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Experiential vs. Agentive Constructions in Korean Narrative*

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1. Introduction. There are parallel syntactic constructions in Korean, depicted in (1a) and (1b), into which a variety of perception and psych verbs can be inserted.¹

- (1) a. *Suni-ka/nun Toli-lul coahanta.*
Suni-NOM/TOP Toli-ACC like 'Suni likes Toli.'
- b. *Suni-eykey/ka/nun Toli-ka coh-ta.*
Suni-DAT/NOM/TOP Toli-NOM likable 'Toli is likable to Suni.'²

Both versions contain an experiencer and an object of experience, but the case marking differs. In (1a) the experiencer is nominative and the object of experience, or stimulus, is accusative. In (1b) the experiencer is dative or nominative and the stimulus is nominative. We will call sentences like (1a) the agentive construction and those like (1b) the experiential construction. While various syntactic characterizations have been proposed for the experiential construction,³ its inherent semantics and how they differ from those of the agentive construction have been neglected. Either it is derived from the agentive construction, suggesting that the two are synonymous, or a more or less fortuitous semantic feature is attached to the experiential construction.⁴

This paper will present an analysis of agentive and experiential constructions based on differences that can be explained by the notion of subjectivity, a property of cognition that underlies all language use. Section 2 is an introduction to subjectivity. Section 3 presents the morpho-syntactic relations between these two constructions, demonstrating a productive structural opposition, akin to voice, in the grammar of Korean. Sections 4 and 5 present the distributional effects that are brought about by the expression of different degrees of subjectivity in interactional discourse and in narrative respectively. Finally in Section 6, the cognitive folk models that underly the two constructions are discussed.

2. The Subjectivity Continuum. At the base of the analysis presented in this paper is the view that language is a subjective enterprise.⁵ All utterances are subjective to some degree in the sense that they presuppose a cognizer. But the degree of subjectivity is greater when the cognizer is encoded in the utterance, as in (2a).

- (2) a. *It seems to me* that the weather is cold today.
b. It's cold today.

Even in those cases where there is no overt cognizer as in (2b), a cognizing agent is implied. The difference is in the degree of subjectivity: (2a) is more subjective than (2b). In any use of language, there must be a speaker/cognizer, whose role is to provide the consciousness through which a pure 'objective' event is perceived and understood. The degree to which an utterance affords direct access to this consciousness--that is the degree to which it creates the impression that the contents of that consciousness are directly exposed--is what is meant by the phrase 'degree of subjectivity'. Thus the objective phenomena that occur in the world are liable to be expressed in a number of ways, each different expression coloring the event for a different degree of subjectivity.

One might view events in the real world in terms of a typology of event phenomena. 'Action' is one type of real-world event; 'perceptual state', 'speech event' and 'emotional/psychological state' are others.⁶ These objective events may be expressed in different forms, varying in the degree to which a subjective viewpoint is encoded. The description of an event may be relatively external, or 'objectified,' as in '*John kicked the*

dog ;' or it may be relatively more internal, as in 'It looked to me as though John kicked the dog .' In the first sentence the cognizer is placed outside of the event as an observer; on the other hand, the second type of sentence directly encodes the cognizer as a part of the utterance; the expression names the interpreter of the event. Schematically, this difference can be represented:



less subjective <-----> more subjective

The difference between the agentive and experiential constructions lies in the degree of subjectivity. The agentive construction has an external observer/cognizer 'objectively' describing the psychological state of some experiencer (Suni in (1a)), whereas the experiential construction identifies the cognizer with the experiencer (Suni in (1b)), and is thus more subjective.

Although the encoding of subjectivity may vary from language to language, all languages seem to have the capacity to express differences in subjectivity. From the examples given in the preceding paragraphs it can be seen that English relies on syntactic periphrasis to express such differences. In contrast, Korean experiential and agentive constructions are examples of morpho-syntactic encoding of differences in subjectivity.

3. Morpho-Syntax. Table 1 gives a morpho-syntactic breakdown of typical predicates in the two constructions. It is important to note that for each predicate in the experiential column there is a lexically related predicate on the agentive side and that the morpho-syntactic relation is complex but systematic. In other words, Korean presents a speaker with a systematic set of coding options based on the same lexical material. In (A) -ha- is added to derive the agentive version from the experiential one; in (B) the experiential predicates are derived from the agentive ones with -i- or -ci-; and in (C) both experiential and agentive predicates are derived from nouns.

	Experiential	Agentive	
A.	Adj-ta	Adj-ha-ta	
	kulip-ta	kulipwe-ha-ta	"miss, long for"
	musep-ta	musewe-ha-ta	"be afraid of"
	pulep-ta	pulewe-ha-ta	"be envious of"
	kwiyp-ta	kwiye-ha-ta	"love"
	silh-ta	silhe-ha-ta	"dislike"
	mukep-ta	mukewe-ha-ta	"feel heavy"
	tulyep-ta	tulye-ha-ta	"dread"
	elyep-ta	elye-ha-ta	"be difficult for"
	mip-ta	miwe-ha-ta	"hate"
yepu-ta	yeppe-ha-ta	"be pretty, good"	
B.	Noun+ha-ta	Noun+ha-ha-ta	
	pulanha-ta	pulanhae-ha-ta	"feel insecure"
	yukweha-ta	yukwehae-ha-ta	"feel pleasant"
	ciluha-ta	ciluhae-ha-ta	"feel bored"
	pulkweha-ta	pulkwehae-ha-ta	"feel upset"
	sinkiha-ta	sinkihae-ha-ta	"be amazed"
C.	pilyoha-ta	pilyolo-ha-ta	"need"

	Noun+iss-ta masiss-ta mesiss-ta caemiiss-ta	Noun+iss-ha-ta masisse-ha-ta mesisse-ha-ta caemisse-ha-ta	"feel tasty" "feel dandy" "be interested in"
B.	Verb-i-ta po-i-ta tul-i-ta ttel-i-ta	Verb-ta po-ta tut-ta ttel-ta	"see" "hear" "tremble"
	Verb-ci-ta nwiuchie-ci-ta nukkie-ci-ta mite-ci-ta heyalie-ci-ta pese-ci-ta mancie-ci-ta	Verb-ta nwiuchi-ta nukki-ta mit-ta heyali-ta pes-ta manci-ta	"repent" "feel" "believe" "figure out" "take off" "touch"
C.	Noun-toi-ta huhwe-toi-ta kekcong-toi-ta ihae-toi-ta hontong-toi-ta uysim-toi-ta sangsang-toi-ta	Noun-ha-ta huhwe-ha-ta kekcong-ha-ta ihae-ha-ta hontong-ha-ta uysim-ha-ta sangsang-ha-ta	"regret" "be concerned" "understand" "be confused about" "be doubtful of" "imagine"
	Noun-sulup-ta salang-sulup-ta calang-sulup-ta conkyeng-sulup-ta	Noun-ha-ta salang-ha-ta calang-ha-ta conkyeng-ha-ta	"love" "be proud of" "be respectful"

Table 1: Morpho-syntactic relations between experiential and agentive predicates

Table 2 gives the range of psychological predicates that enter into these parallel constructions. There does not seem to be any limitation, so that the constructions must be considered highly productive. Semantically the experiential construction extends into spatial metaphor (cf section 6). Morpho-syntactically the two constructions are exploited far beyond the domain of psych-verbs.

cognitive activity: thought, feeling, memory, etc	memory: <i>kieknata</i> vs. <i>kiekhata</i> thought: <i>saengkanata</i> vs. <i>saengkakhata</i>
cognitive disposition: easy, difficult, heavy, possible, etc	heavy: <i>mukepta</i> vs. <i>mukewehata</i> difficult: <i>elyepta</i> vs. <i>elyewehata</i>
perception: see, hear, feel, touch, taste, etc	see: <i>poita</i> vs. <i>pota</i> hear: <i>tulita</i> vs. <i>tutta</i>
affective states: fear, pleasure, shame, boredom, etc.	fear: <i>musepta</i> vs. <i>musewehata</i> boredom: <i>ciluhata</i> vs. <i>ciluhaehata</i>
bodily sensation: cold, hot, hungry, sick, etc.	cold: <i>chupta</i> vs. <i>chuwehata</i> sick: <i>aputa</i> vs. <i>apahaehata</i>

Table 2: Semantic range of the parallel constructions

4. **Interactional Discourse.** Example (3) below is a series of potential turns in a conversation between a speaker (A) and a listener (B) about a third person (Changho).

(3) A: *Na-nun ne-wa Changho-ka kathi issnun kes-ul poass-nuntey...* "I saw you with
 I-TOP you-and Changho-NOM together being-ACC saw-and... Changho and..."

- | | |
|---------------------------------------|--------------------------|
| a. <i>Na-nun Chango-lul cohahae.</i> | "I like him." (AGT) |
| b. <i>Na-nun Changho-ka coha.</i> | "I like him."(EXP) |
| c. <i>??Ne-nun Changho-ka coha.</i> | "You like him."(EXP) |
| d. <i>Ne-nun Changho-ka coha?</i> | "Do you like him?"(EXP) |
| e. <i>?? Changho-nun ne-ka coha.</i> | "Does he like you?"(EXP) |
| f. <i>Changho-nun ne-lul coahani?</i> | "Does he like you?"(AGT) |

It is well-known that the experiential construction is limited to use with first person subjects (cf. Kuroda 1973).⁷ Turns a and b show that the speaker, A, can use either construction to describe his/her own feelings for Changho; (c) shows that the speaker A can not use the experiential construction to describe B's feelings about Changho, except if A is making an inquiry about B's feelings, as in (d), in which case the experiential construction is fine. But if the inquiry is about Changho's feelings for B, as in (e), the experiential construction is odd. Only the agentive construction can be used, as in (f).

What unifies these facts is accessibility to the mental world of the experiencer by a cognizer, namely, the speaker. A, the speaker, can make 'direct access' assertions about his/her own feelings, or s/he can make an inquiry into the feelings of the interlocutor B, in effect making a request for a "direct access" conduit to B's mental state. Example (e) is odd in the experiential construction because neither A nor B have direct access to Changho's feelings. Examples (g) and (h) show that the experiential construction can be licensed by the presence of an evidential which specifies the conduit through which the speaker has access to the experiencer's state.

- | | |
|--|-----------------------------------|
| (3) g. <i>Ne-nun Changho-ka cohun ka poa</i> | "You like him, it seems."(EXP) |
| h. <i>Changho-nun ne-ka coh tey.</i> | "He said that he likes you."(EXP) |
| i. <i>Changho-wa na-nun ne-lul cohahae.</i> | "He and I like you."(AGT) |
| j. <i>Changho-wa na-nun ne-ka coha.</i> | "He and I like you."(EXP) |
| k. <i>?? Changho-wa na-nun kakca ne-ka coha.</i> | "He and I each like you."(EXP) |

In (g) this conduit is B's appearance and behavior; in (h) it is Changho's own words. What is asserted in (g) and (h) is the evidential link, not the experiential state itself. Thus (g) and (h) help to confirm that the basic issue underlying the choice between the two constructions is the accessibility of the experiencer's mental world to a cognizer, in this case the speaker.

Examples (i) and (j) further clarify this point. In (i) A and Changho can be coded as a conjoined subject in the agentive construction with no implication about their personal relationship. But in (j), the experiential construction presupposes that A and Changho have intimate shared knowledge about B; for example, if A and Changho are siblings and B is the sister-in-law. This is confirmed by (k), where a distributive quantifier blocks the shared knowledge interpretation, making the experiential construction unacceptable.

5. Narrative Discourse. The facts of interactional discourse suggest a single unifying pragmatic factor controlling the occurrence of the experiential construction: accessibility of the experiencer's mental world to a cognizer. This factor is equally manifested in the use of the agentive and experiential constructions in narrative discourse. The 'accessibility' explanation offered for the limited distribution of the experiential construction in interactional discourse suggests that this construction ought to be used in narrative for a direct representation of the thoughts and perceptions of a character; in fact, it ought to be limited to such contexts. In contrast, the agentive construction ought to give an objective, external perspective on the character, even when presenting his mental state.⁸

It is a widely held view that a narrative text invites the reader to identify with a perspective from which the story is presented.⁹ Narrative is made up of contexts which may be viewed as more or less subjective. So called objective context may be understood to be portrayed or reported by a narrator as an observer. Hence, the reader, adopting the narrator's point of view, also views the events of the story world as an observer. In subjective contexts, the reader can directly 'participate' in the story *via* the character's thoughts and perceptions. The character whose consciousness is adopted is called the 'subjective character,' and the phenomena that the reader experiences through that character are labeled 'represented thought' and 'represented perception' (Banfield 1982). Typically the text will present perceptions, thoughts and feelings without referring to the experiencer at all. The reader's focus is not on the experiencer as an actor in the story world but rather on the direct experience of thoughts, feelings and perceptions through that character.

We predict that the experiential construction will be used in subjective contexts for the straightforward expression of a subjective character's mental state, since in subjective contexts the reader has direct access to the subjective character's psychological state. We also predict that the agentive construction can occur in either objective contexts, or in subjective contexts to express a non-subjective character's mental state.¹⁰ The agentive construction is licensed in objective contexts because the reader, taking the narrator's perspective, views events as an external observer. The agentive construction in subjective contexts is possible to describe a non-subjective character's mental state because the subjective character cannot have direct access to any character's mental world except his own. (see ex 13 line 3)

Examples (4) and (5) are parallel episodes of narrative discourse. In (4) several linguistic features suggest represented thought of the subjective character *Suni*: the deictic *come...stand*, the reflexive *caki*, the non-embeddable fragment and exclamation, and the causal conjunction. In this context the experiential construction (a) is more coherent than the agentive (b) since it supports a constant psychological viewpoint from within *Suni*. In example (5) linguistic features such as the deictic *go...stand*, the adverbial *obviously*, the plain pronominal possessor and the progressive aspect all suggest an external, objectified view of *Suni*, and in this case the agentive construction (b) is coherent. This illustrates the basic effect of represented perception and thought versus objectified expression. The experiential construction supports the subjective context because it conveys more direct access to the character's mental world, precisely the point of represented thought. On the other hand, the agentive construction supports the objective context, since it suggests an external view of the character.

- (4) *Suni-nun kewul ap-ey wase sessta.*
Suni-TOP mirror front-to come-stand

papo kathi ulkin! ulkoissnun (caki) elkul-ul po-ni,
fool like crying crying (self) face-ACC see-cause,

- a. (*Suni-nun*) *Toli-ka teuk miwessta.* (EXP)
Suni-TOP Toli-NOM more hateful

- b. ?*Suni-nun Toli-lul teuk miwehaessta.* (AGT)
Suni-TOP Toli-ACC more hate

'Suni came and stood in front of the mirror. Crying like a fool!
(Suni) seeing herself crying like that, Toli was even more hateful (to her) than before.'

- (5) *Suni-nun kewul ap-ey kase sessta. kunye-nun punmyenghi ulko issessta.*
 Suni-TOP mirror front-to go stand she-TOP obviously crying was

ulkoissnun (kunye-uy) elkul-ul po-nmye,
 crying (her) face-ACC see-and,

- a. *?Suni-nun Toli-ka miwessta.* (EXP)
 Suni-TOP Toli-NOM more hateful
- b. *Suni-nun Toli-lul miwehaessta.* (AGT)
 Suni-TOP Toli-ACC more hate

‘Suni went and stood in front of the mirror. It was clear that she was crying. As she looked at her face crying, Suni hated Toli even more.’

Examples (6 a, b and c) provide further evidence of the direct access function of the experiential construction. The introductory sentence of (6a) sets up a represented thought context for Insu in the following sentence. Here the experiential construction is fully acceptable, just as it was in the represented thought context of example (4). Example (6b) is projected thought; more specifically, it is Suni’s report of Insu’s mental state, as Insu himself views it. Here the experiential construction is strange, but still marginally acceptable. Finally, (6c) presents Suni’s psychological report about Insu’s mental state, i.e. from Suni’s point of view. Here there is no sense of direct access to Insu’s mental world and the experiential construction is impossible. Thus in moving from (6a) to (6c) the context portrays decreasing access to Insu’s mental world, and the experiential construction becomes less and less acceptable.

- (6) a. *Insu-nun ancase cangmi kkoch-ul pomye saengkakhaessta.*
 Insu-TOP sitting roses -ACC seeing thought

{ *caki-nun i cangmi kkoch-ul coahanta.*(AGT) }
 { *caki-nun i cangmi kkoch-i cohta.*(EXP) }
 self-TOP this rose-ACC/NOM like

‘Insu was thinking as he sat looking at the roses. (To him) These roses were nice.’

- b. *Suni-nun Insu-lopute manun iyaki-lul tules-nuntey,*
 Suni-TOP Insu-from many story-ACC heard-and

{ *ku-nun cangmi kkoch-ul coahanta.*(AGT) }
 { *? ku-nun cangmi kkoch-i cohta.*(EXP) }
 he-TOP rose-ACC/?NOM like

‘Suni heard many stories from Insu, you know, he liked roses.’

- c. *Suni-nun Insu-eytaehae manun iyaki-lul tules-nuntey*
 Suni-TOP Insu-about many story-ACC heard-and.

{ *ku-nun cangmi kkoch-ul coahanta.*(AGT) }
 { ** ku-nun cangmi kkoch-i cohta.*(EXP) }
 he-TOP rose-ACC/*NOM like

‘Suni heard a lot of stories about Insu, and he liked roses.’

The next piece of evidence has to do with aspectual inferences derived from the two constructions. In (7) the initial sentence sets up a character description. In the sequel only the agentive construction in (7a) is coherent. In contrast, the initial sentence in (8) sets up a narrative episode with a here and now deictically anchored to the story world. In the sequel both constructions are coherent, but each has a different interpretation. (8a) is a psychological report giving a general disposition of Insu, explaining why he stopped, perhaps from another character's or the narrator's perspective. (8b), on the other hand, transparently presents what Insu is thinking at that moment of the story.

- (7) *Insu-nun uskinun namca-ta.*
Insu-TOP funny guy

- a. *Ku-nun cangmi kkoch-ul cohahaessta.* (AGT)
b. ?? *Ku-nun cangmi kkoch-i cohassta.* (EXP)
he-TOP roses-ACC/?NOM like

'Insu was a funny guy. He liked roses.'

- (8) *Insu-nun kkoch cip ap-ey sessta.*
Insu-TOP flowershop front-LOC stood.

- a. *Ku-nun cangmi kkoch-ul cohahaessta.* (AGT)
b. *Ku-nun cangmi kkoch-i cohassta.* (EXP)
he-TOP roses-ACC/NOM like

'Insu stopped in front of the florist to look. He liked the roses.'

The Agentive construction can describe a general psychological disposition, or it can summarize. As used in (7a), it gives a report about the mental state of the character, rather than tying us to the character's 'here' and 'now.' The lack of connection to a deictic center, a 'here' and 'now,' results in interpretations which are habitual, durative, timeless, or generic. On the other hand, the experiential construction, in directly representing a character's consciousness, is tied to that character's 'here' and 'now' in the story world. This leads to a punctual, perfective interpretation, as in (8b).

Further support for the cognitive analysis of these constructions is provided by the use of the so called long-distance reflexive *caki* in the complement of psych-verbs, as in (9a and b). The reflexive *caki* expresses reflective consciousness in a context where the experiencer is an objectified element of his own consciousness (cf. reflective *Adam considered himself to be inadequate* versus non-reflective *Adam felt inadequate*).¹¹

- (9) a. *Insu-nun {caki-ka / ?Ø} Suni-lul silhehanta ko nnukkiessta.* AGT)
Insu-TOP {self-NOM / ?Ø} Suni-ACC dislike that felt
'Insu felt that he disliked Suni.'

- b. *Insu-nun {?caki-ka / Ø} Suni-ka silhta ko nnukkiessta.* (EXP)
Insu-TOP {? self-NOM / Ø} Suni-NOM dislikable that felt
'Insu felt Suni to be dislikable.'

In (9a) the agentive construction presents an objectified view of Insu's dislike for *Suni*, but since the whole is located within *Insu's* mental world, as indicated by the matrix psych-verb, it is *Insu's* objectification of his own feeling; he as an observer is regarding a separate intensional entity (experiencer), which happens to be himself. This reflective consciousness promotes the use of *caki* versus *zero* in the complement. On the other hand, in (9b) the experiential construction invites the reader to directly access Insu's

mental state. *Insu* himself is transparent, and *zero* is consequently more acceptable in the complement than is *caki*.

It is the usual case that each experiencer has complete access to his or her own mental world; hence, the preference for the experiential construction with first person subjects (see Section 2). An experiencer is less likely to have access to other human minds, but the potential for access does exist, especially in narrative. However, as Wierzbicka (1980) points out, we have little access to the minds of animals. The inaccessibility of animal minds is reflected in a comparison of (10) and (11).

(10) *Suni-nun twis kelum-ul chessta.*

Suni-TOP back step-ACC took

'Suni stepped back.

a. *Kunye-nun Insu-lul musewehassta.*(AGT)

she - TOP Insu-ACC afraid-of

a. She was afraid of Insu.'

b. *Kunye-eykey/nun Insu-ka musewessta.*(EXP)

she - DAT/TOP Insu-NOM frightening

b. Insu was frightening to her.'

(11) *Ku kae-nun twis kelum-ul chessta.*

The dog-TOP back step-ACC took

'The dog stepped back.

a. *Ku kae-nun Insu-lul musewehassta.*(AGT)

the dog-TOP Insu-ACC afraid-of

a. It was afraid of Insu.'

b. *?Ku kae-eykey/nun Insu-ka musewessta.*(EXP)

the dog-DAT/TOP Insu-NOM frightening

b. Insu was frightening to it.'

(10) shows both constructions are acceptable with a human experiencer if a context for represented thought is set up. (11) shows that in the same context the experiential construction (11b) is odd with an animal experiencer, unless, of course, the whole is embedded in a story such as London's "Call of the Wild," which personifies the animal character.

The following data, taken from Korean narrative stories, instantiate the claims that have been made in this paper. These examples provide some illustration of the narrative effects available through the use of experiential and agentive constructions. (12) is taken from an episode in which the reader participates in *Yuceng's* fear of *Molan*.

(12) 1. *Yuceng-un enusai mom-ul tosalinta. sulmyesi kongpo-ka moliewassta.*
Yuceng-TOP abruptly body-ACC withdrew. slowly fear-NOM crowd-came

2. [*nunap-ey anca cangnankkuleliki-chelem cocaltaenun*]
eye-front-LOC sitting pranster-like chatting

3. *Molan-i kapcaki museweciessta.* (EXP)
Molan-NOM suddenly fearsome

'1. Yuceng abruptly withdrew. Slowly fear came crowding in.

2. There sat (Molan), chattering like a mischievous kid.

3. Suddenly Molan was frightening (to her).'

The context is represented thought, with *Yuceng* as the source. In line (1) the spatial metaphor (see Section 6) *fear came crowding in* helps the reader to identify with her emotional state. In line (3) the experiential construction with deleted experiencer continues the identification with *Yuceng* as a subjective character by directly representing her thought process.

Example (13) is necessarily a bit more complex due to the contrast between the two construction types. The entire passage is represented thought, with 'he' (Youngha) as the subjective character. Youngha is thinking about Yuwha and Yuwha's hatred toward Hyenwu. Line (1) contains the experiential construction, which directly represents Youngha's mental state: Youngha's concern for Yuwha. In line (3), the agentive construction gives Youngha's projection of Yuwha's mental state: Yuwha hates Hyenwu. The reader has direct access to Youngha's mind, hence the experiential construction, but not to Yuwha's mind, hence the agentive construction.

- (13) 1. *ku-nun Yuwha-ka kekcengsulewessta.* (EXP)
 he-TOP Yuwha-NOM concerned. (He = Youngha)
2. [*Kewuy kwangki-ey kakkawul*] *cengto-lo salanamun*
 almost madness-to near degree-with survived
3. *Hyenwu-lul cunghakoiss-nuntey,* (AGT)
 Hyenwu-ACC hating-but
4. [*salanghanun salam-ul ilun*] *sulpum ttaemun-ila*] *ko haki eynun*
 loving person-ACC lost sadness because-is to-say
5. *com cinachita siphessta.*
 somewhat above seemed.

'(1) Yuwha was a concern to him [Youngha] (3) Although (Yuwha) was hating Hyenwu, (2) the survivor, with near madness, (5) it [her hatred] seemed (to him) to be more (4) than the sadness of losing her lover.' (No Won p.46)

6. Cognitive Models. The analysis given in this paper follows Gerdts and Youn (1988) in positing distinct underlying structures for the two constructions. Their unaccusative analysis of the experiential construction contains a locative case-marked experiencer in the initial stratum, while the corresponding agentive construction portrays the experiencer as an agent. This initial-level case marking suggests distinct cognitive models for the two constructions. Table 3 provides a simple schematic of what we think the folk cognitive models underlying the two constructions might look like.¹² Specifically, the experiential construction has a locative basis, while the agentive construction has a force-dynamic one. In the experiential construction the experiencer is categorized as a location which is approached by a stimulus, the object of experience. In some cases this stimulus emanates from a source.

	experiencer	object of experience
Experiential construction	LOC	<i>motion</i> <----- Stimulus (Source)
Agentive construction	AGENT	<i>energy</i> -----> Object

Table3: Folk models of mental events

That Korean experiencers metaphorically conceive of themselves as locations approached by stimuli is shown by the extensive use of "ota" (to come) and "tulda" (to

enter) in predications of mental events, as in (14),¹³ which follow the distribution of the experiential construction.

- (14) a. *sulmyesi kongpho-ka (Suni-eykey) molie-wassta.*
slowly fear-NOM (Suni-DAT) gather-come
'Slowly fear gathered in to Suni.'
- b. *nolae soli-ka (Suni-eykey) tulie-wassta.*
song sound-NOM (Suni-DAT) heard-come
'Suni heard the sound of music coming to her.'
- c. *kulen nukkim-i (Suni-eykey) tulessta.*
that feeling-NOM (Suni-DAT) enter
'That kind of feeling came to Suni.'
- d. *mom-i (Suni-eykey) ttellie-wassta.*
body-NOM (Suni-DAT) shiver-come
'shiver overcame Suni.'
- e. *(Suyen-eykey) Min paksa-uy mosup-i tteola-wassta.*
(Suyen-DAT) Min Dr.-GEN figure-NOM surface-come
'The figure of Dr. Min came to Suyen ('s mind).'
- f. *kapet-uy kamkak-i (Kanguk-eykey) cenhae-wassta.*
carpet-GEN touching-NOM (Kanguk-DAT) transmit-come
'Kanguk became aware of how the carpet felt.'
- g. *papokathun saengkak-i (Suni-eykey) tulessta.*
foolish thought-NOM (Suni-DAT) enter
'A foolish thought came to Suni.'

Furthermore, the case-marking pattern of the experiential construction as in (15) is exactly parallel to that of a locative expression, even when it is not intuitively obvious that a stimulus is approaching a location. Compare the literal locative in (15a), and the experiential construction in (15b).

- (15) a. *Toli-eykey sopho-ka wassta.* b. *Toli-eykey Suni-ka musepta.(EXP)*
Toli-DAT package-NOM come Toli-DAT Suni-NOM fearful
'A package arrived to Toli.' 'Suni is fearsome to Toli.'

An interesting phenomenon to consider in this respect is the fact that body part metonymy (Lakoff 1987) is not only possible, but highly frequent in the experiential construction. The body part used in the expression is the relevant organ to which the stimulus must come in order for it to be experienced. This model for perception is depicted in Table 4.

Type of Experience	body part metonymy	example for experiencer
sight	eyes	<i>pulpich-i nun-ey pointa.</i> light-NOM eye-DAT visible 'The light was visible to his eyes.'
sound	ears	<i>phili soli-ka kwi-ey tulinta.</i> recorder sound-NOM ear-DAT heard 'The sound of a recorder was audible to (his) ear.'
touch	skin	<i>chukchukhan kamkak-i phipu-ey nukkiecinta.</i> wet feeling-NOM skin-DAT felt 'Wet feeling was sensible to (his) skin.'
affect	heart/mind	<i>Suni-ka kasumsok-ey kulipta.</i> Suni-NOM heart-DAT longed-for 'In his heart was longing for Suni.'
thought	head/brain	<i>Suni-uy saengkak-i meli-ey nassta.</i> Suni-GEN thought-NOM head-DAT strike 'The thought about Suni struck him.'

Table 4: Body part metonymy for experiencer

Instead of having the experiencer specified in the dative/locative, a visual experience can come to the eyes, an auditory experience to the ears, a tactile experience to the skin, affect to the heart or body, and thought to the head or brain. This systematic metonymy emphasizes the experiencer as a location since the actual site of experience, in the folk model, is substituted for the whole person, who is usually not mentioned. (Note the lack of overt possessor in Table 4). In contrast, this body-part metonymy is not possible in the Agentive construction. This reflects the folk assumption that people, and not any specific part of them, are the default source of agency. Note the weirdness in English of 'his mind wanted to leave,' or 'his foot kicked open the door'.

Finally, the case marking of the experiential construction places focus on the object of experience, and not only backgrounds the experiencer in an oblique expression, but also promotes its deletion in both interactional and narrative discourse. This is consonant with the claim that the experiential construction allows the reader to view the story world through the thoughts and perceptions of the experiencer, who remains more or less transparent. In contrast, the agentive construction portrays the experiencer as an agent, i.e. as a salient actor in an objective presentation of the story world.

7. Conclusion. In this paper we have attempted to account for two types of constructions in Korean. The difference between experiential and agentive constructions is signalled at the surface level by systematic differences in derivational morphology and case marking. The semantic distinction is accounted for in terms of the notion of subjectivity: the agentive construction has an external cognizing observer who has no access to the mental world of the experiencer, whereas the experiential construction incorporates the cognizer as the experiencer in the utterance who has direct access to her own mental state. We also have discussed the effect of these semantic and pragmatic differences in interactional and narrative discourse. The experiential construction is exploited in subjective contexts in narratives to give the reader the feeling of direct participation in the story world, whereas the agentive construction is used in objective

contexts where the reader is acting as a mere observer of the scene just like a narrator. A locative/directional model for the experiential construction is proposed, and a force dynamic model for the agentive construction. One avenue for future research is an investigation into the similarity of the case pattern [DAT-NOM-PREDICATE] used both in the experiential construction discussed here and in passive constructions, and on the stativity vs. activity of these constructions.

NOTES

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1 The syntactic constructions in question are not limited to psych-verbs. In particular the structure in (1b) with overt action predicates is described as "passive." See also the discussion of Table 2.

2 Where possible we translate the experiential construction in Korean with a superficially parallel inversion construction in English. This does not, however, capture either the distributional possibilities or the semantic effects of the Korean, which are central topics of this paper.

3 Experiential constructions have been noted in Russian, Japanese, Georgian and German, in addition to Korean. They have variously been called Psych Constructions, Inversion Constructions, Double-Subject Constructions, Dative Subject Constructions, Impersonal Constructions or Unaccusative Constructions. See Postal 1970, Youn 1985, N. McCawley 1975 for examples of previous treatments of this phenomenon.

4 N. McCawley's feature "unself-controllable/non-volitional" is one of the more interesting proposals. Lack of volition is a property of the experiential construction which we do not explore in this paper. But it seems easily derivable from the cognitive semantic basis of the construction which we propose in section 6. In particular (cf Table 3), the force-dynamic basis of the agentive construction portrays the experiencer as the controller of the event. In contrast, the locative basis of the experiential construction, and the locative case-marking on the experiencer, seem to invite the inference that the experiencer is a mere location of the experience, and by contrast with the agentive construction, not in control of it.

5 The term 'subjective' is naturally understood in relation to its opposite notion 'objective,' and while these contrasting notions may be useful in understanding the cognitive models behind the experiential and agentive constructions, this should not be taken to imply that language itself can be objective.

6 There may be other categories; these are offered only for purposes of illustration.

7 German shows a similar restriction, but only with a few archaic predicates. For example in interactional discourse, *mich dünkt* is acceptable, but **dich dünkt* or **ihn dünkt* are not possible, although in narrative *ihn dünkte* suggests direct access to the mental state of the character. In contrast, the verb *denken*, with an 'agentive' case-marking pattern, has no such restriction.

8 This point is essentially parallel to Kuroda's claim about adjectival versus verbal predicates in Japanese narrative.

9 This view is implicit in Fillmore's (1975) work on deixis; it is also articulated by Banfield (1982) and Cohn (1978) among others in literary criticism and by Kuno (1987), Kuroda (1973) and others in linguistics.

10 The agentive construction appears to occur in subjective contexts to describe the subjective character's mental state. But rather than directly representing the thought or perception of the character, it gives a psychological report (Wiebe, 1989) of his general

psychological disposition from an external 'objective' point of view (cf examples 7a & 8a). The agentive construction also occurs in passages of **reflective thought**, in which the subjective character is the observer of his own objectivized mental state, as in example (9a).

11 See Zubin, Chun and Li (1990) in this volume for a fuller discussion of this point.

12 We are indebted to pioneers in Cognitive Semantics such as Ronald Langacker and Leonard Talmy for their insights into the underlying cognitive structure of these constructions, and in particular for insisting that such constructions are not maps of reality, but rather conventionalized *construals* of it.

13 See Li, in preparation, for a perspective taking account of experiential constructions in Mandarin.

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