{"id":1202,"date":"2010-10-15T22:00:31","date_gmt":"2010-10-15T20:00:31","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/elanguage.net\/blogs\/booknotices\/?p=1202"},"modified":"2010-10-12T09:43:35","modified_gmt":"2010-10-12T07:43:35","slug":"the-shared-mind","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/journals.linguisticsociety.org\/booknotices\/?p=1202","title":{"rendered":"The shared mind"},"content":{"rendered":"<div style=\"margin-left: 2em; text-indent: -2em;\"><strong>The shared mind<\/strong>:<strong> <\/strong>Perspectives on intersubjectivity. Ed. by <strong>Jordan Zlatev<\/strong>, <strong>Timothy P. Racine<\/strong>, <strong>Chris Sinha<\/strong>, and <strong>Esa Itkonen<\/strong>. (Converging evidence in language and communication research 12.) Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 2008. Pp. xiii, 391. ISBN <a href=\"http:\/\/www.worldcat.org\/title\/shared-mind-perspectives-on-intersubjectivity\/oclc\/221150624&amp;referer=brief_results\">9789027239006<\/a>. $149 (Hb).<\/div>\n<p style=\"text-align: right;\">Reviewed by <a href=\"http:\/\/web.t-online.hu\/andraskertesz\/angol.htm\"><strong>Andr\u00e1s Kert\u00e9sz<\/strong><\/a>, <em>University of Debrecen<\/em><\/p>\n<p>The problem of understanding other minds has so far been tackled predominantly by the theory of mind approach, which is computational and representational. This volume challenges such an approach by claiming that it is intersubjectivity that bridges the gap between the self and others.<\/p>\n<p>Following <strong>Colwyn Trevarthen<\/strong>\u2019s foreword \u2018Shared minds and the science of fiction: Why theories will differ\u2019, the editors contrast the theory of mind approach with the leading idea of the volume in their introductory chapter \u2018Intersubjectivity: What makes us human\u2019.<\/p>\n<p>Part 1 of the volume is devoted to ontogenetic development. <strong>Shaun Gallagher <\/strong>and <strong>Daniel D. Hutto<\/strong>, in \u2018Understanding others through primary interaction and narrative practice\u2019, hypothesize that children understand actions in terms of reasons through narratives of a distinct kind. In \u2018The neuroscience of social understanding\u2019, <strong>John Barresi<\/strong> and <strong>Chris Moore<\/strong> discuss evidence for the claim that autistic children are not able to combine proprioceptive and sensorimotor information about the self with exteroceptive information about others. <strong>Peter Hobson<\/strong> and <strong>Jessica A. Hobson<\/strong>, in \u2018Engaging, sharing, knowing: Some lessons from research in autism\u2019, argue that intersubjectivity is pivotal for understanding autism. In \u2018Coming to agreement: Object use by infants and adults\u2019, <strong>Cintia Rodr\u00edguez<\/strong> and <strong>Christiane Moro<\/strong> explain the way children reach agreement with adults on the use of objects by means of diverse semiotic systems in contexts of joint communicative action. <strong>Ingar Brick<\/strong>\u2019s chapter \u2018The role of intersubjectivity in the development of intentional communication\u2019 accounts for the role of intersubjectivity in the development of nonverbal intentional communication in human infants. <strong>Noah Susswein<\/strong> and Timothy P. Racine, in \u2018Sharing mental states: Causal and definitional issues in intersubjectivity\u2019, introduce a taxonomic concept of intersubjectivity.<\/p>\n<p>Part 2 of the volume bears the title \u2018Evolution\u2019. <strong>Simone Pika<\/strong> answers the question \u2018What is the nature of the gestural communication of great apes?\u2019 by claiming that great apes seem to be capable of intersubjectivity; however, there are differences between human and ape gestures rooted in an innate bias for human cultural learning. In \u2018The heterotronic origins of explicit reference\u2019,<strong> David A. Leavens<\/strong>, <strong>William D. Hopkins,<\/strong> and <strong>Kim A. Bard<\/strong> argue for the opposite thesis, i.e. for the lack of such an innate bias. <strong>Jordan Zlatev<\/strong>\u2019s chapter \u2018The co-evolution of intersubjectivity and bodily mimesis\u2019 suggests that intersubjectivity is closely interwoven with the use of the body for the purposes of representation and communication. In \u2018First communions: Mimetic sharing without theory of mind\u2019, <strong>Daniel D. Hutto<\/strong> explains the sophisticated social engagements of the hominids by growing recreative imaginative abilities.<\/p>\n<p>Lastly, Part 3 focuses on \u2018Language\u2019. In \u2018The central role of normativity in language and linguistics\u2019, Esa Itkonen shows, among other things, that normativity implies common knowledge that is a particular form of intersubjectivity. <strong>Arie Verhagen<\/strong>\u2019s chapter \u2018Intersubjectivity and the architecture of the language system\u2019 discusses the inherently argumentative nature of linguistic communication. In \u2018Intersubjectivity in interpreted interactions: The interpreter\u2019s role in co-constructing meaning\u2019, <strong>Terry Janzen<\/strong> and <strong>Barbara Shaffer<\/strong> claim that the interpreter influences the interchange through her assumptions about the interlocutors\u2019 knowledge states. In the final chapter, \u2018Language and the signifying object: From convention to imagination\u2019, <strong>Chris Sinha<\/strong> and <strong>Cintia Rodriguez<\/strong> outline a multi-faceted definition of intersubjectivity. The book concludes with a subject and an author index.<\/p>\n<p>The central idea of the volume as well as the individual chapters are thought provoking and highly original, thus raising new problems and shedding fresh light on old ones.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>The shared mind: Perspectives on intersubjectivity. Ed. by Jordan Zlatev, Timothy P. Racine, Chris Sinha, and Esa Itkonen. (Converging evidence in language and communication research 12.) Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 2008. Pp. xiii, 391. ISBN 9789027239006. $149 (Hb). Reviewed by Andr\u00e1s Kert\u00e9sz, University of Debrecen The problem of understanding other minds has so far been tackled [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":3,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":[],"categories":[],"tags":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/journals.linguisticsociety.org\/booknotices\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1202"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/journals.linguisticsociety.org\/booknotices\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/journals.linguisticsociety.org\/booknotices\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/journals.linguisticsociety.org\/booknotices\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/3"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/journals.linguisticsociety.org\/booknotices\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=1202"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/journals.linguisticsociety.org\/booknotices\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1202\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":1203,"href":"https:\/\/journals.linguisticsociety.org\/booknotices\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1202\/revisions\/1203"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/journals.linguisticsociety.org\/booknotices\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=1202"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/journals.linguisticsociety.org\/booknotices\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=1202"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/journals.linguisticsociety.org\/booknotices\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=1202"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}