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NON-FINITE CLAUSES IN CREOLES
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Creole languages have recently become the object of much study, which tries to relate common creole structures to structures universally inherent in the minds of language knowers (see especially Bickerton 1981). This approach, if successful, will yield extremely important and interesting results, and if unsuccessful will still yield interesting results. The creole with which I will be primarily concerned is Tok Pisin, or Melanesian Pidgin English, which is spoken in Papua New Guinea and surrounding areas. The particular history of Tok Pisin and facts about its current behavior allow it to be classified as a currently creolizing stable pidgin (see Sankoff 1985). Therefore, despite its dismissal by Bickerton, Tok Pisin should be considered a legitimate source of evidence for or against his theories concerning creolization. In fact, Tok Pisin may be the best source of evidence for processes native to creolization (if such there be), since we have excellent attestation of the antecedent pidgin phase, something we lack for most creoles. Although the stability of the pidgin phase has resulted in grammatical complications not usually found in classic pidgins, the degree of attestation makes it easier to "factor out" specific pidgin influences on the process of creolization in this case. The debate whether creolization is made up of unique processes or merely normal diachronic changes speeded up by various factors will not be addressed here. In either case, the processes are clearly identifiable and, in the case of Tok Pisin, occurring before our eyes.

Among people who study creoles, it has become a commonplace that all clauses in creole languages are finite clauses (see Bickerton 1980, 1981; Washabaugh 1980; Winford 1985; Woolford 1979, 1980). If this fact is indeed true, it interacts with Bickerton's theory to yield the interesting result that the finite/non-finite distinction is not basic to universal grammar, but a distinction which must be developed in natural languages. In this paper, I hope to attack this notion by giving evidence that Tok Pisin, as a result of creolization, is developing a clausal finite/non-finite distinction. This fact, in turn, would constitute evidence for the stance that this distinction is basic to the syntax of creoles and hence, if Bickerton is correct, universal grammar. Further evidence from various Caribbean English Creoles will also be discussed and shown to be consistent with this analysis.

The evidence for a clause being non-finite can be threefold: morphological, syntactic, and/or semantic. Morphological evidence for clausal non-finiteness, for languages which inflect for tense, mood, and aspect, is the verb lacking this inflectional tense/mood/aspect morphology or, for languages which lack verbal inflection, the clause lacking whatever tense/mood/aspect markers that it usually has. Syntactic evidence for clausal non-finiteness is the clause's being subordinate and its inability, with or without its complementizer, to be used as an independent clause. Semantic evidence for clausal non-finiteness is, traditionally, the clause's lack of tense, modal, or aspectual interpretation independent of that of the clause in which it is embedded. Stowell (1984) showed by examples such as (1) that English non-finite clauses are divided as to this trait:
(1) a. Mathilde tried/remembered to lock the door.
   b. Mathilde tried/remembered locking the door.

A better characterization of the distinction is that it is the syntactic realization of the semantic realized/non-realized action distinction, which will be treated here as a privative opposition with "realized" being the marked member of the opposition.

In English, we have all three kinds of evidence. In infinitives, none of the verbs of the auxiliary-main verb chain can be tensed, although the tense and aspect auxiliaries have and be may appear as in to have eaten or to be eating. These clauses are always subordinate and, furthermore, often instantiate the non-realized value of the semantic opposition when in syntactic opposition to a finite complement, as in (2), for example.

(2) a. I remembered/forgot that I locked the door.
   b. I remembered/forgot to lock the door.

When an overt subject appears in a non-finite clause, it is preceded by for and followed by to and is generally assigned "accusative case", as in (3):

(3) It is impossible for [every linguist] / them to eat just one Lay's potato chip.

The evidence that the for-to complement in (3) is indeed a clause and not simply a PP followed by a VP is its ambiguity, although this ambiguity does not rule out for being a preposition taking a clausal complement. In addition, the for-clause is frontable as a unit. In this case, we can say that for is either a complementizer or clause-taking preposition. The only diagnostic that seems to be extant in the creation of the literature for an item being a complementizer rather than a preposition with clausal argument is its deletability. Complementizers, but not prepositions, are supposed to be deletable. I can only assume that this means that a complementizer is in free variation with a wherever it occurs. This may be true of English that, but it certainly is not true of English for. However, where for-complements and that-complements are in opposition, it seems counterintuitive to assign them different structures. Thus, I am not sure that deletability is a necessary criterion, although it may well be sufficient. Both analyses assume a functor with clausal argument, so it is difficult to tell what in principle, beside deletability, would distinguish them. I will try to be agnostic in this paper, since it is the finiteness of the clause and not the status of the subordinator that is at issue here. I will assume that a complementizer must minimally be clause-initial. The to in English is a different story. Although once a preposition, there is much less hope of allowing to to be analyzed as either all or part of a complementizer or a preposition, since it is always preverbal and never precedes a full clause which contains an overt subject. Along with Pullum (1982) and anyone else who has ever come up with this analysis, I will take the to be a modal auxiliary conveying an independent "tense", as Stowell (1984) has suggested.

A problem arises in the analysis of complements that consist of verb phrases clearly marked as infinitive by the to and which never occur with an overt subject. Some theories, including Generalized Phrase Structure Grammar, treat this complement as simply a verb phrase with the feature [+INF]. Others treat this complement as a clause
with empty subject. If there is a gap in the subject position, it must be controlled somehow, and, what is more, if there is not, the verb phrase still must be controlled from somewhere. I would agree that in cases where a to-complement never has an overt subject and where it does not stand in opposition to a finite clausal complement, it can be treated as merely a VP. However, where either one of those conditions is not met (if it either has an overt subject sometimes or stands in opposition to a finite clausal complement) it seems somewhat safer to say that the complement should be treated as a clause with non-overt, reference-controlled subject. One of the primary mistakes made in the analysis of English-based creoles is the assumption that creole structures that appear to be direct translations of English structures must be structurally parallel. I am not here suggesting this type of treatment at all. I have included this short discussion of English infinitival clauses simply to demonstrate my usage of the terms "clause", "complementizer" and "non-finite" in a context which makes clear how I will use these terms in my analysis of Tok Pisin.

Before very recently, according to Woolford (1980), Tok Pisin did not have much, if any, hypotaxis. Old texts in Hall (1943) confirm this to a large degree. In fact in her dissertation, Woolford (1979) analyzes all examples of clausal complementation as in (4a):

\[
\begin{array}{c}
(4) a. PP \\
\quad S \\
\quad \text{COMP} \\
\quad S \\
\quad \text{MAux} \\
\quad VP
\end{array}
\]

In her 1980 paper, entitled "The Developing Complementizer System of Tok Pisin", Woolford claims that Tok Pisin has expanded syntactic functions rapidly through reanalysis to now allow complements with structure as in (4b) as well as (4a). Her candidates for complementizer are the preposition long (from English along), the adverb olsem (from English all the same) and the conjunction na. We will ignore na here. Olsem as a complementizer introduces finite clauses unambiguously and has followed a common genesis to its present position by reanalysis from an interlocutor of reported speech (see Elford 1985 and references therein). Woolford (1979) conspicuously omits the other preposition of Tok Pisin, bilong (from English belong), although she ends up admitting that long and bilong merit the same syntactic treatment. We will be concerned here with the behavior of long and bilong where they introduce clausal complements.

As seems to be extremely common both in creoles and other languages, bilong, borrowed from an English verb, has become a genitive and dative marker as in (5b):

\[
\begin{array}{c}
(5) a. \text{dispela yam i bilong em.} \\
\quad \text{this yam PRED belong of 3S} \\
\quad \text{"this yam is his" or "this yam is for him"} \\
\quad b. \text{dispela yam bilong en} \\
\quad \text{this yam of 3S} \\
\quad \text{"this yam of his"}
\end{array}
\]

The structure of (2a) is debatable, since Tok Pisin has no overt equative copula. In any
case, sure enough, this same bilong is used to introduce purpose clauses, as in the first reading of (6a). The second reading of (6a) indicates the probable original meaning of such constructions, since Mihelic (1971) gives olsem baimbai ("thus, FUTURE") as the only way to express purpose.

(6)a. em i kisim supia bilong kilim muruk.
   3S PRED take spear for kill cassowary
   "he took a spear in order to kill cassowaries" or
   "he took a spear which is used for killing cassowaries"

b. em i kisim supia long kilim muruk.
   3S PRED take spear for kill cassowary
   "he took a spear in order to kill cassowaries"

At any rate, bilong is found almost invariably directly preceding the verb. One exception to this generalization is (7):

(7) yu mas taitim kundu gut bilong ol i ken harim krai bilong en.
   2S must tighten drum well so—that 3P PR may hear sound of 3S
   "you must tighten the drum well so that they may hear its sound"

This example intimates that when bilong takes a full clausal complement, that clause is finite, although, since Tok Pisin has no inflectional morphology (a fact that makes our job all the more interesting) it could be that iken here is the infinitive form of the modal verb itself taking a non-finite VP complement, just as in the case of English be able. Whatever the analysis here, bilong is replaceable by long in purposive constructions. It is not deletable, however, since (6a) with s in place of bilong would mean "he took the spear that killed the cassowary". The ambiguity of (6a) and its substitutability of introducer prompt me to analyze it either as a preposition or complementer (whichever you like, for now) introducing a full, non-finite clause, as in (6b), although Woolford (1979) gives (6a) as its structure.

If there is any difference between long and bilong, it is shown in (8), where long allows both the matrix subject and the matrix object to control the VP:
(8) a. em i grisim mi bilong kisim mani.
   3S PR flatter 1S for get money
   "he flattered me in order to get money from me"

b. em i grisim mi long kisim mani.
   3S PR flatter 1S for get money
   "he flattered me in order to get money from me" or
   "he flattered me to try and get me to take the money"

At this point, the question may arise as to why I don't simply analyze these VPs such as kisim mani as nominalizations and keep the rule PP --> P NP. The evidence that these are really VPs is several-fold, although Bill Croft (public communication) has warned me that there is in fact a continuum of nominalization from VP to NP and that the evidence that I present does not make my case very clear-cut. First, the constructions in question are modified only by adverbs as opposed to adjectives. Second, the verbal forms co-occur with NP objects rather than PP adjuncts. Finally, when the name of an activity is desired to function as subject, Tok Pisin speakers frequently use the construction pasin bilong X
("the habit of X"). Unlike English purposives, bilong-clauses do not stand in opposition to other clause types. In English, we can say either (9a) or (9b) where the finite alternative must use irreals to show that the action is unrealized.

(9) a. The king gave Joshua a sword in order for him to smite to Moabites.
   b. The king gave Joshua a sword so that he could smite the Moabites.

The sentence in (7), therefore, can either be paraphrased as "you must tighten the drum so that they may hear its sound" or "you must tighten the drum in order for them to (be able to) hear its sound". I will hope here that the second translation is the better one.

Although for Woolford bilong-clauses must be analyzed as in (4a), she can analyze long-complements as in (4b) just in case long can be replaced in these structures by olsem or s. Those places where long cannot be replaced or dispensed with are still to be analyzed as in (4a). Her evidence is that: 1. complementizers are deletable and 2. prepositions are non-deletable. It is interesting to note, however, that normal PPs in Tok Pisin are frontable, whereas long with VP or S complement never is. Since olsem-complements are unambiguously finite, Woolford's analysis has the effect of saying that all complementation in Tok Pisin is finite. (10) is an example where long is replaceable by olsem or s:

(10) a. miting long mi kisim pukpuk.
   1S think COMP 1S get crocodile
   "I'm thinking about getting a crocodile"

b. miting olsem mi kisim pukpuk.
   1S think COMP 1S get crocodile
   "I think that I got crocodile meat"

The only problem is, a difference in meaning accompanies the difference in complementizer. In fact, this difference is the realized/non-realized distinction. Notice that the subordinate clause in (10b), a finite clause, contains no tense markers of any sort. This
is an illustration of the well-known fact that finite clauses with non-stative verbs are, in almost every Creole, interpreted as past actions (see Bickerton 1981). This fact will turn out to be a useful diagnostic in testing for non-finiteness. Next to (10), we have (11):

(11a) mi tokim em long/*olsem kisim pukpuk.
   1S tell 3S COMP get crocodile
   "I told him to catch a crocodile"

b. mi tokim em long em (i) kisim pukpuk.
   1S tell 3S COMP 3S (PR) get crocodile
   "I told him to catch a crocodile"

c. mi tokim em long/olsem em i save kisim pukpuk.
   1S tell 3S COMP 3S PR ASP get crocodile
   "I told him that he usually catches crocodiles"

d. mi tokim em olsem kisim pukpuk.
   1S tell 3S COMP get crocodile
   "I told him in the same way that I would catch a crocodile"

e. mi tokim em olsem em i kisim pukpuk.
   1S tell 3S COMP 3S PR get crocodile
   "I told him that he caught a crocodile"

(11b) shows that tokim takes a full clausal unrealized complement introduced by long. (11a) and (11d) show what replacement of long by olsem does in a ɣ-subject environment. (11c) shows that long is also allowed to function in free variation with olsem as a finite complementizer where the aspect marker save occurs in the subordinate clause. (11e) shows, once again, that an unmarked finite complement is interpreted as a past action. Looking at (12), we see another instance of long introducing both finite clauses, as in (12a) and (12c) and non-finite clauses, as in (12b) and (12d):

(12a) (em) i rong long ol misin i wokim plantesin.
   3S PR wrong COMP 3P mission PR run plantation
   "it is wrong that the missions run plantations"

b. (em) i rong long misin wokim plantesin.
   3S PR wrong COMP mission run plantation
   "it is wrong for missions to run plantations"

c. (em) i rong long misin i save wokim plantesin.
   3S PR wrong COMP mission PR ASP run plantation
   "it is wrong that the missions usually run plantations"

d. (em) i rong long wokim plantesin.
   3S PR wrong COMP run plantation
   "it is wrong to run plantations"

*e. (em) i rong long i wokim plantesin.

*f. (em) i rong long i save wokim plantesin.

Notice that the only difference between (12a) and (12b) is that the subordinate clause in
(12a) contains the plural marker *qel and the particle i, which has been called a predicate marker (Hall 1943 and most following) or a subject marker (Sankoff 1985) or even a finite clause marker (Eilfort and Peterson 1985). In this case, it seems to be the only indication that the subordinate clause is finite, but, unfortunately, many factors conspire to make its presence or absence normally totally useless as a diagnostic for finiteness, contra Eilfort and Peterson (1985). (12e) and (12f) show that the prediction that the non-pleonastic subject of a finite clause may not be *a is confirmed.

(13) illustrates the finite/non-finite opposition in another way:

(13) a. mi poret long/*a opim doa.
    1S afraid COMP open door
    "I'm afraid to open the door"

b. mi poret long/olsem mi/*a bin opim doa.
    1S afraid COMP 1S TNS open door
    "I'm afraid that I opened the door"

c. mi poret long doa i op.
    1S afraid COMP door PR open
    "I'm afraid to have the door open"

d. mi poret olsem/*a doa i op
    1S afraid COMP door PR open
    "I'm afraid because the door is open"

(13a) and (13b) show the predictable differences once again. The interesting difference here is exhibited in (13c) and (13d). Once again, long introduces a non-realized action while olsem or *a introduces a realized action. Finally, (14) shows the contrast in complementation for the verb save ("to know", from Portuguese saber).

(14) a. em i save long wokim haus.
    3S PR know COMP build house
    "he knows how to build houses"

b. em i save olsem em i wokim dispela haus.
    3S PR know COMP 3S PR build this house
    "he knows that he built this house"

c. em i save long wokim dispela haus.
    3S PR know COMP build this house
    "he knows how to build this kind of house"

d. mi save long m1 wokim dispela haus.
    1S know COMP 1S build this house
    "I know that I built this house"

Here, the analysis is up for grabs. On one hand, the presence of an overt subject forces the long complement to be finite, hinting that the subjectless long-complement is a VP rather than a clause. On the other hand, save obviously takes full clausal complements and the long-complement (when subjectless) has an unrealized meaning, as the difference in the meaning of dispela haus between (5b) and (5c) strikingly shows.
Another argument for long being a complementizer in sentences such as (14a) is the what-else-could-it-be argument. If long were a preposition, since I have argued that wokim haus is not an NP, we would need a new rule, viz. PP --> P VP, a rather unattested structure. We could always hope that long had been reanalyzed as a modal auxiliary, like English to and as pictured in (4c). Woolford (1979), in fact, discusses and rejects this possibility, noting that sometimes long can introduce a full clause and thus cannot be equivalent to English to. Here Woolford has fallen into the trap mentioned earlier of assuming that one form in Tok Pisin should always be equivalent to one and the same form in English. Woolford continues this approach in disallowing long to be the reflex of English for, since it sometimes introduces distinctively finite clauses. There is nothing inconsistent about allowing long to occur in all of these types of structures; that is, to be a preposition when it introduces NPs, a complementizer when it introduces clauses with overt subjects or clauses with empty subjects where these clauses stand in opposition to finite clauses, and possibly a modal auxiliary when it introduces VPs. A little evidence that long is not yet an auxiliary in the pre-VP position is that VP deletion, which leaves the head auxiliary stranded (as in English Jim can't sing, but I can, or Jim wants to go sailing, but I don't want to.), cannot leave long stranded in Tok Pisin. Therefore, it is probably best to regard long as either a preposition or complementizer.

The same types of analyses as Woolford's, resulting in the same types of mistakes, have been advanced for Caribbean Creole English by (inter alia) Bickerton (1980, 1981), Washabaugh (1975, 1980) and Winford (1985). All of the controversy in these works surrounds the morpheme fi, also known as fə and fə (but never fa or fum). Example (15) from Guyanese Creole (see Bickerton 1981) shows the opposition of fi with a, with the proper semantic results:

(15) a. i tek i gon fi shuut taiga.
   3S take 3S gun COMP shoot jaguar
   "he took his gun to shoot a jaguar (but did not necessarily do so)"
   b. i tek i gon go shuut taiga.
   3S take 3S gun go shoot jaguar
   "he took his gun to shoot a jaguar (and did shoot one)"

Since most of the CEC languages creolized hundreds of years ago, we have no real data on the pidgin(s) from which they sprouted, and, furthermore, effects of creolization have taken their toll (see Bickerton 1980, Winford 1985). Where fi comes from is still a matter of debate, but the Twi directional verb fi, with reinforcement from English for, are often cited. In any case, fi, like hilmong in Tok Pisin, has a dative function, and, sure enough, is used in purposives, such as (16) from Providence Island Creole (see Washabaugh 1975):

(16) im drap bred skrumz fi day fela di trak.
   3S drop bread crumbs COMP 3P follow the track
   "he dropped bread crumbs so that they could follow the track"

Notice that fi here introduces a clause with overt subject, no auxiliary markers and non-
realized interpretation. The purposive use of $\text{fi}$ with empty subject is shown in (17):

(17) jan wok fi mek moni.
    John work COMP make money
    "John worked in order to make money"

There is, in CEC, an unambiguously finite complementizer, $\text{se}$, once again derived from an introducer of reported speech, and shown in (18) interacting with $\text{fi}$ in the expected way:

(18) yong man se fi mi tel yu se mi missi ded.
    young man say COMP 15 tell 25 COMP Miss Missy dead
    "the young man said for me to tell you that M. M. is dead"

Were the $\text{fi}$ to be deleted here, or if the first $\text{se}$ were made complementizer by addition of the verb $\text{lok}$ and deletion of $\text{fi}$, the complement would have taken on a realized past-action interpretation. Washabaugh (1975) finds that in Jamaican Creole, it is common for two $\text{fi}$'s to occur just where English $\text{for}$ and $\text{to}$ would occur. He concludes from this evidence that all of the other CEC languages have two underlying $\text{fi}$'s, $\text{fi}$-1 and $\text{fi}$-2. Here, Washabaugh has caught what Woolford missed - the fact that $\text{fi}$ can sometimes be a complementizer and sometimes a preverbal auxiliary with no cause for alarm. Unfortunately, Washabaugh claims that in Providence Island Creole $\text{fi}$ is $\text{fi}$-1 wherever it introduces a clause with overt subject and $\text{fi}$-2 where it introduces a VP, and that it is a complementizer in both cases. Beside $\text{fi}$'s prepositional and complementizer roles, it acts much like a modal auxiliary in sentences like (19):

(19) im fi kom op ya.
    3S M come up here
    "he ought to come up here"

In a very insightful article, Winford (1985) collapses what seem to be the three uses of $\text{fi}$ (complementizer, modal auxiliary, and preposition) into just the latter two by giving preverbal uses of $\text{fi}$-2 the structure in (4c) where it acts like English $\text{to}$ (such as in (20a)) and giving it a prepositional structure elsewhere, including (16), which is depicted in (21):

(20) a.  
\[
\begin{array}{c}
S \\
NP \\
\text{mi} \\
V \\
NP \\
tel \\
\text{im} \\
\text{PRO} \text{fi} \\
\text{step}
\end{array}
\]

(20) b.  
\[
\begin{array}{c}
S \\
NP \\
\text{mi} \\
V \\
NP \\
tel \\
\text{im} \\
\text{COMP} \\
S \\
\text{fi} \\
\text{NP} \\
V \\
NP \\
\text{COMP} \\
S \\
\text{fi} \\
\text{step}
\end{array}
\]
Washabaugh takes a different approach, subsuming the modal auxiliary use under an analysis which uses an abstract verb of obligation which never appears on the surface. While this approach may be going too far, English sentences such as (22) make it not entirely implausible to give (19) a structure with empty copula and lower subject, analogous to (20b) (but the very sight of (20b) will make some of the more squeamish among us faint dead away).

(22) He is to come up here.

All of this discussion, however, becomes moot in light of Winford's treatment of purposives, shown in (21). While it is true that subordinate clauses with an overt subject followed by *fi*-2 and the VP may stand as independent clauses, and it is possible to treat all preverbal instances of *fi* in these complements as *fi*-2 and thus a modal auxiliary even where no subject appears, it is nevertheless (even according to Winford) impossible to treat the *fi* in purposives as *fi*-2. Thus, even if we call *fi*-1 a preposition, this *fi* must introduce a clausal complement. Furthermore, although it is true that these clauses can stand independently, the fact that Winford misses is that they cannot stand independently *salva veritate* Thus, *dey fala di trak* from example (16), as an independent clause, translates as "They followed the track." Therefore, the lack of aspect markers combined with the non-realized meaning yield the result that purposives at the very least clearly contain non-finite embedded clauses.

What I hope to have shown is that Tok Pisin, in its creolization, has created a rich complementation system which includes both finite and non-finite clauses which instantiate the realized/non-realized action semantic distinction. This analysis is also consistent with the data from CEC. All of these findings constitute evidence that the realized/non-realized distinction is basic to human categorization of actions and that in universal grammar, this distinction finds its prototypical expression in the finite/non-finite syntactic clausal opposition.
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