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Person Reference and References to People in Brazilian Sign Language¹

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1. Introduction: person reference

The systematic examination of sign language forms functionally equivalent to spoken language personal pronouns got underway in the first decade after William Stokoe's article "Sign Language Structure" appeared in 1960. However, analyses proposed over the next two decades did not include the semantic level. (See Wilbur 1979 for a review of the early analyses. Recent analyses include Aarons et al 1992, 1994; Kegl 1990; Liddell 1994, 1995, 1996; Lillo-Martin & Klima 1990.) It was not until the late 1980s that the question was raised as to whether sign languages actually encode grammatical person.

Ahlgren (1990) challenged the linguistic universality of personal pronouns as proposed by Benveniste ([1966] 1971) and Lyons (1977), claiming that Swedish Sign Language has only demonstrative pronouns. Meier (1990) claimed that only the first/nonfirst distinction is encoded in American Sign Language, an analysis that has been widely accepted for ASL (e.g. Liddell 1994, Padden 1990). and extended to other sign languages — among these, Danish (Engberg-Pedersen 1993), Norwegian (Greftegreff 1995), and Argentine (Massone 1993). If these analyses hold, then sign languages are importantly different from spoken languages in not encoding both conversational participants: the sender and the recipient.

2. Sender only

Arguing for the grammaticization of the conversational role of sender in the form of a first person pronoun, Meier claims that points to center chest do not denote the signer as an individual but only refer to the signer in the role of sender, a meaning consistent with that proposed for spoken languages by Bühler ([1934] 1982) and others. Evidence for this claim is the fact that such points can be understood in particular contexts to indicate other individuals in the role of sender. This property of the ASL sign had been noted earlier by Kegl and others, but no one had examined it in the light of the semantics of first person deixis.

However, with respect to the grammaticization of the role of recipient, Meier concluded that there is no regular formational distinction between the forms used to indicate second and third person referential objects, and here he falls back on the Lillo-Martin and Klima (1990) "personless" analysis of a single pronoun with associated referential indices.

3. Conversational participants

Drawing on research on Brazilian Sign Language, carried out over several extended periods of fieldwork in which I video-recorded naturally-occurring conversations in a variety of settings, and my reanalysis of published ASL sources, I claim that at least ASL and Brazilian Sign Language encode the participant/nonparticipant distinction as well as the first/nonfirst distinction —

that is, they have grammaticized personal pronouns for both conversational roles: sender and recipient or addressee.

3.1 Signer's body as part of the phonological form

Although my analysis of first person pronouns differs from Meier's in important ways, in this paper I will concentrate on the issue of greatest disagreement: the grammaticization of the conversational role of recipient.

The first point is that analysis of the addressee form in different sign languages has been complicated by an assumption that a parallel relationship should exist between the sender's physical body as part of the description of the form of the first person pronoun and the addressee's physical body as part of the description of the form of the second person pronoun. A number of researchers (e.g. Engberg-Pedersen 1993) have noted that the signer can't point to an individual in the role of addressee to reference another individual in the role of addressee, as the signer can point to self to reference another individual in the role of sender. This observation has been put forth as evidence against a grammaticized second person pronoun.

The error here is to see the signer indicating self as sender in a kind of type-token relationship. Greftegreff (1992) proposes an analysis of Norwegian Sign Language forms that reanalyzes what in the Stokoean paradigm is a particular place of articulation as, instead, a token indicated by a pointing hand. Among the examples she gives are NOSE, THINK, and I — points to the nose, forehead, and chest, respectively. An important feature of these articulations Greftegreff fails to note is that the signer can refer to her nose, someone else's nose (even a nonhuman one) or noses in general only by pointing to her own nose; a point to anyone else's nose indicates that specific nose and not, I would add, by means of the nominal sign NOSE.

That is, it is only the signer's body which is the source of the phonological elements of the sign, not the bodies of others present in the conversational setting. Although Meier does not make this error in his analysis of the first person pronoun, relying instead on the configuration of observable elements of the articulation itself, he makes a related error as part of his argument against a second person pronoun in concluding that the ASL sign cannot be described "independent of the location of the real or hypothetical addressee" (1990:188). As much for the second person as for the first, it is the articulatory array presented by the signer in the role of sender — and that alone — which is relevant at the level of form; the physical location (and social identity) of the individual in the role of recipient only becomes relevant at the level of interpretation.

3.2 The role of gaze and the midline

What then is the articulatory array presented by the signer which is the form of the second person pronoun? I take as a starting point a passage from Appendix A of the *Dictionary of American Sign Language on Linguistic Principles*, which says:

First and second persons in signing are the opposite and interchangeable ends of an imaginary but well-defined line of sight. A third person or a fourth — even a fifth if needed — is designated by pointing at an angle to that line. (1976:281)

Here the use of the word person differs in an important way from the first mention to the second. The first use is clearly a reference to grammatical categories familiar from spoken languages but the second use shades into reference to individual entities. No discussion posits set-internal contrasts in form or meaning which would justify distinctions among third, fourth and fifth persons.

The DASL passage, however, reveals an intuition about the differing linguistic status of first and second person, on the one hand, and third, fourth and fifth person, on the other: first and second persons “are” but third, fourth, or fifth person “is designated by”. That is, in contrast to putative other “persons,” the first and second persons exist by virtue of the act of address itself.

We see in the word “interchangeable” a reflection of the shifting deictic center Benveniste, Fillmore, and Lyons have described, as the conversation moves between participants, an interchange in which the nonparticipant (that is, the nonfirst/nonsecond “person”) has no part to play. The nonparticipant is located outside the conversational interchange, at an angle to it. On the level of form, the line of sight and the midline² are crucial to a description of personal pronouns.

3.2.1 Examples

Considering and rejecting the possible elements in the form of a second person pronoun, Meier uses examples which are flawed in a number of ways: (a) the transcription is not sufficiently detailed to demonstrate the claim he is making and (b) the performance of the relevant sign is influenced by exigencies peculiar to the situation in which it is performed.

One of Meier’s examples contrasts two utterances, each of which has a conjoined pronominal subject. Four signs are glossed as INDEX, as if they are articulatorily equivalent, distinguished only by subscripts for participant roles and referential indices. In particular, gaze is transcribed as if it were of equal duration in all performances, yet I have noted that Brazilian signers typically mark third person reference with a much briefer gaze, a mere glancing. In actual practice, where more than a single potential addressee is present and attending to a conversation, it can be a delicate matter to make a third person reference to one of them — in part, I would suggest, because the sender’s glance is necessarily cursory.

LSB, example 1 (role of gaze):

Evidence from my data, recorded in a classroom in Rio de Janeiro, is a situation where a Brazilian Sign Language instructor apologizes to the student who will be the referential object of a demonstration of the third person pronoun and assures the student that he is “just playing around.” The form the instructor then produces shows a very brief glance to the conversational nonparticipant.

LSB, example 2 (role of the midline):

Moreover, the relationship of the hand and arm vis à vis the signer’s torso would differ in a predictable way between the performances of INDEX: to indicate the addressee, the hand and arm would be positioned near the midline of the signer’s body; to indicate the nonparticipant, the hand and arm would be at a

distinct angle to the midline. In another classroom in Rio where the students are arrayed in a wide semi-circle in front of the instructor, for a demonstration of the third person pronoun his hand and arm are positioned in almost the same plane as his torso, in contrast to the almost perpendicular positioning of the second person pronoun.

LSB, example 3 (interplay between gaze and midline in multi-party conversation):

A third example is typical of many of the conversations I observed during fieldwork. It is a three-party interaction. At first JC and NP are engaged in conversation about a Brazilian Sign Language class they've just finished co-teaching and about the next day's classes. GR, who is waiting for NP, stands off to the side several feet away. When the topic of the conversation becomes more general, GR waves his hand towards NP to get his attention, and both NP and JC turn towards GR. As they do, JC and NP step back from each other, making the positions of the (now) three interactants approximately equidistant.

In the exchange that follows, as each takes a turn, his head and gaze are directed towards one or the other of his two interlocutors so that head and gaze orientations shift between the two interlocutors' positions. That is, although both interlocutors fix gaze on the signer, the signer can only fix gaze on one person at a time. The chest orientation, however, is disjunct from the head and gaze orientations, remaining oriented at an angle about midway between the positions of the two interlocutors. At the end of the exchange, NP and JC turn towards each other, and the chest orientation is brought in line with head and gaze.

Fillmore (1975) proposes *audience* as a person deictic category, by which he means someone present in the setting not being addressed at a given moment in a conversation. Levinson (1983) proposes *bystander* as a person deictic category, by which he means someone not currently the addressee who is both present and actively attending to the conversation. Goffman (1976), Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson (1974), and Clark and Carlson (1982) examine conversational moves attributable to the presence in the setting of others not directly addressed. It is a question whether the particular positional elements I report here should be analyzed at the level of grammar or communicative practice or both. For the present, the important points are that gaze behavior is more complex than Meier's transcription and analysis reveal and that gaze plays a role at more than one level of the system. A closer look at the data may reveal the formational elements criterial to the distinction between second and third person pronouns.

Meier says of interactional settings such as these (i.e. involving signer, addressee, and audience) that "the set of pointing gestures we might identify as second person largely, if not completely, overlaps the set we would identify as third person." This does not hold if we are accounting for the orientation of handshape with respect to gaze and to the midline of the signer's body. I observed instances of second or third person reference wherein it was unclear who or what was the intended referential object — that is, reference did not go through — but no instances of a confusion between the two grammatical categories.

3.3 Corroboration from native signers

Signers' intuitions also support the claim that gaze and midline are crucial determiners of second and third person pronominal forms. I was fortunate to get on videotape two native deaf signers discussing pronouns and agreeing on the criterial role of these elements. In another recording session, a clearly exasperated sign language instructor chides a student by signing "I was not addressing you," and admonishes the student to recognize as relevant to the roles of sender and recipient in signed discourse a corridor of communication, which he indicates by two flat-hands, called B-hands, upright and parallel a few inches apart, moving outward from center chest. The second person pronoun is performed within the bounds of this corridor of communication.

3.4 Corroboration from citation forms and narrative

There are two final lines of evidence for the existence of patterned regularities sufficient to distinguish second and third person pronouns. First, signers unhesitatingly provide forms which show a conjunction of gaze, chest, and hand/arm orientation away along the midline of the torso in elicitation of a second person pronoun and equally consistently provide a disjunction of the chest and hand/arm orientation in elicitation of the third person pronoun. The citation form of the third person pronoun is especially interesting because it invariably orients to the signer's ipsilateral side (same side as active hand/arm), when a point to the contralateral side would seem to be articulatorily easier. The explanation may be found in the need to avoid the midline in order to keep the second and third person forms maximally distinct.

Second, for reported conversations using role shift, which rely on a typification of the conversational setting, the default position for a hypothetical addressee is directly opposite the signer in the role of reported sender. Pointing signs away along the midline of the body are interpreted as second person pronouns. This is the unmarked form. If a sign intended to have a second person rhetorical force differs from this, it will be understood to be reproducing the positions, relevant to each other, of the signer and addressee as they were at the time of the conversation being reported. Interpretation relies on context provided by the reported conversation. These marked forms, then, simultaneously encode second person and proximity relations between sender and recipient. Evidence for this claim is the fact that an interlocutor could challenge the position off the signer's midline but not the conjunction of formational elements with the midline — that is, the point away along the midline of the body neither asserts nor presupposes that the addressee was in fact so positioned. Contrary to what Meier and others have said, the form does not rely on the addressee's location to make second person reference.

4. From practice to grammar: references to people

I have argued here for the grammaticization of the conversational roles of sender and recipient in the form of first and second person pronouns. The course that process took is open to speculation. Other pro-forms have origins which are more clearly attributable to the exigencies of everyday conversational practice. Significant interactional factors which give rise to these forms are privacy needs and politeness considerations.

4.1 Privacy needs: shielded third person pronoun and the spatial anaphor

The need for privacy has given rise to a number of communicative practices, two of which I will mention here: the shielded third person pronoun and the spatial anaphor.

The *shielded third person pronoun* serves to hide the act of reference from nonsigners. It derives from a conversational practice functionally similar to whispering in spoken languages, whereby one hand hides the other hand while it signs. Two facts are evidence that the form is grammaticized. First, the tip of the index hand, called the G-hand, contacts the palm of the B-hand — other non-contact signs do not become contact — and the “shield” persists only for the duration of the single sign and does not persevere over a string of signs, as is commonly the case in signed “whispering”. Second, Brazilian signers readily volunteer the form; they do not offer shielded alternates of other signs.

As the form is well-known in the Brazilian Deaf community, the shielded third person pronoun cannot be used to ensure privacy when the possible “overhearers” are signers. In this case the *spatial anaphor* may be used. This form takes the spread hand, called the 5-hand, as the base on which to locate referents using the other hand in the G-handshape. I have been told that the form originated in discourse about soccer, where it represented the positions of players on the field. In Rio, the base hand is prone and contact is on the extended fingers; in Recife in the Northeast of the country, the base hand is supine and contact is on the palm at the juncture with the fingers. (In Porto Alegre, in the South, the form seems not to be used.) Although the position of the sender is relevant to the use of the form, there are no set-internal contrasts of sender, addressee, and nonparticipant; the form is third person by default, like demonstratives.

Both the shielded third person pronoun and the spatial anaphor are grammaticized forms whose origins in practice are still recoverable, as is the motive: to hide the visible.

4.2 Politeness considerations: formal personal pronouns and the classifier

The claim has been made (Ferreira Brito 1995) that pointing is not rude in the Brazilian Deaf community, but this is not true if the variety of alternate referential devices is any measure. Among these, the simplest of cases is the substitution of the B-hand for the G-hand. In my data, B-hand pronouns occur more frequently in situations marked by asymmetrical social status or unfamiliarity among interactants. On this basis, I categorize these as formal pronouns. (The interplay between politeness and the recipient’s attentional state, although relevant to pronoun choice, will not be discussed here.)

Another substitute motivated by politeness considerations takes the 4-hand as a base and the G-hand as the active hand. The 4-hand also serves in predications about long, upright objects. While this form can be used to indicate a collectivity of upright objects, including the nonhuman, in that use the signer cannot single out an individual within the collectivity. Since reference to human beings is the only condition under which a single object can be individuated within the collectivity, a notion of person is relevant to the use of the form, at least to the extent that the grammatical notion of person derives from the ordinary

sense of the word. Because the form is only used to make reference to a person at some remove from the conversational participants, it never happens that either sender or recipient is associated with one of the upright objects. There are no set-internal person contrasts.

In sum, Brazilian Sign Language data provide support for the claim that personal pronouns are universal in natural languages. The pronominal forms whose use rests on privacy needs and politeness considerations show that grammaticization can be an outcome of the exigencies of everyday conversation in the gestural-visual modality.

Notes

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² Brentari (1998) makes reference to the midline in her analysis of the phonological process in ASL called "weak drop."

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Language and Responsibility: Perceptions of NATO Expansion

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1. Introduction

During its early-July 1997 summit in Madrid, the North Atlantic Alliance formally invited Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary to membership negotiations. Soon after that, on July 10, President Clinton, whose substantial support for NATO expansion had conclusively influenced the decision, went for a visit to Poland, in order to officially declare the beginning of a new era in the post-communist system of world security. The key event in the agenda was speeches to be delivered by Clinton and Aleksander Kwasniewski, the current Polish President, to the people of Warsaw gathered at the Castle Square. The occasion was perceived as a momentous occasion Poland, and as such had even turned the people's eyes away from the disastrous flood which was raging over southwestern regions of the country at the time.

The speeches, of which the first was given by Kwasniewski and second by Clinton, received a great deal of attention from the American media. A few public TV channels broadcast them live; also, most information and press agencies reported on them in considerable detail. In general, statements of both presidents were perceived as responsible and solid performances, displaying readiness to equally share both privileges and obligations resulting from the emergence of the new security structure. This predominant feeling of the apparently fair distribution of advantages and duties was quite representatively expressed in the USIA coverage of President Kwasniewski's words:

Warsaw - - Polish President Aleksander Kwasniewski welcomed President Clinton to Warsaw July 10, saying that for Poland, "an invitation to NATO is an accomplishment, but also a challenge. We are well aware of tasks ahead of us and their costs. Security does not come free. It is not offered as a gift. We stand ready to assume obligations resulting from NATO membership."

Noting that "everything going on these days has a symbolic dimension," Kwasniewski said "that the era we live in is symbolized not by walls dividing people but by bridges linking them. Not by hostility, but by cooperation. Not by a balance of fear but by common security."

Poland, he said, "will contribute to NATO its accomplishments of the recent years. We are a country of stable democracy. Independent courts, freedom of speech, and independent local government are now taken for granted in Poland. The civil control over the army testifies to its democratic standard. Our economic growth is one of the highest in Europe.... Polish reforms have passed a critical point. They are now irreversible."

Kwasniewski told the Polish people, "you are the greatest heroes of these transformations. It is to be remembered, however, how important for us was the support of our foreign friends, especially the USA."

To the Americans, he extended his thanks, saying that they are aware that "peace, security and prosperity of ourselves, our children and grandchildren" are priceless. (Washington File 97071009. GWE, USIS, USIA.)

Judging by length and a fair level of generalization, the main building blocks of the USIA report seem to be first paragraph and third paragraph, which respectively address issues of Poland's prospective benefits and contributions entailed by NATO expansion. At a closer look in fact, transition from the former to the latter frame is traceable as early as toward the end of the opening paragraph. All in all, the first paragraph and the third paragraph in combination appear to set up an aura of mutual cooperation, as well as a fully active membership on the part of Poland. The concluding paragraphs develop the idea of partnership and legitimized equality by bridging the people of the USA and Poland in their efforts dedicated to *peace, security and prosperity*.

Sadly enough, whether the USIA coverage was actually **intended** to fit the expectations of American taxpayers or not (this factor will be dealt with later in this study), it has nonetheless failed to convey what seems the predominant mood of President Kwasniewski's performance, that is, an implicit shift of anticipated responsibilities toward the American side. Furthermore, it ignored numerous markers of unwillingness to participate in the build-up of new security structures. Later we shall see that the USIA report on President Clinton's address turns out to be a comparably leveled misinterpretation ("disinterpretation"?). The coverage of Clinton's performance has been in turn a neutralization of a harsh imposition of obligations pertaining to NATO membership. The USIA attempts to position both speeches somewhere in between the non-impositive extreme and the forcefully impositive extreme, made in circumstances where one speaker (Kwasniewski) was clearly sticking to the former and the other speaker (Clinton) to the latter, seems either at least a linguistic and political blunder, or at most a purposeful act of manipulation. This paper has been devoted to a pragmatic analysis of both.

2. Kwasniewski: "Here we are, claiming a deserved seat in NATO's limousine..."

Let me sound unoriginal and provide a metaphor to illustrate and summarize President Kwasniewski's points, as it seems to capture the four all-important messages his words might contain. First, there is an aura of admiration of the American partner in the speech, the latter powerful but yet capable of ensuring comfort. Second, the address sees NATO as an infallible mechanism, which obviously can accommodate new members but does not necessarily depend on them for proper functioning. Third, President Kwasniewski seems to have either

inherited from his predecessors or simply learned from Polish history books the rhetoric of national uniqueness and natural feel of “belonging” to fate-dictating forces in the world, even though apparently he himself would rather dissociate membership as such from active participation (which is the moment when his Messianic heritage ends). Fourth, throughout the speech, the spirit of mere “being” clearly outweighs that of “doing” - as the idea of NATO membership is never to be found followed by an enactment of self-directed responsibilities and obligations.

Since this paper is not devoted to componential analyses of political metaphors (especially invented ones), I want to abandon the sub-title metaphor at this point, in hope that the reader will find no difficulty whatsoever in correlating automotive and political domains into the four hypotheses I am putting forward. An important thing to remember, however, is that just as the lexical items of the provided metaphor generate meaning in sequential structure dictated by rules of syntax, President Kwasniewski’s implications work hand-in-hand toward achieving the superordinate goal, whose linguistic enactment comes via piling up ideological and pragmatic frames, rather than via free distribution of pre-set messages.

2. 1. America: powerful and protective

President Kwasniewski’s address opens with a warm welcome:

(1) We welcome you with pleasure to Polish soil, Mr. President. We welcome the leader of the superpower that shapes global policy. We welcome the man who is doing so much for world order, security and peace. We welcome a close friend of Poland.

Apparently a pragmatically neutral celebrity, the welcome seems to carry some important illocutionary load. First of all, by applying a considerable dose of definiteness/uniqueness when characterizing the guest, Kwasniewski positions the US side clearly superior to the rest of the world. The US’s past and present actions are being applauded and expected to continue (note the use of the progressive aspect in *doing*). Their outcomes are perceived as naturally beneficial to the world and as such evade questioning (presupposition *so much*). In general, strategies of positive politeness (cf. Leech 1983; Brown and Levinson 1987) adopted by the Polish President in the opening paragraph of the speech seek to maximize approbation of the US partner, in order to encourage further activity on his side. Left to Poland is in turn the spectator’s role.

The admiration frame coupled with the assumption of passiveness on the part of Poland is to be found later in the address as well, especially when President Kwasniewski talks about American promises:

(2) On 22 October 1996, you said in Detroit, Mr. President, that the first group of prospective NATO members would be invited to preliminary talks in the early

summer of 1997. And you have been as good as your word. Thank you, Mr. President!

That the passive voice is used in the first of the two sentences could perhaps be attributed to a rhetorical routine, if not for another implication of passiveness in the other sentence. Surprisingly enough, by engaging into personal characterization of the partner (*as good as your word* - let me drop phraseological considerations here), Kwasniewski in fact further builds up an aura of superiority around the American side. This time however, its fate-dictating powerfulness is presented not so much in terms of ruling capacity, but rather in terms of protectiveness. It is the image of the proverbial Uncle Sam that appears to be invoked in the passage, the vision of a country which not only "knows better" and, consequently, has its say in the matter on grounds of internal strength as such, but also **kindly** uses its potential for the sake of others.

An important remark to be made is that President Kwasniewski's acknowledgment of American superiority, however rhetorically inconvenient in front of the home crowd at the Castle Square, is going to be balanced by oncoming enactments of historically marked presence of Poland in the international arena. This, I believe, proves coherence of presentation of the four pragmatic frames within the speech (cf. Van Dijk 1977). Still, when expounding on the past, Kwasniewski will in turn be reluctant enough not to address issues ranging back in time beyond the Declaration of Independence. Doing so, not only might he undermine his partner's moral right to rule and protect, but also damage the aura of any partnership at all.

2. 2. Fitting in

There are two major discrepancies between the USIA coverage of President Kwasniewski's address and what seems to constitute his actual message. One of them relates to Poland's perception of the Alliance as such, and the other to Poland's perception of how the Alliance might possibly benefit from the accommodation of new members. Since I consider it convenient for the reader to follow the analysis of the speaker's words in accordance with chronology of the address, the latter question will be dealt with in (2.4.). Right now I wish to cast some light on the manner President Kwasniewski handles his outline of world security under NATO command. The following examples are found approximately one-third of the way through the entire speech:

(3) Everything going on these days has a historic dimension. The end of the Yalta order is approaching. The area of stability and security is expanding. The peaceful order is being consolidated. Poland has not been in a better situation for centuries.

(4) The era that we live in is symbolized not by walls dividing people but by bridges linking them. Not by hostility, but by cooperation. Not by a balance of

fear but by common security. America won the Cold War so that the fruit of this victory could serve free nations. America has shown the world that to be a superpower means to participate, to care about, and build the future.

(5) *It [Poland's membership in NATO] is a natural and logical choice...*

Perhaps the most striking pragmatic quality of these passages is that they are densely packed with direct assertions, which clearly outweigh other illocutionary acts. The pragmatic and rhetorical power of assertion has been thoroughly investigated in recent years. What has been found is that although the primary function of assertive acts is to assert a state of affairs only, many such acts trigger additional inferences on the part of the addressee. In somewhat more precise terms, assertions seem to be capable of enacting credibility, on which the speaker can formulate or impose other acts, not necessarily of an assertive nature alone. In actual fact, it is the very domain of political language that appears particularly characteristic of a number of **directives** clustered around respective assertions (cf. Wilson 1990; Cap 1997). And so, that assertions can be forceful is something to bear in mind when analyzing President Kwasniewski's speech.

How does he acquire his credibility, then? Simply by reiterating messages which stay in line with the pre-existing beliefs most of his audience might share (cf. Festinger 1957). *The end of the Yalta order* is a fact realized, amongst other political events, by the crumbling of the Soviet empire. President Kwasniewski's mention of the *American victory in the Cold War* is another reiteration performed on a similar basis. That *the fruit of this victory* is going to *serve free nations* is in turn an enactment of anti-isolationism, an idea which, having originated with Franklin Delano Roosevelt, has been imposed upon the American minds ever since - to the effect that it gradually became one of the major face-creating assets which have been battled for in presidential campaigns since World War II (cf. Windt 1994). It has therefore been relatively safe for Kwasniewski to tackle such issues, in hope that his audience would find him credible enough to accept later points, such as the claim for Poland's membership in NATO on grounds of historical dogmata and natural order in (5). Interestingly, this claim would most probably have been less appealing if not for the apparent deagentization of assertions in (3) and (4). There are virtually no agentive forces being assigned any "responsibility" for *the end to the Yalta order, stability, security, peaceful order, bridges, or cooperation*, even if we all know, recognize and perhaps appreciate NATO's role in shaping both post-war and post-1989 security structures. However obvious the latter might be, and further given that President Kwasniewski in (4) finally acknowledges American contribution (probably for the reasons explained in 2. 1.), his earlier, deagentized claims do not cease to work toward the enactment of naturalness of historical change which **itself** ultimately allowed for Poland's integration into the Alliance. There seem to be no better circumstances for assuming passiveness, which I believe President Kwasniewski

partly does toward the end of (3), saying *Poland HAS NOT BEEN in a better SITUATION for centuries* [capitalization mine]. Hand-in-hand with this assumption comes an implicit **imposition** of not only an inherent right to join NATO, but also a **directive** at “whoever” is going to be responsible for world security now to further deal with what “naturally” emerged as a self-construed reality (after all, powerful and kind-hearted leaders need neither be replaced nor substantially assisted, do they?)

2. 3. In search of compensation...

To say that the speech of President Kwasniewski pays merely an adequate tribute to past accomplishments of the Polish people over centuries would certainly be an understatement, considering that approximately 50% of verbal forms used in the address take a past ending. About half-way through the speech, Kwasniewski gives a chronological account of four distinct periods in Polish history. Let me be particularly considerate to the reader here and recognize the limitations of space, choose single sentences for exemplification:

(6) *It was here that the first European constitution was passed in 1791.*

(7) *Later, in 1939, there came a moment when we were attacked from the west and the east at the same time.*

(8) *Poland and the whole of Central Europe - through no fault of their own - were left excluded from all post-war reconstruction projects, integration, and cooperation in the field of security.*

(9) *“Solidarity”, the protests of the 1980s, the “round-table talks” marked the beginning of a great transformation.*

If you look at the thematic structuring of examples (6)-(9) (note that selection follows the chronology of President Kwasniewski’s speech), you will probably find that sentences (6) and (9) somehow tend to “embrace” the remaining two. This is due to the fact that, in contrast to (7) and (8), they both deal with remarkable achievements, which indeed have been a contribution to the European civilization. On the contrary, sentences (7) and (8) set up an aura of isolation, during which period no such contribution was made. Yet, for the reason that sentences (7) and (8) are framed by (6) and (9), they might be perceived as thematically-marked and therefore non-representative in context (cf. Halliday and Hasan 1976). What follows is that the addressee will consequently consider the inside of the text in terms of an exception to its complex thematic frame. In actuality then, President Kwasniewski enacts an image of continuity of Polish presence on the international arena, only temporarily disrupted by external factors. An emerging implicatum is that, since Polish membership in the international community is a stability-related (stability-ensuring, in fact) norm and a drive

toward stability has been only self-evident in recent years, the *peaceful order* in Europe ought to be restored to such standards that would automatically recognize Poland's deserved place in the community of ancient democracies.

The implications do not stop here, though. Actually, it appears that sentence (8) thematically mirrors a great deal of the present-day discourse on NATO expansion. Let us imagine a fragment of a cover story saying, (10) *Countries of Central Europe have been integrated into the newly emerging security structure*, which as such is about to become an instance of reality, rather than mere hypothesis. Now, let us compare it to how the actual sentence (8) is structured. What we find is that there holds an analogy in the subject reference, another analogy in the verbal voice, and still another in adverbial phrase reference. That sentences (8) and (10) lack agents is a follow-up analogy being formally true, yet misleading in terms of the generated implicatures. There is good reason to believe that, for historical and political reasons, one might consider the American side an underlying co-agent in the case of the former sentence and a full agent in the case of the latter sentence. Consequently, if we assume that the USA used to have grounds to compromise with the USSR on the seclusion of the Central Europe in exchange for the maintenance of the wobbly balance of power back in 1945, we are naturally prone to conclude that nowadays, with the Soviet threat most probably gone, there is nothing that might prevent Uncle Sam from fostering European integration. Mindful of the size of tragedy and humiliation that followed the 1945 compromise, the addressee is likely to have such implicature turn into an obligation - forceful enough to remove any NATO-related responsibilities from the shoulders of those who apparently deserve compensation for years of suffering.

2. 4. Fitting in (continued)

It is quite remarkable that, as long as they are interpreted in isolation from the rest of the speech, the first paragraph and the third paragraph of the USIA report do provide a reasonably balanced account of costs and benefits relative to the expansion of NATO - the reason being the fairly general character of the third paragraph. Although it seems natural for political audiences to expect the idea of "what we are" to be followed up by "how we (will) act" (cf. Cap 1997), such topical and pragmatic shift is virtually absent from President Kwasniewski's address, certainly not for the limitations of space. In fact, before the speech ends there is enough of it to acknowledge a skillful use of the defeasibility of an action implicature, which is inferable from the USIA quotations if and only if the whole speech has been analyzed. The key problem is that, although the enumeration of *accomplishments* indeed cancels the assumption of *obligations*, no earlier than upon a complete analysis is this cancellation traceable. With only a portion of the actual text provided, the reader is likely to perceive the third paragraph of the USIA coverage in terms of an introductory generalization of what he believes

must have followed it. On the other hand, when approaching the end of the full-size text, he will consider the implicature canceled back at the very first moment it was followed by an enactment of **presence** instead of **action**.

2. 5. Summary

As it has been noted earlier in the paper, the assumption of passiveness on the Polish side is an underlying implicatum behind all four of the analyzed frames. Negotiating a safe "passenger seat" in the "NATO limousine", President Kwasniewski settles on his major rhetorical asset, a continual adherence to a multidimensional status quo. On the one hand, he would be pressing for membership on account of Polish heritage and an established contribution to the making and cultural growth of the Old Continent. Doing so, he would remind his audience of the first constitution ever passed in Europe, bring up images of World War II, or even presuppose Poland's place in NATO ((11) *Not for a moment will Poland in NATO forget the aspirations and hopes of Romania, Slovenia, ...*, he eventually says). One might perhaps consider this strategy negotiation of a civilizational status quo. On the other hand, however, President Kwasniewski would encourage the US side to continue the mission which has been enjoying an almost worldwide applause over the past five decades, and there is hardly any more spectacular way to cling to a status quo in security leadership than with the welcome opening of the speech. Nevertheless, it should be remembered that neither of these strategies is capable of enacting political engagement, one being merely a glorious recollection of the latter and the other surrendering it up to the leader.

3. Clinton: "Do your part, unless..."

President Clinton was to speak second at the Castle Square. Following is the USIA coverage of his address:

Warsaw -- "Three years ago this week," President Clinton told the citizens of Warsaw July 10, "I came to this great city and made this pledge: Nothing about you without you. Nic o was bez was."

"Now Poland is joining NATO," he said. "Poland is taking its place in the community of democracies. Never again will your fate be decided by others. Never again will the birthright of freedom be denied you. Poland is coming home."

In remarks to Polish citizens gathered in Castle Square in downtown Warsaw, Clinton had this message for the American people and their representatives on Capitol Hill: "To the citizens of my own country I say, this land where I speak has known the worst wars of the 20th century. By expanding NATO we will help to prevent another war involving Poland, another war in Europe, another war that also claims the lives of Americans."

One week ago was the 4th of July, America's Independence Day, the President said. "More than 200 years ago, you sent your sons to help to secure our future. America has never forgotten. Now, together we will work to secure the future of an undivided Europe for your freedom and ours."

"That is the promise that brings us together today," Clinton said. "That is the promise that will keep us together in a new Europe for a new century. That is our promise to all the young people here today and to generations yet to come: Security, for 100 years. Sto lat. Democracy for 100 years. Freedom for 100 years." (Washington File 97071006. USIS, USIA.)

When compared to the account of President Kwasniewski's speech, the USIA report on President Clinton's address reveals a striking proportion of similarities. In fact, both coverages hardly differ in structure; nor do they elucidate any different thematic/pragmatic content of the speeches. First, both reports bring up an apparently equal share of mutual costs and benefits following NATO expansion, their structural parallel being the first and, predominantly, the third paragraph of Kwasniewski's coverage vis a vis exclusively the third paragraph of Clinton's coverage. Second, both elicit an image of a fair partnership built on historical grounds. The structural correspondence holds even stronger here: the layout of the reports has the fourth paragraphs follow virtually an identical thematic line, except that Clinton tactfully reverts Kwasniewski's tribute to the American support. Third, among the most important messages of both speeches will be what the third paragraphs of the respective coverages deal with, the parallel appearing in the matter of function, rather than content. We have namely seen thus far how misleading the third paragraph of the USIA report on President Kwasniewski's address might be, especially when it comes to the issue of political involvement. Not to jump ahead of the actual analysis, let me only suggest now that the interpretation of the third paragraph of the USIA report on President Clinton's speech will again be an exercise in spotting intricacies of powerful implicatures, as well as sociopsychological underliers of political talk. To close this outline of analogies I should repeat what I said in the introduction: both coverages fail to account properly for the pragmatic load of the speeches as such.

3. 1. "..., unless you surrender to a foreign rule"?!

There is not a single word in the USIA coverage of President Clinton's speech that would either state or imply Poland's responsibilities entailed by the expansion of NATO, contrary to tens of such markers in the whole address. There is not a single suggestion of actual costs following the membership, one that would do justice to numerous implications of a new share in financing the new security structure in Europe. Finally, there is nothing in the report that would account for what might possibly happen should Poland prove unable to meet NATO standards. Instead (?!), the USIA report offers a lengthy reassurance right in the

third paragraph, by itself longest in the coverage. Let us then look at a **necessarily** longer fragment of President Clinton's speech at the Castle Square:

(12) *NATO is doing its part - taking in new members, taking on new missions, working with new partners. (...)*

(13) *Now, as your President has said, you must continue to do your part. Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic will now become full members of our Alliance, with the full responsibilities of membership - the responsibility to nurture and strengthen and defend your democracies, because, as we in America know, after more than 200 years the struggle for democracy is never over, it must be fought every day.*

(14) *The responsibility to continue the remarkable transformation of your economies, because, having known poverty, you know the true value of the prosperity you have only begun to achieve. The responsibility to reach out to all your neighbors, to the East as well as the West, including the people of Russia. You must continue to build in tolerance what others destroyed in hate.*

(15) *The responsibility to meet NATO's high military standards and to help to bear its cost, because true security requires strength and readiness. We know you are ready to share the burdens of defending freedom because you know the price of losing freedom.*

In actuality President Clinton's address, insofar as it deals with practical implications of Poland's membership in NATO, demonstrates a pragmatic continuum. It sets up a context for a directive, performs the directive both on- and off-record (cf. Brown and Levinson 1987; Thomas 1995), supplements an entailment, and ultimately backs up the whole sequence with an implicit warning.

Namely, in (12) Clinton asserts a substantial contribution on the part of the Alliance, whereby he implicates an absence of such contribution from the prospective members. This built an implicature, self-defeasible by definition, undergoes a half-cancellation by the *continue* part in (13), only to have provided the addressee with sufficient background to take what follows in (13) and (14) as a matter of course. Consequently, the indirect orders that characterize paragraph (13) and paragraph (14) are practically bound to fall within the addressee's latitude of acceptance, rather than rejection. Furthermore, the internalization of obligations imposed by the *you must* repetitions is another factor that pre-alleviates an attitudinal dissonance, which the audience is unlikely to experience anyhow, having been exposed to an indisputable assertion beforehand.

The directives issued throughout (13) to (15) seem to fall into two categories. On the one hand these are indirect commands of a relatively small degree of implicitness, as in *you must continue* to or *the responsibility to* parts. President Clinton performs them baldly on-record, as they have already been neutralized by the implicature of passiveness in (12). On the other hand, paragraphs (14) and (15)

contain implicit warnings; respectively, of the return to *poverty*, and the restoration of Poland's political dependence (*losing freedom*). The warnings will, however, slide off-record in Clinton's speech, since he has made no attempt to pre-neutralize them the way his orders have been pre-neutralized. And so, President Clinton's warnings in (14) and (15) reveal a perplexing mixture of indirectness, hinting via lexical juxtapositions ("stick and carrot" tactics), incompleteness of nominalizations (the agent canceled, it is left unclear who might re-attempt a political takeover of Poland), and semantically neutralizing metaphors (note the use of the Clausewitz's concept of political *price, gains, and losses*).

Somewhat analogously to the presence of a dependency link between the assertion in (12) and all the subsequent directives which I have just pointed to, President Clinton's performance of the latter ones entails **more** directives. Positioned as an integral part of the overall package of obligations resulting from the prospective membership is namely a responsibility to assume a regular share in financing the new NATO. A potentially face-threatening act, Clinton's imposition of such responsibility over Poland comes once again within a neutralizing frame. The principal components of this frame are the assertion following the directive (*because true security...*), the verb preceding it (*help*), and in fact paragraphs (12) to (14), which have been building up a truly ideological setting for the consideration of the down-to-earth implications of NATO expansion.

Having expounded on the US perception of the new Alliance, President Clinton finally visualizes a situation which might be the result of either a blatant rejection of his ideas by the countries of Central Europe, or, more probably, their inability to meet the enforced standards. The implicit warning in (15) seems quite reminiscent of the "tiger metaphor" coined by President Kennedy in his 1961 inaugural (cf. Windt 1994), yet it is by far better constructed and placed in the speech. Not only does it provide a forceful closing to the most important section of the address, but it does so with a presupposition of partnership and mutual understanding, one that adds to the common ground prescribed by the occasion.

4. Conclusion

Imagine the USIA gives a truly comprehensive account of Clinton's points. Imagine the reader discerns more of strenuous persuasion than of courtship and reassurance. There is obviously no room for persuasion and argument in a political address unless there is an underlying problem to overcome. There is no need for a linear buildup of argument unless resistance is presupposed, either. Thus, the expansion of NATO posing a problem, is it worthwhile to support an increasingly bigger spendings it incurs? For an average American taxpayer, is the vague benefit going to pay for the cost?

Imagine the USIA takes an effort to interpret Kwasniewski's words or simply provides longer quotations. Is it worthwhile to invest in a country, however strategically located, whose head would talk of the past rather than future, in an address that has been expected to delineate actual policies?

As we have seen, both coverages were far from inciting such questions. A government-sponsored nonprofit agency, the USIA would rather reassure the addressee his money buys American security. That it same buys loyalty of the media he will probably never know.

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