

There Was a Farmer Had a Dog: Syntactic Amalgams Revisited
Author(s): Knud Lambrecht
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There was a farmer had a dog: Syntactic amalgams revisited.

Knud Lambrecht
University of Texas at Austin

"The phenomena to which I wish to direct your attention are (...) instances of disapproved linguistic usages in English. I take the social status of my phenomena as a guarantee of the importance of what I have to say about them, rather than as evidence for its triviality. Whenever we find impressive regularities in language that we know we didn't learn either at mother's knee or in Miss Fidditch's classroom, we can be sure that we are in touch with structures seated deep in the language, and not inventions externally imposed upon it."

(Charles Fillmore, "Syntactic Intrusions and the Notion of Grammatical Construction," 1985:73)

1. Introduction.¹

Under specific pragmatic circumstances, many speakers of American English use a certain type of complex grammatical construction which is exemplified in (1) through (10). Because of the substandard nature of this construction, I am quoting a relatively large number of examples, in order to enable the reader to develop a "feel" for the construction as it is used in spontaneous discourse. All of the examples are observed utterances from actual conversations.²

- (1) There was a ball of fire shot up through the seats in front of me.
- (2) There's something keeps upsetting him. (Quirk et al. 1972:959)
- (3) There's a lot of people don't know that.
- (4) Well, I have a friend of mine called me. (Prince 1981:238)
- (5) I have one of my uncles was an engineer and he told me...
- (6) A: I thought maybe your grandmother was using the room.
B: No, we had a friend of mine from Norway was staying here.
- (7) I have a friend from Chicago's gonna meet me downstairs.
- (8) Check to see if your feature matrixes came out OK. I got a couple of'em didn't come out right.
- (9) I have a friend of mine in the history department teaches two courses per semester.
- (10) I have a friend in the Bay Area is a painter.

The construction illustrated above is a bi-clausal sequence of the form [[NP V NP][VP]]. The first clause is either a *there*-construction of the "existential" subtype (examples (1) through (3)), or it contains the predicate *have* (or *got*), whose subject is a personal pronoun, typically in the first person singular (examples (4) through (10)). Both in the *there*-type and in the *have*-type the postverbal NP is always indefinite. The second clause has a "gap" instead of a subject pronoun (which gives the construction its distinct substandard flavor) and it has a tensed VP. The fact that the VP in the second clause is tensed distinguishes the construction from another, related construction involving the predicate *have*, which is illustrated in (11):

- (11) a. My friend had his watch stolen.
b. I have two buttons missing on my jacket.

In (11) the forms *stolen* and *missing* are participles, not finite verbs. I will not deal with the participial *have*-construction in this paper.

A brief but highly suggestive discourse-pragmatic analysis of the construction illustrated here is offered in Prince (1981). As far as I know, the construction has received little attention in the generative syntactic literature, no doubt in part because of its substandard nature, but perhaps mostly because of certain formal properties which make it difficult to fit it into one of the established generative analyses of English relative clauses.

The model of grammatical analysis which I will be following for my study is that of Grammatical Construction Theory as developed in recent work by Fillmore (e.g. 1985 and this volume), Fillmore, Kay & O'Connor (forthcoming), Kay (1987), Lakoff (1987; especially the case study on *there*-constructions), and Lambrecht (1984, 1986a,b). To analyze a linguistic structure as a grammatical construction in the sense of this model is to interpret it as a non-derived grammatical template in which syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic properties come together to form a unit. The structural and semantic properties of such a unit can be explained only in part in terms of other known structural or semantic properties of the grammar, even though the unit may be entirely composed of familiar phrasal pieces. My particular goal in this paper is to show that the framework of Grammatical Construction Theory is suited to describe certain phenomena of syntactic reinterpretation or reanalysis which I think can be appropriately labeled as instances of 'grammaticalization'.

In spite of its substandard character, our construction is used by speakers of standard American English. For example the sentences in (7) through (10) were uttered spontaneously by university professors, all of whom were convinced that the construction did not exist in their dialect or speech pattern. The person who uttered (8), a linguist interested in matters of discourse, had explicitly stated, after hearing me talk about the construction, that even though he had heard of such examples, they did not occur in his speech. In fact he considered them not only ungrammatical but uninterpretable.³ And the two sentences (9) and (10) were used spontaneously within fifteen minutes of unmonitored conversation by a professor whom I had interviewed earlier about the status of the construction in her speech and who had been almost insulted at the suggestion that it occurred in the speech of educated speakers.

What distinguishes our construction most strikingly from other relative clause constructions is the absence of a relative pronoun or complementizer. The presence of such a morpheme is usually considered obligatory in standard American English when the relativized element is the subject of the relative clause, as shown in the contrast between (12a) and (12b):

- (12) a. I liked the woman you invited \emptyset for dinner last night.
b. *?I liked the woman \emptyset came for dinner last night.

The argument in this paper does not hinge on the contrast between (12b) and the examples in (1) through (10). If it turned out that more speakers of (standard) American English use structures such as (12b) than is generally assumed, this would be a revealing discovery concerning native speakers' intuitions about their language; it would have only minor consequences for the argument to follow. In fact I argue that the *structure* of English allows for the formal option of leaving the subject in a relative clause unexpressed even when no complementizer is present; however the situations

under which this option may be exploited vary depending on the type of relative clause, the pragmatic circumstances of the discourse, and perhaps also on the individual speaker. Suffice it to observe that speakers whose grammar does not readily permit the type in (12b) nevertheless frequently use the type in (1) through (10), though typically without acknowledging it. Many speakers perceive a difference in acceptability between a sentence such as e.g. (5), repeated below as (13a), which is merely perceived as substandard, and the modified version of (5) in (13b), which seems more severely ill-formed:

- (13) a. I have one of my uncles was an engineer and he told me...
 b. *?I asked one of my uncles was an engineer and he told me...

As I will show, the difference between (13a) and (13b) hinges on the fact that the main clause predicate in (13a) is *have*. The occurrence of this predicate has to do with a specific discourse function, that of presenting a new discourse referent, which cannot be expressed, or cannot be expressed as well, with the more agentive predicate *ask* in (13b).

The sentences in (1) through (10) would of course also be acceptable if they did contain a relative pronoun or a complementizer. Thus (2) for example could also have the form in (14) and (10) could appear as (15):

- (14) There's something that keeps upsetting him.
 (15) I have a friend in the Bay Area who is a painter.

Speakers who use our construction sometimes insist that they do pronounce the relative pronoun *who*, albeit it in a phonetically shortened form. This seems to make them feel better about their speech habits. While it may be true that for example in a sentence like (7) the sequence *who is* can be reduced in fast speech to something resembling the single phoneme /z/ ("I have a friend of mine from Chicago /z/ gonna ..."), the fact remains that there are clearly attested examples in which no subordinating morpheme was pronounced. Thus in (1) and (2) for example the "missing" morphemes would have to be *which* or *that*, both not reducible in the way the pronoun *who* may be in (7). As a matter of fact, in some of the examples involving the verb *have*, as e.g. (4) or (5), the utterances would be in no way "improved" by adding the subordinating *wh-* or *that* morpheme, for semantic reasons to which I will return at the end of my paper.

In Section 2, I will present a preliminary analysis of the construction in (14), i.e. the standard bi-clausal *there*-construction which does contain the subordinating *wh*-morpheme. This analysis will provide the necessary background for the discussion in Section 3, which will be centered on the construction illustrated at the beginning of my paper, in particular on the *have*-construction exemplified in (4) through (10). I will argue that the absence of the relative pronoun or the complementizer in this construction is *pragmatically motivated*, and I will suggest that the substandard phenomenon under analysis is an instance of the *grammaticalization* of certain information structure requirements in the syntactic structure of the sentence.

2. The presentational relative construction.

The *there*-construction introduced earlier, whether or not it involves an overt relative pronoun or complementizer, is akin to the well-known archetypal fairy-tale-starting

construction in (16):

- (16) Once upon a time, there was an old cockroach who lived in a greasy paper bag.

As in the case of the construction in (1) through (10), the construction in (16) seems to have generated little curiosity among formal syntacticians, in spite of the fact that it is a well-established type in the grammar of many languages. One remarkable exception is McCawley's work on English relative clauses (McCawley 1982), in particular his analysis of such sentences as *There are many Americans who like opera*, which he calls 'pseudo-relative clauses'. I will return to McCawley's analysis later on. In my own work (Lambrecht 1986a and forthcoming) I have proposed an analysis of the fairy tale construction in (16) in universal discourse-pragmatic terms as a complex structure whose pragmatic function is to introduce a new discourse referent in non-initial sentence position and to express a proposition about this new referent in the same minimal sentential processing unit. I call this complex structure the *presentational relative construction*. I argue that the existence of presentational relative constructions across languages is cognitively motivated by a universal constraint on the introduction of pragmatically non-recoverable discourse referents in sentence-initial subject (or topic) position. Due to this constraint, a hypothetical sequence such as *Once upon a time an old cockroach lived in a greasy paper bag* will be converted into the bi-clausal construction in (16), because of the "brand-new" (Prince 1981) discourse status of the NP referent. This analysis is consistent with the fact that presentational relative constructions tend to be reserved across languages to indefinite NPs, or, more accurately, to NPs whose referents are assumed to be unidentifiable to the addressee at the time of utterance.⁴

The presentational relative construction consists of two clauses: (i) the referent-introducing *presentational clause* (hereafter S_1) involving the verb *be* or a similar verb; and (ii) the *relative clause* (hereafter S_2), whose relative pronoun is typically a subject. The function of the presentational clause S_1 is to locate or anchor the new ("presented") NP referent in the discourse. This anchoring of the new referent is done in English via the clause-initial locative (or pseudo-locative) expression *there*. The NP designating this referent, instead of appearing sentence-initially, appears as a non-topic NP in post-verbal *focus* position. In the relative clause S_2 , the newly introduced referent is then coded as a pronominal subject in clause-initial position; this relative pronoun is a *topic expression* in S_2 , i.e. S_2 expresses a proposition *about* the topic referent (in our example, the cockroach).

What distinguishes the presentational relative construction from other referent-introducing constructions is the tight grammatical link between the presentational clause (S_1) and the subsequent clause (S_2) which expresses the proposition about the newly introduced topic referent. As I see it, the main difference between the presentational relative construction in (16) and the functionally and structurally related *juxtaposition* construction in (17)

- (17) Once upon a time there was an old cockroach; he lived in a greasy paper bag.

is that the relative pronoun *who* in (16) must be construed as being coreferential with a preceding lexical NP expression, while in the juxtaposition case the pronoun *he* may at least in principle be construed as referring to someone else other than the old


cockroach, even though pragmatically this is highly unlikely in a construction like (17). A useful way of referring to this necessary co-construal relation is to say that in (16) the two NPs are *in construction* with one another whereas in (17) they are not. This terminology implies that the coreference link is a property of the relative construction in and of itself rather than being predicted or constrained by some independent rule governing anaphoric relations in the sentence. I have argued (Lambrecht 1986b) that the necessary co-construal between the relative pronoun and the NP is one of two semantic defining criteria for all relative constructions, the second defining criterion being a necessary topic-comment relation between the antecedent NP and the relative clause. In other words, all constructions involving relative clauses have in common (i) the fact that there is an obligatory anaphoric relation between the relativized element and some antecedent NP (which is not necessarily adjacent to the relative clause), and (ii) the fact that the proposition expressed in the relative clause must be construable as a proposition which expresses some information (whether presupposed, or asserted) *about* the referent expressed by the antecedent NP.

One important structural difference between the presentational relative construction and the *restrictive* and the *appositive* relative constructions is that in the latter two the relative clause functions as a noun modifier which enters into a complex NP construction with the head noun. An example of a *restrictive relative construction* is given in (18). Sentence (18) may be thought of as appearing later in the fairy tale about the old cockroach introduced in (16), so that the proposition that our protagonist lived in a paper bag may now be considered pragmatically presupposed:

(18) The cockroach who lived in the paper bag was very arrogant.

For (18) I assume a structure such as (19):

(19) The restrictive relative construction (RRC)




The details of the structure in (19) are not crucial for my argument and I will not discuss them here. What counts is that the sequence *the cockroach who lived in the paper bag*, which constitutes the restrictive relative construction, is a single complex NP constituent, an assumption which I take to be uncontroversial. Less uncontroversial perhaps, but by no means original, is my assumption, taken from traditional grammar, that the relative pronoun *who* is the actual subject of the relative clause, i.e., that this pronoun does not appear in the WH or COMP position needed for non-subject relative pronouns and the complementizer *that*.⁵

An example of an *appositive relative construction* is shown in (20):

(20) The cockroach, who was very arrogant, was hated by all his neighbors.

For (20) I suggest the structure in (21). Even though the appositive relative construction *the cockroach, who was very arrogant* in (21) is a single complex NP, just like the restrictive relative construction in (19), the internal constituent structure of this complex NP is different from that in (19):

(21) The appositive relative construction (ARC)



That the sequence *the cockroach, who was very arrogant* must be a single NP constituent is demonstrated by the fact that it can appear in other NP positions in the sentence, as e.g. in the active counterpart of (20) shown in (22):

(22) All the neighbors hated the old cockroach, who was very arrogant, and they avoided him.

Notice that in (21) the *internal syntax* of the appositive relative clause itself is identical to that of the restrictive relative clause in (19). It may therefore be labeled 'Rel' in both cases. However its *external syntax*, i.e. the position which the clause occupies within the wider NP constituent, is different. On the other hand, the external syntax of the entire appositive construction ARC in (21) is identical to that of the restrictive construction RRC in (19), i.e. they are both regular NPs which may occupy any NP position in a sentence. But the internal syntax of the two complex NP constructions is different. The two notions of *internal syntax* (or 'constituency') and *external syntax* (or 'distribution') will be of some importance in the discussion to follow.⁶

The difference in internal syntax between the two relative construction types in (19) and (21) may be shown by comparing the different behavior of the two types with respect to a certain kind of pronominalization. While the complex NP in the restrictive relative can be pronominalized with the expression *the one*, as shown in (23a), the complex NP in the appositive relative cannot be so changed, as shown in (23b):

- (23) a. The one who lived in the paper bag was very arrogant. (cf. (18))
 b. *The one, who was very arrogant, was hated by his neighbors. (cf. (20))

The pronominal expression *the one* is not by itself a well-formed NP expression but may normally only appear in combination with a modifier, be it a relative clause, as in (23a), or an adjective or a prepositional phrase (as e.g. in *the arrogant one*, or *the one in the paper bag*).⁷ As a result, this expression may not appear in the appositive relative structure in (21), because here the relative clause follows a complete NP. (This observation leaves open the problem why *one*, which behaves like an N' in that it fits

the N' node in the structure in (19), does not form a well-formed NP when preceded by the determiner *the* in the way other N' occurrences do; I will not worry about this problem here.)

The structure in (21) is consistent with the semantics of the construction, in that the relative clause stands *in apposition to* a complete NP which designates an independently identified referent (the NP in the appositive type could be a proper name). I will not try to further justify the structure in (21), as it is only of limited relevance to my analysis of the presentational relative construction. What counts in (21), as in (19), is the fact that at some level of structure the relative clause forms a single complex NP constituent with the antecedent noun. Nothing of what I am saying here about the two relative clause types claims to be original or new; it was meant merely to provide the necessary syntactic background for the analysis to follow.

One important difference between the structures in (19) or (21) and that of the *presentational* relative construction is that in the presentational relative the sequence NP + relative clause does *not* involve a complex NP of the type shown in (19) or (21). The external syntax of the relative clause in the presentational relative construction is radically different from the external syntax of the restrictive and the appositive types, even though its internal syntax is again that of an ordinary relative clause. Concerning the external syntax of the relative clause in the presentational construction I will argue that this clause is structurally on the same level as the presentational clause S_1 , i.e. that S_2 is a sister to S_1 . This entails, at a certain level of analysis at least, that the relative clause in the presentational relative construction functions as a main clause. My proposal follows from various structural and semantic properties of the construction which, unfortunately, I can mention here only briefly, given the limited scope of this paper.

A first difference between the restrictive and the presentational relative construction has to do with the different behavior of the two relative clause types in conjoined coordinate structures. In the presentational construction it is possible to conjoin a second clause either by repeating the relative pronoun, as in (24a), or by adding a coordinate main clause, as in (24b):

- (24) a. Once upon a time there was an old cockroach who lived in a paper bag and who was very poor.
 b. Once upon a time there was an old cockroach who lived in a paper bag and he was very poor.

In the restrictive relative construction however, only coordination of another relative clause is possible:

- (25) a. I told you the story about the cockroach who lived in a paper bag and who was very poor.
 b. *I told you the story about the cockroach who lived in a paper bag and he was very poor.

I believe that the contrast between (24) and (25) has to do with the fact that in the presentational construction the propositional content of the relative clause is *asserted*, not pragmatically *presupposed*; it may therefore be coordinated with an assertive main clause via *and*-conjunction. Adding a coordinated main clause to a restrictive relative clause however leads to ungrammaticality, because it causes a severe semantic clash

between the presupposed proposition in the relative clause and the asserted proposition in the main clause. I will return to the conjunction issue later on.

A second, more important, difference between the restrictive and the presentational relative construction has to do with the semantic status of S_1 . When I introduced the notion of the presentational relative construction at the beginning of this section, I observed that the presentational *there*-clause S_1 has the pragmatic function of locating the NP referent in the discourse. S_1 does not express a proposition *about* the NP but merely serves to *establish* the new NP referent in the discourse in order to make it available for some predication to follow. This can be demonstrated with a simple semantic observation. In the presentational relative, unlike in any other relative construction, the propositional content of the sequence main clause plus relative clause can also be expressed via a single clause expressing a single proposition. Thus next to the presentational construction in (16) we also have (26):

(26) Once upon a time an old cockroach lived in a greasy paper bag.

This new sentence, which has the same meaning (though not the same pragmatic and stylistic appropriateness conditions) as the bi-clausal construction in (16), contains only the predicate of S_2 in (16). Since it is an inherent property of any relative construction that the referent of the relative pronoun must be identical to the referent of the NP in S_1 we may say that the truth conditions of S_2 in the presentational relative construction are always identical to the truth conditions of the entire construction, except for the fact that the *referent* of the relative pronoun is lexically specified in S_1 . This is tantamount to saying that the presentational clause S_1 is propositionally empty, even though it has a precise pragmatic function, namely that of *naming* a previously unidentified referent in lexical NP form.

It is true that, taken in isolation, the sequence *Once upon a time there was an old cockroach* in S_1 is formally an independent sentence and semantically an independent assertion concerning the past existence of some cockroach; the point is that this sentence loses its independence upon entering into construction with the relative clause S_2 . For example its propositional content cannot be negated any more. While it is possible to say e.g. *There was no cockroach in the paper bag*, it makes no sense to say *Once upon a time there was no cockroach, who lived in a paper bag*. As I will show later on, there are instances of presentational relative constructions in which S_1 has no construction-independent interpretation at all but makes sense *only* in combination with S_2 . Such cases provide good evidence in favor of a 'constructionist' analysis of the bi-clausal presentational relative sequence, i.e., in favor of an analysis in which the construction is seen as a syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic unit which cannot be derived from, or reduced to, some other more "basic" structure in the grammar by applying the general compositional rules of syntax and semantics.

Just as the presentational clause S_1 cannot be considered a full-fledged main clause semantically, the relative clause S_2 cannot be considered a full-fledged subordinate clause, at least not from a semantic point of view, since it expresses the main assertion of the sentence.⁸ Semantically, the sequence *who lived in a greasy paper bag* expresses as much of an independent assertion as the juxtaposed clause *he lived in a greasy paper bag* in the juxtaposition construction in (17). As I observed before, the only semantic difference between the juxtaposed clause and the relative clause is that the relative pronoun *who* is necessarily co-construed with the preceding NP, while the

personal pronoun *he* is not. Nevertheless the relative clause cannot be considered a main clause on *structural* grounds, since it is syntactically dependent on the preceding *there*-clause.

My interpretation of the semantic and syntactic structure of the presentational relative construction finds supporting evidence in the corresponding construction in German. It is well known that in modern German subordinate clauses have verb-final syntax, while in main clauses the verb must be the second constituent. In *restrictive* and *appositive* relative clauses the verb is clause-final in German, as expected. However in the *presentational* construction, the verb is in second, i.e., main clause, position. This is shown in the three sentences (27) (a), (b), and (c), which correspond to the English sentences in (18), (20), and (16), respectively:

- (27) a. Die Küchenschabe, die in der Tüte *lebte*, war sehr eingebildet. (cf. (18))
 b. Die Küchenschabe, die sehr eingebildet *war*, war allen ihren Nachbarn verhasst. (cf. (20))
 c. Es war einmal eine alte Küchenschabe, die *lebte* in einer schmierigen Tüte. (cf. (16))

Verb-second syntax in presentational relative constructions is by no means an archaic feature in modern German (as one might think because of the archaisms frequent in Grimm's fairy tale style), but it is the most natural way of forming such sentences in the modern spoken language.⁹ Notice that in German the relative pronoun *die* is identical in form with the demonstrative pronoun. As a result, the S_2 clause in the German presentational relative construction looks in every respect like a main clause. I am aware that word order phenomena from German cannot be taken as direct evidence for constituent structure in English; however since the presentational relative construction is a well-attested cross-linguistic type, it seems legitimate to resort to cross-linguistic evidence to support my analysis of the English construction.

The earlier mentioned fact that in the presentational relative construction the meaning of the sequence S_1 plus S_2 can also be expressed by a single proposition establishes an interesting family resemblance between this construction and another, much better known, construction type: the so-called *it-cleft construction*. Both in the presentational and in the *it-cleft* construction, a relative clause is preceded by a short main clause containing the predicate 'be'; moreover in both constructions the main clause is propositionally empty and merely *names* the referent which corresponds to the pronoun (or the "gap") in the relative clause, typically (though not necessarily) in the form of a full lexical NP. However, there is an important *pragmatic* difference between the presentational relative construction and the *it-cleft* construction. In the *it-cleft* the proposition expressed in the subordinate clause is pragmatically presupposed, while in the presentational construction the propositional content of the relative clause is asserted. Given the limited scope of the present study, I cannot pursue this interesting parallel between the *it-cleft* and the presentational relative construction any further here. Suffice it to say that many of the observations presented in this paper about the formal and semantic properties of the presentational relative construction may be relevant in one way or another for the analysis of the cleft construction as well.

The semantic cleft character of the presentational relative construction distinguishes this construction from another, structurally closely related, relative construction, which Jespersen (1924:113) calls the *continuative* relative clause. An example of a

continuative relative is shown in (28):

- (28) a. The cockroach gave the poisoned breadcrumb to his wife, who promptly ate it.
b. The cockroach was very arrogant, which is surprising, since cockroaches are known to be humble beings.

The continuative relative clause type in (28b), containing the relative pronoun *which*, shows particularly clearly that the relative clause in this construction cannot be part of a complex NP constituent. Nor can it be part of the VP constituent in S_1 . This follows from the fact that the antecedent of the relative expression *which* is neither a preceding NP, nor some other subconstituent of S_1 . Rather the antecedent of *which* must be the propositional content of the entire first clause.

As its name is meant to suggest, the continuative relative construction typically has the function of continuing a narrative, or of establishing a temporal or logical link between two states of affairs, rather than that of restricting the set of possible referents of a noun phrase (as in the restrictive relative), or that of adding a piece of parenthetical information to an NP referent (as in the appositive relative).¹⁰ Linking two assertions via the grammatical device of subordination has a strong rhetorical effect: it creates tight textual cohesion. This communicative function of the continuative relative explains why in this construction the relative clause must appear at the *end* of the "matrix" clause, a feature which further relates this type to the presentational relative construction.


From the fact that in the continuative relative construction S_1 expresses the first of two independent but connected assertions it follows that in this type the sequence $S_1 + S_2$ does not have the semantic cleft character which we observed in the case of the presentational construction: the bi-clausal sequence cannot be expressed by a single proposition. But the continuative and the presentational type have in common that the sequence main clause plus relative clause may also be expressed by a sequence of two main clauses. This is shown in (29):

- (29) a. The cockroach gave the poisoned breadcrumb to his wife, *and she* promptly ate it. (cf. 28a)
b. The cockroach was very arrogant, *and that* is surprising, since cockroaches are known to be humble beings. (cf. 28b)

(29) parallels (28) in much the same way (17) parallels (16). In some intuitive sense, we may say that in (29) the italicized sequences *and she* and *and that* correspond semantically to the single relative morphemes *who* and *which* in (28). Concerning the substitution of two independent clauses to the sequence main clause plus relative clause, there is a subtle difference between the continuative and the presentational type: while the former corresponds most closely to a coordinate structure involving the conjunction *and*, the latter naturally corresponds to simple juxtaposition (as in example (17)).¹¹ That the continuative type corresponds to *and*-conjunction is a direct consequence of the fact that in this type the two clauses S_1 and S_2 are semantically and pragmatically on the same level, S_2 expressing a temporal or logical sequence to S_1 , while in the presentational type the two clauses are semantically and pragmatically heterogeneous.

The syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic properties of the continuative relative construction lead me to postulate the syntactic skeleton in (30):


(30) The continuative relative construction (CRC)



As far as I can see, the most bothersome aspect of the structure in (30) is that it looks different from the restrictive relative clause structures which we have grown accustomed to from generative analyses and which have been taken to be representative of the species 'relative clause'.¹² (30) captures what I take to be the main properties of the continuative construction, i.e., the fact that the continuative relative clause "acts as" a juxtaposed main clause but is nevertheless a dependent clause by virtue of its internal syntax, and the fact that it must immediately follow the clause containing or constituting the antecedent (NP or S).

Given the close family resemblance between the continuative and the presentational construction, it is natural to posit the same basic structure for the two types. The presentational relative construction is represented in a little more detail in (31):

(31) The presentational relative construction (PRC)



The reason I have chosen a flat structure for S_1 in (31), i.e., a structure without a VP node, has to do with a hypothesis concerning presentational clauses which I have recently sketched elsewhere (Lambrecht 1987a and 1987b). According to this hypothesis, presentational clauses (or 'thetic' sentences, as they are sometimes called¹³) have no semantic subject-predicate bipartition, hence ought not to be analyzed as having a syntactic NP - VP structure. My hypothesis concerning the constituent structure of presentational clauses is not crucial to the argument in this paper and I will not further comment on it here.

The structure in (31) is to be understood as a non-derived grammatical template which is pragmatically associated with the specific discourse circumstances explained earlier. It is an advantage of the Construction Grammar approach to syntax that it allows us to represent syntactic constituents of various sorts, such as the constituent labeled S_{Rel} in our example, as ready-made syntactic building blocks, which can be

inserted into larger structures under specifiable semantic and pragmatic circumstances. Construction Grammar also allows us to account in simple ways for any idiosyncratic features of the internal or external syntax of the constituents which make up the global construction. To take a simple example: even though the constituent S_{Rel} is a ready-made syntactic building block, which is used in all relative clause constructions involving a finite verb, the global construction arising via combination of this building block with other building blocks may impose constraints on the internal or external syntax of S_{Rel} . For example in the presentational relative construction, the relativized element must be the subject of the relative clause, and this relative clause must be positioned after S_1 , two facts which follow directly from the pragmatics of the construction. Both facts are directly expressed in the template in (31). Moreover, by entering in construction with different types of antecedent structures, the constituent S_{Rel} may have unpredictable effects on the semantic and pragmatic nature of the whole construction, where by 'unpredictable effects' I mean effects which cannot be computed compositionally from the combination of S_1 with S_2 . One such unpredictable effect is the previously mentioned fact that the propositional meaning of S_1 may change when S_1 enters in construction with S_2 . A few striking examples of such semantic idiosyncrasy will be discussed below. Construction Grammar can account for such phenomena of unpredictable meaning changes, or at least it does not have to consider such phenomena problems for the theory, because the theory does not rely crucially on the principle of compositionality.

If we recognize the structure in (31) as a syntactic unit with construction-specific semantic and pragmatic properties, it becomes possible to subsume under it certain configurations which at first glance do not seem to fit the unit. Given the fact that in the PRC the combination of S_1 and S_2 is semantically non-compositional, in the sense that S_1 tends to lose its semantic autonomy as an existential (or presentational) assertion and has as its unique function the naming of the NP referent to be talked about in S_2 , it is not surprising to find occurrences of the construction in which the meaning of S_2 departs radically from the meaning which it would have independently of its occurrence in the bi-clausal construction. I believe that such a case obtains in the construction which McCawley (1982) calls the 'pseudo-relative' clause, and which is illustrated in (32):


(32) There are many Americans who approve of violence.

Formally, the pseudo-relative construction in (32) is clearly related to our presentational relative construction. However it differs from the fairy tale archetype in one crucial respect. While in the archetype, S_1 names a discourse referent (in our case the old cockroach) about which some assertion is made in S_2 , the first clause in the pseudo-relative construction does not designate an independently existing discourse referent. In (32), the referent of the antecedent NP is not only non-specific, a feature which already distinguishes it from the presentational archetype, but moreover this non-specific referent simply does not exist outside of the construction in which it appears. It is the construction that "creates" the referent, i.e., the referent comes into existence via the construction. As McCawley observes, the meaning of the S_1 sequence *There are many Americans* in (32) is clearly not the same as that of the independent existential assertion *There are many Americans*. (32) does not assert that there exist many Americans, but rather that out of the total number of Americans (however small or great that

number is), a high percentage approves of violence.

McCawley, after discussing various semantic and syntactic peculiarities of the sentence type in (32), suggests, somewhat hesitatingly, the structure in (33), in which the antecedent NP forms a single constituent with the relative clause, but a constituent of an unknown sort:

- (33) The pseudo-relative clause (McCawley 1982)



Given the independently motivated presentational relative structure which I postulated in (31), I claim that it is possible to subsume under that structure McCawley's pseudo-relative clause as a semantic subtype. My claim that the type in (32) represents the same grammatical construction as presentational relatives is supported by the following observation. In substandard English, the meaning of pseudo-relatives such as (32) may be expressed by two juxtaposed independent clauses, just as in the case of the presentational relative construction. The sentences in (34) and (35) are two examples of this phenomenon from observed spontaneous speech:

- (34) There's some male beauty shops they deal more in your feminine men and actors (Terkel 1974:317; cit. Prince 1981)
 (35) There are some funerals they really affect you. (Terkel 1974:661; cit. Prince 1981)

The juxtaposed structures in (34) and (35) in turn resemble the presentational relative type in that their meaning could be expressed via single propositions, as shown in (36a), and in that they could appear as "full-fledged" presentational relative constructions involving a subordinating morpheme, as shown in (36b):

- (36) a. Some funerals really affect you.
 b. There are some funerals that really affect you.

Pseudo-relative structures are thus in all respects similar to the presentational relative construction, except for the referential quality of the antecedent NP. Notice that the two juxtaposed clauses (34) and (35) could *not* be expressed via coordinate structures conjoined with *and*. (37) shows the range of possibilities:

- (37) a. Many Americans approve of violence.
 b. There are many Americans who approve of violence.
 c. There are many Americans they approve of violence.
 d. *There are many Americans and they approve of violence.

(The star in (37d) applies of course only to the intended reading, in which (d) is

synonymous with (c).) The remarkable fact that in (37d) two clauses which by their internal syntax are independent main clauses cannot be meaningfully conjoined with the conjunction *and* is again easy to account for if we take (37c), like (37b), as a *grammatical construction* in the Construction Grammar sense. Since in this construction S_1 does not state the existence or discourse presence of an independently existing referent but receives its meaning by entering in construction with S_2 , it is not surprising that the two clauses cannot be conjoined like regular main clauses.

With the possible exception of *and*-conjunction, which in English seems to be acceptable in the case of the presentational archetype (*Once upon a time there was an old cockroach and he lived in a greasy paper bag*), we may say that exactly the same paraphrase relations hold in (37) as in the previously discussed presentational relative construction. I therefore conclude that the pseudo-relative type in (32) may be subsumed under the presentational template in (31), i.e., that pseudo-relative clauses are a semantic subtype of presentational relative clauses.

It is interesting to observe that another type of pseudo-relative clause mentioned by McCawley, which at first glance seems identical to the type in (32), must in fact be distinguished from it. This is the type which involves a non-referring NP in S_1 . The sentence in (38) is an example:

(38) There are few Americans who like opera.

In (38) no presentational discourse function is possible. Indeed (38) is logically equivalent to the sentence *There are not many Americans who like opera*; (38) can therefore not be interpreted as introducing a new discourse referent, i.e., it cannot be presentational. Compare the set of examples in (39) with that in (37):

- (39) a. Few Americans like opera.
 b. There are few Americans who like opera.
 c. * There are few Americans they like opera.
 d. * There are few Americans and they like opera.

As (39c) shows, the type in (38) differs from that in (32) in that it does not permit the juxtaposition paraphrase. (38) can therefore not be an instance of exactly the same grammatical construction as (32).

The idea that in spite of its superficial similarity with (32) the type in (38) is different in nature from the presentational relative construction is again supported by the German equivalents of the two types. While the spoken German equivalent of the presentational relative construction in (32) would have the verb in second position, the equivalent of the non-presentational (38) must have V-final syntax. This is shown in (40):

- (40) a. Es gibt viele Amerikaner, die *sind* für Gewaltanwendung. (cf. (32))
 b. *Es gibt wenige Amerikaner, die *hören* gern Opern. (cf. (38))
 c. Es gibt wenige Amerikaner, die gern Opern *hören*.

I do not know whether the semantic and pragmatic differences between the English examples (32) and (38) are reflected in a difference in syntactic structure, as they are in German. I am inclined to think that the constituent structure of (38) must be different from that of (32), but I have at present no arguments to support this idea. I must leave the decision to future research.

3. The presentational amalgam construction.

I am now in a position to make a proposal concerning the analysis of the construction which I introduced at the beginning of my paper in examples (1) through (10). Recall that the pragmatic function of the presentational relative construction is to establish a new discourse referent and to express a proposition about it in the same minimal sentential processing unit. While in the presentational archetype, the fairy tale construction, the purpose of S_1 is indeed to pose explicitly some new referent in the discourse and then to add a piece of propositional information about it in S_2 , the construction is often used in spontaneous speech in a somewhat more condensed fashion. I hope I will not be accused of random speculation if I assume that a speaker who utters a sentence like *There was a ball of fire shot up through the seats in front of me* (example (1)) does not wish to make an independent statement concerning the existence of a ball of fire by uttering the sentence "there was a ball of fire" and then to add to that statement of existence the information that the fire ball shot up through the seats in front of him or her. It seems more natural to assume that the speaker wishes to express the simple proposition 'A ball of fire shot up through the seats in front of me', in a type of utterance which I have called 'event reporting' (and which in many languages is expressed in the form of a presentational construction, cf. Lambrecht 1987a and forthcoming, and in particular Sasse 1987). However the simple sentence expressing this proposition is perceived by the speaker as being contrary to the information structure constraint against inaccessible topic referents, hence the use of the actual structure (1). Now if the single proposition is indeed what the speaker wishes to express, it is natural to assume that the speaker will try to express it with a minimum of syntactic paraphrasing. The quickest way in which the speaker can do this is to code the lexical NP *simultaneously* as a presentational focus and as the topic of a proposition. This, I believe, is the discourse motivation behind the construction in (1).

The same explanation is available for the sentence type in (4) through (10), which involves the verb *have*. For example the speaker who utters (4) wishes to express the proposition in (41), and the speaker who utters (7) wishes to say something like (42):

(41) A friend of mine called.


(42) One of my uncles was an engineer.

An obvious question to ask at this point is how the predicate *have* in (4) through (10) comes to parallel the verb *be* in (1) through (3). What motivates the occurrence of the transitive verb *have* in a construction which closely resembles the presentational *there*-construction with its intransitive predicate? The answer lies in the often noticed similarity in *semantic structure* between the predicate *have* and the predicate *be*. An early discussion of the relevance of this similarity for semantic case theory is found in Fillmore 1968 (p. 60ff). More recently, Foley & Van Valin (1984:48) have observed that there is inherent semantic as well as crosslinguistic morphological evidence that the subject argument of the verb *have* should be interpreted as having the semantic case role of *locative*. This locative case role is manifested in many languages in the fact that the argument which is the subject in English appears morphologically as a dative (e.g. in Hebrew or Latin) or as a locative (e.g. in Tagalog or Russian). The initial pronominal subject NP in (4) through (10) is therefore semantically analogous to the initial constituent *there* in (1) through (3), whose original locative function is transparent.

The pronoun *I* in the *have*-construction is also *pragmatically* analogous to the locative argument in the *there*-construction: the pronominal subject NP of S_1 serves as a (deictic) reference point with respect to which the new discourse referent is anchored or "located" in the discourse. The semantic and pragmatic parallel between *I have NP* and *There is NP* is particularly clear in spoken French, where *j'ai* 'I have' and *y'a* 'there is' are formally identical except for the person difference between *je* and *y* (cf. Lambrecht 1986a and forthcoming). As Foley & Van Valin (loc. cit.) observe, the argument structures of *have* and *be* differ from each other only in the order of the two arguments (theme-locative for *be*, locative-theme for *have*). In English, as in French and other rigid verb-medial languages, the verb *have* is therefore ideally suited for the presentational function involving a pronominal reference point because this verb allows a locative argument to appear as a "nominative" subject NP in clause-initial *topic* position, and it allows the lexical NP designating the located entity (the theme) to appear postverbally, in the preferred *focus* position. The verb *have* has the syntax of a two-place predicate, but the semantics of an "intransitive" verb.¹⁴

Given the semantic and syntactic parallel between *There is NP* and *I have NP*, it would be interesting to know the *pragmatic* motivation determining the use of one or the other of the two alternative constructions. I have not studied this issue in any depth, but I believe that the choice between the two constructions is determined at least in part by the peculiar kind of "possessive" relation which holds between the subject and the object argument of the predicate *have*. As pointed out to me by Claudia Brugman, it is this particular relation that accounts for the very frequent occurrence of *relational nouns* (kinship terms or the noun *friend*) in my data.¹⁵

To account for the syntax of the construction in (1) through (10) it would seem natural enough to assume a structure such as (43), which is similar to that in (31), except for the fact that the subject NP in S_2 is empty:



In (43), the gap in the relative clause is of the same nature as any other gap, except that it appears in the position of subject, which, as we know, normally requires the presence of the complementizer *that*. However I believe that in spite of its naturalness, the structure in (43) is not the best representation for our construction, at least not in all cases. The reason I believe that (43) does not tell the whole story has to do with the cognitive motivation for the use of our construction which I alluded to earlier. As it stands, (43) suggests that S_{Pres} and S_{Rel} are separate clauses with separate NP arguments, one of which just happens to be null. The structure does not capture our intuition that the two "clefted" clauses are in fact one sentence on the propositional level and that one and the same lexical NP functions both as a non-subject argument in S_1 and as a subject argument in S_2 .


This intuition is strongly confirmed, I think, by the semantic idiosyncrasy of the S_1 clause in such examples as (4), (5), (6), and (9). In all these examples, the presentational clause S_1 is semantically highly anomalous. In fact these clauses do not in themselves express semantically well-formed propositions. Consider the S_1 clauses in (4) and (5), repeated here in (44) in isolation from the constructions in which they actually occurred:

- (44) a. ?? I have a friend of mine. (cf. ex. (4))
 b. ?? I have one of my uncles. (cf. ex. (5))

From the point of view of normal language use, the propositions expressed in (44) are almost non-sensical because of the redundancy created by the cooccurrence of *I have* with the possessives *mine* and *my* in the object NPs. To correctly interpret (4), for example, the sentence must be parsed in such a way that the NP *a friend of mine* is construed as the *subject* of the proposition in S_2 -- just as in the mono-clausal version in (41) -- rather than as the object in S_1 . Similarly in (5) the NP *one of my uncles* is more naturally construed as the subject for the VP *is an engineer* (as in (42)) than as the object of the verb *have* in the presentational clause. The same is true in examples (6) and (9).

The various phenomena of semantic anomaly or non-compositionality discussed above lead me to suggest the structure in (45) as the grammatical template for our construction, which I suggest to call the *presentational amalgam construction*, with reference to a term coined some time ago by George Lakoff (1974):¹⁶

- (45) The presentational amalgam construction (PAC)



In the presentational amalgam construction neither S_1 nor S_2 have any independent grammatical existence. The structure in (45) captures the intuition that in this construction one and the same NP functions both as a syntactic *object*, bearing the pragmatic relation of *focus* to the proposition in S_1 , and as a syntactic *subject*, bearing the pragmatic relation of *topic* to the proposition in S_2 . Due to the absence of a subject relative pronoun or complementizer which would mark the boundary between the two clauses, the empty NP in S_2 may become semantically identified with the full NP in S_1 . This identification is indicated by the dotted line in (45). It takes place all the more easily since, as I have repeatedly observed, the NP in S_1 has no semantic case role except that of expressing the pragmatic relation of "being there". As a result, the missing NP in S_2 may invade the object NP in S_1 , so to speak, and occupy it with its own semantic case role.

With its clear pragmatic motivation, the structure I am proposing in (45) may be seen as an instance of the *grammaticalization* of the requirements of information structure in the syntactic structure of the sentence, resulting from structural and semantic rearrangement, readjustment, and eventually reanalysis.¹⁷ In saying that the cognitive requirements of information structure are grammaticalized in the syntactic structure of the sentence I am not claiming that information structure "explains" the structural details of the presentational amalgam construction. Discourse function does not explain the form of the presentational clause S_1 . Nor does it explain the internal syntax of the constituent S_{Rel} . The form of these constituents is determined rather by the general structural and typological properties of the language. Thus it is a simple typological fact that relative clauses may have gaps instead of relative pronouns in English, but not in German. Because of this typological difference between the two languages, German could not develop a presentational amalgam construction, even though the general information structure requirements are the same in both languages. But discourse function may impose specific constraints on the form, interpretation, and use of complex grammatical constructions. The discourse function of the presentational relative construction is to combine referent introduction and predication in one grammatical unit. The external syntax of the two clauses, i.e. the way they enter in construction with one another to form a global unit, may therefore be said to be *motivated* by the presentational discourse function. Moreover the internal syntax of S_{Rel} (or what is left of it) in the presentational amalgam construction may be said to be pragmatically motivated in that the presence of the gap in subject position is favored by the particular function of the construction in discourse.

Speculative though it may be, I think that my proposal concerning the structure of the presentational amalgam construction deserves serious consideration. For example, it accounts for the fact that in the otherwise very similar *continuative* relative construction the subject pronoun cannot be omitted and an amalgam analysis is impossible. This is so because in the continuative construction the antecedent NP in S_1 is an argument in a full-fledged proposition whose various arguments have clear semantic case roles. Therefore the NP in S_1 is not available to be occupied by the case role of the relativized null NP in S_2 . To take two examples whose comparison makes a certain amount of sense:

- (46) a. There was a farmer \emptyset had a dog.
 b. *The farmer gave the bone to his dog \emptyset promptly started chewing it.

I claim that the perceived difference in grammaticality between the presentational sentence in (46a) and the continuative sentence in (46b) is not due to a difference in syntactic structure but to the difference in pragmatic *motivation* between the two types: since the continuative type links two independent propositions in a narrative, the functional motivation for amalgamating the two clauses which was found in the presentational type is absent in this construction. Hence the unacceptability of (46b).

By postulating the amalgam structure in (45) with its functional ambiguity between object and subject we may also be able to account for the peculiar syntactic nature of such observed English utterances as the following, which are different from those analyzed in this paper (for example (48) contains no relative clause at any level of analysis):

- (47) Mom, this is Rutie wants to talk to you.

- (48) I guess that was a difference between me and you was that I always thought with Sylvia it would be over at some time.

In (47) and (48), as in (45), a lexical NP with a new discourse referent appears simultaneously as a non-subject NP in one clause and as a subject NP in another clause. I think that such sentences should not be discounted as strange "non-core" exceptions to the ordinary rules of English grammar. Like the presentational amalgam construction, they should be seen as instances of what Fillmore in the passage quoted at the beginning of my paper calls "impressive regularities in language" which correspond to "structures deep seated in the language". Providing analytic tools with which to analyze such structures should therefore be a primary concern for linguistic theory.

Endnotes.

1. I would like to thank Claudia Brugman and Dale Koike for helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper.
2. Unless otherwise indicated, the sentences are from my own data collection.
3. It is all the more remarkable that a few days later the same linguist overheard himself say (8) while lecturing; he then provided me with the example. Example (8) actually differs from the other *have*-examples in the list in that the antecedent of the relative clause is not a relational noun like *friend* or *uncle*. I am including (8) here mainly because of its sociolinguistic relevance.
4. There are some remarkable exceptions to this crosslinguistic generalization. One such exception is the presentational relative construction in spoken French, which permits definite NPs of a certain pragmatic type (cf. Lambrecht 1986a and forthcoming).
5. The assumption that the relative pronoun *who* in such clauses as (18) appears in subject NP position and that such clauses therefore contain no gap is discussed and defended e.g. by Chung & McCloskey (1983). Cf. also Wiegand (this volume).
6. I am grateful to Chuck Fillmore (class lectures) for making me aware of the importance and usefulness of this distinction. Cf. also Fillmore (this volume).
7. Dale Koike (p.c.) observes that, for some speakers at least, the expression *the one* is a well-formed NP when contrasting with the correlative expression *the other*. In this use of the sequence *the one*, the sentence in (23b) is grammatical. This does not invalidate my argument, which is based on an interpretation in which the two occurrences of *the one* in (23a) and (23b) are of the same type.
8. The expression "full-fledged" main/subordinate clause is of course to be taken with a grain of salt, since it presupposes a fully understood notion of grammatical subordination, which is as yet unavailable in linguistic theory. For some discussion see Haiman & Thompson (1984).
9. Cf. Schuetze-Coburn 1984.
10. Chuck Fillmore (p.c.) suggests to name this type the 'narrative-advancing' relative construction. The construction is particularly widespread in Latin prose, and Latin grammarians refer to it as the 'linking' relative clause ('relatif de liaison' in the French tradition).
11. A cursory examination of some 50 fairy tales in the German original of Grimm's fairy tales shows, for German, that juxtaposition of S_1 and S_2 is frequent, while *und*-conjunction never occurs.
12. Interestingly, Keenan (1985:164) posits a structure similar to that in (30) for a universal subtype of restrictive relative clauses which he calls 'corelatives'. The only

difference between Keenan's correlative structure and my (30) is that in the correlative structure S_{Rel} precedes the "main" clause.

13. Cf. in particular Kuroda 1972 and Sasse 1987.

14. I am using "intransitive" here in its traditional sense, to refer to a predicate which takes neither a direct nor an indirect object argument. I am not claiming that the locative NP following the verb *be* is not an argument of that predicate.

15. Cf. Fillmore 1968:60ff for a discussion of the relationship between relational nouns, inalienable possession, and the verbs *have* and *be*.

16. Discussing such examples as *John invited you'll never guess how many people to his party*, Lakoff (1974) defines a syntactic amalgam as "a sentence which has within it chunks of lexical material that do not correspond to anything in the logical structure of the sentence; rather they must be copied in from other derivations under specifiable semantic and pragmatic conditions" (1974:321). What Lakoff's phenomenon and mine have in common is the fact that pieces of structure are fitted together in a construction which are not expected to go together, given a compositional derivational model of generative syntax. Lakoff's syntactic amalgams and my presentational amalgam construction differ however in the semantic and syntactic nature of the pieces of structure in question. Perhaps the term 'syntactic blend' would have been more appropriate in my case, but that would have given a less interesting title to my paper.

17. A logical next step in the suggested process of reanalysis might be that the syntactic link between the verb in S_{Pres} and the presented NP gets lost, in which case the line connecting the two nodes would be erased. This would entail that S_{Pres} would lose its clause character altogether. The remaining sequences *There was* or *I have* would then become "presentational markers" preceding the now independent clause S_2 . This is of course pure speculation at this point.

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