The weakness of must: In defense of a Mantra

Daniel Lassiter

Abstract


Many semanticists have claimed that must’s meaning is weaker than

epistemic necessity, a claim that von Fintel & Gillies (2010) dub “The Mantra”.

Recently von Fintel & Gillies have argued in an influential paper that the Mantra is

false, and that the intuitions that have driven it can be accounted for by appealing to

evidential meaning. I show that von Fintel & Gillies do not provide a compelling

argument against the Mantra, and that their theory of evidential meaning, while

promising in certain respects, also has serious empirical and conceptual problems.

In addition, a variety of corpus examples indicate that speakers who assert must

p are not always maximally confident in the truth of p. As an alternative, I reimplement

von Fintel & Gillies’ theory of indirect evidentiality in a probabilistic,

Mantra-compatible framework. Ultimately, both sides of the debate are partly right:

must is weak in several respects, but it also encodes an indirect evidential meaning.


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References


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DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.3765/salt.v24i0.2985