Pragmatic Strengthening and Grammaticalization
Author(s): Elizabeth Closs Traugott

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1. Introduction.

"Grammaticalization", as used in this paper, refers to the dynamic, unidirectional historical process whereby lexical items in the course of time acquire a new status as grammatical, morpho-syntactic forms. The study of grammaticalization takes as central the concept of a continuum of bondedness from independent units occurring in syntactically relatively free constructions at one end of the continuum to less dependent units such as clitics, particles, or auxiliaries, to fused agglutinative constructions, inflections and lexical fusion (for example the lexicalization of inchoative in realize as against know), and finally to zero (cf. Bybee 1985:11-12, Lehmann 1985:304).

There has recently been much interest in the semantic-pragmatic processes involved in early stages of grammaticalization. A large body of literature refers to processes of metaphorization. Another body refers to pragmatic inferencing. These two approaches are, of course, not in conflict, provided metaphor is considered to be a pragmatic rather than semantic phenomenon, and hence a kind of inferencing (cf. Levinson 1983). My purpose is to report on work I have been doing with Ekkehard König (Traugott and König 1988), to show that two different kinds of inferencing are at work in the process of many well-known types of grammaticalization, depending on the semantic function of the resulting units. One type of inferencing is metaphor; it is dominant in the development of, for example, spatial markers of temporality (e.g. before, after). However, in other domains such as the development of connectives (e.g. temporal to causal since), and scalar particles (e.g. mere, just), or evidentials (e.g. I heard that he left > I hear he left), a different process is involved, specifically a strengthening of informativeness, which can be analyzed as a kind of metonymy. Whatever names these pragmatic processes are given, what is important is that they involve solving different kinds of cognitive and communicative problems.

It is important for understanding the argument put forward here that the definition of grammaticalization given above says nothing about a process often included in characterizations of grammaticalization: bleaching, or semantic weakening, also called desemanticization. Heine and Reh, for example, define grammaticalization as:

an evolution whereby linguistic units lose in semantic complexity, pragmatic significance, syntactic freedom, and phonetic substance, respectively (1984:15).

From this point of view, grammaticalization is a kind of impoverishment, or deficit—as Lehmann puts it, a process whereby
signs lose their integrity (1985:307). Certainly, bleaching does occur, but only in the later stages of grammaticalization, for example in the development of the main verb do into a dummy auxiliary in Standard English.

Bleaching and grammaticalization must be uncoupled if we are to understand the semantic-pragmatic processes of early stages of grammaticalization. Indeed, as my title suggests, I will be focusing on the opposite of bleaching: strengthening, most especially strengthening of the expression of speaker involvement. My paradigm example is the development of the adverb hwilum 'at times' into the temporal connective while (here the textual meaning is strengthened) and later into the concessive while in the sense 'although', which construes a world that has no reference in the described situation, but only in the speaker's world of belief about coherence among propositions (here the speaker's attitude is strengthened).

Although the transition from strengthening to bleaching may occur at different rates for different classes of markers, and possibly even for different markers within the same class, in general one can say that strengthening occurs in early stages of grammaticalization, and bleaching in later stages. Loss of morphological boundaries, significant phonological attrition, and freezing of syntactic position are usually correlated with bleaching; syntactic-semantic shifts from adverb to connective or particle are less likely to be subject to bleaching.


Metaphoric processes have recently been considered to be major, indeed the major, factors in semantic change. Although definitions of metaphor vary, most share certain concepts in common, especially understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another, and directionality of transfer from a basic, usually concrete, meaning to one more abstract (Sapir 1977, Lakoff and Johnson 1980, Claudi and Heine 1986).

Metaphorization has traditionally been recognized primarily in lexical change. However, recently many arguments have been put forward that semantic change in the course of grammaticalization is also strongly motivated by metaphoric processes, cf. Sweetser (1984), Bybee and Pagliuca (1985), Claudi and Heine (1986), Heine and Claudi (1986), and Heine et al. (1988). For example, Claudi and Heine say:

...the vehicle of a metaphor and the lexeme undergoing desemanticization...are governed by an arrangement of conceptualization...which is unidirectional and proceeds from concrete to abstract, and from concepts which are close to human experience to those that are more difficult to define in terms of human cognition (1986:328).

They discuss the development of body part terms into locatives, of spatial into temporals, etc. in terms of conceptual metaphors such
as SPACE IS AN OBJECT, TIME IS SPACE.

Examples of spatio-temporal metaphors in the process of grammaticalization are widely known, and include the use of GO for future (I'm going to go), COME for perfect (Fr. je viens de le faire), BE AT/BE IN for progressive (cf. Traugott 1978, Fleischman 1982, Bybee 1987). Similarly, there is an extensive literature on the development of verbs of motion into case markers. An example from Nupe (cited Givon 1975:94) is:

(1) a) u bici lo dzuko
   he ran go market
   he ran (going) to the market
b) u bici lo dzuko
   he ran to market

Other examples include the development of adverbs or prepositions into clause connectives, for example of Old English prepositional after "following behind, later" to the Middle English subordinating after.

In the passage cited above, Claudi and Heine speak in the same breath of metaphor and of desemanticization. Similarly, in discussing the Nupe data, Givon points out that in (1a)

'run' is an intransitive verb of the 'be at motion' type, while in [(1b)] the same verb—as a result of the depletion of lo 'go'—has become a more complex motion verb, semantically 'motion in relation to target' and syntactically requiring a locative object (1975:94).

There is unquestionably loss of meaning that references activity in the described situation. But there is increase in the extent to which the words encode the speaker's point of view on the situation. Furthermore, the development of abstract meaning surely does not in itself require or necessarily involve bleaching: if it did, we would be forced to treat as grammaticalization such a well-known shift from concrete to abstract as is evidenced by the development of the abstract mental state meanings of apprehend and grasp from the earlier concrete physical action verb meanings. Indeed, it is odd to identify metaphorization with bleaching: metaphors typically increase specificity (Sapir 1977:21; see, however, Sweetser 1988 for counterarguments).

The examples of grammaticalization I have given have two things in common, neither of which is desemanticization. For one, more concrete concepts come to serve as models for more abstract ones; in other words, metaphor is at work. Secondly, the semantic change involves two of three tendencies that I have identified for semantic change in general, both lexical and grammatical, (Traugott 1987). For purposes of the present study, these two tendencies can be expressed as follows:
Semantic-pragmatic Tendency I:
Meanings situated in the external described situation > meanings situated in the internal (evaluative/perceptual/cognitive) situation

and

Semantic-pragmatic Tendency II:
Meanings situated in the described external or internal situation > meanings situated in the textual situation.

Thus, the extension of the originally spatial preposition *after* to the temporal preposition *after* in Old English is an example of Tendency I: a shift from reference to a concrete, physical situation to reference to a cognitive, perceptual situation; when *after* became a temporal connective, it underwent Tendency II and shifted to a marker of textual relations. When the spatial term is itself derived from a body part, which is often the case (cf. BEHIND), then Tendency I may operate twice, once from OBJECT > SPACE, and then again from SPACE > TIME. Such shifts, which are widely attested, suggest that temporality counts from the linguistic point of view as more 'internal' a percept than space.


What, however, about other kinds of grammaticalization? Are they also instances of metaphorization? Some well-known domains include the development of:

a) Epistemic *will* as in *(Bill will be late again, I suppose)*, from volitional *will*.

b) causal from temporal meanings (e.g. causal *since* from Old English *siban* 'from the time that' > 'because').

Less widely-known are such developments as:

c) concessives from temporals (e.g. *while*, Gm. *dennoch*), cooccurrence or concomitance (e.g. *all/just the same*, Gm. *gleichwohl*), negative expressions (e.g. *notwithstanding*, *nonetheless*, Gm. *nichtdestoweniger*) (König 1986),

d) conditionals, for example from topic markers and demonstratives (e.g. Romance *si* < *s* 2nd person deictic + *si* locative, and ME *so* as in Chaucer *Than shol I clymbe will v-nough...so I my fot might set upon youre bak* 'I will be able to climb well enough...if/provided that I can put my foot on your back'), and also from non-punctual temporals (so *long as*, Swahili *ikiwa* 'it being so') (Traugott 1985).

In yet another domain, that of scalar particles, we frequently find such particles arising out of terms for purity, similarity, and exactness. Thus *mere* meant 'pure, true, undiluted' as of wine and could be used as follows (cf. Traugott 1986):
(2a) 1559-60 That your Majestie...is, and in verie deed, and of most meere right ought to be...our most rightful...soveraigne

Later it came to mean 'not more than specified' (i.e. the scalar particle):

(2b) 1581 If I speeke rather lyke a meere Citizen than a Philosopher

Even meant 'equal, horizontal' and therefore exactly matchable as in:

(3a) c. 1,000 Beow 1571
   lixte se leoma ... efne swa of hefene hadre
gleamed that light ... even as from heaven brightly
   scined rodores candel
shines sky's candle
   'the light [of the fire] gleamed...just like the sun shines brightly from heaven'

and maintained this meaning for a long time, as exemplified by:

(3b) c. 1595 Shakespeare, Two Gentlemen of Verona II.iv.144
   Pro. Was this the idol that you worship so?
   Val. Even she; and is she not a heavenly saint?

(even she="precisely the person"). The scalar meaning, involving 'contrary to expectation' is quite late:

(3c) 1641 In Warre, even the conqueror is commonly a loser

Note that all these cases of grammaticalization involve the third tendency that I have identified in semantic change:

Semantic-pragmatic tendency III:
Meanings tend to become increasingly situated in the speaker's subjective belief-state/attitude toward the situation.

The epistemic auxiliaries are essentially expressions of speaker belief in the truth or probability of the proposition; so are concessives and conditionals, and so are the scalar particles, which express some surprise factor on the speaker's part.

We can gain some insight into how to account for the data by looking at the development of certain meanings that might be metaphorical but which appear to be more complex and to involve additional factors. For example, it is possible to say that the use of instead of as a connective is a metaphorical extension of a spatial term "in (the) place of" from the concrete environment of e.g. I planted roses in (the) stead of peonies to the more abstract
environment of action and state of affairs I played chess in stead of working. One analysis would be that the proposition is metaphorically treated as a space, but this alone does not account for the various conventional implicatures of instead of. Another alternative is to think of instead of as additionally coming to have as part of its conventional meaning what were prior conversational meanings, e.g. temporal priority (I planted roses where there were peonies before), norm (I played chess although I usually worked), or obligation (I played chess although I should have worked).

The process that best accounts for Tendency III is the shift from a conversational implicature to a conventional one. This process is in essence the historical result of the operation of Levinson's Principle of Informativeness: "Read as much into an utterance as is consistent with what you know about the world" (1983:146-47). It is also the historical result of the operation of Horn's R-principle, which, he has pointed out in connection with the development of temporal since to causal since, allows for the coding (i.e. "conventionalizing") of a salient or stereotypical conversational inference (Horn 1984:33). The inference to causal since exemplifies strengthening of a speaker attitude: that there is a causal not just temporal connection, and the basis for that connection has already been established in the discourse. In the case of the development of the epistemics from volitionals or deontics, there is strengthening of the subjective element, and of focus on belief and knowledge: if I say You had to go in the obligation sense, I invite the inference that I believe you did go. Therefore, in You had to have gone, derived from You had to go, the inference of the speaker's belief in the truth of the complement is strengthened.

Strengthening of informativeness has no well-established place in the taxonomy of semantic changes. One might think that it should be added to that taxonomy. However, to treat it as something separate from metaphor, metonymy, narrowing, broadening, and other well known changes is to miss some generalizations. Horn has already pointed out that R-principles are connected with the traditional processes of narrowing and broadening. I suggest that strengthening of informativeness is a type of metonymy.

Metonymy is usually cited along with metaphor as a factor in semantic change. However, it has not been assigned the overall significance that metaphor has (Dirven, for example, speaks of metaphor as a "major associative leap" but of metonymy as a "minor process" (1985:98). In the tradition deriving from Jakobson and Halle's (1956) classic distinction between metaphor as choice functioning on the paradigmatic axis versus metonymy as association and sequence functioning primarily on the syntagmatic axis, metaphor is thought to lead to homogeneity and coherence, metonymy to juxtaposition and potential incoherence (Sapir 1977:4). Another view of the difference between metaphor and metonymy that is more useful to us gives metonymy a more important role. This is Anttila's suggestion that metaphor concerns semantic transfer through a similarity of sense perceptions, and is therefore analogical and
iconic, while metonymy is semantic transfer though contiguity and is therefore indexical (1972:142). By "indexical", Anttila means that metonymy points to semantic relations in certain contexts.

Three types of context have been much discussed:

a) contiguity in socio-physical or socio-cultural experience: e.g. i) Lat. coxa 'hip' > Fr. cuisse 'thigh' (the parts of the body are spatially contiguous in the physical world) (Ullmann 1964:218); ii) Fr. Place de Grève (the name of a square, itself named after a person) > grève 'strike' (contiguity of physical space and social action in that space—laborers met to organize strikes in the Place de Grève) (ibid.); iii) boor 'farmer' > 'crude person' (association of behavior with a certain person or class of persons); iv) concern 'interest, solicitous regard' > 'matter that concerns' (association of a mental state with its object or cause (Stern 1931:376)); v) ampere, ohm (association of an invention or product with its inventor (Ullmann 1964:219, Anttila 1972:142)).

b) contiguity in the utterance (that is, collocation), often ending in ellipsis (cf. Fr. Place de Grève > Grève above; also Fr. ne...pas > pas, painting by Picasso > a Picasso (Anttila 1972:142).

c) Synecdoche, or the part-whole relation, e.g. redbreast > 'robin' (Ullmann 1964:219), and most especially body part changes (cf. Wilkins (1980) on FINGERNAIL > FINGER > HAND). Wilkins sees no evidence for whole > part (e.g. HAND FINGERNAIL) in his data on body part changes, and suggests the following motivation: "'part', by definition, entails some idea of 'whole', but a 'whole' entails no notion of 'part'" (1980:99).

As these examples suggest, the contiguities and associations usually cited with reference to metonymy tend to be concrete. The main exceptions have to do with behavioral-judgmental associations (cf. boor).

The notion of metonymy can usefully be extended from traditional concrete and overt contexts to cognitive and covert contexts, specifically the pragmatic contexts of conversational and conventional inference. With regard to the development of the causal meaning of sibban, the following hypothesis can be made: an originally conversational implicature arising in the context of communication of temporal sequence came to be associated with sibban 'from the time that' and then came to be a conventional implicature pointing to or indexing cause (somewhat as assumptions about the behavior of farmers came to be associated with boor). If this is an acceptable analogy, then it should be noted that the development of conventional implicatures is a case of synecdoche (part > whole only, not whole > part). Note that Wilkins' suggestion that whole > part is blocked by entailment patterns seems to be in keeping with the proposal here.

The germ of the idea I am putting forward is to be found in
Stern (1931). Stern views permutation (his term for metonymy) as resulting from "a word [being] used in a phrase where a notion in some way connected with its meaning is liable to form an element of the context" (1931:353). He rejects Leumann's idea that permutations result from "a difference between the meaning intended by the speaker and that comprehended by the hearer" on the grounds that the speaker must be assumed to know his native language (1931:360); in other words, he rejects the view that the change results from speaker's improper processing (or inadequate learning). Stern suggests instead that permutations result from "striving to fulfill as adequately as possible the symbolic and communicative functions of speech" (1931:359); in other words, speaker's communicative intent is central. He goes on to list under examples of permutation the development of the logical meanings of considering, supposing, of Gm. weil, and concessive while.

4. Conclusion.

Heine et al. (1988), in discussing the principle of exploiting old means for novel functions, and the recruitment of concrete for more abstract terms, suggest that:

grammaticalization can be interpreted as the result of a process which has problem-solving as its main goal, its primary function being conceptualization by expressing one thing in terms of another. This function is not confined to grammaticalization, it is the main characteristic of metaphor in general (1988:4)

In other words, semantic change in general, not just grammaticalization, can be interpreted as problem-solving. The authors identify only one problem: that of representing members of one semantic domain in terms of another, in other words, metaphor. But in semantic change (including the process of grammaticalization) there is a second problem: the search for ways to regulate communication and negotiate speaker-hearer interaction. I have suggested that this is a kind of metonymic change, indexing or pointing to meanings that might otherwise be only covert. The main direction of both types of problem-solving is toward specification. Metaphorical change involves specifying one, usually more complex, thing in terms of another not present in the context. Metonymic change involves specifying one meaning in terms of another that is present, even if only covertly, in the context. In the changes discussed in this paper, the metonymic change is from less to more informative, that is, in the direction of explicit coding of relevance and informativeness that earlier was only covertly implied; in other words, it is a case of pragmatic strengthening.

In summary, I have suggested two things. First, semantic change in the early stages of grammaticalization does not necessarily involve bleaching: on the contrary, it usually involves specification achieved through inferencing. Second, the inferencing
is of two kinds, metaphor and metonymy, which, as would be expected, are not totally inseparable, but which correlate with different tendencies. Metaphor is largely correlated with shifts from meanings situated in the external described situation to meanings situated in the internal evaluative, perceptual, cognitive situation, and in the textual situation. Metonymy is largely correlated with shifts to meanings situated in the subjective belief-state or attitude toward the situation, including the linguistic one. Another way of putting this is that metaphor is correlated with solving the problem of representation, metonymy (or conventionalizing of conversational meanings) is associated with solving the problem of being informative and relevant in communication.

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