0. Introduction

I would like to outline a direction of lexical analysis which articulates the dynamic relation between the stable and unstable parts of meaning. In the first part of the paper I will critique the formalistic approach ("meaning is invariant") and the sociologizing approach ("meaning is contingent") and will then read Voloshinov's analysis of the word, in light of Althusser's concept of the interpellated subject and Pêcheux's further corroboration of the speaking subject. I will suggest that the treatment of language in a social context must always take into account the split between variant and invariant meanings of the word, the split within the conscious/unconscious subject, and the social conflicts polarizing society.

The second part is a case study of the use of terms of "death" and "injury" in the language of the extreme right in Israel during the 1980s. The linguistic data are not surprising, and similar practices have been observed elsewhere. Behind the commonplace observation that "one person's terrorist is the other person's freedom-fighter" lies a rhetorical battlefield over sign theory. In the past three decades we have witnessed dynamic theories of the sign prosper in post-structuralist, post-modernist, and (neo-)Marxist frameworks of several cultural domains (literature, theater, film, etc), but the theory and practice they have been applying to their own objects of knowledge cannot be simply copied over to linguistics, inspiring as they may be. What we lack, then, is both a dynamic theory of the sign and a link between such a theory and our linguistic data.

1. Traditional views of the word

The specific object of investigation in this paper is the lexical morpheme, often simply referred to as the word. By making this choice I am not suggesting that the grammatical morpheme is devoid of ideological charge. The vast literature on the ideological ramifications of gender in language, and on passive and active formulations of political responsibility, clearly demonstrates that the grammatical

---

1 I would like to express my deep appreciation to the anonymous reader of Pragmatics whose thorough review guided me to reconsider and refine my formulations in several places. An early version of section 5. was presented in 1992, at the 25th Annual Meeting of the Societas Linguistica Europaea in Galway, Ireland, in a lecture entitled "Terms of Death and Injury in Israeli Political Discourse".
morpheme has a role in ideology, but these will not be the focus here.

To a great extent, the horizons of the twentieth century treatment of lexis were set by Saussure. The Saussurean concept of the word elaborated on the popular notion that the word consists of a simple representational relation, namely that a word stands for an entity. Saussure conceived this representational relation in two ways. He relegated it to the realm of individual and social psychology, and he gave it its differential quality.

On the plane of individual psychology, the act of signification was removed from the material world of words and objects and was relocated in the mind as signifiant ‘signifier’ and signifié ‘signified’. The mind is the site of representation, in which first of all the signifiant, the sound image, represents the signifié, the entity image, i.e. the concept. Only then can the representational relation be further translated into entities. The signifiant translates into a physical sequence of sounds; the signifié into matter, be it physical ("tree", "horse") or abstract ("to judge"). The psychological word "tree" is one, its manifestations in the real world are many: we can utter the word many times, and we can reference many trees. Since this communicative process is performed among members of a linguistic community, the psychological dimension is generalized to the social domain. Socially, there is a psychological reservoir of fixed representational devices, langue, which is abstract and uniform; individually, the physiological domain of its manifestations, parole, is concrete and uneven.

The differential quality of the Saussurian sign ensues from the systematic relation between words, where each word possesses a function relative to that of the others, called valeur 'value'. Value is a psychological relation as well, for it concerns the psychological words, not their material manifestations. In Saussurean terms, meaning is a combination of the signifié and the valeur of a word. It is both representational and differential.

The only variability that Saussure recognized within "the same language" was diachronic variability, the passage from one état de langue 'state of language' to the next. In Saussure's view, linguistic change occurs when an erratic deviation in the realm of parole is generalized and as such enters the langue. The obvious question a formalist would ask Saussure is: "Where is the point of change?" or "How do you determine when exactly a fact of parole has become a fact of langue?" Saussure's ability to problematize the dichotomy has been forgotten, or even scorned as "conceptual confusion" by Harris (1987: 105). What Saussure in fact said was as follows (1959 [1915]: 701-110. (I have reinstated original French terms, such as langue, parole, and état de langue):

In practice an état de langue is not a point, but rather a certain span of time during which the sum of the modifications that have supervened is minimal. [...] An absolute state is defined by the absence of changes, and since language changes somewhat in spite of everything, studying an état de langue means in practice disregarding changes of little importance, just as mathematicians disregard infinitesimal quantities in certain calculations, such as logarithms. [...] In short, a concept of an état de langue can be only approximate. In static linguistics, as in most sciences, no course of reasoning is possible without the usual simplification of data.

This may not be the most elegant articulation of a dialectical view, but within the context of an otherwise very dichotomous view of linguistic facts, it does indicate
that the narrator of the *Cours* had a clear sense of the flexible nature of scientific modeling. Every model is a reduction that centralizes certain aspects and marginalizes others. Which aspect is centralized and which marginalized depends on the point of view of the scholar, and does not ensue automatically. That this is Saussure's view can be observed also elsewhere (1959 [1915]: 87):

Since changes never affect the system as a whole but rather one or another of its elements, they can be studied only outside the system. Each alteration doubtless has its counter-effect on the system, but the initial fact affected only one point; there is no inner bond between the initial fact and the effect that it may subsequently produce on the whole system. The basic difference between successive terms and coexisting terms, between partial facts and facts that affect the system, preclude making both classes of fact the subject matter of a single science.

It is important to bear in mind the historical context of Saussure's work. In introducing the dichotomies langue-parole, synchronic-diachronic, paradigmatic-syntagmatic, etc., he did not intend to introduce equally balanced pairs, but to establish a science based on the first member of each. To do so, the singularity of these members of the pairs had to be first of all clearly constructed in the context of a research community whose universe of scholarly discourse was based on the second element in each pair. A problematization of tensions within a dichotomy could only come about once the dichotomy had been constructed.

It is this formalist aspect of the dichotomies that was instrumental in the structuralist paradigm-shift. Hjelmslev perfected this dimension of Saussure's theory to an "algebra of language", claiming (1961 [1943]: 5-6) that "Linguistics must attempt to grasp language, not as a conglomerate of non-linguistic (e.g. physiological, psychological, logical, sociological) phenomena, but as a self-sufficient totality". This formalist reading of Saussure still prevails among proponents and adversaries alike.

The most extreme reading of Saussure as a formalist advocating the fixity of the meaning of a word can be observed in Yishai Tobin's neo-Saussurean sign-oriented approach (e.g. Tobin 1990, 1994). For Tobin the distinction between the linguistic code and its discursive manifestations is absolute. The speaker utilizes the invariant meaning of a sign in context, and endows it with its variant bent through creativity. In other words, the employment of the invariant meaning of a word in a discursive context can be viewed as either being faithful to its invariant meaning, in which case it is objective, or as subjectively deviating from it. Aside from the obvious possibility of a mistaken usage of a word, which would result in a breakdown in the communicative process, other deviations from fixity can only be attributed to the intention of the individual agent (81):

[...] the notion of invariant meaning [is] exploited for subjective comment: The speaker may use one sign other than another, in order to tell us something about his own attitude towards the scene - as opposed to merely giving an objective description.

Saussure's problematization of the invariance of langue is not mentioned by Tobin, a practice which ensures a maximal exploitation of the dichotomy.

The same process took place among holders of the opposite view. A most radical opposition to the Saussurean conceptual framework has evolved in the
integrationalist approach. Their critique is, again, based on ascribing a purely formalist reading to Saussure's text. Once Saussure is set up as a pure formalist, it is easier to take issue with him. Roy Harris, a major expounder of the integrationalist school leads us to believe (Harris 1987: 223) that for Saussure "the separation of synchrony from diachrony is neither just a descriptive convenience nor an artifact of linguistic theorizing". For someone who has made Saussure a major object of his knowledge this is a strange oversight.

The integrationalist school is very articulate in problematizing the Saussurean dichotomies in its own way. Roy Harris abolishes langue and parole, synchrony and diachrony, and even 'language' itself as the subject matter for a separate science, reducing it (indeed not as a matter of principle, merely as a convenient classification) to three domains (Harris 1990: 50):

[Integrationalism] rejects any a priori attempt to circumscribe the phenomena of language or to draw a distinction between language and non-language which will be valid in each and every case. Instead, it delimits its own sphere of investigation by reference to dimensions of communicational relevance which apply to all forms of sign behaviour in human communities. Such an inquiry may conveniently distinguish between three different scales or levels of relevance, depending on our mode of involvement in communicational processes. One scale, which may be termed "macrosocial", deals with factors which situate any given communication in its particular historical and cultural context. A second, which we may term "biomechanical", deals with factors of a physiological and physical nature which determine the parameters of communication within that situation. The third scale is the integrational scale itself, concerned with communication as a function of the individual's experience in the context of a given situation.

A reduction of a disciplinary field to other "more basic" fields is in itself a stimulating and legitimate move. The justification for linguistics as a separate science has been challenged more than once in the history of linguistics, most recently by some currents of cognitive psychology and linguistics. But while performing this kind of reduction one must be aware of the fact that the other discipline is burdened with controversies and internal rifts over questions of both theory and practice, at least as much as one's own. Without being conversant with the agenda of the neighboring discipline, one risks using one particular standpoint within it, perhaps the easiest to understand, which might be obsolete, or else seriously challenged by others. If we take the macrosocial scale as an example, Harris (1990: 50) informs us that "to the macrosocial scale belong factors of the kind which orthodox linguistics relegates to such sub-disciplines as dialectology and sociolinguistics". By saying that, Harris only joins the ranks of those performing disciplinary shortcuts, so characteristic of much of the work done within the "hyphenated" disciplines; he does not address the problem inherent in such a move.

A brief look at some of the alternatives offered by the integrationalist school will suffice to demonstrate that after a grand critical tour they have landed on the most formalist grounds of other disciplines. The integrationalist theory of meaning is based on John Locke's theory of freedom and social contract (Taylor 1990), and on Keynesian economy (Harris 1987: 232, 1990: 51-52). Although the ideological bent of the linguistic theories themselves is not the main objective of our discussion here, it is hard not to notice the affinity between terms of scientific argumentation and the capitalist ideological constructs of agency and market economy based on a
freely floating exchange value. The pose of scientific discourse, to be discussed below, is thrown into deep relief in light of its ideological commitment.

The Lockean footing of the theory assumes that the individual is a free agent equipped with free will to combine form and meaning in any possible way. This is an idea derived from Locke's viewpoint on human nature in general and on politics in particular (Taylor 1990: 121):

The roots of political norms are then traced to the individual's sacrifice of a share of their own natural freedoms and powers to the political authority of laws, the aim of this sacrifice being the avoidance of the social anarchy that would arise were every individual allowed the full exercise of their natural freedom.

The utilization of this political principle to linguistics follows (Taylor 1990: 123):

The prescription of norms presupposes a prior ascription of freedom to the individual agent, linguistic or political. For if we are not free, then we cannot choose to obey the recommended prescriptions. Signification remains in the Lockean perspective a free act of the will; but it is a voluntary act which the individual agent should make conform to socially imposed norms.

Linguistic change is viewed as interplay between the two aspects of free will: the will to conform to the norm, and the will to take responsibility and be part of an attempt to change the norm.

The Keynesian simile in the integrationalist theory is based on the demythologization and eradication of the gold standard in economics (Harris 1990: 52):

Myths cannot be shown to be false, because myths are never founded on propositions which were demonstrable in the first place. Keynesian economics did not demonstrate that "gold standard" economics was wrong, but merely that faith in the "gold standard" was unnecessary, unhelpful, and in various ways obfuscating and harmful. The Keynesian strategy is to point out that the assumption that currency notes are pieces of paper standing for quantities of precious metals fails to make sense of economic reality, where in practice money functions as a complex of mechanisms which facilitate the distribution of goods and services. Money does not in addition need to "stand for" anything. Analogously in the linguistic case, once we see that language can be treated as a complex of mechanisms for facilitating communication there is no need to insist that linguistic signs "stand for" anything else in addition.

A word, then, does not a priori stand for anything. It only acquires functionality as a contingent mechanism, subject to the aforementioned interplay of norm and free will.

At the beginning of the century such a position could have possibly posed a conceptual alternative to Saussurean thought, within the same domain of a modernizing revolution. Instead of the total determinism of the social system, it would have suggested a total free will of the individual speaker. Instead of a Janus-faced fixed sign, it could have offered a sign with both form and function being always contextually contingent. But in the 1990s, after a whole century of an elaboration of Freud's ideas, importing the social into the psychological make-up of the individual, the integrationalists - under the guise of a holistic approach - cannot
simply ignore the scholarly presence of a split subject, that transcends the dichotomy individual/social. I am not suggesting that the integrationalists have to accept and incorporate the Freudian split subject in their own research program, but by not addressing it as part of the discursive environment within which their ideas are raised, the integrationalists, who entitled their programmatic book *Redefining Linguistics*, simply redefine the intellectual cocoon that modernist linguistics revolves in.

Tobin and the integrationalists are two extreme outgrowths of Saussurianism. Tobin's neo-Saussurean sign-oriented school claims to carry out (Tobin 1990: 14):

[...] the Saussurean revolution which might have been [but] has not taken place, from the point of view of the linguistic sign. Most post-Saussurean linguists have not adopted the sign as their theoretical and methodological unit of analysis [...].

Harris's integrationalism contends that he found the point (Harris 1987: 237) where the Saussurean framework "will fracture": (Harris 1987: 230-1):

[...] it could have worked out if only Saussure had grasped the full implications of the economic analogy and seen that values are subordinate to transactions, and not the other way round. He might then have seen the wisdom of starting linguistic theory "from the opposite end".

The boundaries of Saussurean structuralism were overstepped within structuralism in a number of important works. In the U.S., the later behavioristic Bloomfield developed some interesting deviations from the Saussurean viewpoint. In his pre-behavioristic phase Bloomfield, in the critique of the second edition of the *Cours* (Bloomfield 1987 [1923]: 64, Bloomfield 1987 [1925]: 67) did not challenge Saussurean terms. But having gone behavioristic, the Bloomfield of *Language* (1933: 139) views the meaning of linguistic form as "the situation in which the speaker utters it and the response which it calls forth in the hearer". A particular meaning becomes fixed in our minds as we grow up thanks to the cumulative effect of repeated situations (131-132): "The meaning of a form for any one speaker is nothing more than a result of the situations in which he has heard this form". Meaning therefore is individual, and "if he has not heard it very many times, or if he has heard it under very unusual circumstances, his use of the form may deviate from the conventional".

Bloomfield introduces here the idea that there might be a difference between the individual and the collective lexicons, an idea that is inconceivable in Saussurean terms. But this is not the only way in which Bloomfield's sign is not entirely stable. The other ways have to do with socially normalized usage. A word is sometimes associated with more than one typical situation, thus we speak of "the head of an army", "the tongue of a shoe", and "warm temperament". What is remarkable in Bloomfield's eyes is (149) "our assurance and our agreement in viewing one of the meanings as normal (or central) and the others as marginal (metaphoric or transferred)". The observation of metaphorlic, transferred, or connotative meaning is certainly not Bloomfield's discovery. His contribution is in incorporating the discussion of these types of meaning in a theory of the internal constitution of the word within a linguistic theory of signification.

The generativist school in its Chomskyan version has been an obedient
follower of certain tenets of American structuralism. The autonomy of syntax has left lexical meaning outside the core agenda of Chomskyan linguistics. The opposition to this stance came primarily from the short-lived school of generative semantics. Its beginnings may be anchored in McCawley (1968) who advocated a method of generating surface forms from componentially analyzed semantic structures. For example, "A kill B" would be derived from "A cause [become [not [B alive]]]." Through a series of transformations the more compact form "kill" is arrived at without recourse to deep structure. In later developments of generative semantics the tree-structure was abandoned and direct mapping was carried out from semantic structure to syntactic structure. At first this mechanism appeared very powerful, but eventually turned out to be applicable to an extremely limited type and number of words. In all its developments componental analysis did not constitute a challenge to invariant meaning, but only an attempt to decompose allegedly compositional wholes into their - yet again - invariant primitives. Though generative semantics died out as a school, the spirit of componental analysis lingered on in a broad variety of schools.

This is probably why the attack against componental analysis, waged by Fodor et al. (1980), did not mark the late school of generative semantics as its target of criticism, but a more general TSP (The Standard Picture), a term which could be seen as applying also to certain more orthodox generative approaches. It is clear, though, that if semantics lies beyond the boundary of autonomous grammar, then what is attacked is not generative linguistics per se, but only semantic approaches compatible with it.

Psycho-linguistics maintains such a semantic approach. Note how despite his awareness of the debate following Fodor et al. (1989), Levelt (1989: 182) chooses to ignore its added complexities:

A speaker's mental lexicon is a repository of declarative knowledge about the words of his language. From the point of view of language production, each item in the lexicon is a listing of at least four kinds of features. There is, first, the specification of the item's meaning. This is the set of conceptual conditions that must be fulfilled in the message for the item to become selected. For the entry eat the meaning is something like "to ingest for nourishment or pleasure". [...] There are, probably, additional properties stored with an item. It may have particular pragmatic, stylistic, and affective features that make it fit one context of discourse better than another. [...] Certain so-called registers (talk to babies, talk between lovers, etc.) seem to select for lexical items with particular connotational properties. Whether such features should be considered as conceptual conditions on the item's use is a matter of much dispute. We will not go into it.

Non-decompositional approaches restore the word as a primitive notion and relegate the inter-relationships between words to domains outside the word, such as semantic memory structure represented as linked networks of lemmas and retrieved by means of spreading activation (Roelofs 1992). The invariability of the meaning of the word is not weakened, perhaps even strengthened, by this move. That mainstream psycho-linguistics has aligned itself with mainstream Chomskyan linguistics is a clear indication that it prefers to remain entrenched in the same unproblematic modernistic position of scientifically sound procedures, and is willing to commit itself to interdisciplinarity only where the other discipline maintains a
similar position. However, since history and certain trends in the social disciplines do not carry a scientific identity card, they are out of bounds for similar enterprises. As a result, any word-internal dynamics that might be motivated by historical and social forces is unfathomable.

2. The dialectical view of the word

Having suffered many years from political silencing in its original Russian version in the Soviet Union, Voloshinov's work resurfaced in the seventies through its translation into English. The challenge of capturing the relation between fixity and variability was met by Voloshinov's theory of the sign (Voloshinov 1986 [1929]), one of the early attempts in the twentieth century to provide a framework for viewing the sign in dialectical terms. For the last twenty odd years his views have been circulating (under his own name or under a presumed restoration of Bakhtin's authorship), making an impact on the writings of semioticians and literary critics, but in linguistics they have not yet received the attention they deserve.

Voloshinov's work, intended to be a contribution to Marxist theory, is based on the standard suppositions of Marxism, schematically summarized here in six points:

(a) The ontological supposition: The world is material, despite the question of grasping or representing it.
(b) The historical supposition: History is a social process, motivated by class conflict.
(c) The sociological supposition: Class conflict is motivated by the economic infrastructure (=base). It is accompanied by superstructural phenomena.
(d) The epistemological supposition: The individual grasps the world through consciousness.
(e) The psychological supposition: The psyche (=individual consciousness) is a product of social forces.
(f) The gnoseological supposition: There are two modes of consciousness: true and false. True consciousness is scientific knowledge; false consciousness is ideology.

Voloshinov identified the function of language in the domains of suppositions (d)-(f). As for supposition (c), he insisted that the sign was not a class feature, but rather a property of the whole community of speakers. This was a radical political stance in the USSR of those days, while the hegemonic dogma voiced by Marr contended that language was a superstructural expression of class. Ironically, only in 1950 was Marr's theory superseded by Stalin's article on linguistics, which determined that language was a tool of society as a whole, not of a particular class. Stalin, who was responsible for the extermination of intellectuals such as Voloshinov, turned out to be the agent of his ideas.

For Voloshinov, language is a social device for inter-individual communication, thus it is first and foremost dialogic in character. Voloshinov rejected idealistic conceptions of the psyche, and insisted that ideology and psyche consist of the same material, i.e. of language, with only a secondary difference
between them: in ideology speech is overt, in the psyche it is covert, *inner speech*. (Vygotsky's 1962 [1934] *inner speech* draws, no doubt, on "many of the same social and scholarly currents"; see Emerson 1986: 27). Hence, the word is the atom of both ideology and psyche. It should be clear that for Voloshinov the pair ideology-psyche does not boil down to the pair social-individual. The psyche is socially constructed, the counterpart of *social* being *natural*, not *individual* (34). The difference between ideology and psyche is merely a matter of organization, of grouping into systems:

[..] any cognitive thought whatever, even one in my consciousness, in my psyche, comes into existence [..] with an orientation toward an ideological system of knowledge where that thought will find its place. My thought, in this sense, from the very start belongs to an ideological system and is governed by its set of laws. But, at the same time, it belongs to another system that is just as much a unity and just as much in possession of its own set of laws - the system of my psyche. The unity of this second system is determined not only by the unity of my biological organism, but also by the whole aggregate of conditions of life and society in which that organism has been set.(35)

What makes language capable of carrying out its outer and inner communicational function is the nature of its building blocks, the fact that they are semiotic units, signs. Though morphology and syntax have, no doubt, meaning as well, it is the word that bears it in its ultimate fashion: "*The word is the ideological phenomenon par excellence*" (13; italicized in the original). Three functional elements play a role in the process of signification. The first element is *theme*: every word has a theme, which is its contextual function. Theme is the unique, singular, irreproducible culmination of a historical event. The second element is "reproducible and self-identical in all instances of repetition" (100), referred to as *meaning* in a narrow technical sense. Hence, the study of signification can take two paths: that of the investigation of theme, and that of the investigation of meaning. Voloshinov blames Structuralism (including the Bloomfieldian variety) for legitimizing only one path:

Such discriminations as those between a word's *usual* and *occasional* meanings, between its central and lateral meanings, between its denotation and connotation, etc., are fundamentally unsatisfactory. The basic tendency underlying all such discriminations - the tendency to ascribe greater value to the central, usual aspect of meaning, presupposing that that aspect really does exist and is stable - is completely fallacious. Moreover, it would leave theme unaccounted for, since theme, of course, can by no means be reduced to the status of the occasional or lateral meaning of words. (102)

Needless to say, similar criticism could be leveled at the integrationalist approach. And in fact, Voloshinov does it, premonitionally as it were:

*Meaning is the technical apparatus for the implementation of theme*. Of course, no absolute, mechanistic boundary can be drawn between theme and meaning. There is no theme without meaning and no meaning without theme. Moreover, it is even impossible to convey the meaning of a particular word (say, in the course of teaching another person a foreign language) without having made it an element of theme, i.e., without having constructed an "example" utterance. On the other hand, a theme must base itself on some kind of fixity of meaning; otherwise it loses its connection with what came before and what comes after - i.e., it altogether loses its significance. (100)

As mentioned above, theme is a sum total of linguistic and non-linguistic factors of
a situation. Hence, theme minus meaning leaves us with a residue, one of whose factors is the evaluative accent:

Any word used in actual speech possesses not only theme and meaning in the referential, or content, sense of these words, but also value judgment: i.e., all referential contents produced in living speech are said or written in conjunction with a specific evaluative accent. There is no such thing as word without evaluative accent. (103)

A theory of change has much to do with the recognition of the evaluative accent:

[...] with respect to changes of meaning, it is precisely evaluation that plays the creative role. A change in meaning is, essentially, always a reevaluation: The transposition of some particular word from one evaluative context to another. (105)

If taken verbatim, these words of Voloshinov are problematic, for he appears to attribute every single change to evaluative accent. Having read Saussure very carefully, Voloshinov had a theoretical reason to identify and enliven the Saussurean duality exactly where it could not have been picked up by reductionists of all kinds. Voloshinov would easily concede that changes take place which are motivated by the linguistic system (analogy, etc.), not by social struggle. Through historization of his project we are able to map and mitigate overstatements. Voloshinov himself admits that he is committed

[...] to the modest task of delineating the basic directions that genuine Marxist thinking about language must take and the methodological guidelines on which that thinking must rely in approaching the concrete problems of linguistics. (xiii)

So let us concentrate on the central component of Voloshinov's discourse, the nature of the evaluative accent as a political phenomenon:

Existence reflected in sign is not merely reflected but refracted. How is this refraction of existence in the ideological sign determined? By an intersection of differently oriented social interests within one and the same sign community, i.e. by the class struggle.

Class does not coincide with the sign community, i.e., with the community which is the totality of users of the same set of signs for ideological communication. Thus various different classes will use one and the same language. As a result, differently oriented accents intersect in every ideological sign. Sign becomes an arena of the class struggle.

This social multiaccentuality of the ideological sign is a very crucial aspect. By and large, it is thanks to this intersecting of accents that a sign maintains its vitality and dynamism and the capacity for further development. (23)

Being part of the social struggle, the sign ought to be subject to the gnoseological supposition (f) above, namely that some of its accents would embody false consciousness, while others would represent the truth. This is in fact upheld:

A sign does not simply exist as part of a reality - it reflects and refracts another reality. Therefore it may distort that reality or be true to it [my emphasis], or may perceive it from a special point of view [...]. (10)

If one of the accents is taken to be true, is there anything that marks it as such? Is
there any way to identify its true nature? For Voloshinov the word does not have a true/false inclination in toto; truth may be sorted out and negotiated through accents.

Voloshinov’s view solves a communicative problem. In the Saussurean model a mismatch of signifiés among interlocutors necessarily results in collapsed communication, while in Voloshinov’s model, which recognizes the mutual awareness of interlocutors to different accents in the same word, communication does not break down. Rather the sense of the word emerges and re-emerges on different fronts of the social struggle. Thus, for a dialectical model of meaning, Voloshinov’s concept of multiaccentuality is indispensable, but its weak point, the psychological constitution of the user of language, calls for revision. Such a model is further enhanced by the concept of the speaking subject, as developed by Michel Pêcheux, under an Althusserian conceptual framework.

Althusser formulated the mechanism by which ideology determines the nature of the individual, and supplied a possible bridge between the social and the individual. He defined ideology as "a 'representation' of the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence" (1971 [1970]: 162). Ideology produces and is reproduced by individuals who have always-already been interpellated as subjects:

[...] the individual is interpellated as a (free) subject in order that he shall submit freely to the commandments to the Subject, i.e. in order that he shall (freely) accept his subjection, i.e. in order that he shall make the gestures and actions of his subjection "all by himself". (182, italics in original)

Althusser’s concept of the interpellated subject, goes way beyond Voloshinov’s view of the psyche as inner speech (see Voloshinov’s earlier book Freudianism, 1976 [1927]). Having been formulated half a century later, it uses more mature Freudian concepts. Althusser basically accepted Freud’s perspective of the split subject:

Freud has discovered for us that the real subject, the individual in his unique essence, has not the form of an ego, centred on the "ego", on "consciousness" or on "existence" - whether this is the existence of the for-itself, of the body-proper or of "behaviour" - that the human subject is de-centred, constituted by a structure which has no "centre" either, except in the imaginary misrecognition of the "ego", i.e. in the ideological formations in which it recognizes itself. (1971 [1964]: 218)

Pêcheux (1982 [1975]) further articulated Althusser’s philosophy in the domain of language. For Pêcheux, the very act of signification, of attributing a slice of reality to a signifier, is an operation of the always-already interpellated subject. Althusser’s statement on the interpellation of the subject, is now applied to the linguistic facet of the subject, the speaking subject, assuming the following shape:

[...] individuals are "interpellated" as speaking-subjects (as subjects of their discourse) by the discursive formations which represent "in language" the ideological formations that correspond to them. (112)

Being a speaking subject necessitates intersubjectivity, the other. Therefore, what is conceived by the subject as "having some meaning" coincides - within the discursive
make-up of that subject - with a more general ideological formation, communally maintained by a society of subjects. While this view historicizes and relativizes what Voloshinov called *meaning*, subjecting both meaning and accent to a modality of being historically generated, it does not keep Voloshinov's distinction between one part of ideology which becomes historically embodied as the *meaning of a word as a general "fiction"*, commonsensically held as valid by all speaking-subjects of a linguistic community within a broad historical phase, and another part of ideology which embodies the *accent of a word at stake* in a particular social conflict, in a singular historical conjuncture.

It would only be fair to Voloshinov to mention that although he did not maintain a refined view of the split subject, he did observe gaps within consciousness, which produce misconceptions. Voloshinov used the term reification to describe the misconceptions resulting from this gap. He criticized modern linguistics for reifying the normatively fixed part of a meaning of a word. His use of the term reification follows a clear path in Marxist theory. It has its roots in Marx's terms Verdinglichung and Versachlichung (Marx 1894: 366), employed for the objectification-mystification of the commodity, wherein an economic relation had ossified as an entity. Lukács broadened the concept, so as to apply to social and cultural relations in general:

> [...] a relation between people takes on the character of a thing and thus acquires "phantom objectivity", an autonomy that seems so strictly rational and all-embracing as to conceal every trace of its fundamental nature: the relation between people. (1990 [1922]: 83)

Voloshinov applied the term reification to the way structuralism - or what he called abstract objectivism - treated the linguistic sign in general, and the word in particular. The word as a social entity, a relation between people, has a normativized invariable part, and a socially contingent part. The normativized part is reified by Saussurean structuralism within langue, and acquires phantom objectivity in the form of an autonomous system. This entity then becomes the sole object of the preferred mode of linguistic investigation, synchronic description. The aspect of change is relegated to the less valued parole. Though this view of reification is explanatorily inferior to the effects of a split subject, it does address the question of internal balance between variable and invariable:

Abstract objectivism [...] is incapable of tying together the existence of language in its abstract, synchronic dimension with the evolution of language. Language exists for the consciousness of the speaker as a system of normatively identical forms, but only for the historian as a process of generation. This excludes any possibility for the speaker's consciousness to be actively in touch with the process of historical evaluation. The dialectical coupling of necessity with freedom and with, so to speak, linguistic responsibility is, of course, utterly impossible on these grounds. A purely mechanistic conception of linguistic necessity holds sway here. (81)

Despite the lack of a split word in Pêcheux's work, it is thanks to his view of the split speaking subject that a more mature theory of scientific knowledge - regarding the gnoseological supposition (f) above - can emerge. We may recall that Voloshinov considered one of the accents to be "true to reality". Althusser could not sustain such a straightforward "voice of truth":

32 Ron Kuzar
Both the one who is writing these lines and the reader who reads them are themselves subjects, and therefore ideological subjects (a tautological proposition) [...]. That the author, insofar as he writes the lines of a discourse which claims to be scientific, is completely absent as a "subject" from "his" scientific discourse (for all scientific discourse is by definition a subject-less discourse, there is no "subject of science" except in an ideology of science) is a different question which I shall leave on one side for the moment. (171)

This enigmatic passage has attracted much critical fire, for the possibility of a subject-less discourse as an entity within materialist theorizing does not come into clear relief without further explication. Althusser re-addresses the topic two pages later, with no higher credibility:

But to recognize that we are subjects [...] - this recognition only gives us the "consciousness" of our incessant (eternal) practice of ideological recognition - its consciousness, i.e. its recognition - but in no sense does it give us the (scientific) knowledge of the mechanism of this recognition. Now it is this knowledge that we have to reach, if you will, while speaking in ideology, and from within ideology we have to outline a discourse which tries to break with ideology, in order to dare to be the beginning of a scientific (i.e. subject-less) discourse on ideology. (173)

Aware of this inelegant exposition, Pêcheux tried to unravel it. He drew a distinction between "the process of the production of knowledges" which is subject-less, and the "scientific discourse" which can never be "pure", i.e. "unconnected with any ideology" (142). Thus it is not the discourse which is transformed from being ideological to being scientific. Discourse is ever-ideological; yet from discourse a body of knowledge can be extracted which is ever-emergent. This distinction, despite its potential, only short-circuits in Pêcheux's explication, because he deterministically ties it to the intellectual product of the proletariat:

[... the historically novel character of proletarian ideological practice [...] consists, in my opinion at any rate, of working explicitly and consistently on the subject-form. (158)

Pêcheux attributes the veracity of proletarian discourse to its self-reflection on the subject form. For him it is a mechanism naturally built into proletarian knowledge:

The paradoxical result of this repercussion of the process without a subject of knowledge on the individuals who are its agents is therefore that it realises in the subject-form a challenging of the subject-form. [...] a process in which ideological interpelation continues to operate as it were against itself. (195)

A refinement of Pêcheux's orientation is necessary to support his contribution to the model of meaning. Pêcheux's position that

[...] one never breaks with ideology in general, but always with some particular ideological formation, historico-materially inscribed in the complex set of the ideological formations of a given social formation. (184)

reads as a promising generalization that could modify his own position on proletarian knowledge. Using Engels's pair of notion and concept as convenient labels for the product of ideological and scientific thought, respectively, the
accumulation of knowledge in such an altered Pècheuxian model shall be viewed as an incessant process of elaboration and distillation of focal notions into concepts, carried out by subjects cognizant of their being interpellated as speaking subjects, and as producers of a notional-ideological discourse. An essential corollary of this process is the understanding that because of the nature of words - all words - as ideologically motivated signs, i.e. as notions, the simultaneous distillation of all notions as concepts within one finite stretch of discourse is impossible. Concepts under focus may be viewed as partially distilled insofar as the subject has successfully expressed the ideological boundaries in which his or her discourse is taking place. The acquisition of knowledge is thus an uneven process of discursively shifting between foci of attention, in the course of which accentual inaccuracies are constantly disregarded so as to elaborate and articulate other accentual inaccuracies. This constant movement can take place within one text, within the works of one author, or inter-textually within a discipline, but since at any historical moment the body of texts is finite, knowledge is always partial, and does not cease to be an attribute of the speaking subject. This mode of knowledge via self-aware modesty seems to me the appropriate alternative to the condescending conviction of positivist truth.

Subject-less discourse is the utopian horizon of this process, wherein the community of scholars strives to infinitely maximize distilled concepts and minimize opaque notions, as part of the collective enterprise of obtaining knowledge. It is this sort of process that may be considered subject-less, in the sense that it is incessant and social. In Kuzar (1997) I refer to this activity as scholarship, as opposed to the static and mythical notion of scientiftcity. Within such a framework, then, the acquisition of knowledge does not aim at scientific truth but at scholarly knowledge. This conceptual framework does not offer a verification test with regard to the voice of truth in social conflict. However, some operational parameters of veracity can be postulated. In a particular historical conjuncture, a text will express the interest of its social sector through (a) a materialist conceptual framework, (b) cognizant of the duality of word, speaking-subject, and society, by (c) implementing relatively distilled concepts, (d) accompanied by accents consonant with these concepts, (e) while minimizing the employment of crude notions. Such a text possesses a higher level of veracity than one which lacks these characteristics. This set of parameters upholds the ontological suppositkl (supposition (a) above) as primary, i.e. as supported merely by belief. Thus, it cannot be subjected to theoretical challenge by an idealist worldview, which denies this supposition. An idealist worldview is, therefore, not a challenge that can be intellectually worked out, but a proposal to adopt an alternative belief.

In what parts of our discipline is the recognition of the three splits relevant to scholarly practice? Does this approach forestall formal linguistics? My answer would be that wherever the invariable systemic aspect of language is selected as the object of investigation, the three splits may be consciously marginalized; wherever change and variation are involved, the three splits have a central theoretical role. Such an approach does not preclude linguistic formalisms merely on the ground of their being formal and marginalizing the contingent. What is important to remember is that even where systemic investigation is carried out, the boundaries between system and non-system have to be actively delineated, and - where necessary - problematized. This is so, because the boundaries between system and non-system
are form, not substance; they do not automatically emerge from the physical matter of language, but are observed by the investigating subject, and as such are controvertible.

The alternatives to this scholarly practice are twofold. At one end of the spectrum one finds most contemporary linguistic practice, which assumes that the boundaries are clear-cut. This assumption eventually builds up and solidifies as a certain kind of social amnesia (see Jacoby 1975), i.e. a communal forgetting of the act of delimitation by which the discipline was initially constituted. This forgetting becomes salient when the investigation encounters borderline cases, which at that point of amnesia already fail to activate a recollection of the unevenness of the material and of the observing subject. This forgetting has an even more striking effect, when the "forgetful" researcher attempts to explain not only that which is systemic, but also that which is changing, in systemic terms. This is, then, carried out via opaque and crude notions, such as "subjective comment" (Diverian school of Columbia), "creativity" (Palmer 1972: 184ff.), "intention of speaker" (illocution theories), "displaced speech" as expressed in "lying, irony, jesting, poetry, narrative fiction" (Bloomfield 1933: 141-2), "Humpty Dumpty's language" (Fromkin & Rodman 1993: 123-4) "loaded" words and "abuse" of words (Bolinger 1980) - all of which are not subjected to conceptual distillation, and have little explanatory power.

At the other end of the spectrum we find the school of integrationalism, which problematizes the concept of system, but instead of dialectically incorporating it into its model rejects it altogether, and cultivates in its stead an idea of sociologized contingency, sometimes named holistic. Such a Heraclitian position nowadays can only be viewed as obsolete. A Lockean conception of social formations which assumes an integral individual whose scientifically minded ego exercises free will, does not fare any better.

3. Metaphorical summary: The word as a piston

The operation of the word as a split entity constituted by social factors can be represented through the image of a piston (see illustration). To liberate our discussion from the confusing effect of using meaning for both general and specific senses, I shall henceforth use the following terms: c-meaning (contingent meaning) for Voloshinov's theme, n-meaning (normative meaning) for his meaning, leaving accent untouched. The piston chamber is divided in two. The top chamber contains c-meaning. A big part of it is n-meaning. When used in conformity with the dominant ideology, the boundary between the n-meaning and the dominant accent is hard to conceive. Under the disc are the subversive accents, which try to apply upward pressure, while the dominant accent (as part of a cohesive dominant ideology linked to it by the rod) exerts downward pressure, trying to minimize or annul the subversive accents. Clearly, many words in language have - at a given point in history - no subversive accents, so that the disc of the piston rests at the bottom of the tube and the single chamber represents consensus. The only difference between this chamber and the Saussurean sign is its inherent potential to become dynamic and socially controversial. The relative size of the lower chamber and the upper chamber represent the acuteness of the struggle within a word; the higher the disc, the more conflictual the word.
This metaphor represents some important characteristics of the word and the dynamic relation between its parts, such as the puzzling existence of ideologically inactive words, the level of social conflict involved, the blurred distinction between normative meaning and dominant accent, the link between internal dominant accent and external ideological framework, and most importantly, the fact that social conflict does not concern only a local struggle between two (or more) accents, but affects the whole internal constitution of the word, as the arena of social conflict. I think this metaphor demonstrates all these features, but like any metaphor, the designans is not isomorphic with its designatum, and if stretched too far, it can distort what I have meant it to symbolize.

4. Lexicons

So far only single words have been discussed. But ideology is not supported by a random assortment of words, but by a web of interconnected words. The terms vocabulary or lexicon are used to express this network. A distinction is sometimes made between the dictionary, that physical object that we keep on our shelves, and the lexicon, which is the abstract list of lexemes accompanied - inter alia - by their
meanings. The nature of the lexicon is a byproduct of the tenets of one’s linguistic theory; thus the Saussurean lexicon is a social entity, while the Bloomfieldian and Chomskyan lexicons are individual. Both have a certain level of fixity which will be absent in the lexicon of integrationalists, who view it as an expression of momentary, ever-contingent and ever-evolving norm.

But if we adopt a view of the word as the arena of social conflict, and of multiaccentuality as ideologically operative and effective both in the conscious and the unconscious domains of mind and discourse, then also the scope of the lexicon ought to be viewed dynamically. We may start from the largest social lexicon, which for languages such as English, French, or Swahili might be multi-national; this category is empty for purely single-state national languages such as Hebrew, but not necessarily for non-state ethnic communities such as Basque or Kurdi. Cross-categorial combinations also exist, where vast immigration waves take place. The cross-state cross-national language - in the broadest sense of the word "language" - contains the most diversified lexicon, the one with the highest potential for multiaccentuality. English on the internet is its ultimate embodiment. However, such a vast multiplicity of accents does not necessarily correspond to social splits relevant to the whole community of speakers. The particular accents of French separatist ideology in Canada are not normally relevant to the French-speaking community of Switzerland, and only remotely to the community of France, unless forcefully imported into national discourse by the French president. The segmentation into geographically secluded communities does not necessarily imply social conflict, in the narrow sense of the word.

At the second level, after the multi-national lexicon, we find the national lexicon, which is usually the broadest lexicon registering relevant multiaccentuality. Under it we may have different sub-lexicons which represent a historically localized social conflict, be it about economic, national, ethnic, sexual, or any other issue. Within a particular sub-lexicon multiaccentuality is reduced. Further differentiation is meaningful as well. A lexicon does not exist in advance of the subjects maintaining it, but rather it is an abstraction which we as scholars extract from texts produced by those subjects. Hence, any coherent sequence of texts, any linguistic corpus, will have - once defined - its own lexicon. It is, therefore, justified to talk about lexicons such as that of a particular newspaper (during a certain historical period), or that of radio and television stations (e.g. those that are state-controlled), the lexicon of a single author, or a single text (story, article, book, poem, user manual, etc.).

Within each sub-lexicon, near-uniaccentuality will usually prevail for words actively relevant to the holder of that lexicon. Regular multiaccentuality will be the lot of all other words which are either irrelevant to the current ideological agenda or are relevant in ways not conceptualized. Part of the strategy of negotiating the meaning of a word is to unmask such accents, thus often enforcing their movement from the unconscious to the conscious.

This model resolves the Marr-Voloshinov (or Marr-Stalin) controversy. Whether or not language is class-oriented is a question that presupposes a clear-cut dichotomy between society and class. Such a dichotomy is crude, and is potentially undermined by the very idea of multiaccentuality of word and lexicon. Language has both society and class orientations through the social struggle and the interplay between sub-lexicons in the social sphere.
5. Case study: Terms of "death" and "injury" in Israeli political discourse of the 1980s

The case study presented here involves some politically salient words in the lexicon and sub-lexicons of Israeli Hebrew of the 1980s. The text that was selected for the investigation was Haggai Segal’s book (Segal 1987) "?axim yekarim": Korot 'hamaxteret hayehudit" ("Dear Brothers": The Story of "The Jewish Underground"; the quotation marks in both cases are original and meaningful). The text is characteristic of all the genres of Segal’s writing in the 1980s: participant-historiography, journalism, and fiction (short stories). The book was written in jail while the author served a three-year sentence for his part in the attempted assassination of Palestinian mayors of the West Bank by sabotaging their cars. The mayors were not killed, but two of them lost their legs. Segal was a member of a group of settlers known as The Jewish Underground, who killed and injured Palestinian leaders and civilians in the early 1980s. He wrote the book in order to explain to the Israeli public the emergence of that underground.

I present here only a partial report of a larger body of evidence. Seven lexical means will be instantiated here, out of a total of some 50 terms of "death" and "injury" (totalling 740 tokens). In what follows I will use meaning as a general term, and n-meaning (=normative meaning), c-meaning (=contingent meaning), and accent as explained in section 3. above. Accent, the ideologically evaluative element, will be rendered as a proposition. It should be clear that while n-meaning and accent are generalized concepts, c-meaning is always contingent, it is the particular meaning at a specific historical moment. Therefore it can only be generalized on statistical grounds. Many similar occurrences of the same c-meaning culminate in an accent, however there is no need to assume that all c-meanings are equal. It is enough to show that one of them prevails statistically. A word on statistics is in order here. What Segal does in his book is to show how the actions of the Jewish underground were a natural and inevitable consequence of Arab terrorism. Therefore the killing of Jews by Arabs is part of the narrative. The passages dealing with Arabs killing Jews and with Jews killing Arabs are equal in size. My statistical assumption is that both cases are equally represented.

5.1. Words from the root r*c*x

This root appears in the noun recax ‘murder’, in the related active and passive verbal forms (lircoax ‘to murder’, leheracax ‘to be murdered’, in the verbal noun recixa ‘murder(ing)’, and in the adjective racxani ‘murderous’.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>N-meaning:</th>
<th>C-meaning:</th>
<th>Accent:</th>
<th>Statistics:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Premeditated killing with a negative ethical evaluation.</td>
<td>Any event of such killing between all members of all national groups, save the case of Jews killing Arabs. Predominantly used for Arabs killing Jews.</td>
<td>Arabs murder Jews. Jews do not murder Arabs.</td>
<td>145 occurrences, of which 101 relate to Arabs killing Jews. In 92 of these occurrences the speaker is the author or a quoted</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
fellow-settler.

It should be noted that the negative ethical evaluation, which is sometimes referred to as the "connotation" of this verb (as opposed to the neutral connotation of 'kill'), is part of the n-meaning in our analysis here, since this evaluation is socially agreed on. It is only in the actual application of words of this root that we would find different behavior, i.e. in the linguistic practice representing ideology.

Examples:
In these, and all following examples the name of the speaker precedes the quoted sentence.

5.7.7. Arabs killing Jews:

(1) Segal: Over twenty of the inhabitants of Kiryat-Arba [a settlement] assembled in one of the local apartments to discuss their possible actions in light of the lack of governmental response to the murder recax. (74)
(2) Segal: The murder recax of Aharon Gross in the central square of the city [Hebron] was carried out in the midst of the strike [...]. (147)
(3) Segal: A few hours after the murder recax minister Arens came to Hebron. (148)
(4) Segal: Two travelers, a man and a woman, were murdered nircexu in Gaza. (93)
(5) Settler Moti Shvat: It was exactly here that they murdered racxu Yehoshua Sluma during the Tu-Bishvat holiday. (13)
(6) Settler Yitzkhak Ganeiram: I feel that it is impossible to remain silent after the murder recax. (73)

5.7.2. Israeli authorities, as quoted by Segal, on Arabs killing Jews:

(7) Labor minister [1968, old quotation] Yigal Alon: We must not accept the fact that because of a murderous racxani pogrom in 1929, we, out of our own will, should make Hebron judenrein. (25)
(8) Commander of Judea and Samaria [The West Bank], Binyamin Ben-Eliezer: We want you to come with us to the military headquarters; there we will discuss our response to the murder recax. (68)
(9) Israeli Radio announcer: Today is the shloshim [thirtieth day of mourning] of the murder recax of the yeshiva (Jewish religious academy) students in Hadassa House [in Hebron]. (99)

5.7.3. Non-Arab gentile, Ukraine leader Petlyura, killing Jews:

(10) Segal: Then I read out loud an editorial from Haaretz [daily newspaper] from some fifty years ago - after the acquittal in a French court of Shalom
Schwarzbard, the executor of Petlyura, the Ukraine murderer of Jews. (261)

5.1.4. Five cases of Arabs killing Arabs:

(11) Segal: Two persons, who had been considered collaborators with Israel, were murdered during the activity of the [Palestinian] National Guidance Committee, as a direct result of its incitement. (87)

(12) Settler Elyakim Haetzni: There were years in which a number of Arabs were murdered daily by the PLO. (143)

The killing of Arabs by Arabs is often mentioned in the writings of the right as testimony for the different values of Arab society, where life is much cheaper. The implication is that when Jews kill Arabs they should be judged by internal Arab standards, not by the higher Jewish standards.

5.1.5. Nine cases of Jews killing Jews

These concern the killing of Israeli peace demonstrator Emil Greenzweig during a Peace Now demonstration:

(13) Segal: The murder of Emil Greenzweig and the bitter tension between left and right, while the war in Lebanon was still going on, filled him [underground member] with worries that the ever-growing manifestations of national polarization will lead to national disaster or even civil war. (145)

5.1.6. 27 cases of Jews killing Arabs

If these examples turned out to be bona fide labels of the act, the decisive formulation of the accent above should have been challenged. However, this is not the case. In all occurrences the naming of the act as 'murder' is rhetorically estranged.

In 11 cases it is Segal quoting directly or indirectly the language of the law, i.e. Segal is citing the accent of rivals, but often explicitly inserts his own reservation into the text.

(14) Segal: After four months Ilan Tor was arrested for "intentional" murder [of a demonstrating Arab female pupil]. (90)

The quotation marks around "intentional" serve here as this kind of reservation, which estranges the accent of 'murder'.

(15) Segal: They [settlers being attacked] will probably weigh in their minds for a few seconds whether it is worthwhile to defend themselves, for they may be arrested or perhaps even charged with intentional murder. (91)
The estrangement of "murder" is expressed here rhetorically, through the creation of relative symmetry (where convenient), representing the oppressor-oppressed relation as a dispute between equals over land. Thus attacks of Jews on Arabs and Arabs on Jews are symmetrical moves in this "territorial dispute". In such a context, the absurdity of the situation of a human being under attack having to consider the legal implications of self-defense serves as the reservation towards the use of the lexeme "murder".

(16) Segal: Six people were charged with murder recax in the college affair. (239)

The event referred to as "the college affair" was a planned assassination of Arab students in the Islamic College of Hebron, carried out with submachine guns. The rivals' accent of "murder" is quoted in light of the lightness of the event which was merely an "affair". This lexical device will be discussed below.

5.1.7. 16 cases of state and civil society functionaries about Arabs killing Jews:

Other settlers, their attorneys, the judges in their cases, political leaders of the right, and some government officials are quoted by Segal as sharing the ideology of the settlers. To a great extent this is accurate:

(17) Anonymous settler: How come Jews are arrested on the eve of Sabbath as if they were dangerous murderers rocxim? (171)

The words "as if" estrange the accent.

(18) Settler Yehuda Etzyon: Committing killings without a comprehensive design to attain national leadership might be ethically interpreted as plain murder recax. (160)

The phrase "might be ethically interpreted as" performs the accentual estrangement.

(19) Settler Yehuda Etzyon: Were we to go up to Temple Mount, as part of our activities, and injure an anonymous guard, without eventually creating a new state of affairs, then we would be considered plain murderers rocxim. (207)

The possibility of killing an Arab guard is referred to as "injure" (to be discussed below). "Murder" is again estranged through "would be considered". The Shabak [General Security Service] used the same language when interrogating the members of the underground:

(20) Shabak interrogator Yaakov: We know that you have always been opposed to actions of mass injury among Arabs, and here, in [the case of] the buses something was about to happen which has the character of a murder recax and mass killing. (191)
The interrogator also uses an estranging strategy: "something which has the character of a murder". In all the cases above it is clear that the speakers do not consider it appropriate to use the c-meaning "murder" in the context of a Jewish settler killing an Arab.

5.2. Words from the root p.q.a.

This root appears in the noun pqi? a ‘injury’, and the active and passive related verbs lifgoa ‘to injure’ and lehipaga ‘to be injured’. The noun pigua of the same root is left out here, to be discussed separately.

N-meaning: With animates: Injury, injure. No premeditation implied. Death may result, but is not implied. No ethical attitude implied. With inanimates: Damage.

C-meaning: The word is predominantly used for cases of Jews injuring Arabs, especially where the result is death.

Accent: Jews do not usually massacre, assassinate, murder, or kill Arabs; they injure them, even though the result is often death. Depicted in this way, these deeds are not subject to ethical judgment.

Statistics: The word occurs 55 times. 46 occurrences refer to Jews injuring Arabs by Segal and by fellow-settlers, 4 occurrences refer to Arabs injuring Jews, and 5 other cases are neutral, such as Israeli soldiers injuring settlers and vice versa.

Examples:

5.2.1. Jews injuring Arabs:

(21) Segal: No longer [shall we conduct] selective injuring pqi? a of instigating leaders only, [...] but now [we intend] to cause the injuring pqi? a of the centers of instigation, even when it is unclear who exactly will be the ones injured hanifga?im. (151)

(22) Settler Shaul Nir: It is true that injuring pqi? a a man or a whole community is a seemingly unethical act; but on the other hand, one must always remember that also the right to survive is anchored in ethics, as well as a people’s national right to be the sole sovereign within the borders of its homeland. (159)

In these statements the settlers express their determination to cause deadly injuries among Arabs, not minor wounds, though if the sentences are read out of context this may not be apparent.

(23) Segal: The [Palestinian] company had seven magnificent buses, and Shauli decided to damage lifgoa five of those carrying passengers from the Kalandiya refugee camp to East Jerusalem. (161)
Again, if taken out of context, such a sentence may imply that the settler was going to damage some empty buses, perhaps in a parking lot. In fact, the settler was going to blow up the buses and kill its passengers. When the text deals with the past, there is no doubt as to the results of the injury:

(24) Segal: Two students taking a walk in a little grove in the yard were injured nifge?u first. (152)

The event described here is the attack by members of the Jewish underground on students of the Islamic College in Hebron with submachine guns and hand grenades. These two students were killed on the spot.

5.2.2. Arabs injuring Jews:

(25) Segal: Quickly they [some settlers] made their way in the darkness that was created by the explosions, until they stumbled on the first [dead] body. Eli Hazeev [a settler] was lying there on his stomach. His hand was clutching the place of injury pgi?a. A stream of blood was flowing from him down the filthy ally. (16)

This passage describes an attack of Arabs on settlers. Here the word pgi?a is not used for the act of injury, since the reader is informed that this was already a dead body. It is merely used in a technical sense, to indicate the source of the stream of blood.

(26) Segal: Eitan Arbel and Khanan Krotheimer were injured nifge?u by the first grenade. They were thrown to the ground. Khanan's face got covered with blood. He breathed heavily. (15)

Here again the word "injured" is used in a narrow technical sense, to denote a particular point in the whole process. It is part of a long, detailed, vivid description of the agony of the sufferer and the atrocity of the deed. Its c-meaning here is different than that of the same word when used as a single verb to denote the total process of killing Arabs.

The two words "murder" and "injury/injure" have complementary functions, under one coherent ideology. Arabs usually murder Jews, which is an action of the condemnable kind. Jews do not murder Arabs. They may be blamed by others for doing so, but this is a misjudgment. Jews only injure Arabs, an act that is ethically neutral, though the result of such injury may be death. But when one does the right thing, and as a result people lose their lives, it is an unfortunate event, for which one cannot be held responsible.

5.3. The word hatkafa

N-meaning: Attack. Ethically neutral term.
C-meaning: It names the actions of Jewish settlers against Arabs. It may also
describe the actions of Arabs against Jews, but then it is accompanied by the adjectives "murderous" or "terroristic".

Accent: One of the tenets of the settlers' ideology was that the situation in the territories was in fact a state of war (akin to the symmetry discussed above). In war, it is known, ethics collapses. One can expect similar kinds of actions to be taken on both sides. Hatkafa 'attack' is a neutral technical term of a legitimate military action. When a state of occupation is represented as a state of war between symmetrical forces, then the suppression of resistance can be termed 'attack', thus legitimizing it.

Statistics: The word occurs 19 times, 13 times for Jews killing Arabs and 6 times for Arabs killing Jews. In 3 of the 6 cases involving Arabs killing Jews the "attack" is further characterized as "murderous" etc. The word is not further modified in the former case.

Examples:

5.3.1. Arabs killing Jews:

(27) Segal: He [one of the attacked mayors] was personally involved in subversive political organizations, and helped conduct terrorist attacks hatkafot teroristiyot. (87)

(28) Segal: A bomb that exploded in a bus in Ashdod [a town within Israel proper], a murderous attack hatkafa racxanit on King George street in Jerusalem [...] motivated Shauli to consider a deterring assault in the public Arab transportation system. (161)

5.3.2. Jews killing Arabs:

(29) Segal: In 1983, a short while after the attack hatkafa on the Islamic College in Hebron [...]. (105)

(30) Segal: Livni [member of the underground] asked him to bring the Peugeot 504 [...], a popular car among the Arabs of Judea and Samaria [the West Bank], in order to confuse the investigators after the attack hatkafa.

5.4. The word pe?ula

N-meaning: Operation, action.
C-meaning: In the context of Jews injuring Arabs, Segal makes extensive use of general hyperonyms which due to their broad nature bear no reference to violence, or to ethical evaluation. Other examples are: erua 'event', yozma 'initiative', mivca 'operation', ma?ase 'deed', nose 'issue', ?inyan 'matter', pe?ilut 'activity', parasha 'affair', iguva 'response', toxnit 'plan' etc. To be sure, some of these uses fall within the legitimate category of co-referential devices, when they are consistent with conventions of cohesion and style.
Accent: Under the guise of such a legitimate practice, the use of hyperonyms is expanded as a way of covering up the specific nature of the underground's deeds. An attack of Jews on Arabs with deadly weapons and with intention to kill is merely an occurrence of "action", "operation", or "event".

Statistics: Hyperonyms are used hundreds of times. Since the distinction between a felicitous use for coreference and an ideological use for cover-up is not always clear-cut, no accurate statistics can be provided here.

Examples:

(31) Segal: I knew that my wife would not object, [...] but I wanted to save her the worries, so I decided to tell her about my participation in the action pe?ula only after it was over. (78)

(32) Settler Yitzkhak Ganeiram: Be on the road leading to Shilo right before midnight. There will be an action pe?ula against Bassam Shaka [one of the Arab mayors whose cars were sabotaged] (96)

(33) Member of the underground Yeshua Ben-Shushan: In these very moments an action pe?ula is taking place. I don't know exactly what, but we should pray. (160)

In some cases these hyperonyms are combined with the location:

(34) Segal: As was the case with the college action pe?ula hamixlala, now as well, Barak was doing the driving. (163)

5.5. The word mixlala

N-meaning: College.
C-meaning: Besides its usual use, Segal often uses the locus of the attack (i.e. the locality, the institution, or the job definition, which were the targets of attack) as its name. This is commonplace for military operations of an army (as one may say, for example, "after Pearl Harbor"), but also for operations of the heroic Jewish pre-state undergrounds. Other similar locutions are "the buses" and "Temple Mount".

Accent: The attack has a standard name. It joins a list of glorious operations. The Jewish underground in the occupied territories can be compared to the pre-state underground organizations.

Statistics: 3 occurrences. But there is a cumulative effect: Ha?otobusim "the buses" appear 7 times and rashei he?arim "the mayors" twice, etc.

Examples:

(35) Settler Noam Yinon: The assault against the mayors was associated in public consciousness with the blowing up of the buses, the college hamixlala and the Temple Mount plan. (211)

(36) Settler Gilead Peli: The buses ha?otobusim were a terrible deed. (241)
Though the settler Gilead Peli was critical of the operation, his vocabulary conforms with the ideological norms that guide his and his friends' discourse.

5.6. The word *kti?a*

N-meaning: Cutting off. When used with limbs it is a surgical term: amputation, or a description of the result of an accident. In the former it has an implication of healing; in the latter it is unfortunate.

C-meaning: It is used with the word *raglayim* 'legs' to indicate the operation of sabotaging the cars of the mayors, which resulted in the blowing up and loss of the legs of two mayors.

Accent: The incapacitation of the mayors as a result of an abortive attempt to kill them is a sterile, elegant medical procedure which is perhaps unfortunate, but may eventually have a positive "healing" effect.

Statistics: There are 2 occurrences of *kti?a* 'amputation'.

Examples:

(37) Segal: The leg cutting/amputation of *kti?a* at *raglei* the mayors of Ramalla and Nablus did not especially grieve most Israeli citizens, but only a few - like MK Rabbi Haiim Druckman and Rabbi Meir Kahana - dared to salute it publicly. (101)

(38) Segal: Five days after his leg was amputated/cut off *nikte?a* in the blowing up of his car [ ... ]. (290)

This word has a twin sibling, *kicuc* 'chopping', which is a technical term in several areas, such as chopping vegetables for a salad, shortening texts (i.e. editing). The expression "to chop one's wings" means metaphorically "to limit one's activity". In Biblical Hebrew it is used for the amputation of fingers and toes of rival kings as a symbol of submission (see Judges 1: 6-7). The availability of Biblical lexemes and meaning-variants is still viable in Israeli Hebrew, even more so among educated religious people, such as the members of the underground.

(39) Segal: In [the settlements] Ofra, Shilo, and Ramat-Magshimim many people aired their guesses that Etzyon, Natanson, or Ekale participated in Shaka and Khalaf's *kicuc raglayim* 'leg chopping'. (103)

5.7. The word *pigua*

*Pigua* is a relatively new word in Hebrew, thus it is of particular interest to our discussion, because its meaning is more actively negotiated within the community. In traditional dictionaries the word does not exist. Only in electronic dictionaries of the present decade it is registered. In Rav-Milim, an electronic Hebrew-Hebrew dictionary, it is defined as
[..] an act of sabotage done by terrorists; an intentional injuring/damaging (of people, buildings, etc.) in order to kill, destroy, and cause severe damage, done out of political, security, or criminal reasons. Example: The terrorists infiltrated into our land to carry out a terrorist pigua in a kibbutz near the border.

This definition post-dates by a decade the events of the 1980s, under discussion here, and takes them already into account. The definition is neutral, unlike, for example, the definition of racax 'murder' which contains the evaluative adjective "unjustified". Note especially the inclusion of "security reasons", a positive term in the Israeli context, in addition to the neutral "political" and the negative "criminal" reasons.

But when the word began circulation in the early seventies, its meaning at the time could be summarized as follows:

N-meaning: An attack, whether by a person or by a time-bomb, with the intention to kill. Often it was simply a Hebrew translation of "terrorism", preferred to the international word for purist linguistic reasons.

C-meaning: Used for such actions of Arabs against Jews. It should be noted that up until the 1980s no "terrorism" of Jews against Arabs is seriously registered in the chronology of hostilities between the two communities.

Accent: Arabs commit terrorist attacks.

However, when the Jewish underground made its first appearance, the Israeli press, in reports as well as in its discussions of the events, both critical and supportive, used the term pigua to describe the actions of its members. For those who were critical of these actions it was a polite substitute of "terrorism"; at that time only extra-consensual radicals dared to call these Jewish saboteurs "terrorists". For the more extremist supporters of the underground, who did not shy away from "terrorism" as a legitimate "answer to terrorism" it served as a convenient substitute for "terrorism", which is usually charged with negative judgment. Finally, for the more moderate, "understanding" critics, it served as a new word, distinct from "terrorism". The formation of a new word's c-meaning in the Israeli press, agreed upon by all political parties, was the background for Segal's choice of the word. The fact that it belongs to the neutral root p.g.? supported its neutralization, and brought it closer to the general meaning of this root.

Because this process of negotiation of the meaning of a new word seemed to me particularly important, I phoned Segal in July 1992, and asked him why he selected the word pigua as the main characterization of the underground's acts. He said he must have picked it bivli da?at 'unawares' from the press of those days. I then asked him whether he thought the word had any evaluative ethical sense in it. Segal said that he thought the word was neutral, even, perhaps, refined. Segal, then, completes a full cycle in the short life of this word, from terrorism back to the safe home of the neutral root p.g.? For Segal's lexicon, then, the following analysis seems appropriate:

N-meaning: An attack, whether by a person or by explosives, with the intention to kill. It is a neutral term.
C-meaning: Used for such actions, primarily for the case of Jews against Arabs, and only marginally for Arabs against Jews.

Accent: Between Jews and Arabs there is an incessant symmetrical exchange of hostilities. Time-bombs and deadly attacks on civilians are legitimate Jewish responses to Arab terrorism.

Statistics: The word appears 109 times. 103 of the occurrences refer to Jews killing or wounding Arabs.

Examples:

Due to the lack of a proper translational equivalent, I use the gloss 'assault' in the following examples, merely as an approximate slot-filler in the English sentence.

5.7.1. Jews attacking Arabs:

(40) Segal: The murder in Hadassa House [in Hebron] [...] made [the settlers] Livni and Etzion - to name a few - concentrate temporarily on an action of different nature: an assault pigua against the heads of the [Palestinian] National Guidance Committee. (66)

(41) Segal: This way of thinking was perhaps justified, had his friends from Hebron not been involved at that time in clandestine activity: planning and carrying out assaults pigu?im against Arabs. (157)

(42) Segal: He told him that he started putting surveillance on Bir-Zeit University [a Palestinian university in the territories] with the intention of carrying out an assault pigua there, against property or people. (158)

(43) Settler Binyamin Katzover: Two of those who admitted that they had participated in the assault pigua at the [Islamic] college [in Hebron] had seen with their very eyes the murder of [the settler] Gross. (180)

5.7.2. Arabs attacking Jews:

(44) Segal: A public atmosphere that encourages the whole population to support and extend help to people carrying out assaults pigu?im is the "hideout jungle" of terrorists. (87)

While for Jews the use of pigua describes the whole operation, often as a counterpart of "Arab terrorism", when it is applied to actions of Arabs it acquires a specific meaning, merely a phase, within a whole array of terrorist attacks.

6. Integration of the case study in the theoretical framework

I will devote the last part of my paper to a discussion of the ways that the discursive strategy demonstrated above - especially with regard to lexical meaning - fits into the theoretical framework outlined beforehand.

Segal's book is both a narrative of a political affair and an apologia. On the
back cover blurb it says:

The author is parsimonious in stating his own positions, and simply presents the facts, in a fluent and captivating manner, leaving it up to the reader to treat the affair according to his own values.

It is true that the narrative presents a variety of opinions and disputes among the members of the underground. It offers different viewpoints: those of their friends, the co-settlers, and other prominent as well as rank-and-file people from the right, from mainstream Israeli politics, and even from their political rivals on the left. Statements of radio, television, army and security service officers, members of the government and the Knesset, administrative officials, and the court of justice are abundantly quoted. Nevertheless, the claim of objectiveness, of letting the facts speak for themselves, so that the reader can be "free" to make judgments "according to his own values" cannot be considered credible.

Facts do not speak for themselves, as the blurb would have the reader believe. Facts are presented within discursive strategies motivated by their ideological inclination. Segal's book is not a blatant defense on behalf of the underground and its actions; it is more sophisticated than that. While its line of argumentation is not over-burdened with persuasive language, it is supported by carefully selected facts and ethical deliberations, and it is decorated with opposing opinions, which give it its pluralistic appearance. However, alongside this more overt strategy, which is not the subject of our discussion, there is a covert message within the discursive practices used in it. These practices are not limited to the lexicon: Morphological and syntactic means (e.g. the way impersonal and passive constructions are employed; see, for example Montgomery 1986: 184-193), graphical means (e.g. boldfacing, photos), rhetorical means (anonymous individuation of the masses (99): "I would kiss their [the Jewish saboteurs'] hands", said a lady loaded with vegetable baskets). Of all these means only the lexical choices and their usage in the text have been selected for examination here.

Often we may find an absolute contradiction between the explicit and the implicit messages. For example, when a settler is quoted as saying that "The buses were a terrible deed" (example above), he overtly criticizes his friends, but covertly reinforces the accent of the lexical choice of the word "buses" as the name of an event. This is where the split subject enters our discussion. The overt and covert messages address the whole range of our consciousness. The overt message tries to persuade the conscious part of our mind, and is singular and specific; this is why a single settler can be allowed within this text to condemn the deeds of his friends, thereby exemplifying the pluralism and freedom of opinion, as well as the moral sensitivity of the community of settlers in general. But the covert message affects our unconscious constitution, and is, therefore, systemic: it constructs a coherent sub-lexicon, with a specific set of accents, representing the ideology of a particular social sector; exceptions in this systemic web would weaken the ideological system and therefore cannot be tolerated. The different sub-lexicons, operative within a particular society at a certain historical moment, can be mapped out. This mapping has to involve an analysis of the social conflict, the split society.

In the early 1980s Israel was still suffering from the traumatic experience of the war in Lebanon, in which - for the first time - the internal tension inherent in
the concept Jewish democratic state was publicly articulated, bringing the disparity between Israel's Zionist particularism and its claim for a universalist humanism into clear relief. The absurd official name of this war - "The War of Peace for the Galilee" - admittedly the first "war out of choice" of the State of Israel - symbolically represented the unsorted double-message inherent in the ideological formation that has given birth to it. For the first time in the history of Israel, a sizable chunk of the population abhorred and was alienated by the deeds of its government, and the sacred national consensus started to crack. The Sabra and Shatila massacre, carried out by an extremist right-wing Christian militia under the patronage of Israel's military power and silent consent, added a measure of emotional responsibility that opened up a potential bifurcation into two diverging positions: a nationalistic-religious-messianic-merciless conception of Israel as a Jewish state, and an enlightened-secular-universalist-moral conception of Israel as a democratic state.

These first signs of a rift within the consensus polarized the political tension, and allowed - in the margins of its two still-consensual encampments (Labor and Likud) - the formation of more radical, extra-consensual forces, that stretched the impossible double logic of these encampments to their maximal resolution. The post-Zionist ideology that has been surfacing in the 1990s is an outgrowth of the universalist position. It was slower in its evolution, and needed another public shock, that of the intifada and its suppression, to get going more openly. Its forerunners during the war in Lebanon were the more radical forces within Ratz (Civil Rights Movement), "Peace Now" and the small organizations Yesh-Gvul "There is a Limit/Border" and "The Committee against the War in Lebanon", and later "The 21st Year". On the right end of the scale, among the settlers in the occupied territories the processes were much faster. A messianic-nationalistic underground supported by the rightmost periphery of the legitimate political forces, tried to put a terroristic end to the personal terrorism of Palestinian resistance, which suddenly realized that it was easier, and more effective, to knife or shoot a single settler or soldier (or an Israeli Jew in general) than to go on with the spectacular hijacking of planes and the laying of bombs in Jewish urban centers. At the same time some of these groups were involved in an actual plan to blow up the Moslem sanctuary on Temple Mount, in order to erect (or help God to re-establish) the Jewish Third Temple. The mental and ideological atmosphere among these circles is unmistakably portrayed in Segal's book.

The state-controlled ideological apparatuses, at the time in the hands of the right-wing Likud, and a majority of the apparatuses of "civil society", supported a rather narrow range of variants of a relatively uninhibited religious-nationalist ideology, restrained only by the wish not to lose the façade of "Jewish ethics" that takes as its axiom, rather than as its operative mode, the proposition that Jews (and the Jewish state), are morally and humanistically motivated, both phylogenetically ("vision of the prophets") and by the afflictions of their own history (anti-Semitism, Holocaust). The delicate balance between the soundless and media-boring acts of oppression by the lasting occupation on the one hand, and the propagated and PR-promulgated stance of the historical justice of the Jewish state and the morality of the Jew on the other hand, was disarrayed by the appearance of the messianic groups. The attitude of the state and the media to the underground was torn between a sympathetic understanding of the motivation for their actions combined with a horrified concern for the loss of (the appearance of) Jewish ethics. In reality
they were brought to trial, sentenced (some to life imprisonment), and within a few years accorded a pardon by President Herzog.

The official sub-lexicon of the forces in dominance in the state and of the hegemonic organs of civil society was, therefore, not so distant from that of the ideological organs of the extreme right. The slightly more sharpened accents of Segal's lexicon were to a large extent those of the majority of electronic and written media. Whatever Segal said and whatever he put in the mouths of his actors was based on the dominant national lexicon, yet at the same time it radicalized and restricted its choice of accents. Its ultimate goal was to penetrate the less controllable part of the reader's psyche, the unconscious, where the very exposure to frequent expressions of one accent may cause a reversal of accents within a person's active vocabulary. The processes that the unconscious subject undergoes take place while the willful individual is, so to speak, off guard. The effect of this over-flooding of the brain was so powerful that often devoted peace activists would catch themselves saying "Judea and Samaria" instead of "West Bank" (or "terrorist organization" instead of "PLO") and would apologize for the slip of the tongue.

The process of psychological penetration into the individual lexicons rests on the impact of texts. Every person is both a hearer-reader and a speaker-writer of texts. Yet the impact of texts produced correlates to one's social standing. The ordinary speaker produces texts which reach a small circle of family, friends, and colleagues. We do not customarily call these short-lived expressions "texts". The role of producing texts that reach masses is the prerogative of intellectuals. In their capacity as journalists, law-makers, fiction and poetry writers, deliverers of religious sermons, school teachers, radio and TV reporters and hosts, advertisers, etc., intellectuals have massive access to every person's unconscious.

The interpellation of the speaking subject involves an interplay between the unconscious and the conscious parts of consciousness. The unconscious accentual system in the lexicon of the subject is socially constructed, and is a major vehicle of the way speakers make a word mean. The conscious part of the subject may either give in to the over-flooding effect of the media, or may be critical of it. The ability to be critical is not an innate capacity of extraordinary individuals, nor is it an act of will; as suggested by Grace, "although our language does influence our perception, it does not do so to the extent that we cannot overcome it if there is sufficient motivation for us to do so" (1987: 121). Critical thinking is an outcome of the balance of accents that a particular hearing subject has been exposed to. Exposure to subversive or critical language causes conflicts between accents within one's personal sub-lexicon. These conflicts surface and become available to conscious treatment. The active attempt to confront the socially dominant sub-lexicon and to develop a personal and sectoral counter-lexicon can only result from the social negotiation of meanings. Segal is an intellectual of the extreme right. His book took up issues of general interest to the community. It targeted the unconscious of the general public, those who are more susceptible to the manipulation of their unconscious, reading subjects, passive consumers of written and broadcast texts. A passive reader will, no doubt, be more prone to exercise his or her "free will" and sympathize with the writer, when the melody of the text harmonizes with the reader's accompanying internal chords. At this point, facts can be made to speak for themselves, "leaving it up to the reader to treat the affair according to his own values".
7. Conclusion

The rough model outlined here is suggested as an incipient treatment of the question of the split word, merely a framework for the type of discourse that offers - so I believe - promising perspectives. Various disciplines around linguistics - in particular cultural studies - have incorporated the three splits into their own theoretical work. Modern linguistics had to tolerate the existence of hyphenated disciplines (socio-linguistics, psycho-linguistics etc.) and other less mainstream varieties of linguistic scholarship (pragmatics, cognitive linguistics), which more often than not do not challenge mainstream theory. Having shown little interest in the plentiful yield of critical semiotic theories, these peripheral disciplines tend to hook on to practices of uncritical trends within modernist psychology and social sciences. As a result, linguistic knowledge suffers, but so do the critical disciplines, since they are unable to converge with a critical variety of linguistics.

A critical mode of linguistic discourse has started to emerge in what has been termed by Fairclough (1989: 5) as CLS - Critical Language Study. To some extent the framework offered here can be considered as both a chapter within as well as a challenge to CLS. The general framework and the scholarly traditions that we draw upon are similar, though the relative weight of certain factors within these traditions may be different: Fairclough emphasizes Foucault and Habermas, while here Voloshinov and Althusser-Pécou have been central.

A critical mode of linguistic studies does not necessarily imply only inter-disciplinary scholarship. The development of rigorous intra-disciplinary linguistic accounts may still remain the bread and butter of linguistic investigation. But even within linguistics proper, only if the discipline does not "forget" to treat the word - in fact, any linguistic construct - dialectically, will it keep eye-contact with the broader horizon, and keep away from the pitfalls of a formalism over-extended beyond its own outlined boundaries. To sum up: A critical mode of linguistic practice, informed by a dialectical treatment of society, psyche, and linguistic mechanism, may make a singular contribution to a general theory of meaning, within the semiotic whole.

References


