SOCIAL MEANINGS OF THE JAPANESE SENTENCE—FINAL PARTICLE NO

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1. Introduction

Linguistics and related fields have made us aware of the fact that language has not only referential and grammatical functions but also indexical functions. Language is capable of signaling social contexts as well as referring to objects "out there." In sociolinguistics, elements which signal aspects of contexts have been referred to as keys (Goffman 1974; Hymes 1974), frames (Bateson 1972; Goffman 1974) and contextualization cues (Gumperz 1982). The terms "register" or "style" have also been used and they typically refer to a particular combination of linguistic features associated with a particular speech event or social context (Anderson 1977; Ferguson 1977 and 1983; Biber 1986; Biber & Finegan in press).

Some studies in linguistics and philosophy also discuss linguistic features which index social contexts (Peirce 1931-58; Morris 1946; Jakobson 1960; Lyons 1977; Silverstein 1976; Ochs in press). Lyons (1977:106) defines indexicality as "some known or assumed connexion between a sign A and its significatum C such that the occurrence of A can be held to imply the presence or existence of C." Silverstein (1976) expands the notion of index into two categories, namely, referential indexes and non-referential indexes. Referential indexes (e.g. deictics such as "I" and "you") do not have any abstract propositional equivalence relations because their references are only in the speech context. Non-referential indexes do not contribute to referential meanings but signal the speech context. Some examples of speech contexts which non-referential indexes signal are social status, roles, settings, activities etc. In the case of French, for example, the tu/vous distinction does not affect the referential meaning of an utterance, but does index different social contexts, viz. tu may indicate that the speaker and the hearer are close and vous may indicate that the speaker and the hearer are in a distant relationship.

However, indexical relations are more complex than one-to-one mappings between a particular feature and some particular socio-cultural dimension. Ochs (in press) points
out that "...isolated linguistic features often have broad indexical scope." She provides an example of deletion of the copula as in "That bad" in American standard English speaking communities. Deletion of the copula can index a variety of social statuses of the addressee (e.g. the addressee as a child, foreigner, patient, or elderly person). Because of the potential breadth of indexical scope, research on indexicality has been rather difficult. One of the problems is how to account for the variety of social meanings which a single linguistic feature indexes. Ochs (in press) proposes a model of indexicality which deals with the complexity of indexical relations. One of the important criteria of indexes which Ochs proposes is direct and indirect indexical relations: a direct indexical relation is a case in which one or more linguistic forms are a direct or unmediated index of some contextual dimension. In an indirect indexical relation, which is more complex, a context directly indexed is conventionally linked to and helps to constitute some second feature of a context. In other words, a directly indexed context evokes a second context. Thus, understanding of the direct indexical meaning is basic to understanding of the indirect indexical meanings. Ochs further suggests that among the various features of the socio-cultural dimensions (e.g. social identity, social relationship, belief, affect, speech events and speech activities), affective and epistemological dispositions are directly indexed in all languages. The following chart illustrates the direct and indirect indexical relations proposed by Ochs.
Examples of direct and indirect indexical relations

Ochs (in press & 1987) mentions are cases of the Japanese sentential particles ze, zo and wa. Since the particles ze and zo are more frequently used by men, they are often referred to as "male" particles. In contrast, the particle wa is more frequently used by women. Hence it is referred to as a "female" particle. However, ze and zo are sometimes used by women and wa is also sometimes used by men. To account for this phenomenon, Ochs proposes that these particles do not directly mark gender per se. Rather there are direct indexical meanings associated with these particles and the direct meanings evoke indirect meanings in particular communicative contexts. The direct meaning of the particle ze and zo are affective intensity. This direct meaning evokes the social image of male gender in Japanese society, namely forcefulness. Thus, the particles ze and zo indirectly index male gender (i.e. indirect meaning). Similarly, the particle wa directly indexes the affect of softness. This direct meaning again evokes the social image of female gender. The meaning, female gender is, thus, indirectly indexed by the particle wa. This analysis, for example, explains why wa is used by women much more frequently than men. Further, since wa does not directly index male gender, it can explain why men also use wa.

A typical case of indexical complexity is reflected in the research on the Japanese sentence-final particle no. In what follows, using the model of indexicality suggested by
Ochs (in press), I will show that (i) the sentence-final particle no directly indexes the speaker's epistemological disposition. (ii) Given this direct indexical meaning of no, diverse social contexts indirectly indexed by no can be explained.

2. Data

Previous analyses of the particle no rely heavily on intuitive judgments of isolated sentences or short discourses made up by the linguists themselves. To broaden the range of data, the present study investigates spontaneous conversation. Conversation is the basic genre among the uses of language in that it is universal and is the medium through which a child first acquires language.

The data come from 14 hours of audio-taped relaxed conversation. Tape 1 (1 hour) comes from a casual conversation involving 8 adult family members gathered at a Christmas dinner. The members are a couple, the husband TO and the wife CH, their two grown-up daughters YO and AT, CH's brother HI, his wife AY and two grown-up sons, YU and TA. The rest of the tapes (13 hours) are dinner-table and bed-time conversations between parents and children of three different families (Family O, Family T and Family M). Each family has two to three children whose ages range between 6 months and 7 years. All the participants are middle class speakers of standard dialect (i.e. Tokyo dialect).

3. Broad Indexical Scope Problems: The Case of the Japanese Sentence-final Particle No

In Japanese, a proposition can be expressed in two ways: one ending with a bare verbal form (i.e. present/future tense verbal and adjectival stems ending in -u and -i and their corresponding past-tense forms in -ta and -katta) and the other ending with the sentence-final particle no. Sentences (1a) and (1b) are examples of these two types of sentences.
(1a) John ga eiga o miru.4
   John SUB movie OBJ see
   'John sees movies.'

(1b) John ga eiga o miru no.
   John SUB movie OBJ see PART
   'John sees movies.'

(1b) consists of a proposition followed by the particle
no. (1a) lacks no and ends with the verb. (1a) and (1b)
share the same propositional content, but in (1b) the whole
proposition is nominalized by the particle no whereas in
(1a) it is not. In this study I will call a verb such as
miru in (1a) without no a "bare verbal form". The
referential meanings of (1a) and (1b) are identical. In the
sense that no does not contribute to referential meaning, it
is purely a non-referential index by Silverstein's
definition. The difference between a bare verbal clause and
a no clause (other than the fact that no nominalizes the
clause) is very subtle and elusive.

In Japanese, when speakers distance themselves from the
addressee as in polite style, an inflection -masu (desu as a
copula form) appears on the verb stem. In such instances no
is followed by the copula desu (i.e. no desu). Further, in
male speech, often no is followed by the plain copula form
da (i.e. no da). These distinctions are not the main focus
of this paper. Therefore, I will group together these forms:
no desu, (and its variant n desu), no da (and its variant n
da) and no itself. Thus, a reference to the term "(sentence
final particle) no" refers to any of these forms throughout
this paper.

Most native speakers, when asked to describe the
difference between clauses with no and without no as in (1b)
and (1a), are unable to do so. However, no certainly indexes
some contextual dimensions. In search of what context no
signals, as I mentioned above, several linguists have
studied the particle no (concentrating primarily on the no
desu form). Because no has such broad indexical scope, the
previous analyses have not yet grasped the essence of the
particle. Various studies of no have reached different
conclusions, and the proposed meaning for no in each
analysis covers only a narrow range of usages. Because of
the diversity of the social contexts no indexes, the
previous analyses of no vary to a great extent. Various
studies propose that no has something to do with: (1)
explanations (e.g. Alfonso 1966; Kuno 1973), (ii) presuppositions or shared knowledge (e.g. Kuroda 1973; Mizutani & Mizutani 1977; McGloin 1980; Noda 1981), (iii) politeness (e.g. McGloin 1983), (iv) women's speech (McGloin 1986) and (v) evidentiality (Kamio 1979; Aoki 1986). In addition, in examining conversational data, we find social meanings that no indexes other than the ones listed above (e.g. make-believe). Each one of the above proposals can account for the use of no in a particular context but not in others. Thus, we are still puzzled as to what is the essential nature of the particle no.

In sum, the previous analyses of no are varied. Although each proposal I mentioned above captures the nature of no in a certain limited case or cases, none of the proposals is general enough to capture the broad indexical scope of no. This means that none of the proposed meanings of no is broad enough to be the direct meaning of no.

The present paper, thus, addresses the question of what characterization of no is general enough to be the direct meaning of no, which can capture the variety of contexts which no indexes. Below, I will propose that in essence no directly indexes the speaker's epistemological disposition: the speaker and his/her group jointly hold an utterance to be true. I will claim that this direct meaning of no helps to constitute various contextual meanings of no.

4. Group Authority VS. Individual Authority

In this section, I will focus on the direct meaning of no in contrast with that of bare verbal forms (i.e. present/future tense verbal and adjectival stems ending in -u and -i and their corresponding past-tense forms in -ta and -katta). I hypothesize that the verbal forms directly index that the authority of an utterance lies with the speaker alone and that the use of no (a nominal form) directly indexes that the authority of an utterance lies with a group of which the speaker is a part. That is to say that when the speaker uses a bare verbal form, he/she authorizes what he/she is saying as an individual (i.e. the speaker alone holds what he/she is saying to be true). When the speaker uses no, he/she authorizes what he/she is saying together with his/her group (i.e. the speaker and his/her group hold what he/she is saying to be true).

It is reasonable to hypothesize that language encodes the authority with which utterances are made. Du Bois (1986)
proposes that no utterance is made without authority. Recent studies on evidentiality in diverse languages have shown that crosslinguistically, epistemological disposition is expressed by various linguistic features and that several epistemological categories (e.g. assimilated and unassimilated knowledge, mode of knowing, degree of reliability, source of knowledge etc.) are found in a number of languages (Slobin & Aksu 1982; Lee 1985; Chafe & Nichols 1986; Irvine & Hill in press). Language may encode whether the speaker is the source of the knowledge or someone else is. For example, markers of reported speech, which are found in many languages of the world, are linguistic markings that indicate that the source of knowledge resides in another as opposed to in the speaker. (Volosinov 1978/1929; Besnier in press).

The distinction I am proposing between the verbal and the nominal no forms in Japanese is different from distinctions concerning reported speech. While the use or non-use of the linguistic feature that indexes reported speech signals whether the source lies in the speaker or someone else, the distinction between the verbal form and the nominal form no in Japanese signals whether the authority (Du Bois 1986) for the knowledge lies in the speaker as an individual or lies in the group of which the speaker is a part. To offer an analogy, when we speak about something, we can speak about it as an individual or we can speak about it as a member of a group to which we belong. In both cases, the content of what we say can be identical, but how the content is cast is different: to use Bakhtin's terminology (1935/1980), on the one hand, the content is cast in an individual "voice" and on the other, the content is cast in a group "voice". When we speak as an individual, the authority for what we say lies solely in the individual, but when we speak as a member of a group of which we are a part, the authority for what we say at least partly lies in the group.

Many linguists have suggested that verbs prototypically express actions and nouns prototypically express objects (Lyons 1968; Ross 1972; Bates & MacWhinney 1982; Givón 1984; Hopper & Thompson 1984). Grammatical distinctions can also be used to index different social contexts (Brown & Levinson 1978). Thus, the distinction between verbs and nouns is relevant for the speaker's dispositions. For example, in English nominalizations indicate a more formal use of language. To say "I am surprised at your early arrival" is more formal and impersonal than to say "I am surprised that
you arrived early." Brown and Levinson (1978:213) point out, "...the more nouny an expression, the more removed an actor is from doing or feeling or being something." The case of the verb form and the noun form (no) in Japanese, then, is consistent with cases in other languages in that the verb form indicates that the speaker is speaking as an individual and the noun form (no) signals that the speaker is speaking as a spokesman, for in speaking as an individual, the speaker expresses his/her feelings more directly or expresses his/her actions and states as first-hand experiences. Therefore, in Kochman's (1981) terms, when we speak as a member of a group, we represent what we say and when we speak as an individual, we advocate what we say.

The choice between speaking as a member of a group and speaking as an individual is related to the folk epistemology of Japanese society (i.e. Japanese views about what can be known) as reflected in language usage. For example, from a Japanese perspective, someone else's psychological state at a given moment cannot be known. In other words, only the speaker has direct access to his/her own psychological state in statements and only the addressee has direct access to his/her own psychological state in interrogatives. As pointed out by a number of linguists (e.g. Kuroda 1973), certain adjectives denoting one's psychological state at the moment cannot occur in bare form without a verbal suffix -gatte iru 'is showing an appearance of' if the subject is not 1st person, as in (2) and (3) below. (-Tai 'want' is an adjectival suffix).

(2a) Watashi wa keeki o tabe-tai desu.  
    I TOP cake OBJ eat want COP  
    'I want to eat (some) cake.'

(2b) *John wa keeki o tabe-tai desu.  
    John TOP cake OBJ eat want COP  
    'John wants to eat (some) cake.'

(3a) *Watashi wa keeki o tabe-ta-gatte iru.  
    I TOP cake OBJ eat want appear  
    'I want to eat (some) cake.'

(3b) John wa keeki o tabe-ta-gatte iru.  
    John TOP cake OBJ eat want appear  
    'John wants to eat (some) cake.'
Other adjectives of this kind include kanashii 'sad', sabishii 'lonely', ureshii 'happy', atsui 'hot', samui 'cold' etc. This shows that in Japanese, one's psychological state at the moment is treated as something known only to oneself but not to others. This being the case, we would expect to find that the verbal form is used to express the speaker's psychological state in statements and the addressee's psychological state in interrogatives. If one's psychological state is only accessible to the self, it is normally impossible for the group to authorize it. Thus, we predict that psychological states (desire, intention, will, internal feelings, ability etc.) of the speaker are most likely to be mentioned in bare verbs and those of the addressee are most likely to be asked in bare verbs. On the other hand, what is viewed as typically accessible knowledge is viewed as potentially common knowledge in society. Hence, we predict that accessible knowledge in society is most likely to be expressed in the nominal form (no). In fact, this is what we will find in the data discussed below.

Consider the following adult conversation in which no indicates accessible knowledge and a bare verbal form indicates inaccessible knowledge about another's ability. In (4) AT, CH, YO and AY are talking about dancing.

(4) [CH is dancing in an old fashioned style to the music. AT is watching CH dance.]  
--> AT: Ima wakai hito soo yuu odori dekinai no yo.  
   'Young people today can't do that kind of dancing.'  
[CH is switching to a rock & roll style dancing.]  
CH: Koo yuu no?  
   'This kind?'  
AT: Un  
   'Yeah.'  
--> YO: Sore shika dekinai no yo.  
   '(They) can only do that.'  
--> AY: Ako chan dansu dekiru?  
   'Ako, can you dance?'
Here, AT, CH and YO discuss young people's dancing in general. AT and YO use no to frame their utterances. Then AY asks AT if she can dance. In this utterance AY does not use no but uses a bare verbal dekiru 'can do'. Knowledge of how young people dance these days is obviously a type of knowledge that can be assumed to be shared in the society. In contrast, the type of knowledge asked in AY's question (i.e. Can you dance?) is different in that it only belongs to an individual until it is revealed to others. Knowledge about how young people dance these days is accessible and, AT and YO, using no, present the message as one stated by a spokesman of the society. In this sense, both the speaker and the society have access to this knowledge and the two (the speaker and the society) jointly authorize it. In contrast, AY asks a question with a bare verbal because she is asking for knowledge to which the addressee has access.

In conversation (5) we see rather consistent use of bare verbal forms to express the speaker's personal views and ask for the addressee's views. Here, the mother has just learned from her children that their friend's new bicycle has been stolen by a stranger. The mother is curious about what her children would do if a stranger approached them and asked if he could borrow their bicycle for a short while. (This was how the friend's new bicycle disappeared.)

(5) Mother

Children

116 Kazushige dattara doo

--> suru, soo iwaretara?

'What would (you) do, Kazushige

if someone said that (to you),'

--> Hiro dattara doo suru?

'What would (you) do, Hiro,'

-->K: Okaasan ni kiku yo.

'(I)'d ask Mother.'

H: Un to me.

Boku dattara otoosan.

'Uh- me, father.'
117 Inakattara?
'What if he wasn't there?'
Otoosan mo okaasan mo
--> inakattara, doo suru?
'What would (you) do if father
and mother weren't there?'

H: Jaa nee.
'Gee'

118 --> Sono ko inai no yo.
'That child's parents
weren't there.'

--> H: Oni- nini ni kiku.
'(I)'d ask (my) older
brother.'

Jaa niini ni kiitara,
--> niini nante iu?
'Then if (H) asks (you),
what will you say?'

K: Un?
'What?'

119 Hiro no- moshi ne
Hiro ga atarashii jitensha ni
notte te dare ka ni
'If (you) were riding a new
bike and by someone'

K: Un.
'Yeah.'

120 Jitensha chotto kashite te
'can (I) borrow the bike'

K: Un.
'Yeah'

--> iwaretara, doo suru?
'were asked, what would
(you) do?'

K: Soshitara boku ga-
Hiro ga sore boku ni
iu no?
'Then, I-, Will Hiro say that to me?'

Un.
'Yeah.'

K: Un. Soshitara ne boku 'Uhn. Then I'

(to H) Oniichan ga inakattara,
-- boku doo suru?
'If older brother wasn't there,
what would (you) do?'

K: Soshitara jaa, jaa, jaa.
'Then, well, well, well.'

-- Sukoshi dake toka itte,
kashitageru?
'Would(you) lend it for a a short while?'

K: Un.
'Uhn.'

Sono mae ni, yappari boku wa okaasan ka
-- otoosan ni kiku.
'Before that, I would ask Mother or Father.'

Dakara inakattara tte
-- kiiten no.
'See, (I) am asking if they weren't home.'

K: Okaasan ka otoosan ga inakattara.
'If either Mother or Father wasn't home,'

Mama ga inai toki datte aru deshoo. Okaimono ni itte.
'There are times Mother is not home. Gone for shopping.'
Throughout conversation (5) the children's viewpoint is constantly elicited by the mother with bare verbals (with the exception of line 126, to which I will return below) and the children also constantly express their views with bare verbals in response. The mother's statements in line 118 and 124 and K's question in line 121 occur with no, but these utterances do not express a personal point of view or other (undisclosed) psychological states of the speaker. I will discuss these functions in detail below.

In conversation (6), which comes from another family, we see as yet undisclosed personal intentions again constantly expressed with bare verbal forms. Here, the mother asks if the child will go to see Flashman (a children's robot hero) when he appears at the nearby department store.

(6) Mother Child

Doo suru, Aya chan
'What will (you) do?'

Honto ni iku, ano Ozu no
Flashman kuru toki?
'Will (you) really go, when
Ozu's Flashman comes?'

A: Iku.
'(I) will go.'

Ozu no flashman kuru toki
iku?
'Will (you) go when Ozu's
Flashman comes?'

--> A: Iku.
(I) will go.'

In (7), which comes from still another family, desire is expressed with bare verbal forms.

(7) Mother

Child

--> Tamagoyaki mada hoshii?
'Do (you) want more omlette?'

Tamagoyaki hoshii hito
arimasu yo, okawari.
'Anyone who wants omlette, there is more.'

--> C: Kamaboko ga hoshii.
'I want fish cake.'

As we have seen in the above examples, one's psychological states, which are generally considered inaccessible to others in the Japanese society, are likely to be expressed with bare verbal forms. In contrast, common knowledge in society (e.g. a style of dancing popular among young people), which is generally considered accessible, is expressed with no. Since common knowledge is usually shared by the members of society, this analysis subsumes the presupposition proposal (McGloin 1980; Noda 1981).

4.1 Who is the Speaker's "Group"?

Though the nominal form no is found in diverse contexts, it directly indexes that the speaker is speaking as a member of a group of which he/she is a part. This leads to the question of who (besides the speaker) holds what the speaker says to be true. Who is the group of which the speaker is a part? Naturally, the speaker is a member of the society he/she belongs to. Examining the data, we also find other groups with which speakers associate themselves. A group can consist of the speaker and the addressee or the speaker and a third party. Thus, prototypically, as
illustrated in Figure 2, we find the following three types of groups with which the speaker is associated in using no.

Figure 2: Three prototypical groups the speaker may associate with in using no

S=the speaker
A=the addressee
T=a third party

(iii)

(i) The speaker forms a group with the addressee.
(ii) The speaker and the third party form a group.
(iii) The group is the society the speaker belongs to.

Below, I will illustrate the three types of groups which the use of no directly indexes.

The first type of group is formed by the speaker and the addressee. In (8) the speaker represents the addressee's view using no.

(8) Mother

Hiro, ashita no ban wa
do suru no ga ichiban ii?
'Hiro, what do you want to do most tomorrow evening?'

Child

H:Keishookaku ni iku no
ga ii.
'(I) want to go to Keishookaku.'

→ Keishookaku ni iku no
gi no.
'(You) want to go to Keishookaku.'

Here, in repeating the child's utterance, the mother uses no. In so doing, she is representing the child's view and the utterance counts as a confirmation.

Further, a group can be formed by speaker and addressee sharing awareness of a particular event. For example, in (9) the mother saw the child stop eating dinner. She asked the child questions with no.

(9) Mother

C: ((stopped eating))

---

Doo shita no?
'What's the matter?'

---

Moo taberarenai no?
'(You) can't eat anymore?'

In instances such as (9) no signals that the speaker and the addressee are both aware of the context. The interrogative with no indicates that the speaker is assuming that the information that he/she is asking for is the type to which the group would have access. The present analysis, thus, subsumes Noda's proposal which claims that no is used in utterances when the speaker presupposes that the connection between the proposition and the referent situation is obvious to the addressee.

Speaking as a representative of society is illustrated in the following conversation. The proposition that no frames is knowledge common to members of the society. Through the use of no in these instances the speaker as a member of the society authorizes an utterance jointly with the society. In (10) the mother is telling the children about manners and she uses no.

(10) Mother

Children

K: ((burp))

H: ((laugh))
warui no yo.
'That's bad manners.'

In (11) the mother and the child are talking about the geography of Tokyo and its suburbs. The use of no in this conversation suggests that knowledge that is supposedly common among the members of the society is most likely marked with no.

(11) Mother

Child

K: Nee, Disneyland tte
---> Tookyoo na no ?
'Is Disneyland in Tokyo?'

Urayasu.
'It's Urayasu.'

K: Jaa boku wa Tookyooto
no tonari ni sunderu
( ) Ichikawa wa.
'Then, I live next to
Tookyoo ( ) Ichikawa.'

Koiwa no eki wa moo-
Edogawa watareba Tookyooto
---> na no yo.
'Koiwa station is already-
When (we) cross Edo river,
it's Tokyo.'

Edogawa-ku tte iu no yo.
'lt's called Edogawa-ward.'

When the speaker's group is not the society nor the addressee, it usually is a third party (and the speaker). In the following conversation, when the mother finds a picture of a hawk moth in the picture book that she is reading to the children, she talks to the children about her childhood episode with hawk moths. Obviously, she does not already share knowledge of this episode with the addressees or with the society at large, but she does share knowledge of this episode with third parties, her sisters who were present when this happened. In recounting this episode, the mother
uses no constantly. No here indexes that the mother is a spokesman of the group, which in this case comprises her siblings and herself.

(12) Mother

Mukashi nee, Mama to Haruko-bachan to Akko-bachan ga chiisai toki nee,
"Long time ago, when, Mama, Aunt Haruko and Aunt Akko were small children,'

Ima no Kaminoge no ouchi ja nakute, betsu no ouchi ni
ita no yo,
"(we) lived in a house other than the one now in Kaminoge,'

Mita no ouchi toko.
'a house in Mita.'

---

Soo sutto, yoru toka sa, amido ga nakatta no yo,
"Then, in the evening, there was no screen, before.'

Soide sa, atsui kara, aketoku ja nai, neru toki ni,
"So, 'cause it was hot, (we) kept (the windows) open, at bedtime,'

Soide koo denki o ouchin naka ni tsuketoku to
yoku kono ga ga haitte kite nee,
"So, when (we) kept the light on, often this moth came in (the house) and,'

kono susumega tte iu no ga ne.
'this, hawk moth.'

---

Biin te akarui toko ni kun no yo, denki n toko ni.
'Buzzing around, it came to a lighted place, to the lamp.'

---

Kyaa kyaa toka itte nigeta no.
'(We) ran around screaming.'

---

Soo suru to Kaminoge no ojiichan ga ne
'Then, Kaminoge's grandpa,'

---

Shinbun de pen toka itte, tsukamaeta no.
'with newspaper (he) hit and caught (it).'
Suzumega, koo iu no ga yoku haitte kita no, kodomo no koro. 'This sort of hawk moth often came in, when (we) were children.'

As illustrated above, the group of which the speaker speaks as a spokesman varies from context to context and typically the group is either the addressee, the society, or a third party.

4.2 Frequencies of the Markings of Psychological States and Common Knowledge in Society

Figures 3 and 4 represent a survey of the speech data and give the frequency with which a bare verbal or no occurred with an expression of a psychological state or an assertion of common knowledge in society, respectively.

**Figure 3:**
Marking in Psychological State Utterances

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>bare verbal</th>
<th>total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>no</td>
<td>94.2%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bare verbal</td>
<td>5.8%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 4:**
Marking in Common Knowledge in Society

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>bare verbal</th>
<th>others</th>
<th>total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>no</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bare verbal</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In Figure 3 we see that 94.2% of all the psychological states expressed in the data are in bare verbal form. On the other hand, Figure 4 shows that 75% of all the utterances in the data which express something about common knowledge in the society are framed by no. The reason why the percentage for common knowledge in the society is somewhat lower is that sometimes common knowledge in society is expressed with other forms, in particular, other nominal
forms such as wake, koto and mono. The high correlations between the linguistic forms and their respective functions support the claim that on the one hand, the verbal form directly indexes that the speaker individually authorizes his/her utterance and that on the other hand, the nominal form (no) directly indexes that the speaker and his/her group together authorize the utterance.

Moreover, the present analysis can subsume the shared information analysis of no and can account for more extensive uses of no. The analysis of no as a marker of shared information cannot explain why no appears in conversations such as (10), (11) and (12). In these conversations, the knowledge expressed in the proposition is not actually shared by the speaker and the addressee. If we held on to the analysis that no is a shared information marker, we would be forced to say that no is used as if the information were shared between the speaker and the addressee (McGloin 1980, 1983 and 1986). However, such a proposal is rather ad hoc and there is little convincing motivation for this analysis. The fact that no appears when either shared or non-shared information is expressed in the proposition is not a problem for the present analysis of no, which claims that no indexes group authority rather than shared information.

In sum, in this section I have shown that the linguistic features of the verb form (a bare verbal) and noun form (no) in Japanese index the speaker's epistemological disposition with respect to whether the speaker authorizes an utterance as an individual or as a member of his/her group. The previous proposals are not general enough to capture the broad indexical scope of no. In other words, none of the previously proposed meanings of no is broad enough to be the direct meaning of no. The proposed notion of epistemological disposition, as I will show below, is broad enough to capture the variety of contexts which no indirectly indexes. Intuitively, epistemological disposition is a notion much broader than those of "explanation", "positive politeness", etc. Moreover, the present proposal is consistent with Ochs' (in press) observation that among the diverse categories of social contexts, two contextual dimensions, namely, affective and epistemological dispositions, are recurrently used to constitute other contextual dimensions.

5. Group vs. Individual Authority and Other Evidential
Notions

Since my analysis of no concerns truth (i.e. who holds the truth and hence authorizes it), it is important to compare the notions of group authority and individual authority with other notions of evidentiality. Below, I will show that the notions of group and individual authorities are distinct from the notion of source such as that in reported speech and "territory of information" (Kamio 1979), though they are related.

As I mentioned in section 4, Du Bois (1986) claims that no utterance is accepted without authority. He also claims that providing a source is a special case of providing authority. Examining cases of no such as those above, I find evidence supporting Du Bois' claim in that providing authority can be achieved without providing a source. Recall examples (10), (11) and (12) discussed in section 4.1. In these examples, the group consists of the speaker and the society or the speaker and a third party. However, the fact that the utterance is directed toward the addressee includes the addressee in the view framed by no. The addressee in this sense is part of the authorizing group but is not a source.

Also, there is a use of no (mentioned in footnote 8) which occurs in non-first person stories. This use of no indexes that both the narrator and the character have access to the character's psychological state in question. However, in this case, the source of the knowledge is in the character but not in the narrator. Nevertheless, both the narrator and the character authorize the knowledge. In sum, the speaker can authorize his/her message when he/she is not a source.

The question, then, is when the person who authorizes knowledge is not the source of the knowledge, what can be a legitimate authorizing agent of knowledge (assuming that no utterance is accepted without authority.) Du Bois (1986) observes, "A statement is sometimes called self-evident if it is considered a basic or foundation tenet of a particular culture..." For instance, he states, the speaker in uttering "All men are equal..." does not indicate the evidence because any rational person will reach the same conclusion by directly examining the evidence him/herself. Underlying Western cultures, there is a folk belief that truth is reached by examining accessible evidence and reasoning logically. In the Japanese folk belief, however, truth is
reached by having consensus among all the members of a group. In other words, what everyone in the group says is the truth. Thus, it is reasonable to propose that a group can function as an authority-providing agent in the Japanese culture. In utterances framed by no, the authority of knowledge in question is given by the group but not by any particular individual in the group though some individual(s) in the group may be the source of knowledge. Since the authority is given by the group, any member of the group can be included in the group view. This is why he/she can still be part of the authority-providing group when the addressee is not the source of the knowledge in question.

One of the epistemological dispositions encoded in a number of languages has to do with the source of information, namely whether the information comes from the speaker or from somewhere else (e.g. Chafe and Nichols (ed.) 1986; Kamio 1979). In the case of Japanese, Kamio (1979) claims that one important distinction concerning epistemological disposition is whether or not the speaker can assume himself to have the information in the speech situation. In other words, the speaker treats himself as a source of information if he/she is in a position to have that information. For example, if the speaker saw a volcanic eruption first-hand, this information is his own, i.e. he can be a source of information. Suppose the speaker did not see the eruption first-hand but he/she is a geologist who is an expert on volcanic activities or he/she lives close to the volcano, he/she is in the position to treat this information as his/her own. According to Kamio (1979), such information is in the speaker's territory of information and is linguistically expressed by either a bare verbal form (Kamio's term "zero form") or no. On the other hand, information outside of the speaker's territory is indicated by the quotative marker -tte, or by the hearsay markers -soo or -rashii. He gives the following examples (Kamio 1979:219.):

(13) Ookina iwa-ga mieru -yo/-n da.
'A big rock can be seen.'

(14) Ookina iwa-ga mieru -tte/-rashii/-soo da.
'It appears/is said that a big rock can be seen.'

Example (13) ends either with a bare verbal or a no. (14) has either a quotative or a hearsay marker. Kamio
states that utterances like (13) almost always report the speaker's own perception whereas utterances like (14) represent a perception by someone other than the speaker.

The notion of territory of information concerns the location of the source of information, i.e. whether it is inside or outside the speaker's territory. In contrast, the notion of group vs. individual authority for knowledge concerns the question of how knowledge (i.e. information) is authorized, i.e. whether it is authorized individually or communally. Figures 5 and 6 show the linguistic markings associated with these notions.

Figure 5: Territory of information

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>location of information</th>
<th>linguistic markings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>inside the speaker's territory</td>
<td>bare verbal form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>outside the speaker's territory</td>
<td>-rashii (hearsay)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-soo (hearsay)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-tte (quotative)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 6: Group vs. individual authority for knowledge

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>who authorizes the knowledge in question</th>
<th>linguistic markings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>the speaker alone</td>
<td>bare verbal form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the speaker and his/her group jointly</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As we note in Figures 5 and 6, the crucial difference between the two notions is that while the notion of territory of information involves a split between inclusion and exclusion of the speaker with respect to the location of information, the notion of group and individual authorities for knowledge does not involve such a split: the speaker is always included in the authorizing agent. Kamio (1979) is correct in that he classifies both bare verbal forms and no as linguistic markings signaling information inside the speaker's territory. His classification, however, is not
differentiated enough to accommodate the distinction between bare verbal forms and no.

Territory of information and group and individual authorities for knowledge are both necessary categories in Japanese. Their markers co-occur in the combinations given in (15).

(15)  
  -rashii no  
  HEARSAY PART  
  -soo na no  
  HEARSAY COP PART  
  -tte iu no  
  QUOT say PART  

* -soo requires the copula na before no and -tte requires the main verb iu 'to say' before no.

The phenomenon presented in (15) would be difficult to explain with only the notion of territory of information. If bare verbal forms and no both indicate information in the speaker's territory and -rashii, -soo and -tte indicate information outside the speaker's territory as Kamio proposes, then the sequences given in (15) are contradictions since the information would have to be both in the speaker's territory and outside the speaker's territory at the same time.

The sequences in (15) often occur in conversation. Consider conversation (16) in which both -rashii and no are used in HI's utterance.

(16) [HI and CH are talking about HI's possible visit to the U.S.]  
HI: Yoshi, kondo iku toki wa renraku shite,  
  'Good, next time (I) go, (I)'ll contact (her) and'  

CH: Un renraku shite,  
  'Yes, contact (her) and,'  

HI: Au yoo ni.  
  'try to see (her).'
Rainen wa haru ka rokugatsu ka dotchi ka na.
'Next year, either spring or June, (I) wonder.'

--> Nanka aru rashii n da yo.
'There seems to be something (some conference).'

Here HI says "there seems to be something" meaning that there is some conference he has to attend in the U.S. He frames this proposition with both -rashii and n(o).

Obviously, the information that there is a conference in the U.S. comes from a third party, perhaps from the company he works for. HI treats this information as if it were not in his territory of information. This is probably because this information is not certain yet. We see in the same utterance that he mentions that the conference may be either in spring or June. This indicates that the date of the conference is not certain yet. At the same time, n(o) indicates that he represents the view of his company (or the organization which plans the conference). Thus, using rashii and no, HI is representing information of his company which is not certain yet. With the notion of group and individual authorities for knowledge, in addition to territory of information, we can explain the forms given in (15).

In sum, I have shown in this section that the notion of group vs. individual authority is distinct from that of territory of information and that these two notions are necessary to account for sequences such as -rashii no mentioned above.

6. No and Various Contextual Meanings

Recall the discussion given in section 3 claiming that the use of an index creates a variety of social contexts. Since social contexts indexed by a particular linguistic feature or particular features are generally vast, this has created problems in understanding the indexes, including the particle no. In this section, I will show that given the direct meaning of no as that of the speaker speaking as a member of his/her group, we will be able to explain the broad indexical scope of no. Below I will discuss such various social contexts indirectly evoked by the use of no. As shown in the data, in a number of cases the direct indexical meaning of no evokes other contextual meanings.
The use of *no* helps members of a group set up a make-believe situation by establishing what the shared givens are of such a situation. Consider the following conversation. In (17) the child Aya is playing in the room with toy building blocks. She steps on the two blocks as if they were skis. Then her father asks if it is snowing in the room and the child answers that she is in a garden.

(17) Parents

F: Ayachan, oheya ni yuki ga

---> ippai futteru no?

'Aya, is it snowing a lot in the room?' (i.e. 'Are we pretending that it is snowing a lot in the room?')

A: Un?

'What?'

F:---> Yuki ga futteru no?

'Is it snowing?'

A: Soo

'Right.'

F: nee,

'Ah,'

M: Ja, moo kurisumasu ga kichau kashira.

'Well, then (I) wonder if Christmas will come soon.'

---> A: Koko wa oniwa na no.

'It's a garden here.'

The father's use of *no* in his questions seems to indicate that he is checking with the child to see if they share the same view concerning the make-believe situation. Then the child's use of *no* signals that what she says is to be accepted as a view held by both her father and herself. Since the pretended elements of the situation (snowing and the garden) do not actually exist here, the use of *no*, which directly indexes that the two people commonly share the view (hence both of them authorize the utterance), facilitates setting up the make-believe situation. If *no* were not used
in conversation (17), it would not sound like a make-believe situation, but rather like a dialogue concerning real weather in a real place.

The particle no can also involve positive politeness as discussed by McGloin (1983). Consider conversation (5) again from line 123 to the end:

(5)
123
K: Soshitara jaa, jaa, jaa.
"Then, well, well, well."

--> Sukoshi dake toka itte,
kashitageru?
'Would(you) lend it for a short while?'

K: Un.
'Uhn.'

Sono mae ni, yappari boku wa okaasan ka otoosan ni kiku.
'Before that, I would ask Mother or Father.'

124
Dakara inakattara tte
--> kiiten no.
'See, (I) am asking if they weren't home.'

K: Okaasan ka otoosan ga inakattara.
'If either Mother or Father wasn't home,'

125
Mama ga inai toki datte aru deshoo. Okaimono ni itte.
'There are times Mother is not home. Gone for shopping.'

--> K: Shitara, Ojiichan ni iu.
'Then, (I)'d tell (my) grandfather.'

-->126
Iu no?
"Would (you) tell him?"

De Kazu- Hiro dattara,
Doo sun no?
'And Kazu- Hiro, what would (you) do?'

So far the mother has not been able to obtain the desired answer to her question (i.e. what would the children do if there were nobody around whom they could ask what to do.), but in lines 124 and 126 (the 2nd occurrence of no) the mother does not challenge the children anymore with a bare verbal, but, instead, uses no. We notice that this use of no occurs after many unsuccessful attempts to get the desired answer from her children. Therefore, it seems that the mother's motivation for switching to no is to obtain the desired answer by including the addressee in the speaker's group after failing to obtain a response in a more direct way (i.e. by means of bare verbals). We notice in conversation (5) that the mother's view and the children's view of what to do when approached by a stranger are different. Apparently, the mother expects the children to decide what to do on their own, whereas the children insist on asking others for advice. The use of bare verbals implies difference in opinion between the mother and the children. The mother's second use of no in line 126 creates a context in which both the mother and the children belong to the same group (i.e. a group which shares the same view). According to Brown and Levinson (1978), a positive politeness strategy treats the addressee as a member of the in-group. This can serve several purposes, such as redressing a potential threat to one's positive face. In this case, the mother, by indicating that she is part of the children's in-group, is hoping that she will get the children to say what they would do. Thus, in line with Brown and Levinson's claim, we can say that no is used as a positive politeness strategy to attain the speaker's goal.

Conversation (18) gives an example in which no is used in persuasion. Here the mother wants the child to eat more but the child does not want to.

(18) Mother
Pan okawari wa?
'Another piece of bread?'

Child
K: Ii.
Note that in (18), child K's speech exhibits a progression from *ii 'That's OK.'* to *ii no.* First K simply makes an assertion with *ii,* then he proceeds to *ii yo* calling the mother's attention to what he is saying. The particle *yo* is similar to "you see" in English and it does not change the speaker's epistemological disposition at all like the particle *no* does. The mother still insists on K's eating more. Then he shifts to *ii no* to include his mother in his point of view so that he can persuade her. This use of *no* is an instance of a positive politeness strategy to get the speaker's desired goal. (Here, however, this strategy failed for K and he did not get his desired goal.) In both (5) and (18) *no* indexes that the addressee is included in the speaker's group. This context is interpreted as a positive politeness strategy in these particular cases.

As noted by Kuno (1973), the particle *no* often appears in explanation clauses. By including the addressee in the
speaker's group, the speaker's explanation becomes more convincing to the addressee. Consider (19). In (19) the child wants "dorai furikake" (fish-flavored powder to sprinkle on rice). The mother explains why she did not put it on his rice using no.

(19) Mother

D: Ah, ah boku ni kakete. 'Ah, ah put it on mine.'

Child

Dorai furikake Dai chan
Dora suki ja nai kara

--> shimatta no yo.

'(You) don't like Dorai Furikake,
so (I) put it away.'

In (20) the mother and child A are playing a guessing game as to what is the dessert for that evening.

(20) Mother

Child

A: Wakatta. '(I) got it.'

Sakuranbo da na. '(It) is cherry.'

Sakuranbo ja nai. '

'(It)'s not cherry.'

--> Moo sakuranbo nai no yo.

'There are no more cherries.'

Notice that in (20) the mother's first utterance is a negation of the child's guess and it occurs with a bare verbal form. Her second utterance, in contrast, is an explanation as to why the dessert is not cherries. Here she uses no. The mother's motivation in using no in her second utterance seems to be to include the child in her point of view to eliminate conflict of opinion.

In this section we have seen that the present analysis of no subsumes the previous proposals concerning no (those of positive politeness and explanation) and also accounts for the use of no in make-believe situations.
7.1 Affect of No: No as a Marker of Harmony and Social Power

No can index affect of harmony between the speaker and the addressee. McGloin (1986) notes that no serves to establish/maintain rapport with the addressee. In examining my conversational data, I find a number of instances of no that are used to create affect of harmony between the speaker and the addressee in conversation. This affect is a consequence of the fact that no can directly index contexts in which the speaker and addressee form a group (i.e. co-membership between the speaker and addressee). As discussed in section 5, since the group authorizes an utterance, the speaker's use of no can convey that the addressee, who is a member of the group, is assumed to have the same viewpoint as the speaker. The direct meaning of no helps to constitute other contextual meanings. On the level of affect, this direct meaning of no can create harmony between the speaker and addressee(s). For instance, in the following relaxed family conversation no is mainly used to encode the affect of harmony between the speaker and addressees.

(21) [TA is talking about what he did when he did not understand English during his visit to the U.S.]

TA: Wakannakattara, toko toko jisho no toko made --> hashiri ni itta no.
   'When (I) did not understand, (I) ran toward dictionaries.'

All: ((laugh))

CH: Jisho kotchi e koi.
   'Dictionaries, come over here.'

TA: Ei-wa jiten to wa-ei jiten to...
   'An English-Japanese dictionary and a Japanese-English dictionary...'

In (21) TA is reporting his experience in the U.S. Here the primary motivation of the use of no by TA seems to be to create harmony between the speaker and the addressees. TA's experience that he ran to dictionaries is his own and not that of the other conversation participants, but by using
no, the speaker creates a group with the addressees. In so doing, harmony is created among the interlocutors.

In fact, most of the uses of no in conversation index interpersonal harmony. In order to appreciate why no often indexes harmony among interlocutors we need to consider the cultural orientation of the Japanese society. In the Japanese society, harmony is considered the most important and desirable goal of communication -- as opposed to asserting one's individual opinion at the risk of contention. Reischauer (1977:135) describes how much harmony is valued and contention is avoided in the Japanese society:

The key Japanese value is harmony, which they seek to achieve by a subtle process of mutual understanding, almost by intuition, rather than by a sharp analysis of conflicting views or by clear cut decision.... Consensus is the goal.... To operate their group system successfully, the Japanese have found it advisable to avoid open confrontations. Varying positions are not sharply outlined and their differences analyzed and clarified. Instead, each participant in a discussion feels his way cautiously, only unfolding his own views as he sees how others react to them.

Considering that the use of no is embedded in this type of cultural orientation, it makes sense that no occurs frequently as a part of harmony-creating efforts in Japanese conversation.

McGloin (1986) reports that no occurs in women's speech in higher frequencies than in men's speech. That no can create harmony between the interlocutors explains why no is often associated with women's speech. Women, as members of the socially less powerful sex, need more mutual support and cooperation than men. Thus, it makes sense that women are more likely than men to create harmony with their addressee using no in their speech. (This is not to say that men do not use no to create harmony.)

When directly indexing the speaker as a spokesman of society, no invokes the authority of society and avoids sharply confronting speech. Generally accepted knowledge of social views can be used to persuade others without confronting them. This conforms to the Japanese cultural
orientation of avoiding confrontation and creating harmony among the group members.

Similar uses of linguistic features to convey social authority are found in other languages. For example, Ruth Borker (1980) reports a case in Karen Larsen's study (1978) on the use of standard Norwegian dialect in the rural area. According to Larsen, the local dialect in this area is associated with intimacy whereas the standard dialect conveys information as representative of the public view. Thus, use of the standard dialect, as Borker points out (1980:30), has the effect of "removing the utterance from the realm of personal communication and giving it both the import and impact of generally accepted knowledge." This use of the Norwegian standard dialect in the rural area closely resembles the use of the Japanese particle no as it is described in the present analysis.

This strategy of using no to exert authority without sharply confronting is common in Japanese mothers' speech to children. Example (22) illustrates this point. In (22) the child Yuu (12 months old) is pulling his toys off the toy shelf when it is already his bedtime.

(22)  
Mother  
--> Yuu chan, omocha dasanai no.  
'Yuu, (We) won't pull out the toys.'

Moo nenne dakara.  
'cause it's already bedtime.'

Ne, hai.  
'Right, yes.'

--> Hora, dasanai no moo.  
'See, (we) won't pull them out anymore.'

Ashita ne, mata ashita asoboo ne.  
'Tomorrow, let's play again tomorrow.'

In (22) the mother uses no while telling the child not to pull out the toys. Here the authority of no comes from the mother's representing common social knowledge (i.e. one does not play with toys at bedtime). The speaker's use of no conveys that the addressee is included in this view. In (22), inclusion of the child as a holder of the view that
nobody plays with toys at bedtime has the power to make the child conform to this social norm. Thus, no is a powerful tool to persuade others by including them as a part of the speaker's group. We also notice in (22) that other linguistic features used by the mother emphasize the unity of the mother and the child. These features include the 1st person imperative "let's" in asoboo 'let's play' and frequent use of the particle ne, a marker of something like tag questions in English, which signals sharing of affect. The mother is not forcing the child to stop playing with the toys and yet the force of no with social power behind it is intended to get the child to conform to the norm of society without separating him from the mother. The authority derives from the social view and not from the individual will of the mother. This analysis of no is consistent with the findings of Vogel (1963) and Hess et al. (1980) concerning Japanese child rearing patterns. The use of no can accomplish two seemingly opposing tasks simultaneously: creating harmony between the speaker and the addressee and getting the addressee to do what the speaker wants him/her to do. Thus, no plays an important role in socializing children into the Japanese society. As we have seen, these two seemingly opposing social meanings, harmony and social power, both indexed by no, follow from the direct meaning of no as a marker of group authority for an utterance.

7.2 Social Power of No and Foreign Speakers of Japanese

Furthermore, the present analysis of no integrates Noda's (1981) observation that non-native speakers of Japanese are often discouraged (by Japanese) from using no. According to Noda, who assumes that no involves presupposed information, this is because Japanese assume that foreigners do not share information and expectations with Japanese. Naturally, when a Japanese speaker represents common views and values of the Japanese society, foreigners in Japan are not expected to share these common views and values.

7.3 Indexical Relations of the Particle No

To summarize what has been discussed in this paper, I will present in Figure 7 a schema of relationships between the direct and indirect indexical meanings of no. Figure 6 shows that the direct indexing of epistemology helps
constitute several different social contexts as its indirect meanings.

Figure 7: Indexical meanings of no

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>linguistic resource</th>
<th>direct meaning</th>
<th>indirect meanings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>persuasion</td>
<td>make-believe</td>
<td>positive politeness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>no disposition</td>
<td>explanation</td>
<td>women's speech</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(authority of the group that the speaker represents)</td>
<td>harmony</td>
<td>social power</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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My intuition is that future examinations of indexical relations such as those schematized in Figure 6 will lead to a deeper understanding of social meanings.

8. Summary and Conclusion

As I stated earlier, in analyzing indexes, we face a problem of broad indexical scope. This is why there have been several different analyses of the Japanese sentence-final particle no. For example, some studies claim that no marks presupposed or shared information, others claim that no marks explanation clauses, and still others propose that no concerns positive politeness and women's language. Each one of these analyses only accounts for a narrow range of
the uses of no. In this paper, I have tried to overcome the 
broad indexical scope problem. By positing one meanings as a 
direct meaning I have shown that other meanings are evoked 
by this direct meaning.

I have proposed that no (the nominal form) is a marker 
of the speaker speaking as a member of a group of which 
he/she is a part. That is to say that the speaker is 
speaking as a spokesman of the group. In contrast, a bare 
verbal (the verb form) is a marker of the speaker speaking 
as an individual. In speaking as a spokesman of a group, the 
speaker's group includes (other than himself) an addressee, 
a third party, or society.

Choice of no or a bare verbal form is related to the 
folk epistemology of the Japanese society: psychological 
states are generally considered to be inaccessible to 
others. We have seen that psychological states are most 
likely to be expressed with bare verbals and accessible 
knowledge such as commonly shared knowledge in society is 
most likely to be expressed with no. This analysis of no can 
subsume the presuppositional analysis (McGloin 1980; Noda 
1981) in that knowledge held as true jointly by the speaker 
and his/her group is often knowledge shared or presupposed 
by the group. In addition, the present analysis of no can 
also account for the cases in which such knowledge is not 
actually shared.

As we have discussed above, in utterances framed by no, 
the authority of the knowledge in question is given by the 
group but not by any particular individual. Because of this, 
any member of the group can be included in the group 
viewpoint. Thus, although the addressee is not the source, 
he/she, as a member of the group, can still be part of the 
authorizing agent.

We have also seen that the two epistemological 
dispositions involving territory of information and 
authority for knowledge are distinct. The crucial difference 
between the two is that while the former concerns whether 
the evidence lies with the speaker or with someone else, the 
latter concerns whether the speaker holds the knowledge in 
question to be true as an individual or as a group. It is 
not enough to classify bare verbals and no as markers of 
information inside the speaker's territory while classifying 
quotative and hearsay morphology as markers of information 
outside the speaker's territory, for there are cases in 
which either quotative or hearsay morphology appears with
I have shown that the present analysis can handle these cases.

Also, the present analysis of no can account for a variety of contextual meanings indexed by no. Different contextual meanings such as those of make-believe situations, positive politeness, persuasion, explanation etc. follow from the direct meaning of no, i.e. the speaker's inclusion of the addressee in the speaker's group. This direct meaning of no can also index harmony between the speaker and the addressee. A number of instances of no in Japanese conversation have this characteristic because the Japanese culture highly values interpersonal harmony. Furthermore, because no indexes harmony, it is more often used by women, who are socially less powerful than men.

Finally, because no can index the speaker as a spokesman of the society, it can exert social power. Thus, the use of no can accomplish two seemingly opposing tasks simultaneously: it creates harmony between the speaker and the addressee and it gets the addressee to do what the speaker wants him/her to do. The use of no plays an important role in socializing children into the Japanese society.

NOTES

1. Ochs (in press) also points out that often a set of indexes narrows the scope. For example, register can be identified by a certain set of linguistic forms that signal some contexts. For instance, co-occurrence of high pitch and deletion of the copula may index baby talk or foreigner talk.

2. A proposition can also be expressed in the -masu form (discussed below). For example, (1) can be expressed with a -masu form as in (i):

   (i) John ga eiga o mimasu.
       John SUB movie OBJ see
       'John sees movies.'

3. There are other occurrences of no in Japanese with which I will not be concerned in this paper. These include the uses of no to mark genitive phrases, to create nouns from adjectives (cf. the English big one), and to subordinate
clauses. I will not italicize such occurrences of no in my examples.

4. Abbreviations: SUB=subject; OBJ=object; PART=particle TOP=topic; COP=copula.

5. In my data, occurrences of the n(o) desu form are very limited. Masu/desu forms of verb inflections basically mark interpersonal distance. Hence, in my recordings of casual family conversation, masu/desu forms occur very infrequently; for example, in one hour of adult conversation among family members, only 3% of the total utterances are masu/desu forms. The occurrence of the n(o) desu form is even more limited. It occurs in only 0.7% of the total utterances in one hour of adult family conversation. Since the occurrences of masu/desu forms are infrequent in my data, I will not discuss them in this paper.

6. Kuno (1973) claims that no clauses are used for explanations. Although this proposal explains some instances of no, it does not account for a wide range of no clauses since there are no clauses which are not explanations.

In an attempt to cover a broader range of cases with no, some linguists have proposed that no is a marker of some presupposed or shared information in context (Kuroda 1973; Mizutani & Mizutani 1977; McGloin 1980; Noda 1981; Kunihiro 1984). For example, Noda (1981) claims that no is used in utterances either when the speaker presupposes that a situation exists and that the addressee is (or can become) familiar with that situation, or when the speaker presupposes that the connection between the proposition and the referent situation is obvious to the addressee. So for Noda, the presupposition is the speaker's presupposition about the hearer's knowledge. McGloin (1980:144) states, "it [no] marks a certain information as known or at least assumed to be known either to a speaker or a listener or both." Thus, for McGloin information can be known to the speaker or to the addressee or to both. In her formulation, however, it is not clear whether she means that no should mark all cases of known information or not. If she means that not all cases of known information are marked with no, then she has to explain when known information receives no and when it does not. Although both Noda's and McGloin's statements apparently are intended to say that no marks some notion of "sharedness" or knowledge in the context, they do not exactly specify the kind of "sharedness" or knowledge that no seems to signal.
Elsewhere, McGloin (1986) reports that no is more frequently used by women than men. She explains that the femininity of no arises from the rapport between the speaker and the addressee which is created by the shared knowledge that no signals. However, there are cases in which no marks information that is not shared.

In an attempt to account for these, McGloin (1983) claims that the speaker, by presenting information that the speaker has as if it were shared by the addressee, tries to create a sense of rapport with the addressee. Thus, McGloin (1983:130) claims that no is a device to express "positive politeness" (Brown and Levinson's (1978) term). In the same paper, however, McGloin also cites an example in which the use of no creates impoliteness. The findings of McGloin (1983) that the particle no has to do with "politeness" but that it can mark either polite or impolite situations suggests that no does not directly index politeness. Rather, the "politeness" phenomenon associated with no is apparently an indirect contextual meaning constituted by some other more direct meaning.

Aoki (1986) claims that no is a marker of evidentiality indicating "fact". He states (1986:230), "no or n is a marker which converts a statement for which ordinarily no direct knowledge is possible into a statement which is asserted as a fact." He gives examples such as (i) and (ii) to illustrate his proposal.

(i) (Aoki's (27))
* Kare wa atui
  he TOP hot
  'He is hot.'

(ii) (Aoki's (28))
  Kare wa atui no da
  he TOP hot PART be
  '(I know that) he is hot. (It is a fact that) he is hot.'

According to Aoki, in Japanese sensations such as hot, cold, or lonely are experienced only by the speaker and cannot be directly experienced by a third person. Therefore, when such sensations are experienced by a third person as in (i), the sentence becomes ungrammatical. In contrast, (ii) is
grammatical because no converts the meaning of the sentence into something like "I know that he is hot" or "It is a fact that he is hot." This claim, however, accounts for only certain uses of no. In examining the data, we often find cases in which no marks accessible knowledge.

Furthermore, Aoki states (1986:229), "Semantically it [no] removes the statement from the realm of a particular experience and makes it into a timeless object. The concept thereby becomes nonspecific and detached." If this claim is true, we would expect to find infrequent use of no in family conversations especially involving children, for such conversations typically deal with particular experiences here and now. In contrast, I have found quite frequent use of no in my data from family conversations. Also frequent use of no by both mothers and children are reported in the literature on Japanese child language acquisition (Yoshida 1977; Yamada 1980; Clancy 1985). Thus, the proposal that no indicates "fact" does not specify exactly what the meaning of no is. The claim that no is a marker of evidentiality made by Aoki (1986) and Kamio (1979), however, is relevant and insightful. I will have more to say about this idea in section 5.

7. There are other nominal forms that function as sentence-final particles. These include wake, mono and koto. However, discussion of these particles is beyond the scope of this paper.

8. Besnier (in press) claims that in reported speech, while at some level the source is not the speaker but rather those quoted, at other levels, in particular, at the affect level, the speaker's "voice" (Baktin's term) carries the speaker's affect.

9. As Aoki discusses, sometimes no occurs with an expression of one's psychological state. Such usages, as pointed out by Kuroda (1973), are often exploited in non-first person stories. In narrating a non-first person story, the narrator is supposedly able to see the characters' psychological states. The use of no in such a context indexes that both the narrator and the character have access to the character's psychological state in question.

10. There are other instances of no which index common knowledge between the speaker and the addressee, the speaker and a third party, etc. However, because it is easier to determine instances of no indexing common knowledge in
society, I have used only the latter cases of no for frequency counting.

11. Following Chafe (1986), I will use the term "evidentiality" to refer to any linguistic expression of attitude towards truth and knowledge.

12. The literature on the Japanese culture points out that there are no universal principles of truth in the Japanese culture. Therefore, truth is relative to the context (e.g. Christopher 1983) and decisions are made not by some principles but by the consensus of the group (Vogel 1979).

13. No da or n da, though, is not associated with women's speech. Since da (the plain form of the copula) intensifies an utterance, it no longer sounds soft. ("Sounding soft" is a feminine characteristic in the Japanese society.)

14. Clancy (personal communication) also notes that in her data of mother-child conversations, no frequently occurs when the mother, instead of confronting the child, urges the child to conform to a norm of the society.
REFERENCES


