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Consciousness Condition on the Korean Reflexive Caki

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1 Problems

Much discussion on Korean syntax has been centered on a reflexive caki, since it evades generalizations of most syntactic binding theories. Its characteristics have been generally assumed as in (1) (Lee 1973).

(1) a. the domain of binding: caki may be bound either within the governing category or outside it.
   b. the nature of antecedents: caki, which refers to the third person only, is mostly bound by a grammatical subject, a topic, or the head of the relative clause.

However, recent studies (S. Cho 1985, Y. Cho 1985, Chang 1986, O’Grady 1987, among others) observe that (1b) is not the correct generalization as to the nature of antecedents. (2) through (5) demonstrate some crucial cases.

(2) violation of the subject condition
   a. John-i Mary-lul Chris-eykey caki-ui pang-eyse
      NOM    ACC    to GEN room-in
      sokayha-yess-ta.
      introduce-past-VE
      'John introduced Mary to Chris in his/her room.'
   b. Na-nun John-ey uihay caki-ui hyung-eykey
      I-TP    by GEN brother-to
      sokaytoi-ess-ta.
      be introduced-past-VE
      'I was introduced to his brother by John.'
   c. [caki-ka iki-n] kes-i John-ui kippukey
      NOM win-adjectival fact-NOM ACC please
      ha-yess-ta.
      make-past-VE
      'That he won pleased John.'

(3) violation of the c-command condition
   GEN book-NOM GEN room-in be-VE
   'John's book is in his room.

b. [John-i iki-n]   kes-i cak¥-ui umma-lul
   NOM win-adjectival fact-NOM GEN mother-ACC
   kippu-key ha-yess-ta.
   please-past-VE
   'That John won pleased his mother.'

c. [John-i sa-n]   chayk-un caki-ui tongsayng-ul
   NOM buy-adjectival book-TP GEN brother-for
   wuihan semwul-i-ta.
   present-be-VE
   'The book that John bought is a present for his brother.'

(4) violation of the third person reference condition

Ne-nun caki-ui il-ina hay.
you-TP GEN business do
'Mind your own business.'

(5) binding in a discourse situation

   NOM you-NOM the party-to go-past-VE-said
   'Chris said that you went to the party.'

Mary: anya, caki-ka ka-ass-e.
   no NOM go-past-VE
   'No, HE went.'

b. (John is looking for a pen.)

Mary (to herself): caki-ui ap-ey issnuntey.
   GEN in front of be
   '(The pen) is in front of him.'

(2) shows that non-subject arguments can bind caki, although subjects are most preferred. In (2a), any arguments within the governing category, i.e., John, Mary, Chris, bind caki. (2b) shows that the passive agent, John, can be the antecedent. In (2c), non-subject arguments outside the governing category can also be the antecedent. (3) demonstrates that the antecedent does not have to c-command caki. The possessor NP in (3a), an NP embedded in a nominal clause in (3b), and an NP in a relative clause in (3c) can freely antecede caki. (4) shows that the first or the second person also binds caki in some limited situations. (5a) shows that caki can find its antecedent in a previous discourse. Furthermore, the antecedent does not have to be expressed linguistically as (5b) demonstrates. Caki can refer to somebody in the actual situation. In sum, the set of potential binders of caki is not limited to a grammatical subject or a topic that c-commands it.

However, it is not the case that caki does not impose any condition on its antecedent, contrary to Manzini and Wexler (1987:422-23). There are cases where caki may not be bound. Furthermore, the set of its potential binders is affected
by preferential hierarchies. This paper attempts to show that the set of its binders is constrained primarily by the concept of consciousness. Precisely speaking, caki is a referring term exclusively adopted when the speaker considers a person as a conscious entity. Once we show that caki is semantically/pragmatically constrained, it will naturally follow why syntactic approaches solely in terms of configurational generalizations fail to explain caki binding.

2 Consciousness condition

Let us consider subtle differences in grammaticality judgement in (6).

(6) a. ??na-nun John-eykeyse [caki-ka cohun salam-i-lila]-nun
    I-TP 'from NOM good person-be-VE-COMP
    insang-ul pat-ass-ta.
    impression-ACC receive-past-VE
    'I received from John an impression that he might
    be a good person.'

b. na-nun John-eykeyse [caki-ka Korea-eyse sa o-n]
    I-TP 'from NOM from buy come-adjectival
    senmwul-ul pat-ass-ta.
    present-ACC receive-past-VE
    'I received from John a present that he brought from Korea.'

c. na-nun John-eykeyse [caki-ka iki-ess-ta]-nun mal-ul
    I-TP 'from NOM win-past-VE-COMP saying-ACC
    tul-ess-ta.
    hear-past-VE
    'I heard from John that he won.'

In (6), all the occurrences of John take the oblique function and bear a source thematic role. It is difficult, however, to bind caki in (6a) compared to (6b) and (6c). The subtle difference lies in whether John is conscious of the situation expressed in the reported speech. In (6b) and (6c), John assumes a high degree of agenthood and should be conscious of the situation. That is why we cannot say I received from John a present that he brought from Korea, but he did not know that he brought it from Korea or I heard from John that he won, but he did not know that he won. In contrast, in (6a), John does not play any agentive role to give the speaker a certain impression: the impression is based on the speaker's observation of John's behavior. Hence, John cannot be said to be conscious of the situation. We can explain (7) in the same way.

(7) a. ??Mary-ka John-eykey [caki-ka ci-ess-ta]-ko
    NOM to NOM lose-past-VE-COMP
    malha-yess-ta.
    say-past-VE
    'Mary told John that she/he lost.'
b. Mary-ka John-ey key [caki-ka ci-ess-nun]-ci
   NOM to NOM lose-past-whether
   mwule po-ass-ta.
   ask try-past-VE
   'Mary asked John whether she/he lost.'

   c. Mary-ka John-ey key [caki-ka ci-ess-um]-ul
      NOM to NOM lose-past-nominal-ACC
      insiksiki-ess-ta.
      make realize-past-VE
      'Mary made John realize that she/he lost.'

In each example in (7), John is the indirect object and bears the goal role. It is difficult, however, to bind caki in (7a), compared to (7b) and (7c). In (7a), John is interpreted as a goal toward which a speech is addressed. Whether he actually understands the content of the reported speech or not does not matter. Accordingly, we may say Mary told John that he lost, but he did not listen. In contrast, the verb ask presupposes that John is in control of the information in (7b). In (7c), the main verb requires that Mary's reporting event should be followed by John's understanding of the reported speech. In other words, he should come to be in a condition of being in control of information. That is why we cannot say Mary made John realize that he lost, but he did not listen. This account in terms of consciousness applies to simple sentences as well.

    NOM GEN book-in praise-past-VE
    'Mary praised John in her/his book.'

      NOM GEN room-in meet-past-VE
      'Mary met John in her/his room.'

      NOM GEN room-to send back-past-VE
      'Mary sent John to her/his room (caused John to go).'

Although all the occurrences of John bear the same grammatical function and the same thematic role, there is a difference, depending on how much the speaker considers John's consciousness of the situation. In (8a), John is a patient which is simply affected by Mary's action. However, when the verb designates a reciprocal action in which both parties' consciousness or volition is equally considered or a causative action as in (8b) and (8c), the object is interpreted as playing a more agentive role. As we predict, caki binding is preferred in these cases.

We can find several pairs that exhibit the same effect in this respect. In (9), all the second cases share the characteristics that John may be conscious of the specific situation depicted in the sentence. In these cases, caki binding is preferred.

(9) a. John-ey kwanhay malhacanyen : John-ui kwancemeyse pomyen
    about speaking GEN point of view seeing
'talking about John': 'from John's point of view'
b. John-eykey malhata : John-eykey malhay cvuta
to say for say give the favor of
'to tell John': 'to give John the favor of telling'
c. John-eykey malhata : John-eykey allita / kaluchita /
to say to inform / teach /
sangkisikita
remind
'to tell John': 'to inform / teach / remind John'
d. John-ey kwanhay uinonhata : John-kwa hamkkey uinonhata
about discuss with discuss
'to discuss about John': 'to discuss with John'

So far, we have considered when caki binding is preferred, that is, the cases where the referent is considered to be conscious of the situation depicted in the reported speech. (10), however, shows that this generalization is too restricted.

(10) a. na-nun John\textsubscript{z} eykey [caki\textsubscript{z} ka ci-n] kes-ul
I-TP to NOM lose-adjectival fact-ACC
sumki-ess-ta.
conceal-past-VE
'I concealed from John\textsubscript{z} the fact that he lost.'
b. John-ul wuihay caki-ui chinkwutul-i surprize party-lul
\textsubscript{z} for GEN friends-NOM ACC
koyhoyk-cwung-i-ta.
plan-in the middle-be-VE
'For John, his friends are planning for a surprize party.'

In both situations given in (10), John does not actually know the specific situation expressed in the sentence, but antecedes caki. What matters here is not that the referent is actually conscious of the situation, but that the speaker perceives him as being potentially conscious. Whether or not to view a person as a potentially conscious entity depends on the speaker's discretion.

Then how can we formulate the precise condition for caki binding? I contend that caki is basically bound by an NP whose referent is considered as a conscious entity by the speaker. How to view a person in these terms varies greatly, depending on speakers and discourse contexts.\textsuperscript{2} The referent does not have to be conscious of the specific situation depicted in the reported speech. However, if the lexical semantics of the predicates clearly requires that the referent should be conscious of that situation, it would explicitly indicate that he is a conscious being. Accordingly, caki binding is preferred in these cases as we have observed in (6) through (8).

This account in terms of consciousness provides us with correct generalizations about the antecedents of caki.\textsuperscript{3} First, caki is preferably bound by an NP taking an experiencer thematic role, since one cannot think or feel if he is not conscious. Secondly, among the NPs taking a goal or a patient role, the object of the lexical causatives is most salient. In such predicates as feed, kill, send, the object plays
a more agentive role, as lexical decomposition of the generative semantics captures the intuition. Thirdly, in general, the first/second person cannot antecede caki. The first and the second person pronouns are used to refer to the speaker and the hearer respectively in the actual discourse situation. In the situation where the speaker and the hearer actively participate, it is impossible to consider them as unconscious. Caki can refer to the first/second person only when they are objectified. Finally, this analysis obviates the issue of the binding domain of caki, since semantically appropriate controllers may appear in any syntactic domain including discourse. Before I conclude, it is worth comparing my analysis with two other similar approaches, that is, an account in terms of logophoricity and Kuno’s account in terms of empathy. I contend that consciousness subsumes both notions.

3 Comparison with Logophoricity and Empathy

First, let us consider logophoricity. Logophoricity, introduced in the studies of such African languages as Ewe, has been adopted to account for non-clause bound anaphors in several languages (Maling 1984 on Icelandic, Kameyama 1984 and Sells 1987 on Japanese, Cho 1985 on Korean, Matsumoto 1989 on Malayalam), especially in the framework of Lexical Functional Grammar. The antecedent of the logophoric anaphor must be the one whose speech, thoughts, feelings, or general state of consciousness are reported (Clements 1975:141). Accordingly, the binder of the logophoric anaphor should be one among sentential arguments of predicates of communication and mental experience as in (11).

(11) a. Na-nun John₁-eykeyse [caki-ka iki-ess-um]-ul
    I-TP from NOM win-past-nominal-ACC
    tul-ess-ta.
    hear-past-VE
    'I heard from John₁ that he₁ won.'

   b. [Caki-ka ci-n] kes-i John₁-ul sulphukey
       NOM lose-adjectival fact-NOM ACC sad
       ha-yess-ta.
       make-past-VE
       'That he₁ lost made John₁ sad.'

This notion is different from consciousness in two respects. First, logophoricity requires that the referent’s state of consciousness be actually represented in the sentence. In (6) to (8), only (6c) is the logophoricity case, since John’s saying is explicitly reported in the sentence. In contrast, consciousness includes the referent’s potential consciousness: it does not have to be explicitly reported in the sentence. If only the speaker can perceive a person as a conscious entity, we can use caki. In this regard, logophoricity is a grammaticized notion of consciousness. Secondly, the logophoric anaphor is not introduced when an account in terms of configurational generalizations is already available, i.e., when antecedents are/are not within the same nucleus with anaphors, or when they are/are not bearing subjective function.
In contrast, my account seeks to find semantic characteristics shared by all the binding cases of *caki*.

Let us then consider Kuno's account in terms of empathy. Kuno (1987:206) defines the term *empathy as the speaker's identification, which may vary in degree, with a person/thing that participates in the event or state that he describes in a sentence*. For example, consider the Japanese sentences in (12).

(12) a. Taro-çi zibun-ni ai-ni kita hito niwa, dare-demo
   TP self-to to see came people to whoever
   syokuzi-o dasu.
   meal ACC offer
   'Taroçı offers a meal to anybody who has come to see him.'

b. *Taro-çi zibun-ni ai-ni itta hito niwa, dare-demo
   went
   syokuzi-o dasu.
   'Taroçı offers a meal to anybody who has gone to see him.'

In (12), the person with whom the speaker empathizes becomes the deictic center. Others should come toward the deictic center, but cannot go there. The Japanese reflexive can be used with the verb *come* only, which clearly shows that its referent is the deictic center and is, furthermore, the person with whom the speaker empathizes. This analysis differs from my account in two respects. First, while my account simply says that the referent should be considered as conscious, the empathy account requires that the speaker should take the referent's point of view when describing a situation. However, we do not necessarily take one's point of view in order to consider him as conscious. We can retain our own point of view but still consider others as conscious. In other words, a simple sentence can have only one point of view, while many persons can be considered as conscious. Accordingly, when *caki* is used in the corresponding Korean sentences of (12), it can be used with both verbs, *come* and *go*. Secondly, while *consciousness* is basically a condition on the lexical semantics of the reflexive itself, the latter concerns the sentential level, that is, the relationship between the speaker and the reported situation.

4 Conclusion

In this paper, I have attempted to show that the notion of *consciousness* can account for *caki* binding. This analysis suggests that syntactic constraints do not play a significant role in *caki* binding. A broader principle stated in terms of *consciousness* predicts not only the configurational generalizations but also the exceptions to them.

5 Notes

* I am grateful to Joan Bresnan, Yo Matsumoto, K.P. Mohanan, and Peter Sells for their valuable comments and suggestions.
1. Im (1987) and Lee (1988) independently arrive at a similar conclusion. Im’s analysis differs from mine in that it takes an interpretive approach: caki always requires its antecedent to be interpreted as being conscious of the situation. Peter Sells suggested to pursue the interpretive approach, which I could not incorporate in this paper. Differently from Im (1987) or my present argument, Lee considers only actual consciousness cases as acceptable. He does not accept potential consciousness cases, which I deal with in Section 2. Accordingly, Lee (1988:4-5) observes the following contrast:

   I-NOM   ACC house near see-past-VE
   'I saw John near his house.'

   b.?*nay-ka namwu twi-ey swumese John-ul caki-cep
   I-NOM tree behind hiding ACC house
   kunche-eyse po-ass-ta.
   near see-past-VE
   'Hiding behind a tree, I saw John near his house.'

2. This is the reason for wide idiolectal variations in the grammaticality judgments of native speakers on the use of caki.

3. In this paper, I have considered only the cases where non-subject arguments bind caki. It is still disputable whether the same account can apply to all the subject binding cases. I think two arguments support that the subject condition may be replaced by the consciousness condition. First, Keenan (1976:310) observes a difference in meaning between the active and passive of sentences containing some adverbs in English, which is equally applicable to Korean.

(2) a. The police arrested John willingly.
   b. John was arrested by the police willingly.

In (2a), the police is the only willing participant in the given situation. But (2b) is ambiguous as to whether John or the police acted willingly. Such adverbs as intentionally, volitionally, consciously show the same subject orientation. This seems to show that the subject position always requires its referent be conscious/volitional to a certain degree. Secondly, the grammatical subjecthood is semantically constrained in Korean: the subject should be a controller of the sententially denoted action (Klaiman 1984).

(3) a. na-nun sikan-ey ccoch-ki-ko iss-ta.
   I-TP time-by chase-passive be-VE
   'I am being chased by time'

   b.*sikan-i na-lul ccoch-ko iss-ta.
   time-NOM I-ACC chase be-VE
   'Time is chasing me.'

A controller of the sententially denoted action should be conscious of it. Accordingly, the subject should always be a conscious being in Korean. These two arguments suggest that the subject condition may be replaced by the consciousness condition.
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