The Syntactic Status of Object Possessor Raising in Western Muskogean
Author(s): Pamela Munro

Please see “How to cite” in the online sidebar for full citation information.

Please contact BLS regarding any further use of this work. BLS retains copyright for both print and screen forms of the publication. BLS may be contacted via http://linguistics.berkeley.edu/bls/.

The Annual Proceedings of the Berkeley Linguistics Society is published online via eLanguage, the Linguistic Society of America's digital publishing platform.
The Syntactic Status of
Object Possessor Raising in Western Muskogean

Pamela Munro
University of California, Los Angeles

When two sentence types have the same logical structure and differ only in their surface syntax, we may say that they are related by syntactic rule. If one accepts the notion of syntactic rules at all, this definition might seem uncontrovertial. Problems arise for the characterization of some putative syntactic rules within certain theories, however, because of the way these rules alter the argument structure of the sentences to which they apply. The Western Muskogean languages Chickasaw and Choctaw\(^1\) have several relation-changing rules which have already received a fair amount of attention in the literature. In this paper, I will examine the notion of syntactic rule which can be motivated by the Western Muskogean rules of III-Subjectivalization and (Subject) Possessor Raising, and then consider the syntactic status of a third process, Object Possessor Raising, which, like Subject Possessor Raising, is of cross-linguistic interest because it appears to result in violations of the Projection Principle (Chomsky e.g. 1982).

Munro and Gordon (1982) discuss the Western Muskogean rule of III-Subjectivalization, which promotes a dative object to subject (see also Carden, Gordon, and Munro ms. and other references cited there):

(a) Chihoow-at hattak im-oktani-tok. ’God appeared to the man’
   God-su man III-appear-pt

b) Hattak-at Chihoow-at im-oktani-tok.
   man-su God-su III-appear-pt

(These examples are Chickasaw,\(^2\) as are all others not otherwise identified below. The Choctaw facts are similar, although lexical items and phonological and morphological details vary.) Sentences like (la) have a subject NP marked with the subject case suffix \(-at\) and an object (generally a semantic dative) triggering the appearance on the verb of a prefix from the III agreement set (\(im\)- is the third-person III prefix, to use Munro and Gordon (1982)'s terminology). Application of the rule of III-Subjectivalization gives a new structure, exemplified by
(lb), in which the III argument has become the subject -- it appears initially in the sentence, is marked with the -at suffix, and can be shown to be the (only) syntactic subject by a variety of other tests, including switch-reference and the triggering of a third-person plural agreement marker (for details, see Munro and Gordon 1982). The old subject (in (l), Chihoowa, 'God', the semantic subject of oktani 'appear') retains its -at case marking but is otherwise not treated as a subject: although in (la) Chihoowa triggers switch-reference marking and other syntactic subject tests, it no longer does in (lb).

III-Subjectivization is a syntactic rule:

(A) The rule relates two sentences which have exactly the same logical structure. (Derived structures created by the application of syntactic rules may differ in implicational structure or discourse use -- this has been shown for English rules such as Dative Movement, Particle Movement, and Passive, and is clearly true of III-Subjectivization. III-Subjectivization appears to be an option in cases where the speaker wishes to mark the increased salience in the discourse of the logical III object. Thus, other translations for (lb) above would be 'The man had God appear to him' or 'The man was appeared to by God'. But the truth conditions for (la) and (lb) are the same.)

(B) In the new structure created by the rule, grammatical relations and derived syntactic properties are changed. However, although the argument structure of the sentence changes, the number of NPs and the semantic predicates in the sentence remains constant -- no new information is added to the sentence by the rule. (After III-Subjectivization, the old subject retains only lexical subject properties, such as those related to selectional restrictions. The derived subject acquires all the syntactic subject properties mentioned above.)

(C) The rule is productive. While there may be lexical or grammatical restrictions on the application of the rule, it applies to a significant class of sentences. (Speakers vary in terms of how productive a rule like III-Subjectivization is -- for some speakers, any sentence containing a verb with a third-person subject and a III object may undergo III-Subjectivization; others restrict the application of the rule to a lexically specified set of verbs.)

(D) The new structure created by the rule is a novel, non-basic sentence type. (English Dative Movement, for example, creates a new type of non-basic sentence with two bare object NPs. Similarly,
because of the appearance of two \textit{at}-marked NPs in derived III-Subjectivalization sentences, these structures are different from any basic sentence type in the language. Thus, all double-\textit{at} structures like (1b) are derived structures.)

As the list of criteria above shows, I do not consider obligatory processes -- Subject-Verb Agreement, for example -- to be syntactic rules of the same type as III-Subjectivalization. True syntactic rules, in the sense I use that term here, must relate pairs of surface sentence types. (On the other hand, certain restricted types of sentences may require or prohibit the application of particular syntactic rules -- thus, English Dative Movement cannot apply when the semantic direct object is pronominal.) Similarly, no rule can add a noun phrase or predicate to a sentence -- thus, there is no syntactic rule of Causativization in Western Muskogean to relate sentence pairs like (2a) and (2b), because the logical structure of such sentences is not the same:

(2a) \textit{lhoo-at \ hilha-tok}. The woman danced
\hspace{1em} woman-su dance-pt

b) \textit{hattak-at lhoo \ hilha-sh-tok}. The man made the woman dance
\hspace{1em} man-su woman dance-cs-pt

(2a) has only one NP argument (\textit{lhoo} 'woman'), and its predicate is the simple \textit{hilha} 'dance'; (2b) has two NP arguments, and a complex predicate. Although there is an interesting sense in which (2b) "includes" the predication of (2a), it is certainly not the case that Causativization can be a syntactic rule. Despite the fact that causative formation is a very regular process in Western Muskogean, then, it must be lexical, rather than syntactic.<4>

The second Western Muskogean syntactic rule described in Munro and Gordon (1982), (Subject) Possessor Raising, presents problems for certain characterizations of possible syntactic rules, as discussed at length by Carden, Gordon, and Munro (ms.). Subject Possessor Raising relates pairs of sentences like those in (3). (3a) is an intransitive sentence with a possessed subject (the possessed noun has a III prefix agreeing with the possessor), while in (3b) there is a double-\textit{at} structure like the one in (1b), with the possessor of the old semantic subject a new derived subject which has acquired all the syntactic subject properties discussed above:
(3a) Ihoo im-ofi'-at ishto. The woman’s dog is big
   woman III-dog-su big
b) Ihoo-at ofi’-at im-ishto.

The semantic subject (the possessed syntactic subject in (3a)) loses its
(alienable) possessive marking, and the verb is marked for
morphological III-agreement with the derived (possessor) subject.<5>
Pairs of sentences related by Subject Possessor Raising have the same
logical structure (although once again their discourse use may vary -- a
sentence like (3b) shows that the possessor is more important to the
speaker in the discourse, and might also be translated ‘The woman has
a big dog’), and do not involve the addition of new NPs or predicates to
the sentence. Subject Possessor Raising creates a novel phrasal
structure, just as III-Subjectivalization does.

However, while III-Subjectivalization promotes a dative in a
sentence whose verb is already lexically subcategorized for a dative
(III) argument (cf. (1a-b)), Subject Possessor Raising, as in (3a-b),
promotes to subject an NP which was not an original subcategorized
argument of the verb. The verb in (3), ishto ‘be big’, cannot take a
semantic dative or any other type of III-marked argument other than
one derived via Subject Possessor Raising. Thus, Subject Possessor
Raising as described here involves a violation of the Projection
Principle within the theory of Government and Binding (cf. e.g.
Chomsky 1982 and Carden, Gordon, and Munro ms.).<6> Subject
Possessor Raising does not add any information to the sentence, but it
does give the verb a new argument (possessor-of-subject is not a basic
argument of a verb like ‘be big’).<7>

The rule which I will examine in the remainder of this paper,
Object Possessor Raising, has some features in common with Subject
Possessor Raising. Just as Subject Possessor Raising promotes a
possessor-of-subject to subject, Object Possessor Raising promotes a
possessor-of-object to object:

(4a) Ofi’-at ihoo im-pask-a apa-tok. The dog ate the woman’s
dog-su woman III-bread-ns eat-pt bread
b) Ofi’-at ihoo-a paska im-apa-tok.
dog-su woman-ns bread III-eat-pt
The object in (4a) is the possessed NP *ihoo im-paska* 'the woman's bread', marked here with the (optional) non-subject marker -a. This NP is a constituent in (4a), and must move and be marked as a unit. In (4b), the possessor, *ihoo* 'woman', is a derived object. It is a separate constituent of the sentence: it controls verbal agreement (the III prefix on the verb of (4b) agrees with the semantic possessor-of-object), may be suffixed with the non-subject marker, and can freely be moved away from the possessed noun *paska* 'bread'. (5) and (6) show some variations of (4a) and (4b) respectively, illustrating these possibilities:

(5a) Ofi'-at apa-tok ihoo im-pask-a.
   b) Ihoo im-pask-a ofi'-at apa-tok.
(6a) Ofi-at paska im-apa-tok ihoo-a.
   b) Ihoo-a ofi'-at paska im-apa-tok.
   c) Ofi-at pask-a ihoo im-apa-tok. (etc.)

The two object nouns in (4b) and (6) act just like the two objects which occur in basic two-object sentences, for instance in sentences with the verb *ima* 'give', which is lexically subcategorized for both a III (dative) object and a direct (patient) object which cannot show verbal agreement. For most speakers, sentences like (4b) and (6) show a similar restriction: the III (possessor) argument shows verbal agreement, and the original direct object is a non-agreeing NP. Other than with regard to agreement, though, the two objects in all such sentences exhibit similar word order and case marking. Subject NPs and object NPs of any type may be either pre- or postposed, with certain discourse limitations.<8> Non-subject a-marking is never required, but is most common when there is more than one non-subject noun. A-marking is used on either the first non-subject noun or on a moved non-subject: it may not occur on the second non-subject noun in a string, or on a preverbal non-subject if another non-subject has been pre- or postposed.

Like Subject Possessor Raising, Object Possessor Raising violates the Projection Principle by adding a new NP as an argument to the verb (as with Subject Possessor Raising, of course, no information is added to the sentence -- but possessor-of-object is not an argument for which the verb of the main clause is subcategorized).
Unlike III-Subjectivalization and Subject Possessor Raising, however, which create non-basic double-\textit{at} sentence structures, most applications of Object Possessor Raising do not create novel, non-basic surface strings. Sentence (4b) above, for instance, can be interpreted as meaning not only 'The dog ate the woman's bread' but also 'The dog ate the bread for the woman' (and, in this reading, it has all the same variations discussed above). In Chickasaw and most varieties of Choctaw, this sort of sentence would be the usual expression of either a benefactive\textsuperscript{9} or an in-place-of 'for', and all speakers can apparently accept a malefactive or "ethical" interpretation for sentences with III objects -- (4b) can, therefore, also mean that the dog's eating the bread involved the woman in some unspecified way, whether she wanted him to eat it or not: thus, 'for' is probably too specific an English translation for Western Muskogean III objects. We may wonder, then, whether there really is a syntactic rule relating sentences like (4a) to the more general type (4b), or whether the possessor-of-object might not simply be one of many interpretations available for a III object in a sentence like (4b).

There are a number of specific ways, however, in which Object Possessor Raising sentences differ from ordinary sentences with basic III objects, which argues that the Object Possessor Raising construction has an independent syntactic status.

First of all, there is by no means a complete overlap between Object Possessor Raising sentences like (4b) and basic, non-derived sentences with III objects such as (7):

(7) Ihoor-at hattak-a ofi’ im-a-tok. 'The woman gave the man a dog' woman-su man-ns dog III-give-pt

A sentence with a verb like 'give' which is lexically subcategorized for a III dative object and an additional patient object does not allow the interpretation that the III object names the possessor of the patient. Thus, (7) cannot mean 'The woman gave (gave up, gave away) the man’s dog'. The same is true of many transitive verbs which are lexically subcategorized to allow an optional added III object. While \textit{apa} ‘eat’ may occur with either a subcategorized III (dative) object or a III argument derived by Object Possessor Raising, other verbs, such as 'kiss' (Chickasaw \textit{shqika}, Oklahoma Choctaw \textit{ahpali}) allow only a
dative interpretation for the III object, never a possessor-of-subject interpretation:

(8) Hattak-at ihoo-a chipota i-sho'ka-tok.
    man-su woman-ns child III-kiss-pt
    'The man kissed the child for the woman', "The man kissed the woman's child".

Further, an Object Possessor Raising sentence must have an unpossessed direct object (understood to be possessed by the derived III object), but there is no such restriction on ordinary III object sentences:

(9a) Hattak-at ihoo yamm-a ofi im-ambi-tok.
    man-su woman that-ns dog III-kill-pt
    'The man killed that woman's dog'; 'The man killed the dog for that woman'

b) Hattak-at ihoo yamm-a chim-ofi' im-ambi-tok.
    man-su woman that-ns 2sIII-dog III-kill-pt
    'The man killed your dog for that woman'

While the set of transitive verbs which may undergo Object Possessor Raising is roughly a subset of the set of transitive verbs which may optionally take an added dative object, this is not completely true.<10> A few verbs, such as ayoppanchi 'like, admire' may undergo Object Possessor Raising, but may not take a III dative argument. The dative reading of (10) below is unacceptable (even though my Chickasaw consultant found it semantically plausible, for instance if the woman urged you to admire the dress for her sake):

(10) Ihoo-a naafka im-ayoppash-li-tok.
    woman-ns dress III-admire-1s1-pt
    'I admired the woman's dress', "I admired the dress for the woman'.

For some speakers, basic III objects and those derived via Object Possessor Raising are differentiated in terms of the position of the III prefix in certain constructions. (1a-b) shows basic sentences containing the Choctaw verb angpoli 'talk', with an instrumental prefix isht-,
which agrees with the 'about' object in (a) and with the III prefix *im*-, agreeing with the dative object in (b). The normal combination of instrumental plus basic dative III prefixes occurs in that order, as in (llc). But when Object Possessor Raising applies to a sentence with an instrumental 'about' object, like (lla), yielding the derived sentence (lld), the III prefix agreeing with the derived possessor-object appears before the instrumental prefix. Thus, the basic III object structure and the Object Possessor Raising structure are not always the same.

**CHOCTAW**

(lla) Alikchi *im-ohoyo* isht-anopoli-li-tok. 'I talked about the doctor III-woman it-talk-lsl-pt doctor's wife'

(b) Alikchi *im-ohoyo* im-anopoli-li-tok. 'I talked to the doctor's

   doctor III-woman III-talk-lsl-pt

   wife'

(c) Alikchi-ya ohoyo isht-im-anopoli-li-tok. 'I talked about the

   doctor-ns woman it-III-talk-lsl-pt

   doctor to the woman'

(d) Alikchi-ya ohoyo im-isht-anopoli-li-tok. 'I talked about the

   doctor-ns woman III-it-talk-lsl-pt

   doctor's wife'

Some of the syntactic properties which characterize the class of objects in Western Muskogean also differentiate between basic and derived III objects. As noted above, *g*-marking and word order do not work differently for basic III's and those derived via Object Possessor Raising. However, the use of reflexives and reciprocals does distinguish these two types of III objects in several ways, again suggesting a separate status for Object Possessor Raising sentences.

The use of the reciprocal and reflexive object prefixes *itti*- and *illi*- and their III counterparts *ittim*- and *ilim* - in Western Muskogean is exclusively subject-controlled. Thus, if Object Possessor Raising creates a new III object, we might expect it to be reciprocalized or reflexivized under the appropriate sort of coreference with the subject. This is true for reciprocals:

(12) Hattak-at paska ittim-apa-tok.

   man-su   bread IIIrc-eat-pt

   'The men ate each other's bread', 'The men ate bread for each other'

As far as I can tell, III reciprocal objects behave no differently
whether they are basic III's or III's derived via Object Possessor Raising. The situation is different for III reflexive objects, however. A III object derived by Object Possessor Raising may be reflexivized in Choctaw, but not, apparently, in Chickasaw:

(l3a) CHOCTAW    Pallaska ilim-apa-li-tok. 'I ate my own bread'
               bread  IIIrf-eat-lsl-pt

b) CHICKASAW   *Paska ilim-apa-li-tok.
               bread IIIrf-eat-lsl-pt

III reflexives are uncommon in Chickasaw, but they can be formed from certain basic III dative objects. However, III objects derived by Object Possessor Raising can never be reflexivized in Chickasaw.

Although Choctaw reflexivizes both basic and derived III objects similarly, there is one Choctaw construction in which they are distinguished. The verb 'talk about' can take a basic III dative object, as in (l1c) above. When the dative object is reflexive, Chickasaw speakers use the expected III reflexive *ilim-, as in (l4a), but Choctaw speakers use the non-III reflexive *il(i)', as in (l4b), even though 'talk' cannot otherwise take an ordinary non-reflexive object:

(l4a) CHICKASAW   (Isht)-ilim-anompoli-li-tok. 'I talked to myself
               (it)-IIIrf-talk-lsl-pt   (about it)'

b) CHOCTAW   (Isht)-il-angopoli-li-tok.
               (it)-rf-talk-lsl-pt

Apparently (l4b) is a lexically specified idiosyncratic form of reflexive + III, used only with Choctaw anopoli. But although (l4b) is the normal way to specify a III reflexive object with this verb, it is not the usual way to specify a derived III reflexive possessor object, as (l5) shows:

(15) CHOCTAW   Hattak isht-ilim-anopoli-li-tok. 'I talked about my
               man   it-IIIrf-talk-lsl-pt    husband'

A derived reflexive III object does not normally appear before instrumental *isht-, the way non-reflexive *im- does in (l1d). However, even though it appears in the same position as the reflexive prefix in (l4b), the reflexive prefix in (l5) takes the normal, regular form, rather
than the idiosyncratic form of the nonderived III object.

Finally, evidence from idiomatic object NPs also supports the idea that certain III objects must be derived, not basic. There are a number of nouns which have the form of possessed NPs, but whose meaning is not predictable from their parts, such as Choctaw *tali i-hina* (rock III-road, literally 'rock's road') 'railroad track' or *nashollo i-tobi* (Anglo III-bean, literally 'Anglo's bean') 'green peas ('English peas')'. My Choctaw teacher willingly accepts Object Possessor Raising pairs like the following, in which the original direct object is an idiomatic possessed NP whose formal possessor can be raised:

CHOCTAW

(16a) Naahollo i-tobi-ya apa-li-tok. 'I ate the white man's beans',
       Anglo III-bean-ns eat-lsl-pt 'I ate the green peas'
   b) Naahollo-ya tobi im-apa-li-tok.
       Anglo-ns bean III-eat-lsl-pt

(17a) Tali i-hina-ya ayska-li-tok. 'I fixed the railroad track'
       rock III-road-ns fix-lsl-pt
   b) Tali-ya hina im-ayska-li-tok.
       rock-ns road III-fix-lsl-pt

(16) could be simply another standard Object Possessor Raising sentence -- and, thus, (16b) also means 'I ate the beans for the white man'. But, crucially, both (16) sentences can mean 'I ate the green peas', a reading which must reflect an original structure containing the idiomatic NP *nashollo i-tobi*. With (17), the case is even clearer, since it makes little sense to think of this sentence as having the reading 'I fixed the rock's road' or (for 17b) 'I fixed the road for the rock'. The possibility of idiomatic readings for the (b) sentences shows that a rule like Object Possessor Raising must exist to relate these two-object surface structures to an underlying structure with a single object, an idiomatic possessed NP.

There are thus a number of ways in which derived III possessor objects behave differently from basic III dative objects in Western Muskogean: in their subcategorization and occurrence with particular verbs, in their marking within the verbal complex, with regard to reflexivization (both generally and in the idiosyncratic Choctaw 'talk' construction), and in their interaction with idiomatic NPs. Significantly,
both Chickasaw and Choctaw distinguish basic and derived III object structures in different ways, which nonetheless confirm the idea that basic III objects are more idiosyncratic and more closely bound to the verb than are the III objects derived by Object Possessor Raising. Thus, Western Muskogean sentences containing a transitive verb plus a III object may reflect (at least) two distinct sources, a basic phrasal type or a derived one. Clearly, then, it seems that my original hypotheses characterizing syntactic rules must be revised: it is certainly not necessary that a syntactic rule produce a completely novel type of sentence structure, as long as it creates a sentence type with unique syntactic properties.

Footnotes

1. Chickasaw and Choctaw constitute the Western branch of the Muskogean family of American Indian languages (Haas 1941). For the purposes of this paper I will refer to Chickasaw and Choctaw loosely as two "languages", although their exact linguistic status has not been established (Haas 1941, etc.; Pulte 1975; Munro ms.): Chickasaw and Choctaw may be distantly related dialects rather than separate languages, though the political separation between the two groups is longstanding. The phonological, morphological, and lexical differences between Chickasaw and Choctaw in general are considerable, however; more than the differences among the various dialects of Choctaw proper I have examined. Although Chickasaw has only recently been extensively studied, Choctaw is well described -- Nicklas (1972) and Davies (1981) are two useful grammars.

The data presented in this paper reflect the usage of my two major consultants, Catherine Willmond for Chickasaw and Josephine Wade for Choctaw. These findings have been corroborated in work with over twenty other speakers of Chickasaw and Choctaw in Oklahoma, Los Angeles, and Mississippi. Any conclusions about the use of the syntactic constructions discussed here in Chickasaw versus Choctaw, however, must be tentative at this time.

I'm very grateful to all of my Chickasaw and Choctaw teachers for their patient help, and to a number of linguists for productive discussion and suggestions. In particular, I want to thank Charles Ulrich
and Lynn Gordon; I’m also grateful to Jan Scott Batchler, Guy Carden, Bernard Comrie, Bill Davies, Larry Hyman, Hyo Sang Lee, Allen Munro, Doris Payne, and Tim Stowell.

My work on Chickasaw and Choctaw has been funded by the Academic Senate and Department of Linguistics of UCLA.

2. Examples in this paper are presented in practical orthography — the digraphs ch, lh, and sh represent [ɬ], [ɬ], and [ʃ] respectively, the apostrophe represents the phonemic glottal stop in Chickasaw, long vowels are doubled, and nasalized vowels are underlined. (For details, and notes on areas where Chickasaw and Choctaw differ, see Munro ms.)

The abbreviations I use in this paper include I, II, and III for the affix agreement sets whose use is described in Munro and Gordon (1982) and elsewhere; 1 and 2 for first- and second-person; cs = causative; it = instrumental, ns= non-subject, p = plural, pt = perfective, rc = reciprocal, rf = reflexive, s = singular, and su = subject.

3. The two positions described here are essentially those of Mrs. Wade, who allows an almost unlimited range of III-Subjectivalizations, and of Mrs. Willmond, whose III-Subjectivalization rule is much more restricted (though it still applies to a great number of verbs). I do not have enough data from additional speakers to know for certain if the difference in these two speakers’ usage is correlated with a general Choctaw/Chickasaw difference, as Lynn Gordon has suggested.

The question of how regular a rule must be to be “productive” is difficult, of course: note, for instance, that Wasow (1977) acknowledges the existence of lexical exceptions to the English Passive transformation, despite his claim that transformations must “have few or no true exceptions” (331). Delimiting “few or no”, and characterizing allowable interspeaker variation are problems I will ignore here.

The restriction of the application of III-Subjectivalization to sentences with third-person semantic subjects, incidentally, appears to hold for every speaker of Choctaw and Chickasaw I have worked with, so it must be fairly widespread. However, Davies (1981) presents data which suggest that some Choctaw speakers may not have this restriction.

4. There is a fair amount of independent support for this position. For one thing, the causative suffix -chi (which becomes -sh in sentences like (2b) by regular phonological rules) irregularly appears
as -chichi with certain verbs, which must be lexically specified. More significantly, morphophonological evidence shows that the causative suffix in Chickasaw must be added to verb stems at a phonological level preceding that at which all inflectional affixation is begun (cf. Munro and Ulrich ms.).

Charles Ulrich has pointed out to me that many of the most intriguing proposals contained in Davies's (1981) analysis of Choctaw within the framework of Relational Grammar would also not be considered syntactic rules, as I use that term here, since they involve lexically triggered obligatory operations.

5. Two variant Subject Possessor Raising constructions are worthy of note here. First, although most examples in the literature have an alienably possessed noun, as in (3), which loses its possessive marking in Raising sentences like (3b), the same construction is possible with inalienably possessed nouns, many of which take II- rather than III-agreement. (i) and (ii) illustrate cases of inalienable possessor raising. In (ii), the possessor is non-third-person (note that the possessor need not surface as an independent pronoun), agreeing with both the possessed noun and the verb:

(i-a) Hattak ipash-at litiha. 'The man's hair is dirty'
    man   hair-su  dirty
    (b) Hattak-at ipash-at i-litiha.
        man-su  hair-su  III-dirty
(ii-a) Sa-pash-at  litiha. 'My hair is dirty'
    lsII-hair-su  dirty
    (b) Sa-pash-at  a-litiha.
        lsII-hair-su  lsIII-dirty

Thus, only alienable possessive marking on the noun is lost in the Raising construction, as confirmed by (iii):

(iii-a) Am-ofi'-at  ishto. 'My dog is big'
    lsIII-dog-su  big
    (b) Ofi'-at am-ishto.
        dog-su  lsIII-big

Second, another Subject Possessor Raising construction is illustrated in
(iv) and the second example in (v) (see Munro and Gordon 1982):

(iv) Ihoo-at im-ofi' at ishto. 'The woman's dog is big' (cf. (3))
(v-a) Hattak im-ofi' at losa. 'The man's dog is black'
    man     III-dog-su black
(b) Hattak-at im-ofi' at losa.

6. It is interesting to note that Subject Possessor Raising is unusual among candidates for Projection Principle violation (such as the Raising-to-Object rules in Persian and Fijian surveyed in Carden, Gordon, and Munro ms.) in that the domain of Subject Possessor Raising is just one clause. In general, it seems, rules which involve potential Projection Principle violations are rules (for instance, Raising rules of all types) which move NPs from a subordinate clause into the higher clause in which that subordinate clause is embedded.

One rule which probably results in a Projection Principle violation of which this would not be true, however, is Pima Postposition Incorporation (Munro ms2). It may be that the relevant generalization involves the extraction of arguments from small clauses, a characterization which would probably take in both postpositional phrases and many types of possessed NPs.

Yuman languages like Mojave and Maricopa provide interesting comparative evidence on this point, since such languages have not only a Subject Possessor Raising rule like that of Western Muskogean but also a Subject Copying rule somewhat similar to familiar Raising to Subject rules (cf. Munro 1976, Gordon 1981). Significantly, possessed nouns in Mojave and Maricopa show many characteristics of sentential nominalizations, and some (such as kinship terms) function synchronically as verbs. However, I know of no particularly convincing evidence that Western Muskogean possessives are complex in this way.

7. As Munro and Gordon (1982) and Carden, Gordon, and Munro ms. show, this process is recursive (infinitely, within performance limitations?), e.g.:

(vi) Hattak-at im-ihooot ofi' at im-ishto. 'The man's wife's dog is
    man-su     III-woman-su dog-su III-big     big'

8. There is some interspeaker variation on this point which
deserves further investigation. It may be that some speakers have a sort of hierarchy (more likely based on animacy than on syntactic role, I think) which governs the syntactic viability of certain object nouns for certain syntactic operations. However, any non-subject argument (i.e., an object, not just a possessor) which is viewed as important in the discourse is subject to movement and a-marking, for all speakers.

9. In Oklahoma Choctaw there is a separate series of specifically benefactive agreement prefixes (cf. Davies 1981, Ulrich in preparation; Nicklas 1972 calls these “free datives”).

10. By “transitive verbs” here, I mean essentially only those verbs which in their simplest use take a subject marked by an agreement affix of the I set (Munro and Gordon 1982) and an object marked by an agreement affix of the II set. The facts are more complicated when other sorts of transitive verbs are considered.

The situation I describe in the text, where certain transitive verbs may take only III objects derived via Object Possessor Raising, but may not take a III object specifying a dative argument, may not occur for some speakers. I have been unable to discover any transitive verbs to which Mrs. Wade is unwilling to add a III argument, for example (although see the comments regarding the reflexive of ‘talk’ below).

11. I’m grateful to Lynn Gordon for bringing some of these facts to my attention.

References


Munro, Pamela. 1976. Subject copying, predicate raising, and

--------. Ms. Some characteristic differences between Chickasaw and Choctaw.

--------. Ms2. Postposition incorporation in Pima.


--------, and Charles H. Ulrich. Ms. Structure-preservation and Western Muskogeian rhythmic lengthening. (WCCFL 1984.)


Stemberger, Joseph P. Ms. Raising in Choktaw.