

Event Construal and Case Role Assignment

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## **Event Construal and Case Role Assignment**

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While something analogous to, and often a lineal descendant of, Gruber's and/or Fillmore's original conception of semantic roles plays a major part in most current approaches to syntax, in few outside of the cognitive movement do they map directly to both a cognitive and a syntactic level of representation. Most work retreats from full commitment to the original generative conception of case roles, abandoning the notion of a direct relationship between them and either semantic or the surface syntactic representation. Those working within frameworks in which there is fairly direct mapping from case roles to surface structure (e.g. the theta roles of GB theory or the initial GR's of Relational Grammar) tend to be sceptical as to whether these roles can be given independent semantic characterization. On the other hand, much of the work done in the direct "Case Grammar" tradition has taken the semantic content of the case roles as fixed, but has tended to be lax about constraining many-to-many mappings between these roles and surface syntactic categories.

A fundamental problem which has prevented the development of a widely-accepted generative case grammar is the lack of a principled basis for determining the semantic content of case roles, and thus for identifying the roles played particular arguments of clauses. The root of this problem is the commitment--usually unarticulated, but sometimes explicit--of most linguists to an objectivist conception of semantics in general, and of the semantics of case in particular. There is a growing literature (Lakoff 1977, 1987, Hopper and Thompson 1980, DeLancey 1984, 1985a, b, 1987, 1990a, b, Schlesinger 1989) showing that the criterial approach to the definition of case categories which is part of this naive objectivism fails, and that concepts like Agent or transitive clause have the same sort of complex and sometimes fuzzy structure as other conceptual categories.

The central problem for linguistic semantics is to describe the relation between the wide and subtle variation found in the world of experience and the smaller set of categories available in a language. My papers cited above for the most part approach the problem from the world of experience end, and discuss how various subtly different types of event are sorted into the categories encoded by different morphosyntactic constructions. In this paper I want to approach the problem from the other side, and present a minimalist account of the semantics of what I will claim is a set of core case roles, which can be formulated so as to prevent the objectivist error which lies at the root of much incorrect analysis.

### The objectivist error

For as long as I have taught I have taught a course in English grammar, targeted at graduate students and advanced undergraduates in linguistics and other fields. The course includes a brief discussion of case roles and how they can be thought of as mediating between semantics and syntax. The first or second time I taught the course, I gave an exam which included a strikingly original question in which the students were given sentences with selected NP's underlined and asked to identify the case roles of those NP's. One of the sentences was:

- 1) John threw the ball through the window.

The answers which I intended were *John* = Agent, *the ball* = Patient, and *the window* = Locative. But when the exams came in, nearly half the class had labelled *the ball* as Instrument and *the window* as Patient. I marked them all wrong, and wondered how I'd ended up with such a class full of dodos. When I handed the exams back to the students, there was weeping and wailing and gnashing of teeth. I patiently explained that in this case the ball was what underwent the change of state, and was therefore the Patient, while the window in this sentence is simply a description of the path, and thus a Locative. "But", replied the students, "we were visualizing the scene with the window closed!"

Unfortunately, they were right--in terms of everything I had told them about case, the window in that scenario does indeed undergo a change of state, and thus qualifies as a Patient, and the ball is then the Instrument. But on the other hand, they were wrong--*the ball* simply is not an Instrument in that sentence, nor is *the window* a Patient. So, what I had taught them had led, by perfectly legitimate reasoning, to conclusions which are clearly wrong. Therefore there must have been something wrong, or at least seriously incomplete, about what I had taught them.

While this is a more evidently flawed misanalysis than is commonly found in the linguistic literature, it represents a fundamental error which also underlies many arguments about the theory and practice of Case Grammar which do appear in the literature. This is the notion that to say that case roles are semantic means that it should be possible to read them algorithmically off of an objective description of an incident. In this paper I will argue that this misconception is one of the major obstacles in the development of a generative case grammar, and offer a few examples of what can be accomplished once it is eliminated.

The generative conception of Case Grammar is regarded in many quarters as discredited on grounds of the apparent difficulty of developing a limited set of semantically-definable categories in terms of which

morphosyntactic facts can be systematically explained. I will argue that many of the difficulties which have impeded the development of a useful yet constrained theory of Case Grammar stem from the same misconception of the semantics of case roles which led my students to their error--the assumption that case role assignments for a sentence can be read directly from an unconstrained description of what an episode would have to be like for the sentence to refer to it.

I will also argue for one particular approach to Case Grammar, in which a core set of case roles is defined with respect to a small set of cognitive state and event schemas, on the grounds that it both provides for a principled limitation on the set of universal case roles, and automatically prevents this semantic error. Not much of the outline of localist Case Grammar which I will present here is entirely new, though parts of it are likely to seem unfamiliar to some. My purpose in this paper is not to defend this particular model, but to show that this kind of model, in which case roles are defined in terms of a constrained theory of event structure, automatically prevents the objectivist error which has been the source of many flawed analyses in the past.

### **Event-based characterization of case roles**

The standard approach to describing a case role is, in the manner of Fillmore 1968, by prose definition. Such definitional phrases as Fillmore's "perceived instigator of the action" and "force or object causally involved in the action or state" imply a theory of actions and states, but the necessary theory has not always been perceived as a crucial component of a generative Case Grammar. This is in part to blame for the inability of linguists to agree on a set of case roles. Such prose definitions have no automatic constraints; anything can be loaded into them.

A better approach is to define at least a set of core case roles strictly in terms of a small set of state and event schemas. This seems to be becoming a popular idea (see e.g. Jackendoff 1990), but was not an explicit part of much work in Case Grammar until relatively recently. (Croft (1991) traces the approach back to Talmy 1976, though something like the idea is implied in Halliday 1967-68). If roles are defined strictly in terms of state and event schemas extra semantic detail is forced back into the verb, where it belongs.

We begin with a simple and traditional ontology of states and events, where event is defined as a change of state or location. I will assume a stringently localist hypothesis that every clause describes a literally or metaphorically locative relation between a Theme and a Location (Anderson 1971, Diehl 1975). Note that, as well-established in localist case theory and

the study of lexical metaphor (e.g. Diehl 1975, Lakoff and Johnson 1980, Langacker 1986), states as well as physical and temporal locations are Locations. We can then distinguish states from events, which describe the Theme coming to be at Loc. We neither need nor want to provide any more definition of Theme or Loc than this; the AT relation which defines its two arguments is taken to be primitive. (cf. the similar discussion in Jackendoff 1990, Langacker 1990ms, and Talmy's (1978) promising approach to interpreting these in terms of the psychological categories Figure and Ground).

Compare this with a prose definition for Theme such as "the object in motion or being located". One problem with this particular definition is its wide applicability, since, at least once we have identified states as locations, everything that can be talked about is in motion or is located. This objection may seem at first blush like a parody of an objectivist approach to case semantics, since there is presumably an assumed proviso along the lines of "which is construed in a given clause as" in any such definition. But in fact there are still linguists who are unable to get this straight. Huddleston's (1970) familiar worry about sentences like

- 2) The stove is next to the refrigerator.
- 3) The refrigerator is next to the stove.

exemplifies exactly this error. The apparent problem with these sentences can be expressed in our terms as the appearance that they each have two Themes. The argument is that since *the stove* is clearly a Theme in (2), it must be so also in (3), and vice versa; so that in each of the sentences each of the two NP's is Theme. The same line of argument can then prove that each is also Loc.

The correct analysis of these data is given in Gruber (1965). Each clause predicates the location of one entity, and defines the location by a landmark. The simple fact that we can infer information about the location of the landmark from the sentence does not make it a Theme. Of course each referent is in a location--just like everything else in the universe--but each sentence is about the location of only one referent. (Note that the same erroneous argument can apply to any locational predication; after all, if I say that *My shoes are on my feet*, does this mean that the NP *my feet* has the Theme case role, since its referent must be in my shoes?)

Unfortunately this error is still alive and well, and can be found for example in Dowty's worry about

the case of predicates that do not have any apparent difference at all in their entailments with respect to two of their

arguments, hence offer no semantic basis for assigning distinct role-types to these arguments ... (1989:107)

i.e. sentences like

4) Mary is as tall as John.

Although Huddleston has historical priority in bringing up the problem, he is explicitly vague on the issue of exactly which of the then current assumptions about Case Grammar is the primary impediment to a more satisfactory analysis. Dowty is quite explicit in a footnote criticizing Talmy's analysis:

such pairs are not distinguished by any objective feature of the situation described but at best by the "point of view" from which it is described. (1989, fn. 14, p. 123)

In other words, case roles are "in the world" (cf. Ladusaw and Dowty 1988), and are to be read off from the world, not from some construal of it.

Some form of this error lies at the base of most of the problems in the development of Case Grammar. Dowty and Ladusaw are indeed correct in their supposition that given this approach to semantics, a case grammar constrained enough to be interesting is probably impossible. (I disagree with them about which of these must therefore be abandoned). The objectivist error is automatically avoided when we define the notions Theme and Loc strictly in terms of the AT relation; given that (4) must have the underlying semantic structure Theme AT Loc, there can be no question about the correct assignment of roles.

Events are changes of state (or of location); rather than being depicted as at a state/location the Theme is depicted as coming to be there. Events in this sense can be categorized into simple changes of state and more complex configurations which include an external cause of this change. We will take this as the definition of Agent. Our grammar so far consists of states and simple and complex events, or statives, inchoatives, and causatives (Croft 1991). We can define three fundamental case roles, Theme, Location, and Agent, in terms of this simple grammar of states and events:<sup>1</sup>

5) Theme AT Loc  
Theme GOTO Loc  
Agent CAUSE Theme GOTO Loc

The essential point of this approach is that case roles are defined and assigned in terms of tightly-constrained event schemas, rather than being

assigned with reference to the larger more amorphous scenarios found in the lexical semantics of verbs.

In the generally Andersonian model developed here only these three core cases are defined. (SOURCE, which appears in the glosses to a few of the examples below, appears to be an oblique rather than a core case role, although this remains to be conclusively argued). We will take seriously the evidence of languages with "coverb" serial verb constructions that Instruments, Benefactives, etc., which in languages like English are encoded with oblique case forms, can in fact be defined as playing one of the core roles, but in a distinct event from that which assigns core case roles in the clause. The function of oblique case roles is to allow reference within a clause to actors from the scenario that do not have one of the core roles in the event schema which underlies the clause.

### **The Localist model and traditional Case Grammar**

This model differs from traditional conceptions of Case Grammar<sup>2</sup> in a number of ways, of varying relevance to my general argument. Perhaps most striking is that elements of surface structure other than NP's--in particular, predicates--are associated with underlying case roles. This has to be accomplished in one way or another in any truly localist Case Grammar (e.g. Gruber 1965, Anderson 1973, Diehl 1975), but it is irrelevant to my main argument, which can be established equally as well in a non-localist model. (Such a model will require a richer inventory of underlying state/event schemas; the localist hypothesis makes it easy to establish a principled constraint on this inventory).

Since in this model a verb can have only an underlying State or Event schema, and the most complex Event schema has only three arguments, a verb can assign only three core case roles. Again this makes my main argument easier, but is not required for it, as long as the case inventory is read directly off of a constrained inventory of state/event schemas. (Note that the set of surface case frames is larger than three because of different patterns of argument incorporation). The important aspect of the model for my present argument is that only those case roles which are automatically defined by the basic schemas are part of the inventory of core case roles. Directly stemming from this is the abandonment of the notion that all case roles are of equal status. There is an explicit distinction here between the core case roles, defined by the event schemas, and the less-constrained set of oblique case roles.

The last difference between this model and the traditional approach is that all elements of a schema must be referred to in a clause which encodes that schema. This point is essential to my argument at various points, and we

will see that it is also essential to a semantically and syntactically responsible Case Grammar.

## **Agents**

The characterization of Theme in this approach is probably not controversial, as the Theme role has never been given the sort of elaborate and highly specific definition that notions such as Dative and Agent have. The characterization of Agent in these terms is more contentious. Most work that makes any reference to case roles has insisted on some version or other of an a priori definition of Agent which includes bulky semantic baggage--in particular animacy and volition--for which there is no obvious place in this simple event schema. While there is an idealized model of event causation, with explicit reflections in morphosyntactic structure, which incorporates these parameters, it is clear that if we intend case roles to play an explanatory role in morphosyntax, we must recognize a broader and simpler conception of Agent, which is simply the causal argument in the expanded event schema.<sup>3</sup>

A simple definition of Agent as first cause (cp. Croft's (1991) "autonomous cause") eliminates the notorious problems of natural forces, and of similar problematic data such as these:

- 6) His attitude infuriates me.
- 7) This mess really bothers him.
- 8) The beauty of this vista has inspired many artists.
- 9) The look on her face would curdle milk.

As far as I know no substantial body of grammatical evidence has ever surfaced that the subjects of these clauses have a different case role from those of indisputably Agentive examples, nor is there any satisfactory account of what their case role should be if they are not Agents. Thus we have no justification for supposing that they are anything but Agents, which is just what our event model requires.

## **Event construal and case roles**

A properly-constrained Case Grammar will prevent the version of the objectivist error which my students made. The problem is that the sentence which I gave them could be imagined as referring to a scenario in which both

the ball and the window underwent changes of state, and therefore in terms of an argument-centered definition, are Themes (or Patients, as I taught them at the time). The intuitively obvious explanation of why the students' answer is wrong is that the sentence is "about" what happened to the ball, not what happened to the window, in exactly the same way as (2) is about the location of the stove, not that of the refrigerator. This is explicitly represented in our event grammar by the fact that *throw*, like any other verb, can have only one Theme. *Throw* is about the change of location of the thrown object. One could also construct a sentence about the change of state of the window, but this would need a verb appropriate to that kind of change of state, such as *break* or *smash*. *The window* is Theme with respect to its own change of state, but is not a Theme with respect to the change of state of the ball, and thus is not a Theme (or a Patient) in the example.

My students' error is unexpected because the predicates that could be chosen to describe the ball event and the window event in this scenario are so different. In parallel examples, however, where predicates have as part of their meaning a scenario such as this which involves more than one event, even we linguists seem to get confused. The students' fundamental error is one which, sometimes but not always in subtler forms, underlies a great many arguments concerning the analysis of putatively problematic data in Case Grammar. That is the assumption that anything and everything that can be said about a situation is part of the semantic representation of any sentence which describes that situation.

Consider the traditional hay/wagon, etc., examples:

- 10) He loaded the wagon (with hay).
- 11) He loaded the hay on the wagon.

A standard approach to a Case Grammar analysis of these data starts from the assumption that because *the wagon* is Loc (or Goal) in (11), it must have that role in (10). But this is the objectivist error again. Taking a pile of hay and moving it all into a previously empty wagon involves two events in our sense--the hay changes its location, from being on the ground to being in the wagon, and the wagon changes its state, from being empty to having hay in it. Under the first construal *the hay* is Theme, under the second *the wagon* is. Only one of these construals at a time can be encoded in a clause. In each case the mapping of case roles to surface relations is direct: the Agent is subject, and the Theme object.

An important distinction to maintain here is between what I am referring to as the "scenario" which the verb describes, and the constrained notion of "event" which I have defined. The loading scenario involves two events, but only one event at a time can be encoded in a clause. More

evidence for such a constrained version of Case Grammar is found in the syntax of transactional predicates such as *buy* and *sell*. It has been widely observed in several different contexts that these lexical items have in some sense four semantic arguments: two individuals, the merchandise, and the payment. But neither English nor any other language has a clause type with four core arguments. What English does with these scenarios is to encode them as two- and three-argument clauses.

It has been argued (Dowty 1989:106, Jackendoff 1990:59-60), that we must analyze single arguments of clauses with these verbs as having multiple case roles.<sup>4</sup> As in the case of the hay/wagon examples, the assumption underlying this analysis is that in the sentences

- 12) Esau sold Jacob his birthright.
- 13) Jacob bought Esau's birthright (from him).

the case roles are constant, that is, *Jacob* in both is Goal (in our grammar it will be Loc), *Esau* in the first example and *him* in the second both Source,<sup>5</sup> with *birthright* and the mess of pottage--which note can only be included as an oblique in either clause--both Themes. But nothing whatever in the syntax of either example bears out this analysis. Ditransitive predicates are easily described in terms of our simple schemata; they can be described as complex events in which the verb lexicalizes neither the Theme nor the Location, so that both are left as arguments of the verb. Thus a simple-minded assignment of case roles to these examples--one based only on the syntax, with no reference to the meanings of *sell* and *buy*--would give us the following:

- 14) Esau sold Jacob his birthright.  
AGENT    LOC    THEME
- 15) Jacob bought Esau's birthright        (from him).  
AGENT    THEME                                (SOURCE)

The more elaborate structure attributed to such clauses by Jackendoff and others is based on the intuition that since Jacob and Esau play the same role in the transaction in both clauses, *Jacob* must be Loc (or Dative, or whatever) in (14) as in (15), and Esau Source in (15) as in (14). Thus it is worth pointing out that the subject of *sell* is not necessarily a Source in any sense, nor that of *buy* a Loc (or Goal):

- 16) My realtor sold my house.
- 17) My agent bought some property for me.

Note that brokers, agents, and suchlike are not normally encoded as Source; one buys *through*, not *from*, a realtor. All that is necessary to qualify as subject of either verb is Agenthood, i.e. being the cause (as far as the clause reports) of the change of (possessional) location on the part of the Theme.

On the objectivist view of case roles it is surprising that these verbs do not manage to carry their full set of apparent arguments with them. In our grammar, on the other hand, they could not do so. If the scenario which the verbs describe involves change in location of two different entities, then it involves two distinct events. Only one can be reflected in the clause structure. Both *buy* and *sell* refer to the event of which the merchandise is Theme, and the payment has no direct role in this event. A different verb, e.g. *pay*, must be used to construct a clause describing the event of which the payment is Theme.

### Staging and event construal

Essentially the same error, seeking case role assignments in some imagined "real world", lies at the root of another set of errors which have bedeviled Case Grammar since the beginning. A prime example is the identification of a spurious class of Instrument subjects in English and some other languages, which leads inevitably to debilitating and ultimately fatal weakness in the grammar. DeLancey (1984) and Schlesinger (1989) present arguments against any notion that the inanimate subjects of transitive verbs which have generally been so analyzed are anything but Agents.

There is a range of types of data involved here. We have already discussed the category of inanimate forces such as lightning, which have long been identified as Instruments. The source of this error, as already mentioned, is the packing of the case roles with irrelevant semantic detail. An event-based Case Grammar could not permit such an analysis: the complex event schema has a slot for an Agent, and there must be an Agent in a clause encoding that schema. Obviously in events in which forces like lightning and wind are the causal agents, no other possible Agent is conceptually or even imaginably present. Schlesinger points out that the same argument is applicable to clauses like the subordinate clause of (18):

- 18) The clock was ticking so loudly that it woke the baby.

Although a clock, as an artifact, seems intrinsically much more Instrument-like than natural forces, nevertheless it is hard to come up with a principled way of finding another Agent for this clause than *the clock*.

Another subcategory is the more controversial class of data represented by *exx.* such as these:

- 19) The janitor opened the lock with a key.
- 20) The key opened the lock.
- 21) The assassin's poison killed its victim.
- 22) The axe made a satisfying "chunk" when it hit the wood.
- 23) When the first stone hit a policeman, it provoked a violent reaction.

In these, as in the previous examples, there is an NP with the morphosyntax appropriate to an Agent, which nevertheless most linguists would want to analyze as an Instrument. Like the supposed Instruments in the previous examples, these share with true Instruments the irrelevant factor of inanimacy. But unlike lightning and ticking clocks, these represent entities which our real-world knowledge tells us could not have played the role they are described in the clause as playing without initially being manipulated by someone. That is, these cannot easily be conceptualized as autonomous causes, occupying the initial node in a causal chain.

Thus the source of the analysis of (20), for example, as having Instrument subject is the same objectivist approach to case semantics that we have been examining. The underlying argument is that since *the key* in (19) is an Instrument, and since (19) and (20) could refer to the same scenario, *the key* must be Instrument in (20) as well. An event-based Case Grammar imposes a very different analysis. The requirement that a clause reflect in its structure one of the state or event schemas means that all elements of the schema must be present in the clause. Nothing in this approach to event semantics gives us warrant to go wandering through the world which the clause suggests to our imagination looking for arguments. (20), since it is a perfectly good transitive clause, must encode the complex event schema, with an Agent that causes the change of state of the lock. That Agent can only be *the key*; there is no other candidate in the clause.

Schlesinger points out that many such examples manifest semantic behavior more consistent with this analysis than with the traditional one. For example, in spite of the widely asserted hospitality of English to supposed instrumental subject constructions, a sentence like (24) is odd:

- 24) This pencil draws lines.

In contrast, (25) is perfectly ordinary:

- 25) This pencil draws very thin lines.

This reflects the fact that while there is nothing odd about depicting a particular pencil as playing the causal role in effecting thin lines (as opposed to just any lines), any pencil presumably can draw lines, and it is thus hard to conceive of a particular pencil as playing any unusual causal role with respect to line-drawing in general.<sup>6</sup> Similarly, outside of the popular folklore of linguists, sentences like (20) are not freely usable in English. Speakers presented with this sentence in isolation generally have a clear intuition that *the key* is being given some contrastive force--that the sentence evokes a context in which a particular key, rather than any other, or the key rather than some other means, was essential to the successful opening of the door.

In general, clauses like (20) and (25) are acceptable in English precisely to the extent that there is a plausible construal of the described scenario in which the supposed "Instrument" can be seen as playing an essential causal role in the complex event schema. But, by our constrained definition, to be an Agent is to be identified as the causal argument in a complex event schema--so in such clauses as these the subjects are Agents, not Instruments.

But it is not clear that any such interpretation will explain the syntax of *exx.* (21-23). Let us stipulate that in the most natural context for these examples the inclusion in the clause of reference to the inanimate proximal cause, but not the animate ultimate cause whose existence is inferable, is a matter of "staging", rather than of attribution to the inanimate actor of sufficient causal force to qualify it as an Agent. This is a phenomenon that is widely attributed to "pragmatics" (e.g. in Fillmore 1977), and thus considered to be non-semantic and irrelevant to the study of case roles per se.

Again, the intuition that *the assassin's poison* in (21), for example, must be analyzed as an Instrument depends on the objectivist analysis which says that we know from the sentence that the poison was administered by an assassin. Then the poison, considering its role in the overall scenario, clearly best fits the definition of Instrument, while the assassin best fits the definition of Agent. But *the assassin* in fact has no case role in the clause (note that it is more natural in this clause to refer to *its* than to *his victim*). In (23) the putative Agent is not mentioned anywhere in the clause, sentence, or any necessary context, and indeed it is difficult to cram one into the sentence.

The error of the Instrument subject analysis here is again the error of trying to incorporate into the semantic representation of the clause inferences which, however legitimate they may be, are not in fact part of the event representation of the clause. (21) describes a complex event, of which poison is represented as the cause. As soon as we open the door to admitting into the semantic representation of a clause entities with no grammatical role in the clause (as in (21)), and even some not actually available within the discourse (as in (23)), our grammar will inevitably have the potential to allow

any number of clearly undesirable analyses. What, for example, would prevent us from analyzing a sentence like

26) He finally talked under relentless interrogation.

as having a higher Agent--the interrogator(s)--as part of its semantic representation, and then analyzing *he* as playing a causee role of some sort?

In effect, the Instrument subject analysis of a sentence like (21) depends upon the claim that the sentence is synonymous with one like:

27) The assassin killed his victim with poison.

But this is simply not true (even leaving aside the interesting semantic effects that we get by introducing into both sentences other material, e.g. adverbials like *slowly*). In order to explain the syntactic reflexes of a case role analysis of a clause such as (21), we must see the "staging" phenomenon as one more example of event construal. The "real world", as we perceive it, is a complex web of causal relations. Any transitive clause presents one single cause-effect relation. There are no case roles, as a conceptual or a linguistic phenomenon, until a complex event representation has been constructed. Whatever is included in the causal slot of that representation is the Agent, for that is what an Agent is.

### **On Case Grammar**

In the original conception of case roles in the various versions of case grammar developed in the sixties (those of Gruber, Fillmore, and John Anderson) case roles were intended to mediate between semantic and syntactic representations. Some level of semantic representation from which case roles are recoverable is thus generative, and these approaches would be as legitimately called "generative semantics" as the logic-based approach which bore that name. The arguments criticized in this paper are retreats from a strong theory of Case Grammar, in which there is a direct relation between underlying semantic case roles (whatever those be) and surface morphosyntax. The data represent variations in syntactic behavior in what are claimed to be the same underlying case. These and other data are more easily understood under a strong version of Case Grammar, once we understand that case roles, like any other semantic categories, encode construals of events rather than objective facts.

### Notes

1. This classification of predicate types has a long and broad history; my thinking here most directly reflects the lexical decomposition approach of Generative Semantics and the Vendlerian approach developed by Dowty (1979) and Foley and Van Valin (1984). For present purposes differences in formalization and terminology between this and other proposals along the same lines are more expository than substantive. For example, I use GOTO instead of the BECOME function often used here (e.g. in Dowty 1979) simply to call attention to the fact that this schema represents both literal spatial motion and metaphorically motional change of state.
2. I use the vague reference to "traditional" conceptions advisedly throughout the paper; though most linguists who discuss case explicitly link their work to the foundational frameworks of Fillmore (1968, 1977) and/or Gruber (1976), there has grown up a traditional account of the semantics and syntax of case roles, such that we find papers such as Rosen 1984 and Holisky 1987 making crucial use of demonstrably incorrect conceptions of the semantics of particular case roles without explicit reference to any work in Case Grammar (see DeLancey 1985a).
3. DeLancey 1984, 1985, 1990a, b. In DeLancey 1990a I show how volition can be represented in more complex event schemata.
4. This is a different argument from Gruber's (1965) more plausible suggestion that a single argument of a clause may have two case roles, if and only if one of them is Agent.
5. The place of the Source relation in the localist schema that I have outlined here is not entirely clear, but for the present I will assume on the basis of its syntactic behavior that it is an oblique rather than a core case role.
6. Cf. the argumentation with respect to a different phenomenon in Lakoff 1977.

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