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Linguistic vs. Metalinguistic Intuitions*

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0. Introduction.
The term 'intuition' has been used in two ways in modern theoretical linguistics, both as a synonym for competence and as a synonym for meta-intuition, that is, introspective judgments about those other intuitions:

(1) 'Intuition' = competence (Unconscious, inaccessible, automatic ability to process utterances of one's language):

'A distinction must be made between what the speaker of a language knows implicitly (what we may call his competence) and what he does (his performance). A grammar, in the traditional view, is an account of competence. It describes and attempts to account for the ability of a speaker to understand an arbitrary sentence of his language... Notice, incidentally, that a person is not generally aware of the rules that govern sentence-interpretation in the language that he knows; nor, in fact, is there any reason to suppose that the rules can be brought to consciousness. Furthermore, there is no reason to expect him to be fully aware even of the empirical consequences of these internalized rules — that is, of the way in which signals are assigned semantic interpretations by the rules of the language that he knows (and, by definition, knows perfectly). On the difficulties of becoming aware of one's own linguistic intuitions, see the discussion in Chomsky, Aspects of the theory of syntax, Ch. I, § 4.' (Chomsky 1965:9ff.)

'Obviously, every speaker of a language has mastered and internalized a generative grammar that expresses his knowledge of his language. This is not to say that he is aware of the rules of the grammar or even that he can become aware of them, or that his statements about his intuitive knowledge are necessarily accurate.' (Chomsky 1965:8)

(2) 'Intuition' = meta-intuition, introspective judgment (Conscious, accessible meta-intuition about our linguistic intuitions):
'There is, first of all, the question of how one is to obtain information about the speaker-hearer's competence, about his knowledge of the language. Like most facts of interest and importance, this is neither presented for direct observation nor extractable from data by inductive procedures of any known sort. Clearly, the actual data of linguistic performance will provide much evidence for determining the correctness of hypotheses about underlying linguistic structure, along with introspective reports (by the native speaker, or the linguist who has learned the language).' (Chomsky 1965:18)

'The problem for the grammarian is to construct a description and, where possible, an explanation for the enormous mass of unquestionable data concerning the linguistic intuition of the native speaker (often, himself)...' (Chomsky 1965:20)

'One may ask whether the necessity for present-day linguistics to give such priority to introspective evidence and to the linguistic intuition of the native speaker excludes it from the domain of science. The answer to this essentially terminological question seems to have no bearing at all on any serious issue.' (Chomsky 1965:20)

'...In short, we must be careful not to overlook the fact that surface similarities may hide underlying distinctions of a fundamental nature, and that it may be necessary to guide and draw out the speaker's intuitions in perhaps fairly subtle ways before we can determine what is the actual character of his knowledge of his language or of anything else.' (Chomsky 1965:24)

1. Qualitative difference between 'primary' intuitions and meta-intuitions.

This confusion/conflation is unfortunate as there are qualitative differences between the two types of intuition. What I shall call 'primary' intuitions are well known to be distributed evenly across population, they develop at the same age and in the same way in all non-pathological humans, they are part of the endowment of the species. In contrast, what I am calling 'meta-intuitions', while still poorly understood, have been shown not to be uniformly distributed across the species; for example, Gleitman and Gleitman 1970 show that the ability to report on judgments of novel compound nouns varies by age and class.

I believe the distinction between primary intuitions and meta-intuitions is an important one, both cognitively and methodologically. In particular, I propose the following hypothesis about the nature of meta-intuitions:

(3) **Hypothesis about (one property of) linguistic meta-intuitions:**

Faced with a sentence in isolation, speakers are much better at imagining an appropriate social/situational context in which it might occur felicitously than at imagining an appropriate discourse context.

**Social context:** Aspects of the discourse situation: age, class, sex, 'type' of people who would use it, type of speech event they are engaged in, affective properties (politeness, sarcasm, 'emphatic' style...), etc.
Discourse context: Aspects of the information structure of the proposition conveyed, various types of anaphoric relations holding between entities represented in an utterance and other entities which would be present in the discourse-model under construction, were the utterance to occur naturally in a coherent discourse, etc.

2. Anecdotal evidence for hypothesis.
2.1. Do-imperative
Schmerling 1978 reports an interesting and, I believe, very relevant observation with respect to the English do-imperative. In particular, she reports that native speakers confronted with examples of do-imperatives like those in (4) judge them to be markedly 'polite' and hence markedly 'female', in contrast to the unmarked imperatives in (5), which are associated neither with marked politeness nor with a particular sex:

(4)  a. Do come in!
    b. Do make yourself at home.

(5)  a. Come in!
    b. Make yourself at home.

At the same time, she shows that do-imperatives are not in fact limited to 'polite' or 'female' speech. More specifically, she shows that do-imperatives have two distinct discourse functions, one being the 'polite'/female' one and the other being what she calls the Reprise function. The latter is exemplified in (6), (6a) being an approximation of a telephone conversation she overheard her (quite masculine) husband having with a business associate and (6b) being a naturally-occurring one in my corpus:

(6)  a. ...I'm sending over some papers for you to look at. They show some interesting trends that no one's predicted, so far as I know. [Discussion re trends.] Ok, gotta run. Take care. And do have a look at those papers. (Based on Schmerling 1978)
    b. I think one thing is that you should start acting like part of the family. I know, it's always hard when we move in with our children after we've been alone for a long time. [Discussion of problems encountered by third party in similar situation.] Anyway, try to think positively. And do make yourself at home there — it is your home, after all.' (Email msg, collected by BS)

Do-imperatives used with a Reprise function reiterate a request or order or suggestion made earlier in the discourse. Thus, (6a) repeats the request that the hearer look at some set of papers; (6b) repeats the request/suggestion that the hearer make herself at home, i.e., act like one of the family, in her children's house. Neither sounds particularly 'polite' or 'female'.

In contrast, the 'polite'/female' do-imperative may be uttered out of the blue, with no prior discourse context required. For example, (4a) above may be the first utterance of someone answering the doorbell, just as (5b) might.
In actual frequency, it is hard to guess which of these two functions is more common in American English; if pressed, I'd probably bet on the Reprise function being more frequent. However, it is the Politeness function that people think of when hearing a *do*-imperative out of context, as Schmerling notes. I believe there is a reason for this, which follows from the Hypothesis given above: Politeness and femaleness pertain to the situational context and are therefore available to the informant's meta-intuitions when s/he is judging a *do*-imperative isolation; reiterating a prior speech act pertains to the discourse context and is thus far less accessible.

2.2. Yiddish Subject-Prodrop
A rather different case linguistically but very similar with respect to meta-intuitions is that of Yiddish Subject-Prodrop. According to many traditional Yiddish grammarians (Kagarov 1929, Zaretski 1929, Katz 1987, Zucker 1994, among others), the subject of a Yiddish sentence may be deleted just in case its overt form is *du*, the second-person singular familiar personal pronoun, as in (7):

(7) a. [0] Host dokh gezem, vi er hot geshvign di gantse tsayt. (RP.I.65)
   [0] have indeed seen how he has kept-quiet the whole time
   'You've indeed seen how he didn't speak the whole time.'

   b. Nem dir a shhtikl broyt mit puter. [0] Bist dokh avade hungerik.
      (RP.I.66)
      take-imp you-dat a piece-dim bread with butter. [0] are indeed of-course
      hungry
      'Take yourself a piece of bread and butter. You must be hungry.'

   c. [0] Zogst a lign! (RP.I.69)
      [0] say-2sg a lie
      'You're telling a lie!'

These grammarians' 'meta-intuition' about the distribution of Subject-Prodrop (which is in fact mirrored by naive Yiddish speakers) is in fact wrong: Subject-Prodrop in Yiddish is in no way restricted to the second person singular, as shown in (8):

(8) i = Stere, i' = Stere's hands, j = Hersh-Ber, k = Tsine, k' = Tsine's hands
    (a) ...Az zi j vet zayn daynj vayb, (b) vet zi i dirj krikhn unter di negl. (c)
    [0 i] Iz efsher nokh a mol azoy shtark vi ikh k. (d) [0 j] Host gezem ire i
    hentj? (e) [0 i'] Zaynen efsher nokh a mol azoy grob vi maynek k.
    (GF.II.88)
    (a) '...If shej's your wife,' (b) 'shej'll drive youj crazy.' (c) '[0 i] Is perhaps
    twice as strong as Ik.' (d) '[0 j] Have seen herj handsj?' (e) '[0 i'] Are
    perhaps twice as thick as minek k.'

In the passage in (8), from a very popular 1923 play and subsequent movie, *Grine Felder* by Perets Hirshbeyn, we find Subject-Prodrop having applied to a third-person singular subject (c) and a third-person plural subject (e), as well as to a second-person singular subject (d). Similarly, first-person as well as second person plural subjects can be deleted, as shown in (9):

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(9) a. \( 0 \) \( [= \text{Ikh}] \) Bin opgeven a khoydesch, efsher shoyn mer vi a khoydesch tsayt—genug. (GF.II.83)

\( '0 \) \( [= \text{I}] \) Have been [here] a month, maybe already more than a month’s time—enough.’

b. \( 0 \) \( [= \text{Ir}] \) Badarft bentshn goyml. (GF.III.92)

\( '0 \) \( [= \text{You}] \) Should say a prayer of thanks.’

So the belief on the part of these grammarians that Subject-Prodrew is restricted to second-person singular appears curious indeed, and one must wonder at this point how the grammarians could be so mistaken. The answer, I believe, lies in the nature of Yiddish Subject-Prodrew and how it interacts with our metalinguistic capabilities.

Elsewhere (Prince 1994), following a corpus-based Centering analysis of Yiddish Subject-Prodrew, I have argued that there are in fact two separate Yiddish ‘Subject-Prodrops’ from a pragmatic perspective, though syntactically they appear to be a single form. The two functions are outlined in (10):

(10) **Cb-Drop:** Main-clause-initial unstressed pronominal subjects may be deleted just in case they represent the Backward-looking Center (Cb) following a Continue transition.

**Du-Drop:** Main-clause-initial unstressed *du ‘you-sg’* may be deleted.

First, note that all personal pronouns are deletable in principle. Second, with a few small exceptions, Subject-Prodrew is confined to main-clause-initial position. Third, and not surprisingly, stressed pronouns are not deletable. Fourth, and most relevant to the present discussion, the second-person singular pronoun appears to have no discourse constraints whatsoever on its deletion — if the syntactic and prosodic constraints are met, the pronoun *du* may be deleted. That is, the only constraint on this type of Subject-Prodrew is that the referent of the deleted pronoun must represent the addressee and that addressee must be a single individual with whom the speaker is on familiar terms.

Put differently, the only constraint on such Subject-Prodrops, beyond the syntactic and prosodic constraints, is a *situational* one — the pronoun must refer to a particular participant in the speech situation and that participant must be in a particular social relation to the speaker.

In contrast, if any pronoun *other* than *du* is to undergo Subject-Prodrew felicitously, a very special relationship must hold between the referent of that pronoun and the prior discourse context. To get a clear understanding of what this relationship is, we must look briefly at Centering theory.

(11) **Centering Theory:**

Centering Theory is a way of modeling attentional state in discourse, a component of a theory of local discourse coherence (Grosz, Joshi, and Weinstein 1995, Walker, Joshi, and Prince 1998, among others). Within Centering Theory, each utterance \( U_i \) in a coherent local sequence of utterances (a discourse segment) \( U_1...U_m \) affects the structure of the discourse model as follows:

1. Each utterance evokes, explicitly and implicitly, a set of discourse entities (*'filecards'*, following Heim 1983) called **Forward-looking centers**, or \( \{\text{Cf}\} \).
2. This set is ranked according to various formal (e.g. syntactic, morphological, theta role, prosodic) features, the rankings being determined language-specifically.
3. The highest-ranked Cf in the \{Cf\} of some utterance \(U_i\) is called the Preferred Center, or \(Cp\), of \(U_i\).
4. The highest-ranked Cf in the \{Cf\} of utterance \(U_{i-1}\) that appears as well in the \{Cf\} of the subsequent utterance \(U_i\) is the Backward-looking Center, or \(Cb\), of \(U_i\). Note that, if there is no \(U_{i-1}\), as in the case with a discourse-initial \(U_i\), or, if there is a \(U_{i-1}\) but no Cf in \(U_{i-1}\) occurs in \(U_i\), then \(U_i\) lacks a \(Cb\).

(12) Centering Transitions:

\[
\begin{align*}
Cb(U_i) &= Cb(U_{i-1}) \neq Cb(U_{i-1}) \\
Cb(U_i) &= Cp(U_i): \quad \text{Continue} \quad \text{Smooth-shift} \\
Cb(U_i) \neq Cp(U_i): \quad \text{Retain} \quad \text{Rough-shift}
\end{align*}
\]

(13) (Original) Pronoun Rule: If any Cf in an utterance is represented by a pronoun, then the \(Cb\) must be represented by a pronoun.

(14) Zero Pronoun Rule (based on Japanese and Turkish): If any Cf in an utterance is represented by a zero pronoun, then the \(Cb\) must be represented by a zero pronoun.

(15) Revised Zero Pronoun Rule (based on Japanese, Turkish, and Yiddish): If any Cf in an utterance is represented by a zero pronoun and if, in Yiddish, the Cf so represented is not 2sg, then the \(Cb\) must be represented by a zero pronoun.

The notion of 'Cb following a Continue transition' is, I believe, a precise way of denoting what has often been called in the literature an 'ongoing topic' — the referent of a Cb following a Continue transition is the highest ranked entity in its clause (i.e. \(Cp\)), is the highest ranked entity in the preceding clause that occurs in this clause (i.e. \(Cb\)), and was the highest ranked thing in the clause before that that occurred in the preceding clause.

Returning to the traditional grammarians' claims about the nature of Yiddish Subject-PrOd, we see that, although there are in fact two different types of Subject-PrOd in Yiddish, only one of these comes to mind when speakers — even speakers who are trained grammarians — rely on their meta-intuitions by inventing examples and then conjuring up appropriate contexts. The context they conjure up is the situational context required for Du-Drop; the discourse context required for Cb-Drop is apparently inaccessible to them, with the result that they believe only the pronoun du is deletable.

2.3. Left-Dislocation.

Keenan 1977 claims that Left-Dislocations in English are characteristic of unplanned speech, not quite 'syntactically coherent', something that linguists of a different school might in fact label a 'performance error':
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(16) 'Left-Dislocations] ... stand somewhere between single subject-predicate constructions and discourse. They share properties of both. ... [T]hey ... rarely appear in highly planned discourse. We rarely find left-dislocations in written prose, for example. On the other hand, we do find left-dislocations or rather constructions like left-dislocations abundantly in the speech of young children producing multi-word utterances. ... These constructions may as well be transitional structures, anticipating more syntactically coherent sentences.' (Keenan 1977:21)

And she gives as an example the token in (17):

(17) (K has been talking about the fact that his car radio was taken from his car)
K: They cleaned me out. And my father oh he's // he's fit to be tied. [= Keenan 1977, ex. 10]

Interestingly, to my knowledge no one ever disputed this assessment and in fact it was consistent with my own feelings. And we find other examples, e.g. (18):

(18) 'My sisterë got stabbed. Sheë died. Two of my sisters were living together on 18th Street. They had gone to bed, and this man, their girlfriend's husband, came in. He started fussing with my sisterë and sheë started to scream. The landlady, sheë went up, and he laid herë out. So sisterë went to get a wash cloth to put on herë, he stabbed herë in the back. But sheë saw her death. Sheë went and told my mother when my brother was buried. "Mother," sheë said, "your trouble is not over yet. You're going to have another death in the family. And it's going to be meë." And sure enough, it was. 'Welcome, 12/2/81, p. 15

However, unfortunately for Keenan's claim and all those who believe it, Left-Dislocations do indeed occur in highly planned, even written, discourse, as illustrated in (19):

(19) a. 'Most children flourish. Most children live and grow up. **Even the children in the hospital, most get well and go home and live happily ever after.** Pediatrics is a comparatively happy field, a field full of happy endings.' (From P. Klass, *Other women's children*, 1991, cited in *Phila. Inquirer Magazine*, 5/24/92, p. 28)

b. 'Contrary to popular wisdom that says most white wines (except sweet dessert wines) and Champagnes do not age well, white Burgundies and premium California chardonnays gain intensity and richness after a few years of bottle age. **And Champagnes, well, they acquire a rich, toasty aroma and nutty flavor that I (and the English) prefer to the crisp, acidic fruit of a young sparkler.**' (*Phila. Inq.*, 4/19/92, p. 1-2.)
There are many groups of cacti worthy of collection. Even opuntias, the plants which tend to give cacti a bad name, with their nasty little barbed hairs or glochids, which are used for 'itching powder', and sharp, barbed spines which go into one's flesh much more easily than they come out, even they have much to offer and can make an interesting—if forbidding—collection. Echinocereus is another group with marvellous, often highly colorful spination...' (Glass and Foster 1976:31.)

In fact, I believe the problem is that there are, as I have argued elsewhere (Prince 1997), (at least) two different functions for English Left-Dislocation, outlined in (20) and (21):

(20) **Discourse Processing Function of Left-Dislocation: 'Simplifying' LDs**
A 'Simplifying' Left-Dislocation serves to simplify the discourse processing of Discourse-new entities by removing the NPs evoking them from a syntactic position disfavored for NPs evoking Discourse-new entities and creating a separate processing unit for them. Once that unit is processed and they have become Discourse-old, they (or, rather, the pronouns which represent them) may comfortably occur in their canonical positions within the clause.

(21) **Set-inference Triggering Function of Left-Dislocation: 'Poset' LDs**
A 'Poset' Left-Dislocation serves to trigger an inference on the part of the hearer that the entity represented by the initial NP stands in a salient partially-ordered set relation to some entity or entities already evoked in the discourse-model.

If we look again at Keenan's example in (17) or the example in (18), we see that the entity represented by the leftmost NP is not in any special anaphoric relation to anything evoked in the prior discourse; in fact, both represent Discourse-New entities (Unused or Inferrable). In contrast, if we consider the Left-Dislocations in (19), we see that the leftmost NP represents a discourse entity that stands in a salient partially-ordered set relation to entities already evoked in the discourse: in (19a), *the children in the hospital* are a subset of *children*, of which another (not disjoint) subset has already been evoked by *most children* in the previous sentence; in (19b), the left-dislocated *champagnes* represents a member of the already evoked set represented by most *white wines*...*and Champagnes*; finally, in (19c), the left-dislocated opuntias represents a member of the set already evoked by many groups of *cacti*.

In terms of frequency, I again have no figures but I am here very confident that Poset LDs are far more common than Simplifying LDs; the Poset LDs outnumber the Simplifying LDs in my corpus (of mostly unplanned discourse, by the way) by more than five to one. However, when faced with a Left-Dislocation out of context, it is the Simplifying function that seems to come to mind, for Elinor Keenan and I believe for English speakers in general. Again, this would follow from the hypothesis in (3): Given a line out of context, we are very good at imagining what sort of social or situational context it might occur in but are inept at imagining what special discourse context it might be appropriate in. Simplifying LDs need no special prior discourse context and so it is them that we think of when we hear the form in isolation; we are then quick to imagine the social/situational context of
Simplifying LDs: spontaneous speech, especially of less than fully articulate speakers, e.g. small children. In contrast, Poset LDs require a very special prior discourse context — one that will allow the sort of poset inferences they mark; since we are bad at conjuring up such a constrained prior discourse context, we simply do not think of a Poset LD when hearing the form in isolation.

2.4. 'Goy-Movement' vs. Yiddish-Movement.
Many English speakers, including many English-speaking linguists, claim that they do not use OSV word-order or, if they do, only in a very restricted way, and many linguists and non-linguists alike believe that OSV word-order is the mark of English speakers of a Yiddish background. For example, in an informal presentation at the University of California at Berkeley in 1975, Jerry Morgan claimed that standard speakers can felicitously use OSV order just in case the sentence is negative or the fronted object is a demonstrative, which he jocularly labeled 'Goy-Movement', goy being the Yiddish word for 'non-Jew', as opposed to 'Yiddish-Movement', restricted to English speakers of a Yiddish background, where fronting of objects was unconstrained:

(22) Following Morgan 1975:

\begin{align*}
\text{'Goy'-Movement:} & \quad \text{John I don't know.} \\
& \quad \text{That I like.} \\
\text{Yiddish-Movement:} & \quad \text{[all other OSV]}
\end{align*}

As an English-speaker of Yiddish background, I personally had no reason to doubt the accuracy of this claim. However, when I read the White House transcripts shortly thereafter, I was stunned to find many instances of OSV word-order where the sentences were affirmative and the fronted objects non-demonstrative, stunned since none of the speakers were conceivably from a Yiddish background:

(23) a. Nixon: 'What I can't understand is how Mitchell would ever approve.'
    Haldeman: 'That's the thing I can't understand here.'
    Nixon: \textbf{Well, Magruder I can understand doing things.} He
        is not a very bright fellow. I mean he is bright, but not—
        he doesn't think through to the end. But Mitchell knows
        enough not to do something like that.' (The Presidential
        Transcripts, p. 189)

b. Petersen: 'Wasn't that story that Bittman talked to O'Brien—'
    Nixon: 'No. Bittman to O'Brien said, "Look, we need the
        money."'
    Petersen: 'That's right.'
    Nixon: 'Or was it Bittman to Dean? I don't know. What kind of
        guy is O'Brien?'
    Petersen: I've only met O'Brien one time and then only recently at a
        recent Bar dinner. I don't know him. Bittman I know
        well. I just thank God I broke off social relations with
        him from the time he represented Hunt.' (The
        Presidential Transcripts, p. 678)
c. Dean: 'No one knows what in the world Sirica is doing. It is getting to be a long time now. It frankly is, and no one really has a good estimation of how he will sentence. There is some feeling that he will sentence Liddy the heaviest. Liddy is already in jail, he's in Danbury. He wants to start serving so he can get good time going. Hunt he will probably be very fair with.' (The Presidential Transcripts, p. 82)

In fact, subsequent research on naturally-occurring OSV word-order in English revealed that this single order, combined with different prosodic patterns, had different discourse functions (Prince 1981, Ward 1988, and elsewhere), outlined below:

(24) **Topicalization**: (Standard English)
Examples: [See 23a-c]
Function:
1. Topicalization triggers an inference on the part of the hearer that the entity represented by the initial NP stands in a salient partially-ordered set relation to some entity or entities already evoked in the discourse-model.
2. Topicalization triggers an inference on the part of the hearer that the proposition is to be structured into a focus and a focus-frame as follows. First, if the entity evoked by the leftmost NP represents an element of some salient set, make that set-relation explicit. Then, in all cases, the open proposition resulting from the replacement of the tonally stressed constituent (in the clause!) with a variable is taken to represent information saliently and appropriately on the hearer's mind at that point in the discourse, the tonally stressed constituent representing the instantiation of the variable and the new information in the discourse.

(25) **Focus-Movement**: (Standard English)
Examples:
a. 'Colonel Kadafy, you said you were planning on sending planes—M-16s; I believe they were e1—to Sudan...' (ABC's World News Tonight; collected by G. Ward)
b. 'Let's assume there's a device which can do it—a parser; let's call it e1; What follows?' (J.D. Fodor)
c. 'She was here two years. [checking transcript] Five semesters; she was here e1.' (K.Miselis)
Function:
   a. A Focus-Movement structures the proposition it represents into a focus and a focus-frame, where the focus-frame is an open proposition and the focus identifies the instantiation of its variable.
   b. The open proposition conveys that a certain entity has a certain attribute, and the focus is understood as representing the particular value of that attribute, not yet known to the hearer.
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c. That the entity in question has the attribute in question is marked as being assumed to be already known to the hearer and already salient in his/her consciousness at that point in the discourse.

(26) **Yiddish-Movement:** ('Yinglish')

Examples:

a. "You've got clean underwear?" "I'm washing it at night. I'm okay, Aunt Gladys." "By hand you can't get it clean." "It's clean enough. Look, Aunt Gladys, I'm having a wonderful time." "Shmutzi he lives in e1 and I shouldn't worry!" (Roth 1963:54)

b. "Look who's here," his wife shouted at him the moment he entered the door, the day's dirt still under his fingernails. "Sol's boy." The soldier popped up from his chair and extended his hand. "How do you do, Uncle Louis?" "Gregory Peck," Epstein's wife said, "Montgomery Clift; your brother has e1. He's been here only 3 hours, already he has a date." (Roth 1963:148)

c. EP: 'What did she see in him?'

FC: 'Eleven million! Eleven millioni he made e1 on the Scarsdale Diet!'

(Conversation about the murder of the Scarsdale Diet doctor)

Function:

a. A Yiddish-Movement structures the proposition it represents into a focus and a focus-frame, where the focus-frame is an open proposition and the focus identifies the instantiation of the variable.

b. The information in the open proposition is marked as being assumed to be already known or at least plausibly inferrable to the hearer.

Note that, while all three structure the proposition into a focus and focus-frame (Vallduvi 1992, Partee 1991, and elsewhere), they each do something else in addition. What Standard English Topicalization and Focus-Movement do involves marking very constrained relationships between what the leftmost constituent conveys and what is already in the discourse model — a poset relationship in the case of Topicalization and an attribute relationship in the case of Focus-Movement. These are just the sort of things that, following the hypothesis of this paper, would be predicted to be inaccessible to our meta-intuitions when faced with an OSV sentence out of the blue.

Note further than Yiddish-Movement, which is dialectally restricted to English speakers from a Yiddish background, marks no such relationship of any kind on what the leftmost constituent conveys and what is already in the discourse model. Therefore, it follows from the hypothesis that this is the OSV type that would be accessible to a speaker when presented with this word-order out of the blue. At the same time, the social constraint on it, that it occurs in the speech of speakers of a certain nonstandard dialect, would be predicted to be the sort of thing that is accessible to meta-intuitions.

Thus, when faced with an OSV sentence out of the blue, speakers respond that it does not occur in Standard English and occurs only in the speech of 'Yinglish' speakers. Why Morgan noticed true Topicalization just in case the fronted NP was a demonstrative or the sentence is negative is less obvious. Interestingly, both
demonstratives and negative sentences typically involve poset relations —
demonstratives point to members of (perhaps singleton) sets and a negative sentence
involving some entity often occurs in the context where the corresponding
affirmative with respect to an analogous entity is salient. Perhaps these two are
simply very frequent in Topicalizations and their high frequency makes them more
salient to at least one trained linguist's meta-intuitions.

3. Conclusion.
In conclusion, I have tried to give some evidence for the importance of
distinguishing 'primary' intuitions — our unconscious linguistic competence that
permits us to produce and understand the sentences of our language — from meta-
intuitions — our conscious reflections about and opinions of those primary
intuitions. The first type are the object of study of theoretical linguists, that which we
are trying to understand and explicate. The second, while perhaps an interesting
object of study in their own right, come into play at the level of methodology and
ignoring their limitations and the substantive differences between them and 'primary'
intuitions can have very undesirable effects on our research.

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