

There-Sentences and Inversion as Distinct Constructions: A Functional Account

Author(s): Betty Birner and Gregory Ward

Proceedings of the Nineteenth Annual Meeting of the Berkeley Linguistics Society: General Session and Parasession on Semantic Typology and Semantic Universals (1993), pp. 27-39

Please see “How to cite” in the online sidebar for full citation information.

Please contact BLS regarding any further use of this work. BLS retains copyright for both print and screen forms of the publication. BLS may be contacted via <http://linguistics.berkeley.edu/bls/>.

The Annual Proceedings of the Berkeley Linguistics Society is published online via [eLanguage](#), the Linguistic Society of America's digital publishing platform.

There-Sentences and Inversion as Distinct Constructions: A Functional Account*

Betty Birner

University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee

Gregory Ward

Northwestern University

1 Introduction

A number of previous studies (e.g. Hartvigson & Jakobsen 1974, Erdmann 1976, Breivik 1981, Penhallurick 1984) have claimed or assumed that existential *there*-sentences and locative PP inversions are functionally equivalent with respect to the information status of the post-verbal NP (henceforth PVNP). Indeed, some have gone so far as to assume that these two sentence types are variants of a single construction. Consider, for example, the *there*-sentence in (1a) and the PP inversion in (1b):

- (1) a. In the garden there was a parrot.
 b. In the garden was a parrot.

For some, the *there*-sentence in (1a) is merely a surface variant of the PP inversion in (1b).

In this paper we compare certain discourse-functional properties of *there*-sentences and inversions, and show that the two have very different distributions in naturally-occurring discourse. As demonstrated in Birner 1992, PP inversion, like inversion in general, serves to link relatively unfamiliar information to the prior context via the clause-initial placement of information that is relatively familiar in the discourse. As demonstrated in Ward & Birner 1993, however, felicitous use of *there*-sentences requires that the information represented by the PVNP constitute information that is new to the HEARER – not just to the discourse (Prince 1992). We begin with a brief review of earlier work on these constructions.

2 Previous studies

Previous accounts have attributed a wide range of discourse functions to various types of inversion. For example, Green (1980) posits a variety of distinct uses for inversion, including connective, emphatic, and introductory functions. Rochemont (1986), Rochemont & Culicover (1990), and Bresnan (1990) view locative PP inversions as identifying the postverbal

*This research was supported by NIH Grant #CMS 1 R01 DC01240-01.

constituent as a 'presentative' or 'presentational' focus, while Penhallurick (1984) argues that inversion in fact *defocuses* the PVNP, and Levine (1989) claims that inversion identifies the *preverbal* element as the focus. Moreover, Rochemont (1986) argues that the focussing of the post-verbal constituent is dependent on its not being 'c-construable' (roughly, 'under discussion') in context. Finally, Penhallurick (1984) argues that the postposing of the subject is licensed by virtue of its representing 'new' information.

Similarly, the notion of given and new information has played a key role in many previous functional studies of *there*-sentences. As many researchers have noted, the PVNP in a *there*-sentence must represent 'new' information in some sense. These studies, however, differ in their characterization of 'new information'. Rando & Napoli (1978), for example, argue that this NP must be 'non-anaphoric', where anaphoricity is defined in terms of what is familiar to both speaker and hearer (Kuno 1972). However, as Abbott (1992, 1993) observes, an anaphoric NP may be fully felicitous if it represents a response to a request for entities "to fulfill a certain role". Holmback (1984) argues that *there*-sentences serve a presentational function and therefore the PVNP in a *there*-sentence will generally represent unfamiliar information. Lumsden (1988), following Milsark (1974), argues for a distinction between 'strong' and 'weak' quantified expressions, where the interpretation of strong quantified expressions is "characterized by the expectation of the hearer that the set of objects over which quantification takes place is in some form already accessible to him". In other words, when the hearer expects the set to be known or accessible, then the interpretation is strong and outside the province of *there*-sentences.

Thus we see very similar types of discourse functions being attributed to both constructions — i.e., that of presenting relatively new information in post-verbal position. In fact, there are those who claim that the two constructions are functionally equivalent with respect to the role of the PVNP. For example, Hartvigson & Jakobsen 1974 and Erdmann 1976 claim that the function of both inversions and *there*-sentences is to preserve the basic distribution of thematic information preceding rhematic information (Firbas 1964); that is, both constructions serve as devices for presenting rhematic, or new, information in sentence-final position. In a similar vein, Breivik (1981) argues that *there* can be 'dispensed with' (under certain well-defined conditions) if the locative adverbial is preposed; for example, according to Breivik's 'Visual Impact Constraint', *there* appears if the sentence fails to convey visual impact (cf. Bolinger 1977). Likewise, Penhallurick (1984) considers *there*-sentences to be 'non-paradigm' cases of inversion, with *there* simply serving to fulfill the requirement that some expression must precede the verb; for cases where *there* is preceded by a PP, he appeals to Breivik's Visual Impact Constraint. Nonetheless, for Penhallurick, both sentence types serve to present new information in post-verbal position, whereas we will show that in the two constructions this position is sensitive to very different types of familiarity.

3 Information status

As seen above, accounts of both inversion and existential *there* have commonly made reference to the notion of given and new information; these accounts differ, however, in their charac-

terization of these information types. Such terms as 'old/new', 'focused', 'non-anaphoric', 'thematic/rhematic', and 'c-construable' have all been employed, with varying definitions, in attempts to accurately characterize the precise nature of the long-recognized given/new distinction.

Prince (1981b), however, notes that a dichotomy of given and new information is inadequate, and presents instead a taxonomy of the various types of assumed familiarity that may be relevant for discourse. In Prince 1992 this taxonomy is further transformed into a matrix of crosscutting dichotomies: DISCOURSE-OLD vs. DISCOURSE-NEW information and HEARER-OLD vs. HEARER-NEW information. This matrix reflects the fact that what is new to the discourse may not be (assumed by the speaker to be) new to the hearer (cf. Firbas 1966, Chafe 1976:30), although presumably what is familiar in the discourse will be familiar to the hearer as well.

Thus, there are four theoretically possible information statuses, of which only three typically occur in natural discourse:

- Hearer-old, Discourse-old – Information previously evoked in the discourse, and therefore also assumed to be familiar to the hearer.
- Hearer-old, Discourse-new – Information not previously evoked in the discourse, but nonetheless assumed to be familiar to the hearer.
- Hearer-new, Discourse-new – Information not previously evoked in the discourse, and assumed to be unfamiliar to the hearer.
- Hearer-new, Discourse-old – Theoretically, information previously evoked in the discourse, but nonetheless assumed to be unfamiliar to the hearer. (For obvious reasons, this type presumably does not occur in natural discourse).

The advantage of this system is that it acknowledges the non-binary nature of familiarity. In particular, it provides a characterization of such information as that represented by the subject and direct object NPs in (2):

- (2) a. Bill Clinton moved into the White House recently.
 b. The Bears are considering leaving Chicago.

Discourse-initially, for a typical Chicagoan, all four NPs in these examples constitute information that is discourse-new yet hearer-old; *Bill Clinton*, for example, can be assumed to represent information that is familiar to the hearer even in the absence of prior mention within the discourse. Any binary treatment of givenness must classify such information as categorically either given or new, predicting that it would pattern as consistently given or new in those constructions sensitive to information status. However, we will argue that such information in fact patterns quite differently in two such constructions, inversion and existential *there*.

4 Inversion

As seen above, many previous studies have recognized the importance of information status to the distribution of inversion, yet none of these studies has distinguished between information status relative to the hearer and information status relative to the discourse. Such a distinction is, however, drawn in Birner 1992, where it is argued that inversion serves an information-packaging function (Chafe 1976), allowing the presentation of relatively familiar information before a comparatively unfamiliar logical subject. Birner's study of more than 1700 naturally-occurring tokens of inversion in context revealed that there was not a single token in the corpus wherein the element represented by the initial constituent was discourse-new while that represented by the post-verbal constituent was discourse-old. Thus, compare the naturally-occurring tokens in (3) with the infelicitous example in (4).

- (3) a. We have complimentary soft drinks, coffee, Sanka, tea, and milk. *Also complimentary is red and white wine.*
[Stewardess on Midway Airlines, 12/30/83]
- b. Expressions like 'geezer,' 'codger,' 'fuddy-duddy,' 'old goat' obviously disparage the old person. *Not so obvious are the euphemisms 'umpteenth years young' and 'Golden Ager.'*
[*Chicago Tribune*, 3/15/90]
- (4) A: Hey, Bill, where's the coffee grinder? Our guests will probably want some cappuccino after dinner.
B: #On the kitchen counter is the coffee grinder.

In (3a), *complimentary* clearly represents discourse-old information, while *red and white wine* represents information new to the discourse. Likewise, in (3b), *obvious* represents discourse-old information, while the listed euphemisms are discourse-new. In (4), however, *the kitchen counter* represents discourse-new information, while the PVNP *the coffee grinder* represents discourse-old information, rendering the inversion infelicitous.

On the other hand, Birner did find tokens containing a hearer-new initial constituent with a hearer-old post-verbal constituent, as in (5):

- (5) a. Napkin notes: *Reopened after a summer siesta is the SMC Club*, only it's not the SMC Club anymore. With renovations and an expansion of the old Videotech concept came a new name—the Kennel Club.
[*Au Courant*, 10/4/83]
- b. I had lunch at Marshall Field's yesterday and you wouldn't believe who was there. *Behind a cluster of microphones was Mike Ditka*, holding yet another press conference.

In (5a), the initial constituent *reopened after a summer siesta* represents hearer-new information, while the PVNP *the SMC Club* represents hearer-old information in context, and the

inversion is fully felicitous. The same point is illustrated in the (constructed) example in (5b). Thus, Birner concludes that it is not the (assumed) familiarity to the hearer that is relevant for felicitous inversion, but rather the familiarity WITHIN THE DISCOURSE of the information represented by the initial and post-verbal constituents – i.e., its DISCOURSE-FAMILIARITY.

Given these results, Birner 1992 posits a pragmatic constraint on inversion, to the effect that the initial element in an inversion must not be newer WITHIN THE DISCOURSE than the post-verbal element. Note that this is not equivalent to saying that the initial constituent in an inversion always represents discourse-old information while the post-verbal constituent always represents discourse-new information. Felicitous inversion is sometimes possible when the initial and post-verbal elements are either both discourse-old or both discourse-new; preliminary research suggests that in such cases other factors (including, for example, relative salience and topichood) affect the felicity of the inversion (see Birner 1992 for details).

Birner also found that ‘inferrable’ information (Prince 1981b) is treated as discourse-old with respect to inversion. That is, inferrables always precede, and never follow, discourse-new information in an inversion, and they may either precede or follow evoked (i.e., discourse-old) information. In total, 78% of the tokens for which sufficient context was available (1009/1290) contained a discourse-old (i.e., evoked or inferrable) initial element and a discourse-new post-verbal element. In sum, Birner concludes that inversion is sensitive to the discourse-familiarity of the elements represented by the initial and post-verbal constituents, and specifically that the initial element in an inversion must not be newer within the discourse than the post-verbal element.

5 *There*-sentences

The felicitous use of *there*-sentences is also sensitive to the information status of the PVNP (Erdmann 1976; Rando & Napoli 1978; Ziv 1982; Penhallurick 1984; Holmback 1984; Lumsden 1988; Prince 1992; McNally 1992; Abbott 1992, 1993; inter alia); however, unlike inversion, existential *there* is sensitive not to DISCOURSE-familiarity, but rather to HEARER-familiarity. That is, as noted in Prince 1992, the PVNP in a *there*-sentence is required to represent information that the speaker believes is not already known to the hearer. Given this constraint, the so-called ‘definiteness effect’ (Milsark 1974, Safir 1985, inter alia) long and, we argue, erroneously associated with *there*-sentences can be seen as epiphenomenal, the result of an imperfect correlation between the cognitive status to which definiteness in general is sensitive (i.e., unique identifiability) and the cognitive status to which the referent of the PVNP of a *there*-sentence is sensitive (i.e., hearer-newness). In Ward & Birner 1993, we examined a large corpus of naturally-occurring data and found that all cases of acceptable *there*-sentences with a definite PVNP could be accounted for by restricting definite NPs in post-verbal position to those that can be interpreted as hearer-new. In Ward & Birner 1993 we discussed five such contexts; these are listed in (6).

(6) Classes of definite PVNP in *there*-sentences:

- I Hearer-old entities marked as hearer-new
- II Hearer-new tokens of hearer-old types
- III Hearer-old entities newly instantiating a variable
- IV Hearer-new entities with unique IDs
- V False definites

Type I consists of hearer-old entities marked as hearer-new. This category includes the 'reminder' *there*-sentences noted by Bolinger (1977), Hannay (1985), Lakoff (1987), and Abbott (1993), inter alia, as illustrated in (7):

- (7) Mr. Rummel: Well, didn't the designer of the orbiter, the manufacturer, develop maintenance requirements and documentation as part of the design obligation?
Mr. Collins: Yes, sir. And that is what we showed in the very first part, before the Pan Am study. *There were those other orbiter maintenance and requirement specifications, which not only did processing of the vehicle, but in flow testing, pad testing, and what have you, but also accomplished or was in lieu of an inspection plan.*
[Challenger Commission transcripts, 3/31/86]

Although the entity represented by the PVNP here has been previously evoked, there are sufficient grounds for the speaker to believe that the entity has been (temporarily) forgotten, thus licensing the speaker to treat it as hearer-new (see Lakoff 1987).

Examples of Type II, in which the PVNP in a *there*-sentence represents a new instance of a known type, are well attested in the literature (Jenkins 1975, Erdmann 1976, Ziv 1982, Hannay 1985, Lakoff 1987, Lumsden 1988, Prince 1992, Abbott 1993, inter alia); these include PVNPs with adjectives indicating resemblance to a known or inferrable type (e.g. *same, usual, obligatory, ideal, perfect, necessary*), as in (8):

- (8) The Woody Allen-Mia Farrow breakup, and Woody's declaration of love for one of Mia's adopted daughters, seems to have everyone's attention. *There are the usual sleazy reasons for that, of course* – the visceral thrill of seeing the extremely private couple's dirt in the street, etc.
[“It's All on the Screen,” *San Francisco Chronicle*, 8/24/92]

Here, the PVNP has dual reference, both to a type and a token. The definite is licensed by the unique identifiability of the (hearer-old) type (Hawkins 1978, 1991), while the *there*-construction is licensed by the hearer-new status of the current instantiation of that type.

The third class of definite PVNPs consists of hearer-old entities newly instantiating a variable, as in (9):

- (9) And there's two components in [Division H], which is the operations division: the people that do the flight activity planning procedures work, provide for the crew activity planning and the time line support and integrated procedures development and overall flight data file management; *and then there is the payload support folks, who*

provide for customer operations integration and support of their onboard interfaces.
[Challenger Commission transcripts, 4/8/86]

Here, the individuals listed are uniquely identifiable, thus warranting the definite; however, they constitute hearer-new instantiations of the variable in the salient open proposition 'X is a component in Division H' (see Prince 1981c, Ward 1985, Prince 1986, *inter alia*, for details).

Unlike the first three classes, the fourth type of definite PVNP does not depend on prior context for its felicity. Consider (10):

- (10) In addition, as the review continues, there is always the chance that we'll uncover something additional that is significant.
[Challenger Commission transcripts, 3/18/86]

Here, although *the chance that we'll uncover something additional that is significant* may be new to the hearer, the description provided in the NP is sufficient to fully and uniquely identify the chance in question, hence the felicity of the definite (cf. Holmback 1984).

The last type of definite PVNP is what we call 'false definites'. It has been noted (Prince 1981a) that the demonstrative *this* can felicitously introduce an NP whose referent is brand-new, as in (11):

- (11) One day last year on a cold, clear, crisp afternoon, I saw this huge sheet of ice in the street.
[Hockey player; Terkel 1974:505; from Prince 1981a]

Here, *this huge sheet of ice* can be used to refer to an entity that is unknown to the hearer. While most uses of demonstratives require that the speaker assume the hearer is in a position to identify the referent, the use of *this* exemplified in (11) assumes the hearer is not in such a position, and instructs the hearer to add a new entity to his/her model of the discourse. And, as we would expect, NPs that represent such hearer-new entities are fully felicitous in the PVNP position of *there*-sentences. Consider (12):

- (12) One day last year on a cold, clear, crisp afternoon, there was this huge sheet of ice in the street.

Whether one wishes to call *this huge sheet of ice* in (11) and (12) definite or indefinite depends on whether definiteness is being defined as a formal or cognitive category (cf. Prince 1992). Here, we use the term *false definite* to refer to formal definites used to represent entities not assumed to be uniquely identifiable to the hearer.

Although *this* is by far the most widely discussed of this class, there are other types of false definites that occur in *there*-sentences as well, as illustrated in (13):

- (13) a. There are all sorts of other false definites.
 b. There is every reason to study them.
 c. There is the most curious discussion of them in our paper.
 [=Ward & Birner 1993, ex. 46]

In (13a), *all sorts of* does not mean literally 'every sort of', but rather is used colloquially to mean, in effect, 'a lot of'. Likewise, in (13b), *every reason* doesn't mean literally each one of a set of reasons, but rather something more like 'good reasons' or 'many reasons'. Note that when the meaning is truly exhaustive, as with *each*, use of a TS is infelicitous:

- (14) #There is each reason to study them.

Finally, in (13c) *the most curious discussion* is not a literal superlative. The speaker will not be taken to believe that this discussion is actually the most curious of some set of discussions; rather, the superlative is used as a simple intensifier (see Hawkins 1978, 1991). None of these NPs, then, is being used to refer to a uniquely identifiable identity.

Thus, post-verbal position in *there*-sentences may felicitously be occupied by exactly those definite NPs that are construable as hearer-new, rendering the term 'definiteness effect' a misnomer. More importantly for our purposes, these results demonstrate that what is relevant for the felicitous use of *there*-sentences is not discourse-familiarity, but rather hearer-familiarity. That is, it is not sufficient for the PVNP to be merely discourse-new; it must in fact be hearer-new for the *there*-sentence to be used felicitously.

6 Discussion

As we have seen, felicitous inversion requires only that the information represented by the post-verbal constituent be newer in the discourse than that represented by the preverbal constituent, while felicitous use of a *there*-sentence requires that the post-verbal information be new to the hearer. Therefore, we can predict different distributions of these two constructions in discourse. Specifically, we would expect that in contexts where the information represented by the PVNP is familiar to the hearer but nonetheless new to the discourse, inversion may be felicitous while the corresponding *there*-sentence would not be. An examination of a large corpus of naturally-occurring data bears out this prediction. Consider the examples in (15)-(16):

- (15) a. Georgia's protective surplus stands at \$9 million, the lowest level in 15 years. "That would run the state government for about six hours," says Clark Stevens, director of the Governor's office of planning and budget. *In even worse shape is Mississippi*, which is looking at a \$120 million deficit in fiscal 1984, despite \$250 million in pared spending.
 [*Time*, p. 27, 11/28/83, article "Restoring a delicate balance"]
 b. ...#In even worse shape there is Mississippi, which is looking at a \$120 million deficit in fiscal 1984, despite \$250 million in pared spending.

- (16) a. Now way out front with the ball is Brenner.
[Radio; cited in Green 1980]
- b. #Now way out front with the ball there is Brenner.

In each of these examples, the PVNP represents information that is at once hearer-old and discourse-new. The felicity of the inversions in (15a) and (16a) is due to the discourse-new status of the PVNP, while the infelicity of the corresponding *there*-sentences in (15b) and (16b) is due to its hearer-old status. This category of information status — hearer-old/discourse-new — corresponds to what Prince in earlier work called ‘unused information’ (1981b). Unused discourse entities are often represented by proper names, as in (15) and (16); however, definite descriptions may also have this information status, as in (17):

- (17) a. Hey, mom – what’s going on outside? A police car is parked in front of the Williams’ house. *In the back seat is my biology teacher.*
- b. Hey, mom – what’s going on outside? A police car is parked in front of the Williams’ house. #*In the back seat there’s my biology teacher.*

Here, *my biology teacher* represents information that is new to the discourse but presumably known to the hearer.

Pronouns, on the other hand, may not be used to represent unused information: they necessarily represent salient discourse-old (and hence hearer-old) information and thus are disallowed in post-verbal position in both *there*-sentences and inversion. Consider (18):

- (18) a. #In the corner was he/him.
- b. #In the corner there was he/him.

Here, the necessarily discourse-old status of the entity represented by the pronoun renders it infelicitous in post-verbal position in both sentence types.

We can conclude, then, that it is the category of hearer-old/discourse-new information that crucially differentiates the two constructions under investigation. If an NP represents information that is both hearer-new and discourse-new, then it will be felicitous as the PVNP in both inversion and the corresponding *there*-sentence, as in (19):

- (19) a. George, can you do me a favor? *Up in my room, on the nightstand, is a pinkish-reddish envelope that has to go out immediately.*
[=Birner 1992:3, ex. 1b]
- b. George, can you do me a favor? *Up in my room, on the nightstand, there’s a pinkish-reddish envelope that has to go out immediately.*

Likewise, if an NP represents information that is both hearer-old and discourse-old, then it will be infelicitous in a *there*-sentence, and also infelicitous in an inversion (unless the initial constituent represents more recently evoked, and hence older, information in the discourse (see Birner 1992)). We have already seen an infelicitous inversion of this type ((4), repeated below as (20a)); in (20b) we see that the corresponding *there*-sentence is equally infelicitous:

- (20) a. A: Hey, Bill, where's the coffee grinder? Our guests will probably want some cappuccino after dinner.
B: #On the kitchen counter is the coffee grinder.
- b. A: Hey, Bill, where's the coffee grinder? Our guests will probably want some cappuccino after dinner.
B: #On the kitchen counter there's the coffee grinder.

Only when the hearer-status of the PVNP differs from its discourse-status will the constructions systematically differ in felicity. Nonetheless, we see that the two constructions are sensitive to entirely different dimensions of familiarity. For inversion, what is relevant is the discourse-familiarity of the PVNP, while for *there*-sentences, it is hearer-familiarity that is relevant.

It is of course possible that these two sentence types are DERIVATIONALLY related, as argued by Coopmans (1989) and, more recently, by Freeze (1992); this, however, does not entail any type of functional relationship. Prince 1988, in fact, notes that "the coherence signals represented by the syntactic form of a sentence are not predictable from the actual syntactic operations that that sentence has undergone." Instead, Prince observes that discourse functions in general correlate with particular 'constructions', with 'construction' being defined at a more abstract level, independently of their syntactic derivation.

Assuming that coherence signals do in fact correlate with particular constructions, distinct discourse functions would then mark distinct constructions in this sense. What we have shown in this paper is that, in the case of inversion and existential *there*, post-verbal position is sensitive to different types of information status. That is, these two sentence types have distinct discourse functions, reflected by their differing distributions in natural discourse. Thus, despite recent attempts to provide a unified syntactic derivation for *there*-sentences and inversion, a corresponding functional univocality does not follow, and we can conclude that the two constitute distinct constructions.

References

- Abbott, B. 1992. Definiteness, existentials, and the 'list' interpretation. In Barker, C. and D. Dowty, eds. Proceedings of SALT II. Columbus, Ohio.
- Abbott, B. 1993. A pragmatic account of the definiteness effect in existential sentences. To appear in *Journal of Pragmatics*.
- Birner, B. 1992. The discourse function of inversion in English. Northwestern University Ph.D. dissertation.
- Bolinger, D. 1977. *Meaning and form*. London: Longman.
- Breivik, L. 1981. On the interpretation of existential *there*. *Language* 57.1-25.
- Bresnan, J. 1990. Levels of representation in locative inversion: a comparison of English and Chicheŵa. Ms.
- Chafe, W. 1976. Givenness, contrastiveness, definiteness, subjects, topics, and point of view. In Li, C., ed. *Subject and topic*. NY: Academic Press. Pp. 25-55.
- Coopmans, P. 1989. Where stylistic and syntactic processes meet: Locative inversion in English. *Language* 65.728-751.
- Erdmann, P. 1976. *There sentences in English*. Munich: Tuduv.
- Firbas, J. 1964. On defining the theme in functional sentence analysis. *Travaux Linguistiques de Prague* 1.267-80.
- Firbas, J. 1966. Non-thematic subjects in contemporary English. *Travaux Linguistiques de Prague* 2.39-56.
- Freeze, R. 1992. Existentials and other locatives. *Language* 68:553-95.
- Green, G. 1980. Some wherefores of English inversions. *Language* 56.582-601.
- Hannay, M. 1985. *English existentials in Functional Grammar*. Dordrecht: Foris.
- Hartvigson, H. and L. Jakobsen. 1974. *Inversion in present-day English*. Odense: Odense University Press.
- Hawkins, J.A. 1978. *Definiteness and indefiniteness*. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press.
- Hawkins, J.A. 1991. On (in)definite articles: implicatures and (un)grammaticality prediction. *Journal of Linguistics* 27.405-442.

- Holmback, H. 1984. An interpretive solution to the definiteness effect problem. *Linguistic Analysis* 13.195-215.
- Jenkins, L. 1975. *The English existential*. Tübingen: Niemeyer.
- Kuno, S. 1972. Functional sentence perspective: a case study from Japanese and English. *Linguistic Inquiry* 3.269-320.
- Lakoff, G. 1987. *Women, fire, and dangerous things*. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
- Levine, R. 1989. On focus inversion constructions and the role of a SUBCAT stack in phrase structure grammar. Columbus, Ohio. Ms.
- Lumsden, M. 1988. *Existential sentences: their structure and meaning*. London: Croom Helm.
- McNally, L. 1992. An interpretation for the English existential construction. UCSC Ph.D. dissertation.
- Milsark, G. 1974. *Existential sentences in English*. MIT Ph.D. dissertation.
- Penhallurick J. 1984. Full-verb inversion in English. *Australian Journal of Linguistics* 4.33-56.
- Prince, E.F. 1981a. On the inferencing of indefinite-THIS NPs. In Joshi, A.K., Webber, B.L., and Sag, I.A., eds. *Elements of discourse understanding*. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press. Pp. 231-50.
- Prince, E.F. 1981b. Toward a taxonomy of given/new information. In Cole, P., ed. *Radical pragmatics*. NY: Academic Press. Pp. 223-55.
- Prince, E.F. 1981c. Topicalization, Focus-Movement, and Yiddish-Movement: a pragmatic differentiation. In Alford, D. et al., eds. *Proceedings of the seventh annual meeting of the Berkeley Linguistics Society*. Pp. 249-64.
- Prince, E.F. 1986. On the syntactic marking of presupposed open propositions. In Farley, A., Farley, P., and McCullough, K.-E., eds. *Papers from the Parasession on Pragmatics and Grammatical Theory, 22nd Regional Meeting, Chicago Linguistic Society*. Pp. 208-22.
- Prince, E.F. 1988. Discourse and the notion 'construction'. Presented at the International Workshop on Discourse Processing and the Representation of Coherence. University of Brabant, Tilburg (The Netherlands).
- Prince, E.F. 1992. The ZPG letter: subjects, definiteness, and information-status. In Thompson, S. and Mann, W., eds. *Discourse description: diverse analyses of a fund raising text*. Philadelphia/Amsterdam: John Benjamins B.V. Pp. 295-325.

- Rando, E. and Napoli, D.J. 1978. Definites in THERE-sentences. *Language* 54.300-13.
- Rochemont, M.S. 1986. *Focus in generative grammar*. Philadelphia/Amsterdam: Benjamins.
- Rochemont, M.S. and Culicover, P.W. 1990. *English focus constructions and the theory of grammar*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Safir, K. 1985. *Syntactic chains*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Ward, G. 1985. *The semantics and pragmatics of Preposing*. New York: Garland.
- Ward, G. and Birner, B. 1993. *There-sentences and information status*. Paper presented at the LSA Annual Meeting in Los Angeles.
- Ziv, Y. 1982. Another look at definites in existentials. *Journal of Linguistics* 18.73-88.