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Consciousness Condition on the Korean Reflexive *Caki**

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1 Problems

Much discussion on Korean syntax has been centered on a reflexive *caki*, since it evades generalizations of most syntactic binding theories. Its characteristics have been generally assumed as in (1) (Lee 1973).

- (1) a. the domain of binding: *caki* may be bound either within the governing category or outside it.
 b. the nature of antecedents: *caki*, which refers to the third person only, is mostly bound by a grammatical subject, a topic, or the head of the relative clause.

However, recent studies (S.Cho 1985, Y.Cho 1985, Chang 1986, O'Grady 1987, among others) observe that (1b) is not the correct generalization as to the nature of antecedents. (2) through (5) demonstrate some crucial cases.

(2) violation of the subject condition

- a. John_i NOM Mary_j ACC lul Chris_k eykey caki_i ui pang-eyse GEN room-in
 sokayha-yess-ta.
 introduce-past-VE
 'John_i introduced Mary_j to Chris_k in his_i/her_j room.'
- b. Na-nun John_i ey uihay caki_i ui hyung-eykey GEN brother-to
 I-TP by
 sokaytoi-ess-ta.
 be introduced-past-VE
 'I was introduced to his_i brother by John_i.'
- c. [caki_i ka iki-n] kes-i John_i ul kippukey ACC please
 NOM win-adjectival fact-NOM
 ha-yess-ta.
 make-past-VE
 'That he_i won pleased John_i.'

(3) violation of the c-command condition

- a. John_i-ui chayk-i caki_i-ui pang-ey iss-ta.
 GEN book-NOM GEN room-in be-VE
 'John_i's book is in his_i room.
- b. [John_i-i iki-n] kes-i caki_i-ui umma-lul
 NOM win-adjectival fact-NOM GEN mother-ACC
 kippu-key ha-yess-ta.
 please-past-VE
 'That John_i won pleased his_i mother.'
- c. [John_i-i sa-n] chayk-un caki_i-ui tongsayng-ul
 NOM buy-adjectival book-TP GEN brother-for
 wuihan senmwul-i-ta.
 present-be-VE
 'The book that John_i bought is a present for his_i brother.'

(4) violation of the third person reference condition

Ne_i-nun caki_i-ui il-ina hay.
 you-TP GEN business do
 'Mind your own business.'

(5) binding in a discourse situation

- a. John: Chris_i-ka [ney-ka ku party-ey ka-ass-ta]-tela.
 NOM you-NOM the party-to go-past-VE-said
 'Chris_i said that you went to the party.'
- Mary: anya, caki_i-ka ka-ass-e.
 no NOM go-past-VE
 'No, HE_i went.'
- b. (John_i is looking for a pen.)
 Mary (to herself): caki_i-ui ap-ey issnuntey.
 GEN in front of be
 '(The pen) is in front of him.'

(2) shows that non-subject arguments can bind *caki*, although subjects are most preferred. In (2a), any arguments within the governing category, i.e., *John*, *Mary*, *Chris*, bind *caki*. (2b) shows that the passive agent, *John*, can be the antecedent. In (2c), non-subject arguments outside the governing category can also be the antecedent. (3) demonstrates that the antecedent does not have to c-command *caki*. The possessor NP in (3a), an NP embedded in a nominal clause in (3b), and an NP in a relative clause in (3c) can freely antecede *caki*. (4) shows that the first or the second person also binds *caki* in some limited situations. (5a) shows that *caki* can find its antecedent in a previous discourse. Furthermore, the antecedent does not have to be expressed linguistically as (5b) demonstrates. *Caki* can refer to somebody in the actual situation. In sum, the set of potential binders of *caki* is not limited to a grammatical subject or a topic that c-commands it.

However, it is not the case that *caki* does not impose any condition on its antecedent, contrary to Manzini and Wexler (1987:422-23). There are cases where *caki* may not be bound. Furthermore, the set of its potential binders is affected

by preferential hierarchies. This paper attempts to show that the set of its binders is constrained primarily by the concept of *consciousness*.¹ Precisely speaking, *caki* is a referring term exclusively adopted when the speaker considers a person as a conscious entity. Once we show that *caki* is semantically/pragmatically constrained, it will naturally follow why syntactic approaches solely in terms of configurational generalizations fail to explain *caki* binding.

2 *Consciousness condition*

Let us consider subtle differences in grammaticality judgement in (6).

- (6) a. ??na-nun John_i-eykeyse [caki_i-ka cohun salam-i-lila]-nun
 I-TP from NOM good person-be-VE-COMP
 insang-ul pat-ass-ta.
 impression-ACC receive-past-VE
 'I received from John_i an impression that he_i might
 be a good person.'
- b. na-nun John_i-eykeyse [caki_i-ka Korea-eyse sa o-n]
 I-TP from NOM from buy come-adjektivial
 senmwul-ul pat-ass-ta.
 present-ACC receive-past-VE
 'I received from John_i a present that he_i brought from Korea.'
- c. na-nun John_i-eykeyse [caki_i-ka iki-ess-ta]-nun mal-ul
 I-TP from NOM win-past-VE-COMP saying-ACC
 tul-ess-ta.
 hear-past-VE
 'I heard from John_i that he_i won.'

In (6), all the occurrences of *John* take the oblique function and bear a source thematic role. It is difficult, however, to bind *caki* in (6a) compared to (6b) and (6c). The subtle difference lies in whether *John* is conscious of the situation expressed in the reported speech. In (6b) and (6c), *John* assumes a high degree of agenthood and should be conscious of the situation. That is why we cannot say *I received from John a present that he brought from Korea, but he did not know that he brought it from Korea* or *I heard from John that he won, but he did not know that he won*. In contrast, in (6a), *John* does not play any agentive role to give the speaker a certain impression: the impression is based on the speaker's observation of *John's* behavior. Hence, *John* cannot be said to be conscious of the situation. We can explain (7) in the same way.

- (7) a. ??Mary-ka John_i-eykey [caki_i-ka ci-ess-ta]-ko
 NOM to NOM lose-past-VE-COMP
 malha-yess-ta.
 say-past-VE
 'Mary told John_i that she/he_i lost.'

- b. Mary-ka John₂-eykey [caki₂-ka ci-ess-nun]-ci
 NOM to NOM lose-past-whether
 mwule po-ass-ta.
 ask try-past-VE
 'Mary asked John₂ whether she/he₂ lost.'
- c. Mary-ka John₂-eykey [caki₂-ka ci-ess-um]-ul
 NOM to NOM lose-past-nominal-ACC
 insiksiki-ess-ta.
 make realize-past-VE
 'Mary made John₂ realize that she/he₂ lost.'

In each example in (7), *John* is the indirect object and bears the goal role. It is difficult, however, to bind *caki* in (7a), compared to (7b) and (7c). In (7a), *John* is interpreted as a goal toward which a speech is addressed. Whether he actually understands the content of the reported speech or not does not matter. Accordingly, we may say *Mary told John that he lost, but he did not listen*. In contrast, the verb *ask* presupposes that *John* is in control of the information in (7b). In (7c), the main verb requires that *Mary's* reporting event should be followed by *John's* understanding of the reported speech. In other words, he should come to be in a condition of being in control of information. That is why we cannot say *Mary made John realize that he lost, but he did not listen*. This account in terms of consciousness applies to simple sentences as well.

- (8) a. ??Mary-ka John-ul caki₂-ui chayk-eyse chingchanha-yess-ta.
 NOM ACC GEN book-in praise-past-VE
 'Mary praised John₂ in her/his₂ book.'
- b. Mary-ka John₂-ul caki₂-ui pang-eyse manna-ass-ta.
 NOM ACC GEN room-in meet-past-VE
 'Mary met John₂ in her/his₂ room.'
- c. Mary-ka John₂-ul caki₂-ui pang-ulo tolie ponay-ass-ta.
 NOM ACC GEN room-to send back-past-VE
 'Mary sent John₂ to her/his₂ room (caused John to go).'

Although all the occurrences of *John* bear the same grammatical function and the same thematic role, there is a difference, depending on how much the speaker considers *John's* consciousness of the situation. In (8a), *John* is a patient which is simply affected by *Mary's* action. However, when the verb designates a reciprocal action in which both parties' consciousness or volition is equally considered or a causative action as in (8b) and (8c), the object is interpreted as playing a more agentive role. As we predict, *caki* binding is preferred in these cases.

We can find several pairs that exhibit the same effect in this respect. In (9), all the second cases share the characteristics that *John* may be conscious of the specific situation depicted in the sentence. In these cases, *caki* binding is preferred.

- (9) a. John-ey kwanhay malhacamyen : John-ui kwancemeyse pomyen
 about speaking GEN point of view seeing

- 'talking about John' : 'from John's point of view'
- b. John-eykey malhata : John-eykey malhay cwuta
 to say for say give the favor of
 'to tell John' : 'to give John the favor of telling'
- c. John-eykey malhata : John-eykey allita / kaluchita /
 to say to inform / teach /
 sangkisikita
 remind
 'to tell John' : 'to inform / teach / remind John'
- d. John-ey kwanhay uinonhata : John-kwa hamkey uinonhata
 about discuss with discuss
 'to discuss about John' : 'to discuss with John'

So far, we have considered when *caki* binding is preferred, that is, the cases where the referent is considered to be conscious of the situation depicted in the reported speech. (10), however, shows that this generalization is too restricted.

- (10) a. na-nun John_i-eykey [caki_i-ka ci-n] kes-ul
 I-TP to NOM lose-adjectival fact-ACC
 sumki-ess-ta.
 conceal-past-VE
 'I concealed from John_i the fact that he_i lost.'
- b. John-ul wuihay caki_i-ui chinkwutul-i surprize party-lul
 for GEN friends-NOM ACC
 koyhoyk-cwung-i-ta.
 plan-in the middle-be-VE
 'For John_i, his_i friends are planning for a surprise party.'

In both situations given in (10), *John* does not actually know the specific situation expressed in the sentence, but antecedes *caki*. What matters here is not that the referent is actually conscious of the situation, but that the speaker perceives him as being potentially conscious. Whether or not to view a person as a potentially conscious entity depends on the speaker's discretion.

Then how can we formulate the precise condition for *caki* binding? I contend that *caki* is basically bound by an NP whose referent is considered as a conscious entity by the speaker. How to view a person in these terms varies greatly, depending on speakers and discourse contexts.² The referent does not have to be conscious of the specific situation depicted in the reported speech. However, if the lexical semantics of the predicates clearly requires that the referent should be conscious of that situation, it would explicitly indicate that he is a conscious being. Accordingly, *caki* binding is preferred in these cases as we have observed in (6) through (8).

This account in terms of *consciousness* provides us with correct generalizations about the antecedents of *caki*.³ First, *caki* is preferably bound by an NP taking an experiencer thematic role, since one cannot think or feel if he is not conscious. Secondly, among the NPs taking a goal or a patient role, the object of the lexical causatives is most salient. In such predicates as *feed*, *kill*, *send*, the object plays

a more agentive role, as lexical decomposition of the generative semantics captures the intuition. Thirdly, in general, the first/second person cannot antecede *caki*. The first and the second person pronouns are used to refer to the speaker and the hearer respectively in the actual discourse situation. In the situation where the speaker and the hearer actively participate, it is impossible to consider them as unconscious. *Caki* can refer to the first/second person only when they are objectified. Finally, this analysis obviates the issue of the binding domain of *caki*, since semantically appropriate controllers may appear in any syntactic domain including discourse. Before I conclude, it is worth comparing my analysis with two other similar approaches, that is, an account in terms of *logophoricity* and Kuno's account in terms of *empathy*. I contend that *consciousness* subsumes both notions.

3 Comparison with Logophoricity and Empathy

First, let us consider logophoricity. *Logophoricity*, introduced in the studies of such African languages as Ewe, has been adopted to account for non-clause bound anaphors in several languages (Maling 1984 on Icelandic, Kameyama 1984 and Sells 1987 on Japanese, Cho 1985 on Korean, Matsumoto 1989 on Malayalam), especially in the framework of Lexical Functional Grammar. The antecedent of the logophoric anaphor must be the one *whose speech, thoughts, feelings, or general state of consciousness are reported* (Clements 1975:141). Accordingly, the binder of the logophoric anaphor should be one among sentential arguments of predicates of communication and mental experience as in (11).

- (11) a. Na-nun John_i-eykeyse [caki_i-ka iki-ess-um]-ul
 I-TP from NOM win-past-nominal-ACC
 tul-ess-ta.
 hear-past-VE
 'I heard from John_i that he_i won.'
- b. [Caki_i-ka ci-n] kes-i John_i-ul sulphukey
 NOM lose-adjectival fact-NOM ACC sad
 ha-yess-ta.
 make-past-VE
 'That he_i lost made John_i sad.'

This notion is different from *consciousness* in two respects. First, logophoricity requires that the referent's state of consciousness be actually represented in the sentence. In (6) to (8), only (6c) is the logophoricity case, since *John's* saying is explicitly reported in the sentence. In contrast, *consciousness* includes the referent's potential consciousness: it does not have to be explicitly reported in the sentence. If only the speaker can perceive a person as a conscious entity, we can use *caki*. In this regard, *logophoricity* is a grammaticized notion of *consciousness*. Secondly, the logophoric anaphor is not introduced when an account in terms of configurational generalizations is already available, i.e., when antecedents are/are not within the same nucleus with anaphors, or when they are/are not bearing subjective function.

1. Im (1987) and Lee (1988) independently arrive at a similar conclusion. Im's analysis differs from mine in that it takes an interpretive approach: *caki* always requires its antecedent to be interpreted as being conscious of the situation. Peter Sells suggested to pursue the interpretive approach, which I could not incorporate in this paper. Differently from Im (1987) or my present argument, Lee considers only *actual* consciousness cases as acceptable. He does not accept *potential* consciousness cases, which I deal with in Section 2. Accordingly, Lee (1988:4-5) observes the following contrast:

- (1) a. ?nay-ka John-ul caki-cip kunche-eyse po-ass-ta.
 I-NOM ACC house near see-past-VE
 'I saw John_i near his_i house.'
- b. ?*nay-ka namwu twi-ey swumese John-ul caki-cip
 I-NOM tree behind hiding ACC house
 kunche-eyse po-ass-ta.
 near see-past-VE
 'Hiding behind a tree, I saw John_i near his_i house.'

2. This is the reason for wide idiolectal variations in the grammaticality judgments of native speakers on the use of *caki*.

3. In this paper, I have considered only the cases where non-subject arguments bind *caki*. It is still disputable whether the same account can apply to all the subject binding cases. I think two arguments support that the *subject* condition may be replaced by the *consciousness* condition. First, Keenan (1976:310) observes a difference in meaning between the active and passive of sentences containing some adverbs in English, which is equally applicable to Korean.

- (2) a. The police arrested John willingly.
 b. John was arrested by the police willingly.

In (2a), the police is the only willing participant in the given situation. But (2b) is ambiguous as to whether *John* or the police acted willingly. Such adverbs as *intentionally*, *volitionally*, *consciously* show the same subject orientation. This seems to show that the subject position always requires its referent be conscious/volitional to a certain degree. Secondly, the grammatical subjecthood is semantically constrained in Korean: the subject should be a controller of the sententially denoted action (Klaiman 1984).

- (3) a. na-nun sikan-ey ccoch-ki-ko iss-ta.
 I-TP time-by chase-passive be-VE
 'I am being chased by time'
- b. *sikan-i na-lul ccoch-ko iss-ta.
 time-NOM I-ACC chase be-VE
 'Time is chasing me.'

A controller of the sententially denoted action should be conscious of it. Accordingly, the subject should always be a conscious being in Korean. These two arguments suggest that the subject condition may be replaced by the *consciousness* condition.

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