apart from linguistics (Ochs 1993: 302). As would be expected, there is considerable diversity across these ideologies of communication as interactional achievement, both because it is only relatively recently that scholars have actively begun to co-constitute such perspectives in inter-action with one another, and because more widespread, stable social constructions of such ideologies have yet to emerge from this on-going co-constituting. And it is reasonably common to find aspects of code-using and even of conduit ideologies being co-constituted along with interactional achievement ideologies, for our long history of co-constituting the former two ideologies makes it difficult not only to recognize contradictions with the latter ideology, but also to co-constitute clarifications if ambiguities do become apparent.

The theoretical model of communication associated with interactional achievement
accounts and ideologies will be identified here as the ‘co-constituting model’ because it explains communication as a phenomenon that emerges in dynamic inter-action as participants produce adjacent utterances and in so doing mutually constrain and reciprocally influence one another’s formulating of interpretings. In a fundamental departure from the encoding/decoding and information transmission models, the co-constituting model treats the dyad, rather than the individual, as the minimum, irreducible unit of analysis for communication, one central implication being that communication phenomena cannot be explained in terms of the properties of single individuals. More specifically, from the participant’s perspective, communicating is a process in which a participant formulates interpretings that develop and change over time, contingent upon the prior and subsequent actions of the co-participant(s). Alternatively, from the observer’s perspective, communicating is a process in which one can identify contingency among the actions of the co-participants. Another implication, then, is that an event is not an instance of ‘communication’ unless one or more properties of the sequence of participants’ interpretings or actions can be seen to exhibit contingency or conditionality, and hence non-summativity or emergence, across the sequence. If the properties of such a sequence are a summative compilation of or can be reduced without remainder to the properties of individual participants’ interpretings or actions, then within the framework of the co-constituting model ‘communication’ has not occurred, only individual (psychological) activity (see Krippendorff, 1970, for a formal treatment of non-summativity).

As Jacoby & Ochs (1995: 178) noted, the co-constituting model implies that every interactional moment is a unique space for a response to which subsequent interaction will be further responsive, and that interlocutors are processing and responding to the rich flow of unique interactional moments on-line, in real time, at the same time, at the same speed, and in the same state of half-consciousness through which they give linguistic shape to their spontaneous and often smoothly timed utterances. A co-constructed view of interaction thus entails a ratification of the biological complexity of human cognition and communication behavior and an almost subversive recognition that every interactional moment is potentially an opportunity space for some participant to redirect the unfolding of the discourse such that individual understandings, human relationships, and the social order might be changed.

The co-constituting model obviates the problematic entailments of the Gricean encoding/decoding account of communication. Instead of privileging a cognitively based explanation, the co-constituting model treats individual interpreting and action as but one aspect of the explanation of social inter-action. More particularly, instead of focusing on isolated, bounded speech acts, the co-constituting model explains the interactional organization of ordinary inter-action, and hence accounts for “its emergent properties that transcend the characteristics of the individuals that jointly produce it” (Brown & Levinson 1987: 48). This alternative model is clearly of the type Brown & Levinson project as the likely basis for an improved conceptualization of politeness phenomena. If we as scholars continue to co-constitute accounts and ideologies of communication as code-using, and to employ encoding/decoding models as bases for conceptualizing language use, we will continue to face a significant impasse to advancing our understanding of politeness. If we can co-constitute accounts and ideologies of communication as interactional achievement, and employ the co-constituting model in explaining inter-action, however, we will have a way around that impasse and a basis for developing a distinctly different account and ideology of politeness.
2. The Co-constituting Model of Communication

Because accounts and ideologies of interactional achievement are distinct from those of conduits and of code-using, and because the key principles of the co-constituting model involve significant departures from the information transmission and encoding/decoding models, I must develop the co-constituting model in some detail before considering how it serves as the basis for developing an alternative to politeness theory. First, I characterize five philosophical orientations in explaining human phenomena and use them to distinguish among the models of communication sketched above. Second, I describe a general principle underlying the interpreting of utterances, and third describe another principle basic to the producing of utterances in conversation. Fourth, I develop the co-constituting model itself, which leads to a return to issues of politeness in Section 3.

2.1. Philosophical orientations in explaining human phenomena

Werner & Baxter (1994) have described five broad philosophical orientations employed in research on human behavior (I capitalize the names for these orientations to distinguish their specialized uses in this context from other uses of the same terms in this paper). Researchers who employ a Trait orientation “focus on individuals and their psychological processes as the unit of analysis, view people as largely independent of their context,” and assume “that the impetus for behavior resides within the individual” (p. 335). Those who adopt an Interactional orientation “assume that behavior is determined both by aspects of individuals and by aspects of the social and physical environment,” such that “person and situation are treated as separate factors that may jointly influence behavior,” but as factors whose defining properties remain unchanged in the event. “The unit of analysis therefore is how combinations of independent factors influence the individual’s psychological states and behaviors.” (p. 336). Like the first two orientations, researchers utilizing an Organismic orientation assume the position of an outside observer, but believe that “the unit of analysis is the total system; individual units are not—and in fact cannot—be studied apart from the whole” because the interdependence of the parts produces emergent properties that characterize the whole. Nevertheless, “the individual elements in the system can be defined and studied independently of each other” (p. 338) in terms of their contributions to the whole and their mutual, reciprocal influences on one another. Those who employ a Transactional orientation study “aspects” of a holistic system because “the whole cannot be broken up into and is not made up of separate parts; the aspects are mutually defining and inseparable and together contribute to the definition and meaning of events.... There is no dominant or dominating mechanism that controls functioning; all aspects are equally important, mutually constraining, and events unfold in a coordinated holistic way” (p. 342), so that the researcher focuses not on the source of change, but on the “pattern, shape, outline, or recognizable organization in the flow of events” (p. 344). Finally, researchers who adopt a Dialectical orientation share most of the philosophical commitments of the Transactional orientation, but focus on the dynamic tensions between dialectically organized contradictions as the source of change or as the explanation for the pattern or organization in the flow of events (pp. 355, 370).

The information transmission and encoding/decoding models are fully consistent with
the Trait orientation in that researchers who co-constitute them normally talk about individual behavior or psychological processing both apart from context and as motivated by needs, drives, or other psychological states or characteristics inherent in the individuals involved. Elaborated versions of the encoding/decoding model that acknowledge effects of social (or physical) context are likely to be consistent with the Interactional orientation, as is Sperber & Wilson’s (1986) model, given their concern with explaining how a communicator’s utterance, together with the content of an audience’s cognitive environment, leads to changes in the audience’s psychological states in the form of inferential processing, the co-presence of communicator and audience comprising the social environment.

In contrast, the co-constituting model of communication has aspects that are consistent with the Organismic, Transactional, and Dialectical orientations. The model is consistent with the Dialectical orientation in addressing two dialectics that characterize inter-action. First, the co-constituting model privileges neither the individual/cognitive aspects of communication, as in Gricean approaches, nor the social aspects of inter-action, as in conversation analytic approaches. Instead, the individual aspects and the social aspects of human inter-action are positioned as the inseparable, mutually constitutive contradictions of a dialectic. Focusing exclusively on individuals precludes focusing on the social unit, just as the reverse is true, yet these two aspects also form a conceptual unity in that individuals are defined in reference to a social matrix, just as the opposite is the case (Werner & Baxter 1994: 350; cf. Pearce & Cronen 1980: 99-101). Second, the co-constituting model privileges neither the processes of interpreting an utterance, nor those of producing one. Interpreting an utterance directed to one as a listener is in many respects quite distinct from and contradictory to producing an utterance as a speaker that is directed to another person. Yet the two processes are intimately related and mutually defining, in that producing an utterance requires considering how the other will interpret it, just as interpreting requires taking into account the other’s activities in producing it. At the level of conversational action these distinct processes are in fact grounded in the same set of procedures (Heritage 1984: 241). In recognizing the importance of reflexivity in language use, Grice hinted that interpreting and producing were interrelated, but unlike the co-constituting model, the encoding/decoding model he assumed treats interpreting and producing as distinct, independent processes.

The co-constituting model is consistent with the Organismic orientation in that it conceptualizes the individual people who engage in communication as systems in and of themselves, each with a ‘mechanism’ that controls the system’s functioning. The components and processes that comprise these individuals-as-organismic-systems can be defined and studied independently of one another, but only in terms of their mutual, reciprocal influences on one another, for it is the interdependence of the components and processes that creates the emergent properties that characterize the system as a whole entity. Such individuals-as-organismic-systems embody self-regulating control ‘mechanisms’ and so are capable at any given moment of interpreting events in, as well as of acting on their environments with relative independence from other individuals, though they need not do so, and ultimately do not do so because their ability to function with relative independence was developed in communication with other individuals-as-organismic-systems. The co-constituting model is at the same time consistent with the Transactional orientation, not only because the model focuses particularly on the flow or sequence of events generated
in the moment-by-moment inter-linking of participant’s actions, but also because it conceptualizes the dyad, or more generally the social unit, as the minimum, irreducible unit of analysis with regard to communication phenomena. This social whole cannot be broken up into parts because its individual aspects are mutually defining and inseparable. That the model is consistent with the Transactional orientation in this latter way would make it inconsistent with the Organismic orientation, were it not for the key dialectic between the individual and the social aspects of communication phenomena.

But there is another consistency with the Transactional orientation that is also one of the most important characteristics of the co-constituting model: the model holds that at the level of the social unit, “there is no dominant or dominating mechanism that controls functioning [of the social unit]; all aspects are equally important, mutually constraining, and events unfold in a coordinated holistic way” (Werner & Baxter 1994: 342). In other words, at the level of the social unit, there is no organismic system as there is at the level of the individual unit, no unit level, self-regulating control ‘mechanism’ that directs the social unit’s functioning (cf. Pearce & Cronen 1980: 148). If a social event unfolds in a coordinated, holistic way (which is common but by no means inevitable) the “pattern, shape, outline, or recognizable organization in the flow of events” (Werner & Baxter 1994: 344) is one that is co-constituted through the mutual constraint and reciprocal influence of the individual aspects, and not through some overarching aspect of the social unit. In the co-constituting model, it is the mutual constraint and reciprocal influence of the individual aspects that creates the contingency or conditionality, and hence the non-summativity or emergence that is evident in the flow or sequence of events, that defines the sequence as an instance of ‘communication,’ and that creates the social unit in which the communication occurs. Emergence is thus characteristic of both the individual and the social aspects of communication phenomena, but in the individual organismic system emergence arises in the hierarchical organization of components, whereas in the social unit in which communication occurs emergence arises in the sequential inter-action of two comparable, equally important organisms. Because emergence defines communication, and because it is co-constituted, communication phenomena cannot be reduced without remainder to psychological phenomena or to individual cognitive activity (cf. Krippendorff 1984: 29).

The co-constituting model is thus consistent with important features of the Organismic, Transactional, and Dialectical orientations and inconsistent with the Trait and Interactional orientations, and consequently it provides an explanation of human communication quite distinct from that provided by the information transmission model, by the Gricean encoding/decoding model, or by Sperber & Wilson’s model, as in Section 1.2. But it remains to provide a more detailed sketch of the co-constituting model itself. Given the scope of this paper I will focus on communication using language forms, with full awareness that I am artificially separating language behavior from non-language behavior. The co-constituting model is not limited to language behavior, and it is apparent that ultimately language behavior will not in the long run be understood fully without examining its integration with non-language behavior.
2.2. Interpreting: The Sequential Interpreting Principle

The two core principles that underlie the co-constituting model rest on certain definitions and assumptions. As the term is used here, an individual is an individual-as-organismic-system, identified as the system that produces the energy required to articulate the sounds that comprise language behavior and to produce the physical acts that comprise non-language behavior. Obviously an ‘individual’ is far more than this, but these complex and contentious definitional issues are well beyond the scope of this paper. This definition is sufficient as a starting point (cf. Stewart 1995, on language as ‘articulate contact’). As used here, interpreting is the individual’s processing of language constituents as they appear moment-by-moment in the stream of behavior that is inter-action, this comprehending involving formulating meanings, conversational actions, and inferences to be utilized in continuing one’s participation in the inter-action (Clark & Clark 1977: 45).[3] Interpreting is a complex, multifaceted, though integrated process that spans language constituents ranging from specific sounds, through full utterances in extended sequences, including the non-language behavior occurring with language use. Utterances (or strings of language constituents) are produced in time and hence are interpreted as they accrue in time, though only a limited portion of what has been accrued at any given point can be held in ‘working memory’ while it is being interpreted for integration into long term memory. Long term memory holds the products of prior interpreting, which are continually being updated in and through the on-going processes of interpreting (Clark & Clark 1977: 135-147). Because of the phenomenon of ‘chunking,’ constituents at lower levels of constituent organization are generally also components of higher level constituents, with the direct implication that interpreting proceeds in parallel or concurrently at multiple levels of constituent organization (Arundale 1997: 14-15).

An expectation is an individual’s anticipation that a known pattern or heuristic (cf. Levinson 1995: 233-238; forthcoming) for processing language constituents will be applicable in formulating and/or in utilizing meanings, conversational actions, and inferences for constituents yet to appear in the stream of inter-action. Expectations are, in effect, predictions of means yet to be employed in formulating interpretations for some range or set of constituent types. Normally, several different expectations at different levels of constituent organization will be invoked concurrently and will be interrelated, as for example when an expectation that a clause in nearing completion coincides with an expectation that a topical contribution and/or a language action are being completed, so that a transition relevance place may be imminent (cf. Ford et al. 1996). Expectations have time spans ranging from tenths to tens of seconds, and are almost uniformly tacit (Arundale 1997: 15-16), the evidence for them being physiological (e.g., Allen et al. 1997), psychological (e.g., Neisser 1976), and inter-actional (e.g., Schegloff 1984a) as in the observable consequences of deviating from them (cf. Heritage 1984; Sperber & Wilson 1986: 37). Finally, producing as used here is the individual’s generating of sequences of language constituents that comprise utterances to be interpreted by others, both as contributions to and as continuing one’s participation in the stream of behavior that is inter-action. Like interpreting, producing is also a complex, multi-component, though integrated process encompassing sequences of language constituents ranging from sounds through sequences of utterances, including the non-language behavior that accompanies language use. And as with interpreting, constituents at lower levels of constituent organization are
generally also components of higher level constituents, which implies that producing involves parallel or concurrent processes at multiple levels of constituent organization (Arundale 1997: 14-15).

Certain key assumptions of the model have been suggested already: (a) The presence of two individuals as the minimum social unit for communication, though co-presence does not imply communication; (b) The presence of actions in sequence by both of the co-present individuals, so that contingency or conditionality across interpretings or across actions (and hence the presence of ‘communication’) may be assessed as evident or not; (c) The absence of a control or regulating component at the level of the social unit. Several other key assumptions also need to be identified: (d) Ordinary conversation or talk-in-interaction is the fundamental form of human communication using language (see note 3); (e) No individual has access to the interpretings and expectations of any other individual, that is, individuals can only infer the interpretings and expectations of others; (f) Individuals ascribe the interpreting they formulate for an utterance to the individual who produced it; (g) Individuals are continually interpreting not only the utterances of others they are listening to, but also their own utterances as they produce them; (h) Individuals engaged in interpreting are always situated in an environment or ‘surround,’ which includes but is not limited to both the co-present individual(s) and the sequence of actions to the current point in the inter-action; and finally, but all too often overlooked from the perspective of observers who examine transcripts, (i) As participants, individuals engaged in interaction have no knowledge of the sequence of actions beyond the current point in the inter-action, only expectations currently invoked for inter-action-to-come.

The core principle grounding the interpreting aspects of the co-constituting model of communication is the Sequential Interpreting Principle (Arundale 1997), a highly general principle framed here more specifically with reference to a recipient’s interpreting of constituents at the level of a sequence of utterances in conversation:

Recipients interpret the utterance currently being produced by another individual using expectations invoked in producing/interpreting their own prior utterance; they integrate this current interpreting with their evolving interpreting of the inter-action; and they invoke expectations for another’s subsequent interpreting of the recipient’s own next utterance (to be used in producing that next utterance).

The three more general processes that underlie this particular application of the Principle are, first, interpreting current constituents using expectations invoked in prior interpreting, second, integrating the current interpreting with evolving interpreting, and third, invoking expectations for subsequent interpreting, all three processes being closely linked, and having strong empirical support (Anderson 1985: 340-350; Clark & Clark 1977: 43-85; see Arundale 1997, Section 5, on the more general principle). The Sequential Interpreting Principle is not a new principle, but a formal statement intended to organize existing findings and insights regarding interpreting as it occurs in inter-action. As stated in the form above, the Principle is fully consistent with empirical research in conversation analysis.

The three linked processes comprising the Sequential Interpreting Principle (hereafter SIP) have been developed elsewhere in greater detail (Arundale 1998: Section 2). I will
briefly characterize and exemplify each process here with reference to a segment of conversation examined by Schegloff (1988b: 57-58) (utterance numbers added):

(1) (Family dinner)
   1 Mother: ‘z everybody (0.2) [washed for dinner?]
   2 Gary: [Yah.
   3 Mother: Daddy ‘n I have t- both go in different directions, en I wanna
talk ta you about where I’m going (t’night).
   4 Russ: mm hmm
   5 Gary: Is it about us?
   6 Mother: Uh huh
   7 Russ: I know where you’re go’in,
   8 Mother: Where.
   9 Russ: To the uh (eighth grade ) =
  10 Mother: = Yeah. Right.
  11 Mother: Do you know who’s going to that meeting?
  12 Russ: Who.
  13 Mother: I don’t know.
  14 Russ: Oh:. Prob’ly Missiz McOwen (‘n detsa) en prob’ly Missiz Cadry
and some of the teachers. (0.4) and the counsellors.
  15 Mother: [Missiz Cadry went
to the- I’ll tell you...

The first of the three linked processes in the SIP is the recipient’s (e.g., Mothers’s) interpreting of the utterance they are currently listening to (e.g., Russ’s utterance 9), using expectations invoked earlier in producing and concurrently interpreting their own prior utterance (e.g., Mothers’s utterance 8). Such expectations are, in effect, the current recipient/prior speaker’s projections of the conditional relevance of the current utterance in view of their prior utterance, as for example in the expectations involved in pre-sequences, preference organization, and more (Sacks 1992: 554-560; Schegloff 1988a: 138-148). More specifically, it is quite likely that Mother interprets her utterance of “Where” at 8 not as a request for information she lacks, but as an action that advances the pre- sequence begun with Russ’s utterance 7, making conditionally relevant at utterance 9 an announcement by Russ of the information he indicated he knows. Mother’s interpreting of utterance 9 thus takes place using expectations invoked as she produced and concurrently interpreted her utterance 8 (along with other expectations she may have invoked earlier). The SIP holds that no utterance or utterance constituent is ever interpreted de novo, as an isolated entity, but always against the background of the interpreting that has preceded and that has enabled and constrained, or more succinctly has ‘afforded’ the current interpreting by generating expectations for it. The expectations invoked in prior interpreting may be of a quite general nature, but they are nevertheless essential in guiding or directing current interpreting. Interpreting is also always ‘situated’ in that it requires the recipient to utilize certain ‘resources’ currently at their disposal. Although the scope of the resources potentially required in such interpreting is very broad, the speaker of the utterance (Russ) will have designed it to be interpreted by this particular recipient (Mother), having taken into account the resources this recipient will be able to access and employ at the moment.
The second of the linked processes noted above is the recipient’s (Mother’s) integrating of their current interpreting (of utterance 9) with their evolving interpreting of the conversation to this point in time. Such integrating occurs not only because working memory can hold only a relatively small span of material currently undergoing processing, which must be ‘cleared’ before processing of new material is possible, but also because of the phenomenon of ‘adjacent placement.’ As Sacks pointed out as early as 1972, both speaker and recipient are aware of the ‘fundamental ordering principle’ of conversation, “that utterances which are placed immediately next to some prior are to be understood as produced in response to, or more loosely, in relation to that prior” (Heritage 1984: 261). Accordingly, if the current speaker has taken no action to indicate otherwise, the recipient normally interprets the current utterance both in view of the expectations invoked at that point, and as directly related to their interpreting of their prior utterance. But apart from these issues of cognitive processing, there are fundamental issues of communication involved in integrating current interpretations with evolving ones. Specifically, Mother’s interpreting of Russ’s utterance 9 (which interpreting she ascribes to Russ as his meaning) provides her with evidence relevant to two aspects of her evolving interpreting of the sequence of utterances to this point.

First, Mother is able to assess her provisional interpreting of her own prior utterance 8 on the basis of its consistency with her interpreting of Russ’s current utterance 9. As recipient, Mother may find that her interpreting of Russ’s utterance 9 is fully consistent in topic, action, and/or inferential relationship with her interpreting of her prior utterance, as appears to be the case in this instance given that Russ provides an answer to Mother’s “Where.” Second, in addition to allowing Mother to assess her interpreting of her own prior utterance 8, Mother’s interpreting of Russ’s utterance 9 also allows her to assess her provisional interpreting of Russ’s utterance 7 that had preceded her prior utterance, or in other words, to assess her interpreting of Russ’s utterance two positions back from his current utterance. Here again, Mother may find that her interpreting of Russ’s utterance 9 is fully consistent with the interpreting she had formulated for his utterance 7, as appears to be the case given that Russ does indeed provide the information he indicated at 7 that he knew. In short, in integrating her interpreting of utterance 9 with her evolving interpreting of the conversation, Mother assesses her heretofore provisional interpretations of her own and Russ’s prior utterances in view of the ‘fit’ between those interpretations and her current interpreting. The SIP holds that the recipient’s interpreting of both of these prior utterances (and perhaps earlier ones) is always provisional, at least until the interpreting of the current utterance is integrated with the evolving interpreting. But in what sense is this the case? The provisional nature of Mother’s interpreting of utterances 7 and 8 is difficult to see because utterances 7, 8, and 9 together are such an excellent example of “the routine nature of the implementation of ‘seen but unnoticed’ procedures for accomplishing, producing and reproducing ‘perceivedly normal’ courses of action” (Heritage, 1984: 118).

However, Russ’s integrating of utterance 13 makes the provisional nature of prior interpreting fully evident. In utterances 11, 12, and 13 the roles are reversed from those in utterances 7, 8, and 9. Schegloff (1988b: 58-59) has argued that Russ initially understands his utterance of “Who” in utterance 12 to be a forwarding of the pre-announcement sequence begun by Mother’s utterance 11, making conditionally relevant at utterance 13 Mother’s announcement of the meeting participants. Russ’s interpreting of utterance 13 begins initially using the expectations invoked as he produced utterance 12 and interpreted
utterance 11, but in integrating his initial interpreting of utterance 13 with his evolving interpreting, and specifically in assessing his interpretings of the prior two utterances in view of his initial interpreting of utterance 13, Russ is faced with inconsistencies. First, with regard to his own prior utterance 12, he finds that Mother has not announced the meeting participants. To make sense of the conversation, Russ must retroactively update his provisional interpreting of his prior utterance, taking it as something other than a move in a pre-announcement sequence. Second, with regard to his Mother’s prior utterance 11, Mother has indicated that she does not know the identities of the meeting participants. If he is to continue the conversation by producing another contribution of his own (in utterance 14), Russ must retroactively update his provisional interpreting of utterance 11, as well, taking it as a request for information about the participant’s identities (cf. Schegloff, 1988b: 59). From an encoding/decoding and specifically from an isolated-act-by-isolated-act perspective on language use, one might argue that utterance 13 is a special case that forces an after-the-fact formulating of a new meaning that the speaker then substitutes for the fixed meaning that led them to construct the utterance in the first place. But because utterances 7-9 and utterances 11-13 represent the extremes on a continuum from routine to non-routine interpreting of utterances, and because the next utterance in sequence always has the potential to engender some form of non-routine interpreting and hence some form of updating, it is evident that our interpreting of prior utterances remains provisional until our interpreting of subsequent utterances permits confirmation or engenders modification.

In short, the assessing process that occurs in integrating current interpreting with evolving interpreting is the basis for the recipient’s retaining or updating of their heretofore provisional interprettings of their own and other’s prior utterances. But there is more. As one interprets another’s current utterance, and assesses one’s provisional interprettings, one establishes grounds for inferences regarding the nature of the other’s interpreting, to which one has no direct access. If Russ’s interpreting of Mother’s utterance 13 had been consistent with his provisional interprettings, he could infer that his Mother’s interpreting was basically as he had projected. But to the extent that Russ finds inconsistencies between his interpreting of utterance 13 and his provisional interprettings, he can infer that Mother’s interpreting has taken a path different from that he had projected. Indeed, the SIP holds that the integrating and assessing processes in interpreting utterances are not only the central bases for inferences regarding the nature and direction of one’s co-participant’s interprettings, but also the primary means by which one is influenced by one’s co-participants in constituting one’s meanings for utterances.

The third of the linked processes in the above version of the SIP is the recipient’s (e.g., Mother’s) invoking of expectations for another’s (e.g., Russ’s) future interpreting of the recipient’s own next utterance (e.g., utterance 10). That is, as Mother interprets Russ’s utterance 9 in view of her prior expectations and integrates that interpreting with her evolving interpreting, she also begins to invoke expectations for how Russ will interpret the next utterance in the conversational sequence (which will often but not always be an utterance by the current recipient). The expectations that the current recipient invokes in interpreting and integrating are thus expectations for another co-participant’s subsequent interpreting. Such expectations are one set of guides to the current recipient in producing their next utterance, but are not in themselves sufficient for that process to take place. The SIP addresses only matters of interpreting utterances and the place of expectations in that
interpreting. Producing utterances is the other contradictory pole of the dialectic and involves the second general principle.

2.3. Producing: The Recipient Design Principle

The terms ‘recipient design’ have been employed in discussing a broad range of practices “in which the talk by a party in a conversation is constructed or designed in ways which display an orientation and sensitivity to the particular other(s) who are the coparticipants” (Sacks et al. 1974: 727; Heritage 1984: 156). Sacks (1992: 438) suggested in 1971 that recipient design had the status of a maxim for constructing conversations, and Sacks et al. (1974: 727) noted that it was “the most general principle particularizing conversational interaction.” The Recipient Design Principle attempts to capture the insight that I produce the utterance I address to you in a continuing process of projecting the interpreting you will be doing as you listen to that utterance, that interpreting being what you will ascribe to me as the meaning I was formulating as I was articulating my utterance. Recipient design is thus fundamentally reflexive in nature, first in the sense that the interpreting I attribute to you is what I presume you will ascribe to me, and second in the sense that the utterance I am designing for you functions in constituting the very events it is a part of, as enthomethodologists have long emphasized (Heritage 1984). Exactly what interpreting I am projecting in designing an utterance for you, and just how it functions in producing events depends on the particular conversational procedure involved, e.g., action projections, assessments, accounts, and more. The Recipient Design Principle does not describe specific procedures, but rather identifies the processes that unite them as instances of recipient design.

The Recipient Design Principle grounds the producing aspects of the co-constituting model of communication and is framed here with reference both to the SIP and to an individual’s producing of an utterance and its constituents at the level of a sequence of utterances in conversation:

Speakers frame an utterance to be produced using both expectations invoked in their interpreting of another’s prior utterance, and recipient interprettings yet to be formulated;
they attribute to the future recipient knowledge of certain resources and procedures;
they project the interpreting, integrating, and invoking processes the recipient will employ in formulating an interpreting of the utterance to be articulated;
they produce the utterance by selecting and articulating utterance constituents;
and they presume that their recipients will hold them accountable for their contribution to the conversation.

Like the SIP, the Recipient Design Principle is not a new principle, but a formal statement intended to organize related findings and insights regarding the production of utterances in inter-action. And like the SIP, this Principle is also fully consistent with empirical research in conversation analysis. Unlike the SIP, however, the five general processes that comprise the Recipient Design Principle do not necessarily operate in the sequence outlined.
above, though all five are closely interwoven. These five processes have been developed elsewhere in greater detail (Arundale, 1998), hence I will but characterize and exemplify each, again with reference to conversation (1).

The first of the processes identified in the Recipient Design Principle (hereafter RDP) is the incipient speaker’s (e.g., Mother’s) framing of the utterance to be produced (e.g., her utterance 13), not only using expectations invoked in their interpreting of another’s (e.g., Russ’s) prior utterance (the third process in the SIP), but also on the basis of the incipient speaker’s identifying of interpretings yet to be formulated by the future recipient (e.g., Russ). With regard to expectations invoked in interpreting another’s prior utterance, Schegloff (1984b: 38) has noted that “utterances are built to display speakers’ understanding; they are made available to coparticipants’ inspection to see if they display an adequate understanding.” With regard to identifying interpretings yet to be formulated, the utterance the incipient speaker is now framing represents their (i.e., Mother’s) first and best opportunity for ‘commentary’ on what they infer to be the other’s (i.e., Russ’s) interpreting, whether by active ‘repair’ (affording a change in the other’s interpreting, which is what Mother does in utterance 13) or by omission of repair (leaving the other’s interpreting unchanged, which is what Russ had done in utterance 9) (cf. Heritage 1984: 258; Schegloff 1992). In addition to commentary on inferred interpretings, the incipient speaker (e.g., Mother) is also likely (though not required) to frame the utterance they are producing (e.g., utterance 11) in ways that advance or transform the conversation in accord with their own interests or projects (Goodwin & Goodwin 1987: 4; Heritage 1984: 260). The process of identifying interpretings yet to be formulated can and often does operate outside of conscious awareness, and is an evolving process, hence utterances are not (usually) consciously framed or framed as wholes before they are articulated, as is evident in Russ’s utterance 14. That the framing process depends in important ways upon expectations already invoked and on interpretings stemming from prior integrating represents one important way in which contributions to conversation are ‘context-shaped’ (Heritage 1984: 242, 280-290).

The second process identified in the RDP is the speaker’s attributing to the future recipient knowledge of certain resources and conversational procedures. Producing a viable contribution to a conversation depends upon assuming that one’s future recipient (e.g., Mother) has the knowledge of conversational procedures required to formulate the interpreting one has framed or is framing. Given utterances 7-9, Russ certainly seems entitled to assume this in producing utterance 12. ‘Knowledge of resources’ is a much more open-ended category, but the RDP specifies that incipient speakers attribute to recipients knowledge of only ‘certain’ resources and procedures. Specifically, they attribute only that knowledge needed to formulate the interpretings the speaker has framed or is framing, together with that knowledge which has been required in interpreting the conversation to this point. This latter category of knowledge has been delimited by the preceding inter-action, and its potential use by the recipient in interpreting the utterance being produced represents a second important way in which utterances are context-shaped.

The third process identified in the RDP is the incipient speaker’s projecting of the interpreting, integrating, and invoking processes the recipient will employ in formulating an interpreting of the utterance to be articulated. Projecting is the central process in recipient design, and the source of its reflexivity. The incipient speaker’s ability to project the recipient’s interpreting processes rests directly on the speaker’s own ability to formulate
interpretings for the utterances of others. It differs from their own interpreting, however, in that the speaker must project the three processes of the SIP from the recipient’s perspective rather than from their own, based on whatever attributing the speaker has done regarding the resources and procedures this other person can employ. Projecting a recipient’s interpreting has both a proactive and a retroactive focus. ‘Proactive focus’ references the phenomena involved in an incipient speaker’s (e.g., Mother’s) design of an utterance (e.g., utterance 13) on the basis of their projecting of another’s (e.g., Russ’s) interpreting of it and subsequent framing of a response to it in a future turn (e.g., utterance 14, and perhaps beyond). These phenomena are well documented in conversation analysis studies (Arundale 1997: 4; Schegloff 1988a: 138-148). ‘Retroactive focus’ references the phenomena involved in designing an utterance (e.g., 13) on the basis of projecting the recipient’s (e.g., Russ’s) integrating of their interpreting of the utterance with their evolving interpreting, and especially the recipient’s assessing of their provisional interpreting of their own prior utterance (e.g., 12), and/or of their provisional interpreting of the incipient speaker’s (Mother’s) prior utterance (e.g., 11). These latter phenomena are evident, for example, in discussions of topic development and repair (Arundale 1997: 4-5; Schegloff 1988a: 148-154).

The fourth process identified in the RDP is the incipient speaker’s producing of the actual utterance by selecting and articulating of a sequence of utterance constituents. More specifically, the speaker selects and articulates an initial sequence of constituents that they assume will be interpreted using the expectations the speaker presumes the recipient has currently invoked, and that they presume will in turn invoke further expectations for subsequent interpreting, consistent with the SIP. The speaker’s sequence of utterance constituents thus progressively affords the recipient’s interpreting of the constituent sequence. As speakers articulate their utterance, however, they are also concurrently interpreting it. That is, following the SIP, they formulate an interpreting of the utterance-in-process using the expectations developed in the projecting process, they begin integrating that interpreting as well as assessing (that assessing involving both their own provisional interprettings and their projecting of the retroactive focus), and they invoke expectations for their own subsequent interpreting of the other’s next utterance in sequence (i.e., projections of the conditional relevance of the next utterance, as in the first process in the SIP). The speaker’s action of articulating an utterance that affords certain recipient interprettings, rather than others, functions “to renew (i.e., maintain, alter or adjust) any more generally prevailing sense of context which is the object of the participants’ orientations and actions” (Heritage 1984: 242; see 280-290). Each contribution to a conversation is therefore not only context-shaped in the speaker’s framing and attributing processes, but also context-renewing in the speaker’s processes of articulating and concurrently interpreting it, as well as in the recipient’s processes of interpreting it.

The fifth process identified in the RDP is the incipient speaker’s presuming that their recipients will hold them accountable for their contribution to the conversation. That is, the speaker recognizes (usually implicitly) that as their recipient goes about the processes of interpreting the utterance being articulated, the recipient not only will ascribe their interpreting to the speaker as the speaker’s meaning, but also will ascribe to the speaker the implementing of those conversational procedures that the recipient has employed in formulating the interpreting. The speaker’s presuming that they will be accountable for what is ascribed to them is another key aspect of the reflexive nature of recipient design.
These five interwoven processes of the Recipient Design Principle make apparent that producing an utterance is not, as is assumed in encoding/decoding models, a simple task of finding words that represent the ideas one wishes to share with another. Instead, recipient design is a complex process that instantiates Garfinkel’s position that social action is “designed with reference to how it will be recognized” (Heritage 1984: 140). The RDP identifies the general processes involved in producing an utterance, as the SIP identifies the basic processes in interpreting one, the two processes together representing the contradictory poles of the dialectic of interpreting and producing.

2.4. The co-constituting model of communication

The SIP and RDP are necessary components of the co-constituting model of communication, but they are not sufficient because both principles focus primarily on individual rather than social aspects of communicating, though as with any dialectic, presenting these individual aspects required consideration of social aspects. Completing the co-constituting model requires focusing on the social aspects of communicating, though doing so involves consideration of individual aspects. I will continue as above to consider only sequences of utterances, as exemplified in conversation (1), but at a later point will generalize to co-constituting within utterances.

Focusing on the social aspects of communicating requires examining the inter-action that occurs as two individuals produce and interpret adjacent utterances directed to one another. For example, as Mother is involved in producing utterance 13 directed to Russ, she is engaged in the processes of framing, attributing, projecting, producing, and presuming. Among these processes, the most central with regard to co-constituting is her projecting of the interpreting, integrating, and invoking Russ will perform as recipient and will reflexively ascribe to her as her interpreting. In particular, Mother projects how her utterance will afford Russ’s interpreting, including both how Russ may frame his next utterance in response (the proactive focus), and how he may integrate his interpreting and assess his provisional interpretings, either of his prior utterance 12 to her, or of her utterance 11 to him (the retroactive focus), or both. As Mother produces utterance 13 she is concurrently interpreting that utterance, integrating that interpreting and assessing her evolving provisional interpreting, and invoking expectations for his next utterance. At the same time, Russ is interpreting Mother’s utterance 13, and is engaged in the processes of interpreting, integrating, and invoking. Among these processes, the most central with regard to co-constituting are both Russ’s integrating of his interpreting of Mother’s utterance with his evolving interpreting of the sequence of utterances, and more particularly, his use of his interpreting of utterance 13 in assessing not only his provisional interpreting of his utterance 12 to Mother, but also his provisional interpreting of her utterance 11 to him. These processes lead him to invoke expectations for his coming utterance in the conversation.

In short, as Mother produces utterance 13 by projecting Russ’s interpreting, she not only affords his current interpreting and influences his framing of his coming utterance 14, but also influences his evolving interpreting of the conversation through his assessing of his provisional interpreting of his prior utterance 12 and of his provisional interpreting of her earlier utterance 11, in both cases in ways she had potentially projected. Somewhat more
generally, through the seemingly straightforward action of producing an utterance adjacent to Russ’s, Mother not only affords his interpreting of her utterance but also influences his evolving interpreting of his immediately prior utterance, as well as of the utterance before his, if it was produced by her. Mother’s action of placing an utterance adjacent to Russ’s makes her a fundamental co-participant in his formulating of his interpretings, such that Russ’s interpretings can be said to be co-constituted by the two of them. Mother’s fundamental influence on Russ’s formulating of his interpretings is perhaps most evident when his assessing of utterance 13 results in his modifying his provisional interpreting of his adjacently prior utterance and of her utterance before it. But the speaker’s influence is equally important when the recipient’s assessing results in confirming their provisional interpreting. Hence Russ has an equally fundamental influence on Mother’s formulating of her interpretings when, in view of his utterance 9, her assessing of her provisional interpreting of his utterance 8 and his utterance 7 results in confirming those interpretings—an occurrence that is relatively common because speakers quite often successfully project the retroactive focus of their recipients’ integrating. At the most general level, then, the speaker’s projecting, leading to the adjacent placement of an utterance that affords the recipient’s formulating of an interpreting, is a necessary process in co-constituting. But it is not sufficient because co-constituting, per se, does not take place apart from the recipient’s use of this new interpreting in assessing, that is, in modifying or confirming their provisional interpreting of at least their own previously adjacent utterance.

But note a very important point with regard to the co-constituting model of communication. The co-constituting of the recipient’s interprettings described thus far is effectively uni-directional, from speaker to recipient, because it is the outcome of the speaker’s affording of the recipient’s interpreting and influencing of the recipient’s assessing processes. Because co-constituting is uni-directional, and because it involves no mutual constraint or reciprocal influence among the participants (and hence no source of contingency, conditionality, or emergence) co-constituting of interpreting is an individual aspect of the process and does not constitute ‘communication’ between speaker and recipient. But of course if the current recipient produces a next utterance adjacent to the current utterance, they in turn take on the roles of affording and influencing the other’s interpreting. What are for two co-participants, individually, matters of affording another’s current interpreting and of influencing another’s assessing of provisional interpreting become, across their two or more adjacently placed utterances, matters of mutual affordance or constraint, of reciprocal influence, and hence of communication in the social unit that the co-participants thereby create. The social aspects of communication thus become evident only if one recognizes both that A and B are engaged in exactly the same processes of affording and assessing with regard to each other’s utterances, and that it is the adjacent placement of utterances by each of them that links them in inter-action, each affording and influencing the other’s interprettings. Sacks (1992: 554) noted that adjacent placement was the “most powerful device for relating utterances,” and although he did not to examine the processes involved in producing and interpreting utterances, his “fundamental ordering principle for conversation” (Heritage 1984: 261) is critical to the social aspect of communication, and comprises the third core principle of the co-constituting model. The fundamental importance of adjacent placement in communication is ‘in-conceivable’ to one who co-constitutes an isolated-act-by-isolated-act account and
ideology of communication. Indeed, it is difficult or impossible to conceive of ‘communication’ as it is conceptualized in the co-constituting model apart from conceiving of its individual and social aspects as the inseparable poles of a dialectic, and it is difficult or impossible to conceive of ‘co-constituting’ apart from conceiving of interpreting and producing as dialectically linked individual aspects of the process of communication.

Though I have developed them as such above, there is nothing about the SIP, RDP, or adjacent placement principles that restricts them either to whole utterances (or to only two participants). The principles apply equally well to sequences of constituents within utterances, for it is quite clear that while B can produce an utterance in response to A, after A has concluded their utterance, B can also produce verbal or non-language responses to A during or within A’s utterance, as in overtalking, laughing, gazing at or withholding gaze from A, shaking one’s head laterally or vertically, and much more. Any such response by B within the span of A’s utterance will afford interpreting by A, and some assessing of their provisional interpreting, so that co-constituting will be occurring while A is producing their utterance. Clear, empirically grounded demonstrations of co-constituting within utterances can be found in Goodwin (1981) and in Schegloff (1987 or 1988a). Even more basic to human inter-action, however, I submit that Sacks et al.’s (1974) explanation of how transition relevance places are identified in interpreting a stream of utterance constituents is one of the best examples of within utterance co-constituting. TRPs, turn constructional units, the allocation of turns, and hence the turn structure of a sequence of utterances are co-constituted through the mutual invoking of expectations for where one participant’s stream of constituents might end, so that the other’s might begin, and through both participants acting on those expectations to formulate a given transition in the talk.[4] Two individuals who co-constitute turn constructional units in one another’s adjacent streams of utterance constituents are mutually constraining and reciprocally influencing one another. In short, they are communicating with one another.

Such mutual constraint and reciprocal influence is also the means by which two individuals-as-organismic-systems are able to generate emergent phenomena in the absence of any overarching control ‘mechanism’ that directs the social unit’s functioning, as would be present if the social unit were an organismic system. In other words, the mutually interlinked psychological processes of two individuals no longer comprise, nor are they reducible to, one or even two psychological processes. They comprise instead a social phenomenon to be explained on non-psychological grounds. Good (1989) has argued similarly, noting that with regard to the way they are produced, conversations have an ontological status distinct from that of sentences produced by individuals. The evidence consistent with the co-constituting model of communication is broad in scope, ranging from the co-constituting of turns, topics, and adjacency structures in conversation, to the co-constituting of relationships and of face in inter-action, and is noted in Arundale (1998).

Finally, although the issues warrant extended treatment, I can but briefly suggest how co-constituting in face-to-face inter-action is related to social construction, defined here as the process by which individuals in an extended social group construct the events and objects comprising the ‘world’ they know and inhabit and presume the others they inter-act with know and inhabit as well. As described above, co-constituting interpretations in communication is a phenomenon that occurs within a relatively well-defined span of time and within a space created by the co-presence of participants. The phenomena of social construction are only loosely bound in time and/or in space. But it is apparent that as
individuals go about their lives they are continually engaging in co-constituting interpretings, i.e., affording and influencing one another’s interpretings, with a range of other individuals at different times and in different spaces. From each participant’s perspective this on-going co-constituting appears simply as the ordinary communication they have over time and space with the other persons they encounter.

But from the perspective of an observer who examines the large scale patterns in who interacts with whom over time and space, this on-going co-constituting among co-present individuals can be seen as a large network of inter-actions, with relatively tight inter-connections across time and/or space characterizing some groupings of individuals, somewhat looser inter-connections across other such groupings, and in some regions virtually no inter-connections at all. If such networks persist over time, certain properties of the individuals who comprise its nodes may well converge, as Kincaid (1987) has shown in modeling cultural groups as networks. The co-constituting model of communication therefore explains social construction as convergence in interpretings that arises as individuals co-constitute interpretings with multiple others over both time and space, this on-going co-constituting becoming in effect a ‘co-maintaining’ of the convergence in interpretings. Krippendorff (1975) has shown clearly how such inter-action within a network across time and space creates a structural form of social memory, independent of the memories of individuals. Convergence occurs whether the participants in a network are conscious of it or not, and because the network has usually converged on certain interpretings before each individual new to the network becomes a fully functioning part of it, the interpretings the newcomer co-constitutes will very likely converge over time in the same direction as those of other participants in the network. One implication is that although individuals can at times operate with relative independence from other individuals, ultimately they are not ‘self-contained’ or ‘free-standing’ because their abilities to function independently both were co-constituted in inter-action as they became participants in their ‘network of origin’ and are co-maintained within it. Note also that convergence and co-maintenance of a particular set of syntactic structures, meanings, and patterns of usage are properties that identify a group as using a particular language, which implies not only that a language is a social construction, but also that unlike the encoding/decoding model, the co-constituting model provides an explanation for how a language comes into being and is maintained over time and space.

Observers who examine inter-acting groups over time/space often attempt to explain the presence of certain patterns they find in the on-going inter-action by adducing properties presumed to function at the level of the group as a single unit. In the co-constituting model of communication, however, what appear to be properties of the group as a whole are explained as distributed and/or emergent properties enabled in on-going inter-action. In other words, like the dyadic units in which co-constituting takes place, larger groups are not organismic systems in that they lack unit level control mechanisms. Phenomena like self-regulation, control, leadership, power, etc., are all emergent properties arising in on-going co-constituting. One implication is that the phenomena observers identify as ideologies or social institutions are socially constructed in the same way, contrary to Searle’s explanation (Krippendorff 1997). From the perspective of the co-constituting model, ideologies and social institutions are but abstractions that observers create to explain patterns in inter-action, and such abstractions cannot ‘drive’ or cause human action (Lannamann 1994). Rather, as Althusser (1971) and Heritage (1984: 280-290) argued, we
co-constitute anew in each inter-action patterns that we have likely co-constituted in similar form in the past, and it is the continual re-co-constituting or co-maintaining of these patterns that observers attempt to explain using abstractions like ‘ideologies’ or ‘social institutions.’ But from the perspective of the co-constituting model of communication, an ideology or social institution does not exist except as a continual renewing of patterns in inter-action.

3. The Co-constituting Model and an Alternative to Brown & Levinson’s Politeness Theory

Brown & Levinson had clearly identified the isolated-act-by-isolated-act limitation of the Gricean basis of politeness theory in their original 1978 presentation (see 1987: 84), and they identified the privileging of cognitive as opposed to inter-actional explanations of language use, together with the inability to explain emergence in their 1987 projection for future development of the theory (p. 84). The co-constituting model directly addresses these limitations, and others that have been identified in over 40 years of critiques of encoding/decoding models. The co-constituting model acknowledges fully the reflexivity Grice saw as fundamental to language use, and is consistent with Levinson’s (forthcoming) reformulation of the key maxims as recipient heuristics or expectations. But the model is distinctly non-Gricean in a number of ways: it explains all interpreting, not just implicatures, as dependent upon expectations; as described below, it recognizes routine, default interpreting as essential in using language, and treats implicatures as one form of non-routine, nonce interpreting; it explains utterance design in terms of speakers’ projections of recipient interpreting; it recognizes that all interpretatings are provisional until assessed in view of an interpreting of the adjacent utterance of another; it explains how interpretatings are co-constituted in the inter-action of two or more individuals; it explains how mutual and reciprocal co-constituting generates emergent properties distinct from the properties of participants’ individual actions; and it defines ‘communication’ as the presence of emergence, rather than the recognition of intention. Among these non-Gricean features, one can find both similarities and differences between the co-constituting model and the models of scholars such as Arndt & Janney (1987), Clark (1996), and Pearce & Cronen (1980), though examining such similarities and differences is not feasible here.

Employing the co-constituting model as an alternative to the Gricean (and Sperber & Wilson) accounts of communication would generate implications in a number of areas of language pragmatics. But my concern in developing the co-constituting model as an alternative is specifically to ground the development of an alternative to Brown & Levinson’s politeness theory, which I have termed Face Constituting Theory. Against the background of twenty years of talking and writing about politeness in terms of Brown & Levinson’s theory, Face Constituting Theory (hereafter FCT) presents a quite different basis for co-constituting understandings of how face is co-constituted in using language. I have outlined FCT elsewhere (Arundale, 1998), and identified four key ways in which it differs from politeness theory (hereafter PT). First, FCT provides a more culture-general conceptualization of the basic concept of ‘face.’ Second, it provides a definition of the concept of threat to face, and hence of support for face, which were not clearly defined in Brown & Levinson’s presentation. Third, FCT substitutes for Grice’s maxims a pair
principles for default and nonce interpreting that derive from the SIP. And fourth, FCT substitutes for Grice’s speaker-oriented, act-by-act view of language use the recipient-oriented, inter-actional conceptualization represented by the RDP, the SIP, and the adjacent placement principle. I will focus below on the third and fourth differences because they derive directly from employing the co-constituting model as an alternative to the Gricean encoding/decoding model of communication. I have elsewhere examined the first and second differences regarding face (Arundale 1993) and threat and support (Arundale 1997: Section 9; 1998: Section 4).

3.1. The default and nonce interpreting principles, and Brown & Levinson’s theory

One of Grice’s fundamental insights in developing the Cooperative Principle and maxims was that there are normal ways of designing utterances that conversants expect one another to employ (Arundale 1997: Section 3). The default interpreting principle alluded to above is a direct elaboration of this insight: if there are no indications to the contrary, recipients formulate presumed or default interpretations. The nonce interpreting principle elaborates a related Gricean insight: if there are indications to the contrary, recipients formulate particularized or nonce interpretations. Garfinkel also articulated insights parallel to Grice’s in laying out ethnomethodology as an approach to studying social action (Heritage 1984), and that both he and other researchers could lay claim to these two principles I take to be added support for them.

The default interpreting principle develops the Gricean insight regarding normal ways of designing utterances, but within the framework of the SIP: If an expectation for default interpreting is currently invoked, and if no conflicting interpreting is present, recipients formulate the presumed interpreting(s) for any current constituent consistent with the expectation. Following the SIP, the recipient integrates this default interpreting with their evolving interpreting and invokes expectations for interpreting subsequent constituents. The defining characteristic of default interpreting is its thoroughly routine nature, i.e., provided that an expectation has been invoked, meaning(s) for the current constituent will be formulated following a routine sequence or ‘program’ that proceeds directly from initiation to conclusion unless blocked or halted by the occurrence of some specific event. Default interpreting is the fundamental, predominant mode of comprehending language across all levels of constituent organization, and is fully consistent with the ethnomethodological assumptions that social action arises because conversants have available routine, “’seen but unnoticed’ procedures for accomplishing, producing, and reproducing ’perceivedly normal’ courses of action’” (Heritage 1984: 118), and because they attribute these procedures to one another and employ them reflexively.

The nonce interpreting principle develops Grice’s insight that particularized interpreting ensues when deviations occur, but again does so within the framework of the SIP: If an expectation for nonce interpreting is currently invoked, whether because default interpreting was terminated, because no expectation for default interpreting was invoked, or because the expectation for nonce interpreting was invoked explicitly, recipients formulate a particularized interpreting for any constituent consistent with the expectation, the nonce interpreting being integrated with the evolving one and new expectations invoked, as in the SIP. Nonce interpreting is distinct from default interpreting because of
the non-routine or ‘one-off’ nature of the process of formulating meaning, and because of the dependence of that formulating on features of the particular sequential and non-sequential context of the current constituent. Even though it is not the predominant mode of comprehending language, research relevant to the nonce interpreting principle abounds in language pragmatics, much of it focused on particularized conversational implicature (i.e., full Gricean implicature). As is evident in ethnomethodology and in conversation analysis, and I believe in Grice as well, nonce interpreting occurs in light of and is ‘visible’ only with regard to or against the background of default interpreting (Heritage 1984: 118-119). The default and nonce interpreting principles are both developed in greater detail in Arundale (1997: Sections 6 & 7; 1998: Section 3.1).

Brown and Levinson (1987: 4) indicated that in developing PT, the “only essential presumption” they drew from Grice’s work was “that there is a working assumption by conversationalists of the rational and efficient nature of talk,” rational and efficient talk being defined more specifically by the maxims (p. 271). Any utterance in conversation that is not maximally efficient comprises a deviation from this broad expectation and requires the recipient to formulate an interpreting involving a particularized conversational implicature. But because there should be “no deviation from rational efficiency without a reason” (p. 5), any utterance that deviates from maximal efficiency requires an explanation for its deviation. For Brown and Levinson, linguistic politeness stands out as “a major source of deviation from such rational efficiency, and is communicated precisely by that deviation” (p. 95), hence the recipient “finds in considerations of politeness reasons for the speaker’s apparent irrationality or inefficiency” (p. 4). Brown and Levinson have defined politeness as mutual attention to conversants’ ‘face,’ so that one common explanation which recipients formulate for a given deviation and resulting conversational implicature, and which they attribute to the speaker, is that the speaker designed their utterance in an inefficient way in order to attend to the recipient’s (or the speaker’s) face. For Brown and Levinson, then, politeness in language use is always accomplished by means of particularized conversational implicature. This latter point is one they have emphasized repeatedly (Brown and Levinson, 1987: 5, 22, 55, 95, 271; Brown, 1995) in view of a common misconstrual that they had seen politeness as inherent in or as carried by linguistic signals or markers.

If polite language use is always accomplished by means of a conversational implicature, then in PT, politeness always involves nonce interpreting. If nonce interpreting is conceptualized in terms of the nonce interpreting principle, as in the co-constituting model, then default interpreting must also be acknowledged, given that the nonce principle presumes the default principle. Because both principles are instantiated widely in language use, and because there is no reason to expect politeness phenomena to be exempt from either principle, there is an important implication for developing an alternative to PT: there should exist means of being polite, or more precisely, means of attending to face, whose accomplishment involves default interpreting. Such means are explicitly part of FCT, but are not examined in Brown and Levinson’s theory. Brown and Levinson have never denied this possibility, but this implication is not apparent within the Gricean framework of the original theory.

This implication arises in employing the co-constituting model of communication, in place of the encoding/decoding model, and directs attention to means of attending to face that involve default interpreting, in addition to means that involve nonce interpreting as in
Note that in constructing their theory, Brown and Levinson (1987: 236) assumed not only that actions often pose a threat to the speaker’s or the recipient’s face, but also that when such actions occur a “balance principle” applies in which the face ‘debt’ created by the threat must be balanced by ‘reparation’ or redress in the form of attention to face. This balancing mode of maintaining face is reasonably common, and Brown and Levinson focused their efforts on explaining the processes of face redress that serve to balance the loss of face that results from the face threatening action. But describing face maintenance in terms of restoring balance suggests the existence of another mode of maintaining face: one that involves not balancing threat with redress, but rather not creating any imbalance at all, or in other words, the maintaining of face that occurs when face is not threatened. Conversants can and do attend to their own and other’s face even when redressing a threat is not an issue. This stasis mode of maintaining face involves routine means of attending to face following the default interpreting principle, hence it is not explained within Brown and Levinson’s theory. Yet because default interpreting is the fundamental, predominant mode of comprehending language, stasis face maintenance must be common using language, appearing for example in the ordinary use of T and V forms in central European languages, in the normal, smooth constituting of turns in conversation (cf. Brown & Levinson 1987: 232-233), in the ritualistic use of formulaic utterances, in the importance of wakimae or ‘discernment’ usage in Japanese (Ide 1989), and in many more aspects of language use. Stasis face maintenance is explicitly recognized and explained in FCT because it is grounded in the co-constituting model. I argue that this common mode of face maintenance has not been examined in politeness research to date because it cannot be problematized within PT, given its grounding in the encoding/decoding model that underlies Grice’s framework.

Against this background, and contrary to Brown and Levinson’s (1987: 5, cf. 33) position, it is clearly not the case that politeness or attention to face is always communicated by deviation from maximally efficient usage, that is, by means of particularized conversational implicature (as one form of nonce interpreting). Nor is it the case that the absence of politeness communicated via a conversational implicature is “to be taken as absence of the polite attitude,” for face can be both maintained and redressed by routine means involving default interpreting. The co-constituting model of communication indicates that the expectations which recipients use in their everyday interpreting are far too varied and complex to be reduced to a single, global expectation for maximally efficient usage, i.e., to a single ‘essential presumption’ against which all deviations are measured and from which all nonce interpreting ensues. Indeed, it is clear from the above that deviation from expectation is not required at all, for face issues are commonly addressed through normal or routine action, or through expectations for default interpreting. Those expectations are part of a range of expectations for default interpreting in inter-action that can be seen to include Grice’s maxims (cf. Levinson, forthcoming). Considering PT in view of the co-constituting model indicates how the theory’s grounding in Grice’s framework resulted in an emphasis on non-routine actions to the exclusion of routine actions. FCT also addresses other problematic conceptual issues within PT’s theoretical structure, including the apparent self-contradiction of “on record off recordness” (cf. Brown & Levinson 1987: 12), the treatment of conventionalized indirectness, and the suggestions of other modes of nonce inferencing apart from the particularized Gricean implicatures specified in the theory’s fundamental framework (see
Arundale, 1997: Section 8). But all of these issues emphasize individual aspects of communication. Brown (personal communication, June 18, 1993) on the other hand emphasized the social aspects of inter-action in arguing that “face is indisputably a socially and interactionally created thing,” which “is invoked interactionally and requires the input of others to maintain,” that invoking and maintaining occurring “in the context of the moment.” The individual aspects of co-constituting face are not separate from the social aspects, though at times discussion may emphasize one pole of the dialectic over the other.

3.2. FCT, PT, and the co-constituting model of communication

In FCT the individual’s interpreting of face issues is framed explicitly within the non-Gricean co-constituting model of communication, so that routine or stasis face maintenance, together with non-routine or balancing face maintenance, as well as outright face threat and outright face support, are all explained as co-constituted in inter-action as participants use language in social relationships. More concretely, person A may perceive that the utterance she has articulated has engendered a particular interpreting of face support on B’s part, which for purposes of illustration I will assume is the meaning B has initially formulated in his interpreting, and the very meaning A had consciously intended he formulate. But FCT makes clear that A’s perception that she has caused some state in B is based solely on her own interpreting of her utterance, and that her interpreting remains provisional until B articulates his response “in the context of the moment.” It is only as A interprets B’s response and assesses her provisional interpreting that she can confirm or disconfirm that provisional interpreting of her own initial utterance, and with it her perception regarding the interpreting she had engendered. FCT holds that in A’s assessing process, A and B co-constitute A’s interpreting of her initial utterance such that regardless of her initial intention, B’s articulating of his utterance adjacent to hers can either confirm her provisional interpreting, or lead A to modify her provisional interpreting of face support in a way she could not have foreseen. What A had seen as face support could, in the moment of B’s utterance, become face threat. In this case, if she is to produce another utterance in the conversation, A will have to utilize the interpreting of her initial utterance (and intention) that was co-constituted in B’s responding to her. Following Brown, “face is indisputably a socially and interactionally created thing.”

FCT also makes evident that as A continues the inter-action with another utterance of her own, A and B together co-constitute B’s interpreting of the face issues involved in his response to her. In the space of their adjacent utterances, then, A and B mutually afford and reciprocally influence one another’s interpretations of face. Their inter-action exhibits emergence in the form of mutually inter-linked interpretations of face and of much else besides. A and B are thus engaged in communication, and in communicating they establish a social unit. If A and B have never encountered each other before, by creating that social unit and more particularly by mutually co-constituting interpretations of face, they form a new social relationship. If A and B have an on-going relationship, their creating of a social unit at this current moment interactionally achieves the co-maintaining of their social relationship. FCT holds that even long term relationships are continually renewed and co-maintained, for there remains the ever present possibility that the next adjacent utterance may result in A and B’s co-constituting an interpreting of face quite different from those
co-constituted in the past. The response to such an utterance and the mutual co-constituting
of face that ensues from that response may well produce a social relationship that is very
different from that moment onward. Again, following Brown & Levinson (1987: 55),
“‘ways of putting things’, or simply language usage, are part of the very stuff that social
relationships are made of….”

Because the Gricean model of communication makes it difficult to look beyond the
cognitive processes by which one individual produces or interprets a single, isolated
utterance act, it is extremely difficult within PT to conceptualize the phenomena of
mutually co-constituting face. The non-Gricean co-constituting model that grounds FCT
not only allows one to conceptualize these social level phenomena, but also provides
explanations for how they are achieved. And because it explains face as co-constituted or
interactionally achieved, FCT makes evident that facework is fully intrinsic to or
endogenous in conversation. This view is in direct contrast to a widespread though by no
means necessary interpretation of PT in which face is conceptualized as a need, desire,
or psychological want, making facework an extrinsic or exogenous factor that simply
motivates language use. But in arguing that “face is indisputably a socially and
interactionally created thing,” Brown (personal communication, June 18, 1993) also argued
that “wants aren’t needs,” and that interpreting them as such “is to reify the notion of face-
 wants and to psychologize it” (see Arundale 1993 for a fuller discussion). FCT’s
explanation of face as co-constituted in interaction does not conceptualize face as a need,
want, or motivation, which implies not only that the interactional achievement of face is a
matter to be examined within conversation analytic studies, rather than apart from them,
as Chen (1990/1991) and Lerner (1996) have demonstrated, but also that the methods
employed in conversation analysis are important resources for use in empirical
investigations of the co-constituting face in inter-action.

This consideration of FCT with respect to PT could be extended with other implications
of employing the co-constituting model, as well as with implications stemming from FCT’s
definitions of face and of threat/support. But the implications sketched here must suffice
as an indication that FCT is an improved conceptualization of politeness, or more generally
of facework in human inter-action, of the type that Brown & Levinson identified in the
paragraph that opens this paper. FCT is a much more complex theory than PT, principally
because the co-constituting model that grounds it is more complex than the
encoding/decoding model that grounds PT. That complexity demands justification in view
of William of Occam’s injunction. A full justification would be lengthy, but its most
important component is that FCT explains the phenomena previously encompassed by PT,
and in addition explains new and important phenomena in a new framework that is “well
equipped” for conceptualizing inter-action in terms of “its emergent properties which
transcend the characteristics of the individuals that jointly produce it” (Brown & Levinson
1987: 48). What is yet needed is a careful examination of just how these theoretical
explanations are manifested empirically, including detailed consideration of how the
phenomena of politeness so extensively documented by Brown and Levinson are explained
within FCT.
4. Conclusion

Among the theories of politeness phenomena available to this point, it is clearly the case that PT is the most widely employed and examined (Fraser, 1990; Watts et al., 1992). That fact suggests that whenever scholars concerned with language use inter-act regarding politeness issues, they are likely to be co-constituting accounts of politeness associated with PT, even when they are co-constituting critiques of the theory. Given the Gricean framework of PT, those accounts must also be associated with an encoding/decoding model of communication. Brown & Levinson themselves have indicated that there are critical weaknesses in their account of politeness—weaknesses that I have identified with the encoding/decoding model, and that are part of my argument for rejecting it as a useful model of communication. But because rejecting the encoding/decoding model entails rejecting PT, despite its wide appeal and use, I have focused in this paper on developing the co-constituting model of communication as an alternative that obviates the weaknesses, and that grounds the development of a productive alternative to PT.

The co-constituting model of communication also grounds an alternative understanding of the insight Althusser (1971) provided regarding the nature of ideology, namely, that ideology was based in the material practices of individuals engaged with one another in the events of everyday life. As Lannamann (1994: 139) has characterized this position, ideology “emerges between positioned subjects as they work to construct meaning” in active address and response. The co-constituting model accounts for such emergence in face-to-face language use, making evident both why and how inter-action, whether regarding day-to-day affairs or regarding theoretical models of communication or of politeness, is inherently ideological. Observers may well abstract what they characterize as a ‘belief system,’ or in Althusser’s terms an ‘ideological state apparatus,’ from the patterns they find in the on-going inter-action among ordinary folk or among scholars. But absent these patterns in on-going inter-action, observers would find nothing they could abstract as a belief system or an ideology. Applied reflexively, the co-constituting model of communication makes evident that the co-constituting model and the account of politeness provided by FCT are themselves co-constituted in inter-action, and as a consequence comprise ideologies, just as do the encoding/decoding model and the account of politeness offered by PT to which they stand as alternatives.

Notes

1. The specifics of this alternative model of communication are developed below, but my use of three terms demands comment at this point. First, throughout this paper I use the term ‘co-constituting,’ rather than the more common term ‘co-construction,’ in describing the conjoint formulating of interpreting in talk-in-interaction. In most interaction I find that talk about ‘construction’ results in interpreting that what is being formulated is relatively permanent, while talk about ‘constituting’ results in interpreting that suggest greater fluidity or an on-going process. Use of the progressive verb form here and elsewhere is a deliberate choice in order to emphasize the dynamic nature of the phenomena I am considering. Second, for reasons that will be evident at a later point, I employ the term ‘interpreting’ in describing the complex processes an individual is engaged in when listening to and producing in talk-in-interaction. ‘Interpretations’ involve ‘meanings,’ but are not restricted thereto (see note 3). In particular, I recognize that my use of ‘interpreting’ as a gerund does some violence to the normal expectation for the term ‘interpretation,’ but this use is again deliberate to emphasize the dynamic nature of the processes of interpreting. For the same reason I have strongly considered
substituting ‘communicating’ for all appearances of the term ‘communication.’ Third, except where it appears in quotations, I will henceforth use the hyphenated term ‘inter-action’ to emphasize that talk depends upon conjoint, reciprocally linked conversational action. I find that ordinarily people use the term ‘interaction’ much as they use ‘conversation’ or ‘talk,’ that is, to index a situation of verbal communication, not to highlight its conjoint actional features.

2. Let me be clear that by including in this sentence inter-action between persons by means of writing and reading, I am not suggesting that the co-constituting of knowing that occurs in talk-in-inter-action also occurs in writing and reading. Inter-action via writing/reading has few of the characteristics described in Section 2 that enable persons to co-constitute interpretings in talk-in-inter-action, and then only in very attenuated form. To what extent one can describe writing/reading as co-constituting is a matter for careful examination in the future.

3. I use the terms ‘meanings’ and ‘inferences’ with considerable reluctance, because it might appear that I am accepting the common position in LP that meanings for utterances are generated by semantic processes and supplemented by pragmatic inference. I reject that position entirely, but know of no other brief way to suggest the nature of interpreting. Were space not an issue, I would argue that all interpreting involves processes of inferring, from the highest level implicatures down to the lowest level of categorical perception of phonemes.

4. Although there is no possibility of doing so, here, I would argue that the SIP in its most general form (Arundale 1997: Section 5) provides an explanation for what Wilson et al. (1984: 172-173) and others point to as one of the most vexing problems in Sacks et al.’s (1974) model—the question of how participants project TRPs. And though not directly relevant to the discussion here, I would note that there is nothing about the SIP, RDP, or even the principle of adjacent placement that restricts them to directly contiguous utterances. For the principle of adjacent placement, the default adjacent position is the immediately preceding utterance, but clearly this need not always be the case and can be over-ridden (Sacks et al. 1974: 728).

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An alternative to politeness theory


