Getting the Whole Picture: The Role of Mental Images in Semantics and Pragmatics
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The idea that mental images might have something essential to do with meaning has been taboo within mainstream semantics at least since Fregg. And because Fregg, who deserves to be called the founder of modern logic and modern formal semantics, has been the object of such generally deserved admiration, I think it's only fair to pin part of the blame on him. Here's what Fregg has to say about mental images in his classic paper "On Sense and Reference:"

The reference and sense of a sign are to be distinguished from the associated idea. If the reference of a sign is an object perceivable by the senses, my idea of it is an internal image, arising from memories of sense impressions which I have had and acts, both internal and external, which I have performed. Such an idea is often saturated with feeling; the clarity of its separate parts varies and oscillates. The same sense is not always connected, even in the same man, with the same idea. The idea is subjective: one man's idea is not that of another. There result, as a matter of course, a variety of differences in the ideas associated with the same sense. A painter, a horseman, and a zoologist will probably connect different ideas with the name 'Socophalus [the horse of Alexander the Great].' This constitutes an essential distinction between the idea and the sign's sense, which may be the common property of many and therefore is not a part or a mode of the individual mind. For one can hardly deny that mankind has a common store of thoughts which is transmitted from one generation to another.


Here Fregg is taking mental images as subjective. He assumes that there are no conventional images within a culture, and no regularities of images from one person to another. This fits in very well with the ax he had to grind, with his objectivist philosophical views, and with his proposal for formal logic, which required that he define sense (or meaning) in purely objectivist terms.

What I'm going to argue is that there are conventional mental images, as opposed to merely individual ones, and that conventional mental images are associated with linguistic expressions as part of the language, and that those images are essential in linguistic semantics and pragmatics.

Before I go on, let me point out some of the ways in which Fregg was right about mental images. His observations on the whole are perceptive and sophisticated. First, not all linguistic expressions have conventional images. Second, images do vary from person to person. Thirdly, individuals often have more than one conventional
image per given expression or meaning. Fourthly, images are not clear in the way that photographs can be clear. The clarity of the separate parts of an image, as Fregé observed, does vary and oscillate. And images are, as Fregé puts it, saturated with feeling. Moreover, they’re also saturated with all sorts of other things, imagined motor activity, sound impressions, and so on. But granting all of this, it doesn’t follow that there are no conventional images, nor does it follow that images play no role in meaning. It only follows that images play no role in objectively defined meaning, which is the only kind Fregé took seriously. As Mark Johnson and I (1980) have argued, objectively defined meaning is irrelevant for natural language semantics, or for any application in the human sciences. In the discussion that follows, I’m going to take for granted the results that Johnson and I reported on, in particular the fact that our conceptual system is mostly structured by conceptual metaphors, and that these conceptual metaphors are reflected in the expressions of our everyday language. The first class of cases I want to discuss in which the images show up are a subclass of idioms—not all idioms, but a particular class which I’ll call imageable idioms. I want to make two claims about them: first, that they have conventional images associated with them, and second, that the associated images do play an essential role in the way that the idioms are understood—in other words, the meanings of the idioms are not arbitrary. An example of an idiom with a conventional image is "keep someone at arm’s length." Different people have somewhat different details in the image, but you can get at what is common by asking questions like the following and recording typical answers:

Q: How is the arm oriented with respect to the body? Up? down? forward? backward? sideways?
A: Forward, perhaps slightly to the side. Typically it's the right arm, and slightly to the right side.
Q: How high?
A: About chest height.
Q: Is the hand open or closed?
A: Open.
Q: How is the hand oriented? Is it up, down straight up, bent to the inside, bent to the outside?
A: Up, something like 45 to 90 degrees.
Q: Is there another person there?
A: Yes.
Q: Is the other person facing you or turned away?
A: Facing the subject, or whoever’s got his arm out.
Q: Are the muscles tense or lax?
A: Tense.

There are also lots of things that are not specified in the image, that are either not important or vary indiscriminately from person to person, e.g., Is it a male arm or a female arm? Does it have clothes on? All sorts of things that are irrelevant or vague, and
that vary and oscillate. Thus, parts of the image are relatively stable, and parts are not. Knowledge of the world tends to be associated with images; in this case, the knowledge has to do with the fact that when your arm is in the position given in the image, you can be protecting yourself—you can keep someone away from you so he can't hurt you.

Another example of a conventional image associated with what I'll call an imageable idiom is "spill the beans":

Q: Where are the beans before they're spilled?
A: A pot, a cup—some container, typically, a basic-level object which is a container of some sort.
Q: Where are the beans after they're spilled? Are they in a nice neat pile, in another container?
A: No, they're scattered all over.

If you ask people what kinds of beans they are: Are they pinto beans, white beans, black beans? The answers vary from person to person. Some people can't tell, some people have one bean or another depending on their experience.

Not only are there imageable idioms; productive constructions also have images. Take "hit the ball." Suppose you ask people: What kind of ball? How big is it? In this culture—not in all cultures, but in this culture—it's usually about the size of a baseball. If you ask: What do you hit it with—a pizza platter? a broom? People will usually say you hit it with a bat or a stick or something like that. People from other cultures give other answers—e.g., a soccer ball. Or take "He poured water into the glass from a pitcher." Is the person standing on a ladder twelve feet above the glass? No. Is the image the same as "He poured beer into a glass from a beer bottle." No, it's a somewhat different image. The glass is typically taller. There's foam on the beer.

What such examples show is that conventional images do exist. They vary, but they do have certain things in common, or they at least have family resemblances. But suppose you acknowledge that conventional images exist. So what? What does it have to do with linguistics?

Let's start with the productive constructions, like "hit the ball." Suppose you ask what you can report, truthfully, without misleading anybody, just by saying "John hit the ball." Suppose you look out a window over the schoolyard, and you see John hitting a beach ball with a large pizza platter. Assuming that no one else has seen the beach ball and the pizza platter, it is misleading to report this merely as "John hit the ball." The person you're talking to would get the wrong image. Or suppose Harry is standing on top of a ladder with a pitcher between his feet pouring the water from ten feet above into a glass, and you just reported it as "Harry's pouring water into a glass from a pitcher," with no special prior context. It would be misleading. In other words, what's reportable is what's not in the conventional image.

We can draw two immediate theoretical consequences:
1. Any adequate pragmatic theory must take conventional images into account.

2. Knowledge of how to use a language includes knowledge of which images are conventionally associated with which productive expressions.

3. As far as pragmatic aspects of meaning are concerned, the meaning of the whole is not a function of the meanings of the parts for mundane, syntactically productive expressions like "hit the ball."

Let us now return to idioms. It is usually assumed that the meanings of idioms are arbitrary, in other words, that any idiom could have any meaning. According to the usual theory, there is no reason why "keep someone at arm's length" means what it does and why "spill the beans" means what it does. According to the arbitrary meaning theory, each could have the other's meaning: "spill the beans" could mean what "keep someone at arm's length" now does, and vice versa. Or either could mean "go skiing" or "negotiate a peace treaty," or anything else. What I'd like to show is that, at least for imageable idioms, this is not true. Instead, I would like to make the following claim:

The meaning of an imageable idiom depends on

(a) the image conventionally associated with the idiom
(b) the world knowledge that goes with the image
and (c) the interpretation of the image and world knowledge via conventional metaphors (in the sense of Lakoff and Johnson, 1980).

For example, take "keep someone at arm's length." The image has the arm extended forward, hand up. The world knowledge is that this is a protective position, a means of keeping the other person far enough away so he can't hurt you. The relevant conventional metaphors are INTIMACY IS PHYSICAL CLOSENESS, and EMOTIONAL PAIN IS PHYSICAL PAIN. Applying these metaphors to the image and the world knowledge, we get the meaning of the idiom—maintaining emotional distance, typically to keep oneself from being emotionally hurt.

Or take "spill the beans." Jan-Ola Östman has observed that the relevant metaphors are THE MIND IS A CONTAINER, IDEAS ARE FOOD, and the CONDUIT metaphor. Take the conventional image and what we know about spilling, beans, and the storage of food. Apply these metaphors, and we get: There is information in someone's mind that he is supposed to keep there. Typically by accident (though not necessarily), he lets the information out and it goes all over the place. That is, he's supposed to keep a secret and he doesn't.

The point of these examples is that the meanings of the idioms is not arbitrary. There is a reason why they mean what they mean. In order to account for the nonarbitrary aspects of the meaning of these images, we need to make use of conventional images, conventional metaphors, and knowledge of the world.

The theoretical consequences of these observations is rather considerable. First, they provide still more evidence for the existence of conventional conceptual metaphors, as proposed by Lakoff and Johnson, 1980. Second, they show that images play a role not
only in pragmatics, but in semantics (assuming one wants to keep
them separate). Since no current formal theory of either seman-
tics or pragmatics admits images, such examples show the inadequa-
cies of all imageless theories.

Now back to Frege. There was a good reason why Frege wanted to
keep images—and anything else psychological—out of semantics.
Frege saw meaning and truth as objective—free of all human vaga-
rices. His views are inadequate to account for the semantics and
pragmatics of human language. So are the views of his intellectual
descendants—most contemporary formal theories of semantics and
pragmatics.

SOME RANDOM COMMENTS
Extensions of Conventional Images

Conventional images can often be extended, as in "They just
buried the hatchet but it won't be long before they dig it up again."
If the meanings of all idioms were arbitrary, such cases should be
impossible. But since the meaning of imageable idioms is based on
conventional images, new extensions of the idioms can be based on
extensions of the images.

Metaphorical Images

A metaphorical image is a case where one image is structured by
another image. Sports announcers often have a facility for creating
such cases. Consider an example like "The fullback exploded up the
middle for five yards." Here an explosion image is structuring a
football image. The explosion occurs either where the fullback
starts accelerating or where he hits the line. He is carried for-
ward by the force of the explosion; his motion is fast. The oppo-
sing linemen are scattered.

Compare this with "The fullback ploughed up the middle for five
yards." The motion here is slow not fast. The fullback's legs are
pushing hard into the dirt, like the legs of a ploughhorse. The
opposing linemen wind up like the furrows, piled in two rows behind hi.

The same ability that allows us to metaphorically structure one
concept in terms of another allows us to metaphorically structure
one image in terms of another.

Why Idioms Tend Toward Basic Level Objects and Actions

In order for an idiom to be imageable, it has to have imageable
components—arms, buckets, hatchets, beans, rocks, elbows, etc. As
Eleanor Rosch has observed, basic-level objects are the most general
kind of objects that are imageable. Thus, it is not surprising to
find basic-level objects and actions turning up most often in idioms.

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Speaking for Two: Respect Speech in the Guarijio of Northwest Mexico

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The use of language in its cultural context, and its inter-relation with linguistic structure, is just one of Professor Emeneau's many interests. One may point, for example, to his excellent description and analysis of the speech style found in the poetry embodied in Toda song (1958). It is, therefore, quite appropriate that my contribution also deal with a kind of style, namely respect speech. Like the poetry of song, respect speech is an elevated style level, and is universal. It is used to show respect or deference. It is a style which has recently received rather full attention from Brown and Levinson (1978).

I am concerned in this instance with a kind of respect speech\(^1\) that has become formalized and institutionalized among the Guarijio Indians. I address these topics: first, how it is marked linguistically; second, who uses it; third, under what circumstances it is used; fourth, the relation between the linguistic markers and the social meaning; and lastly I provide a brief comparison with other forms of respect speech.

First a note on who these people are. The Guarijios live in the canyons and western slopes of the mountains in western Chihuahua, and extend into the foothill country of neighboring Sonora. They are a small group, numbering perhaps 2,000. They speak a Uto-Aztecan language most closely related to Tarahumara, their neighbors to the east and south who live in higher and more canyoned country. To the north, and also in mountain country are the Pima, and to the west, on the coastal plains, are the Mayo. Both the Pima and Mayo speak related Uto-Aztecan tongues, though not as closely related as Tarahumara.

My Guarijio data was collected between September 1976 and May 1977, and during a six week's stay during the summer of 1978. Field work was supported by the National University of Mexico, and the University of Utah. Some of the examples of respect speech turned up in tape recorded conversations, others in tape recorded stories, and additional examples were elicited in formal field sessions.

The Guarijios refer to their respect speech as "talking for two", which focuses on both the social setting and on the linguistic markers; or as "compadre speech" which focuses attention on the personnel involved. The linguistic markers involve the variation of three things: (1) the personal pronouns, (2) number, and (3) voice. The first and second person singular pronouns are replaced by the appropriate case forms of the first person plural pronouns (Table 1). Secondly we find the replacement of singular forms by the appropriate plural. This is clearly related to the first feature, the replacement of "I" and "you" by "we", especially since a plural verb form is appropriate with
Subjective | Oblique
---|---
1st sg. | =ne, neé | no=, noó
1st pl. | =reme, remé | tamo=, tamó
2nd sg./pl. | =mu, muú | amo=, amó

Table 1: pronouns

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Active</th>
<th>Passive</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Past</td>
<td>-Ø</td>
<td>-tú/ru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evidential past</td>
<td>-re</td>
<td>-reru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imperfect</td>
<td>-(a)ri</td>
<td>-wari</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present</td>
<td>-ni, -na</td>
<td>-ni</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Habitual</td>
<td>-ni, -na</td>
<td>-wa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Future</td>
<td>-ma (sing.)</td>
<td>-pó(1a)/bo(1a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-pó/bo (pl.)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N.B. The present active has two morphologically conditioned allomorphs. The active -ni and the passive -ni are usually added to different stem forms, and usually trigger different phonological processes, so that the two voices are usually distinguished.

Table 2: tense suffixes

a plural subject "we". This feature is not as important as it might seem, since the plural suffix found in most Uto-Aztecan languages has been lost in Guarijio. But some common verbs have suppletive or reduplicated plurals, a few adjectives have reduplicated plurals, and most kinship terms along with a few human nouns have reduplicated plurals. The last linguistic marking manipulates the voice of the tense suffixes (Table 2), and resolves the ambiguity that results from the replacement of the first and second persons by a single form; at least it resolves it for the subject forms. If the underlying subject is the second person, then the verb takes the corresponding passive tense suffix; if it is the first person, then the tense remains in the active voice. For example:

(1) Martiñana: Muké-ru remé ku'frabi?
(carry-past:pass we short:while)
"Did you carry it on your shoulder a while?" ("muú" replaced by "=reme")

Enaro: Ka'i=reme muké-Ø=reme.
(no=we carry-past:act=we)
"No, I didn't carry it." ("=ne" replaced by "=reme")
The verb is in the past passive, and the second person pronoun ("muú") is replaced by the first person plural form ("reme"). In the response, the pronoun "we" has been retained, but the verb is in the active, showing that "reme" is to be interpreted as "I". In ordinary speech this exchange would be:

(2) Martiñano: Muké muú ku'írabi?
    Enaro: Ka'í=ne muké-∅=ne.

The third example shows the same pattern as the first:

(3) Martiñano: To'a-tú remí-ri isukí?
    (have-past:pass we-also tesgüíno)
    "Did you have any tesgüíno?" ("ni-rf" replaced by "remí-ri")
    Enaro: Hée, to'á-∅=reme woká paiká sigorf.
    (yes, have-past:act=we two three jug)
    "Yes, we had two or three jugs." ("=ne" replaced by "=reme")

namely the question in the passive, the answer in the active, indicating that "reme" is to be interpreted as "you" in the question, but "I" in the answer. An example of a verb that has a reduplicated plural form:

(4) Ka'í=na remé-ga co'-colóa-wa?
    (not=particle we-emphatic redp-hungry-hab:pass)
    "Are you hungry?" ("neé" replaced by "reme"; colóa-ni replaced by co'colóa-wa)

And with both subject and object in a relative clause:

(5) Uró remé tamó ki'a-∅-a muguré, kompári.
    (burro we us give-past:act-gerund died, compadre)
    "The burrow that I gave you died, compadre." ("neé" replaced by "reme", "amó" replaced by "tamó")

(6) Uró remé tamó ki'a-tú-∅-a muguré, kompári.
    (burro we us gave-past:pass-gerund died, compadre)
    "The burrow that you gave me died, compadre." ("muú" replaced by "reme", "noó" replaced by "tamó")

As you might guess from the glosses, they were elicited. They are not the kind of sentences that are apt to occur in free conversation in respect speech, but they do nevertheless illustrate the linguistic potential of the system. In actual fact, complicated sentences in free speech sometimes lack some of the markers, as in:
si'yá = SpFa (Spouse's Father)
wasí = SpMo
mo'né = DaHu
mo'órí = SoWi

Extensions (old system): used for

(1) Spouse's parent's siblings (e.g. HuFaBr, HuMoBr = si'yá, etc.)
(2) Siblings's child's spouse (e.g. BrSoWi, SiSoWi = mo'órí, etc.)
(3) Spouse's older siblings (e.g. HuOlSi = wasí, etc.)
(4) Younger sibling's spouse (e.g. YoBrWi = mo'órí, etc.)

The four terms used in the extensions have been replaced in the newer system by two terms, komári (Spanish compadre), and komári (Spanish comadre). E.g.
komári = WiMoBr, HuFaBr, WiFaBr, HuOlBr, YoSiHu, etc.
komári = HuFaSi, WiFaSi, BrSoWi, YoBrWi, etc.

Table 3: affinal terms

(7) I'wá tamo=ki'a-má=ne sunú.
    (here us=give-fut:act=I maize)
    "I will give you maize." ("amo=" replaced by "tamo=",
    but "=ne" is not replaced by "=reme")

in which the object "you" has been changed to "us", but the subject "I" is retained.

Who is addressed in respect speech? It is principally used with certain affinal relatives, and always reciprocally, so that those that receive respect speech answer in respect speech. It is used with one's father-in-law, and mother-in-law; and reciprocally with one's son-in-law and daughter-in-law (Table 3). These affinal terms are extended to other relatives, and not surprising respect speech is used with them as well. These affinal extensions are now being replaced by loans from Spanish "compadre" and "comadre". The Guarijios have borrowed the Mexican institution of the compadrazgo, and plugged it into an existing system. So today one uses respect speech not only to those affinals that are addressed by "compadre" and "comadre", but also those who are "compadre" or "comadre" as defined by the Mexican institution. In addition to these usages, I have recorded respect speech in a story about one of the Saints, San Ysidro, the farmer's patron Saint, who gave mankind maize and other cultivated crops (example seven, above). Why it is used in this instance, I don't know, because I'm not aware that the saints stand in an affinal relation to mankind. It should be noted that respect speech is not used by God, nor by his children when speaking to God, since God is our father, not our father-in-law.
A person will not use respect speech until he is an adult, and normally not until he is married. Even though he has heard it all during childhood, speakers report that they have difficulty keeping everything straight when they first use it with their in-laws. And in fact my main informant often got mixed up, when, in formal eliciting sessions, I asked him to change rather complicated sentences from everyday speech into respect speech.

The use of respect speech is appropriate only between certain individuals, but it is not appropriate in all situations. Unfortunately, I lack full data to specify exactly when it is used and not used, but basically it seems to be appropriate when the speaker wishes to include or invite his in-law or compadre to join him, to become psychologically a part of him. Look back at the first example. The local resident linguist had just come with Enaro, from Enaro's house across the canyon, carrying a heavy pack. Both Enaro and Martinano had the resident linguist under their wing, and felt a joint concern for his well being. Or example three. The topic refers to a tesgüinada, or drinking of tesgüino, a corn beer, which is the local social lubricant. The tesgüinada is an important social institution, and one normally wishes to be included and to be invited to join in. Now contrast these two examples with eight:

(8) Enaro: Ka'í=na nayú-ni=reme?
   (not=particle sick-pres:pass=we)
   "You aren't sick, are you?"

   Martinano: Ka'í=ni-gá.
   (not=I-emphatic)
   "Not me."

The question, "You aren't sick, are you?" is put in the respect form, but the response is not. I was told that the respect form would not be appropriate in the response, because no "invitation" was involved. Thus, an invitation to join with ego seems to be important, and hence the term "to speak for two" when referring to respect speech.

Next is a consideration of the relation between the linguistic markers and the social meaning. The use of "we" is clear; it is a device to include the hearer within the speaker's orbit, so that he is "speaking for two". It is clear that semantically the pronoun represents a dual inclusive "we", even though these are not grammatical categories in the Guarijio language. The use of the plural is motivated by exactly the same thing, and in fact for the verb, it would have to be plural to agree with the plural subject "we".

The passive is a well developed and commonly used grammatical category in Guarijio and other Uto-Aztecan languages in Northwest Mexico. To understand its use in Guarijio respect speech we must first consider the use of impersonal. The
meaning of impersonal and passive often intergrade, and in many languages the two are expressed by the same grammatical machine-
ry. Because of the intergrading of meaning, impersonal usage is clear only when the passive is used with intransitives. I have never recorded the passive with intransitive verbs, except in respect speech; and my attempts to use the passive impersonally with intransitives were interpreted by my informant as "speaking for two".

I believe it is noteworthy that in the closely related Tarahumara, which lacks this type of respect speech, the passive is used impersonally (Brambilla 1953). Thus I would argue that the passive in Guarijio was probably once used impersonally, but that this semantic function has been usurped by respect speech.

Now, why the impersonal for respect speech? It puts psycho-
logical distance between the speaker and the hearer. By having a subjectless, or more accurately an agentless sentence, the speaker cannot be held responsible for the action. Notice the effect of the three linguistic markers, and how they interact. The use of "we" and of the plural closes the psychological dis-
tance, and brings the hearer into the speaker's psychological orbit. The difference between "I" and "you" is made by turning around and placing more distance between speaker and hearer for the "you" form.

Now a comparison with systems in other speech communities. As used by the Guarijio, I would call respect speech a formalized speech style. By formalized styles I have in mind such things as men's and women's speech in Koasati (Haas 1944), or abnormal speech in Nootka (Sapir 1915), or baby talk in Cocopa (Crawford 1970). An abrupt change is made, normally by using one or a combination of three techniques: (1) by applying a set of phono-
logical rules, (2) by applying one or a set of grammatical rules, and (3) by using a specialized vocabulary that is reserved for that purpose. Perhaps a fourth technique can be recognized for formalized marking, one which in any case is widely used in non-
formal systems. It is the indirect marking by rules for speaking: e.g. kinds of topics that can be discussed, the dis-
course structure, the way requests are made, the topics that cannot be discussed, by the lexical items that cannot be used, and the like.

Nonformalized style changes, as in American English respect speech, tend to be continuous rather than abrupt. However, in some formalized systems there are several degrees within the formalized style, so that the changes can appear to be continuous. I have in mind the various honorific levels in Japanese and Korean (Martin 1964), the degrees of brother-in-law speech among the Guugu Yimidhirr (Haviland 1979), or the various levels in Javanese (Geertz 1960).

My discussion of these two types, formalized and nonformal-
ized styles, is probably not entirely satisfactory. But no matter; in reality the distinction between the two is probably
not clear cut, and ambiguous cases probably exist. Nevertheless I think it is a useful distinction, and that the two types can usually be distinguished.

The fourth technique, the indirect one, is the primary means of marking the respect speech used with in-laws among the Northern Athapaskans (Rushforth ms), along with a grammatical change (the change from singular to plural of the second person pronouns). As described by Rushforth, it appears to meet my expectations for a formalized system. Nevertheless, the indirect means does not seem to be used very commonly as the main technique for marking a formalized respect system. However, I think it will become evident that the source for the formalized grammatical markings cannot be understood without considering the indirect markings.

The first technique, the use of phonological rules, is widely used to mark a number of styles, such as baby talk, and men's and women's speech. But I'm not aware that it is the primary technique for any formalized respect speech. This leaves us with two marking techniques, the use of grammatical rules and a specialized vocabulary, both of which are widely used, alone or together, in formalized respect speech: Javanese (Geertz 1960), Madurese (Stevens 1965), Samoan (Milner 1961), Ponapean (Garvin and Riesenber 1952), Japanese and Korean (Martin 1964), most European societies (Lambert and Tucker 1976; Friedrich 1966), Burundi (Albert 1972:83), Nahuatl (Pittman 1948; Hill and Hill 1978), and most Australian societies (Capell 1962).

It is the grammatical markings that interest us for a comparison with Guarijio respect speech. The respect system manipulates three things, pronouns, number, and voice, aspects of grammar that are involved in formalized systems commonly throughout the world. The only grammatical marking in common use in formalized respect systems not utilized in Guarijio is the use of the diminutive. And it is perhaps no accident that the diminutive is not grammatically or morphologically marked in this language. Let's look at each of these three aspects of grammar in turn, looking at both formalized and nonformalized systems.

First the pronouns. There are two very common techniques. One is to replace the second person "you" with a third person form; Spanish and Italian are examples. The other, perhaps more common technique, is to make the singular into a plural; French and earlier varieties of English are examples. These changes have been widely reported and much studied throughout Europe (Lambert and Tucker 1976; Friedrich 1966; and many others), but they are not uncommon elsewhere (Albert 1972:83; Capell 1962:517; Garvin and Riesenber 1952; Rushforth ms; see Brown and Levinson 1978:203 for further references). Changing to third person or changing to plural serves to create greater psychological distance between the speaker and his listener. I know of no formalized respect system that changes a second person to first person plural, as in Guarijio. However, this is not surprising
when we realize that the object of most systems is to place
distance between speaker and hearer, whereas in Guarijio the
object is to include the hearer within the speaker's psycholog-
ical orbit. The semantic categories involved are dual inclusive,
"you" sg., and "I", though neither the dual nor inclusive-
exclusive are grammatical categories in Guarijio. The expression
"speaking for two" clearly shows dual intent.

In discussing nonformalized systems, Brown and Levinson have
noted that "by using an inclusive 'we' form, when [the speaker]
really means 'you' or 'me', he can call upon the cooperative
assumptions..." (1978:132). They note sentences of the following
type:

"Let's have a cookie, then." (i.e. me)

"Let's get on with dinner, eh?" (i.e. you)

We can also include the "parental we" here:

"We don't throw spinach at Grandma."

Brown and Levinson note that in Tamil, Tzeltal, Quechua and
Malagasy (1978:132, 207), it is the inclusive "we" that is used;
I can find no examples from a language that distinguishes, as a
grammatical category, the dual from the plural, but it is, of
course, the dual that I expect to be found.

Notice that this usage is not to be confused with the royal
"we", or the editorial or expository "we" that is now passing
from use, but which used to be used in scholarly papers. The
royal and editorial "we" is exclusive and plural, and when we use
it, it is to place distance between ourselves and our readers
(see Brown and Levinson 1978:208).

The second feature is the replacement of the singular with
the plural. The use of the plural in respect speech is so
common that it hardly needs documentation (see Brown and Levinson
1978 for references). However, I think it is clear that while
the Guarijio forms (verbs, adjectives, nouns) are plural, seman-
tically they are dual. The plural makes the reference more
diffuse; the dual ties together the speaker and hearer, and ex-
cludes all others.

Changes of voice are not as common as those of pronouns or
number, but parallels can be found. The reflexive and passive-
impersonal are used in the Aztec reverential (Hill and Hill 1978;
Pittman 1948), and the passive is used in the Japanese honorific
system (Prideaux 1970:17), as well as in the Korean honorific
system (Haruo Aoki, personal communications). Impersonals and
passives are also widely used in nonformalized systems, as noted
by Brown and Levinson (1978:199-202, 278-281). The object in
all these cases is to disclaim responsibility, by leaving the
agent unspecified. Guarijio, however, seems to be unique in using the passive to disambiguate the first and second persons.

The emergence of grammatically marked respect systems can be understood through the study of language usage. If we find that a grammatically marked respect system can be a factor in language change, then we have a clear case of language usage playing a role in historical grammar. Changes in the pronominal systems, along with the appropriate verb agreement, in European languages, are cases in point. Another example would be Guarijio, if I am correctly interpreting the evidence from the closely related Tarahumara. It appears likely that the passive was used in Guarijio, as it is still today in Tarahumara, for both the passive and impersonal. But today it is only passive, since the impersonal function was made impossible by the use of the passive with intransitives for respect speech.

Lastly a note on the relation between respect systems and the nature of the society. Brown and Gilman (1960) have made famous a model with two dimensions, one horizontal, the other vertical. The forms used on the horizontal dimension are used reciprocally, with the formal terms showing distance, the familiar ones intimacy. Forms on the vertical dimension, however, are used non-reciprocally, with the superior using familiar terms, but the inferior using formal ones. The title of the paper, "Pronouns of power and solidarity", captures the essence of the two dimensions very nicely. The Brown and Gilman model was found to be applicable, sometimes with some modifications, to a large number of societies, particularly complex societies in Europe and Asia (see Howell 1968, and Brown and Levinson 1978). The model, however, will not work for the Guarijio. Here we find respect speech is always used reciprocally, between certain kinds of in-laws. Reports from simpler societies are not as full as for complex societies, making it difficult to generalize. But it does appear that a similar situation is found in much of Australia (Capell 1962, Dixon 1971, Haviland 1979), in northern California (Miller, submitted; Robert Oswalt, personal communications), and in Northern Athabascan (Rushford ms). In these cases, respect speech is used reciprocally, either between affines (especially affines of the opposite sex) or between siblings of the opposite sex. It may well turn out that the difference is between stratified and nonstratified societies.

Note

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Bibliography


