

Speech Reporting Practices and Subjectivities: Evidence from an Amazonian Society

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1. Introduction

This paper¹ examines the speech reporting practices (SRPs) of the Nanti, an Arawakan people of the Peruvian Amazon.² The goals of this paper are to provide a description of Nanti SRPs from a communicative-functional perspective, and to account for the observed organization of Nanti SRPs from this standpoint.

In particular, I describe the exclusive use of direct speech reporting (DSR) for the reporting of speech, and the use of DSR to represent illocutionary forces, evaluative judgments, subjective orientations, and agency in Nanti discourse. On the basis of this evidence, I argue that Nanti SRPs form part of a practice of representation of subjectivity and agency in discourse that makes use of a non-dualistic model of the person in which agency and subjectivity are represented through reported speech. I argue that the organization of Nanti SRPs can be understood as stemming from the place of SRPs in this system of discursive representation of the person.

I will compare my findings for Nanti SRPs with those of other scholars working in other societies in Latin America and beyond, and note an apparent correlation between SRPs and cultural models or ideologies of the speaking subject.

¹This paper results from fieldwork I have carried out with Chris Beier, and many of the above ideas are derived from discussions with her. This paper has benefited tremendously from discussions with Joel Sherzer and Elizabeth Keating. *Yogari matsigenxa montetonixu yogotagajigax-enara irinjane. Noxanti inti xameti matsigenxa montetonixu.* The shortcomings that remain in this work are my own.

²The Nanti live at the headwaters of the Camisea and Timpia Rivers, located in the lowland rainforest of southeastern Peru. There are roughly 600 speakers of Nanti, living in approximately ten shifting settlements. During four fieldwork trips from 1997 to 2000, I spent ten months in the two largest of these settlements, Montetoni and Maranxejari, which have a combined population of approximately 250 individuals.

Nanti is closely related to several other better-known Arawakan languages spoken in southeastern Peru, including: Asháninka, which is estimated to have 15,000-18,000 speakers; Ashéninka, which is estimated to have 18,000-25,000 speakers; and Matsigenka, which is estimated to have 7,000-12,000 speakers (Aikhenvald 1999).

Finally, I will relate my findings to recent work that links speaking practices to forms of subjectivity, and explore the implications of the comparative evidence from Nanti society for research on the relationship between SRPs and forms of subjectivity.

2. Nanti Speech Reporting Practices

I will begin by describing the two major characteristics of Nanti SRPs that are relevant to the issues raised: (i) Nanti speakers' exclusive use of direct speech reporting (DSR) to report speech, and (ii) Nanti speakers' use of DSR in settings in which speakers of European languages would typically employ performative verbs of speaking or mental activity verbs to introduce indirectly reported speech or represented thought.

Of these, the exclusive use of DSR for reporting speech might be the most immediately striking aspect of Nanti speaking practices for a speaker of a European language such as English or Spanish.

Imagine the following scene on a path between a Nanti village and the river: a woman on her way to the river passes a child. As she passes, she says to him *Nojate ojaxu* 'I am going to the river'. Minutes later, her husband passes by the same child, looking for his wife, and asks the child *Tyaxa ojataxe?* 'Where did she go?'. The child responds *Oxanti nojate ojaxu* 'She said, "I am going to the river"'. Under these circumstances the child would never say *Oxanti ojate ojaxu* 'She said she is going to the river'. That utterance would be interpreted by a Nanti speaker as 'She (the woman who passed by) said that she (another woman) was going to the river'.

Abandoning hypothetical examples, consider the following interchange, which took place as part of a conversation in 1998, in which I was inquiring about the location of various family groups prior to their settlement in Montetoni, the village in which this conversation took place.³

- (1) a. L: *Tyara pinejaxeri yonatan, pirijasantenixu o tinpijaju?*
where you.saw.him yonatan at.Pirijasanteni or at.Tinpija

'Where did you see Yonatan, at Pirijasanteni or at Tinpija?'

- b. B: *Te, tera noneje janta. Ari axa xara pajirani noxemaxoti.*
not not I.see there indeed there there long.ago I.heard.about
Ixanti maixa ainyo janta nonej maixa. Maixa ixanti maixa
he.said now there.is there I.saw now now he.said now
ainyo janta nonej maixa. Maixa paira tetyara pairani
there.is there I.saw now now long.ago not.yet.then long.ago
iryu janta jatatsi ixanti axa ainyo axa tsinxatani.
he there was.gone he.said there there.is there Tsinxatani

³ Square brackets in the free translations below indicate systematically recoverable referents not present in the original Nanti, while braces indicate contextual information available only through the specific interaction.

'I did not, did not see him there. Indeed, long ago there {at Tinpija} I heard about {him}, he said, "There is someone there, I saw {him} {at Tsinxatani}." At that time, long ago, before he {Yonatan} had left, he said, "There is someone there at Tsinxatani."'

The speech reported in this data sample was produced approximately 25 years ago, and even under these circumstances, that speech is reported as direct speech.

A detailed examination of DSR in Nanti discourse reveals several patterns of use. First, Nanti speakers employ DSR, and only DSR, in contexts in which speakers of European languages regularly use performative verbs of saying, such as "promise", "order", and "prohibit", in conjunction with indirectly reported speech. In short, Nanti speakers communicate about illocutionary forces deployed in conversation by directly reporting the speech carrying that illocutionary force.

Consider the following conversation, which took place in 1998, in which Tejotoro, a young man who is rising in political prominence in Montetoni, discusses with my partner and myself the conditions under which our presence in Montetoni is welcome:

- (2) T: *Tera, te tera nonxante, nonxante pijataje. Tera nonxante.*
not not not not.I.say not.I.say you.go.back not not.I.say
Oxanyota xatinxa onti pixa janta nojataje notimira.
it.is.like noon it.is you.said there I.go.back my.land
Noxa nani, nani xameti. Tera nomintiganxajenpi noxa pijataje.
I.say fine fine good not not.I.send.you.away I.say you.go.back
Jame nonejaxoti xanyorira saburi, xotsiro, jame nonejaxoti
had.not I.see.about for.example machete knife had.not I.see.about
nonxa pijataje...
I.will.say go.back

'I don't, don't, don't say, don't say, "Go back" [i.e. go away], I don't say [it]. It is like you said at noon, "I am going back to where I live." I say, "Fine, fine, good." I don't send you away, I don't say, "Go back." Had I not seen {that you brought}, for example, machetes and knives, had I not seen [them], I would say, "Go back"...'.

Tejotoro continues:

- (3) T: *Itya nonejaxenpi tera tera nonxante janta mabani pisaninxu*
when I.see.you not not not.I.say there several your.people
pitentajigaxiti. Tera nonxante. Biro onti oga pitoriti
you.accompany.over.here not not.I.say you it.is that your.wife
pintsipajigax. Noxanti jame jame pitentiro paniro
you.will.accompany I.say had.not had.not you.accompany.her one
papuntaxa inxa iro yonta intinxami peresetente inxa
you.came.alone he.will.say it that.one chief president he.will.say
pijataje.
you.go.back

"When I see you, I don't, don't say, "Several of your people [should] accompany you over here." It is that one, your spouse, that you will accompany, I do not say [that] {i.e. that I should arrive with any other of "my people" apart from my spouse}. I say had you not, had you not come here with your spouse, had you come by yourself, he would say, that one, the chief, the president, he would say, "Go back."

This interchange is replete with instances of what speakers of European languages would likely characterize as "prohibiting", "ordering", or "demanding", and which would likely be reported using a performative verb of saying and indirect speech. Instead, Tejotoro makes exclusive use of DSR to convey these illocutionary forces, as is typical in Nanti discourse.

Consider another example, in which Manoero, the present leader of Montetoni, describes the climax and resolution of the first friendly encounter with the Matsigenka, the neighboring indigenous group, in the late 1980s. At this point in the narrative, Manoero approaches the Nanti man who had gone to check on a Matsigenka man spotted gathering palm fronds by a Nanti hunting party.

- (4) M: *Inpo nopoxapajira. Ixanti maixa nonejajigaxiri nonejajigaxiri.*
 then I.came.towards.there he.said now we.saw.him we.saw.him
Inpo ixanti, ixanti xamani pamutaxojigaxiri igapasite.
 then he.said he.said tomorrow you:PL.will.help.him his.palm.fronds
Inpo nojajigaxi. Patiro xutagite nojajigaxi. Xantira pamutaxoji
 then we.went one day we.went said.then you.all.help
inti matsigenxa. Ixanti te tsaxopi. ... Ixanti injax ixanti
 he.is person he.said not arrow he.said he.spoke he.said
maixa oxarioxa xapasi pamutaxojigaxenara. Nojajigaxitira.
 now that.one palm.frond you.will.help.me we.went.over.there
Axa noxarajigaxi yonta ne, tobaini. noxarajiga axa, axa
 here we.measured this.one see many we.measured here here
noxarajiga. Inpo nojajig namugaxeni. Pasi yogatuti, pasi yogat.
 we.measured then we.went we.helped more he.got more he.got
Axa yopijotaxeni xapasi ojojojoi ... Yamataxotanara sintipoja.
 here he.piled.up palm.frond wow he.float.on.away raft
Ixanti maixa nonpoxajira aixiro. Ixanti pamutaxojiga.
 he.said now I.will.come.back again he.said you:PL.will.help
Patiro aixiro sirijaga poxapaji aixiro.
 one again dry.season come.back again

"Then I came back towards him. He said, "Now we saw him, we saw him" {i.e. the Matsigenka man}. Then he said, he said, "Tomorrow you all will help him with his palm fronds." Then we went for one day, we went. He said, "No arrows" {i.e. he is not armed}. He said, "He spoke, he said, 'Please you all help me with these palm fronds', you will help him, he is a person" {i.e. as opposed to a violent killer}. We went, we numbered this many {gesturing}, this, see, we numbered many. This, this many {gesturing} we numbered. Then we went, we helped. More he took, more he took. He piled the palm fronds up, wow! He took [the palm fronds] away with a balsa raft. He said, "I will come back again." He said, "Please help me [again]. In one more year, [I] will come back."

We see that Manoero makes exclusive use of DSR to communicate what European language speakers would be inclined to call "requests" and "promises", terms they would typically incorporate as performative verbs that would introduce an indirect speech report.

Another relevant major use of DSR is the use of DSR by speakers of Nanti in contexts where speakers of European languages typically employ verbs of mental activity and mental state, such as "decide", "believe", and "think". Consider the following example, in which Manoero describes the problems associated with an individual who was the nominal health worker in charge of health care in Montetoni:

- (5) M: *Pine mai xanta pitaxeni sanitari xara. Iriro janta mujigaxi,*
 you.see now stay stay.for health.worker there him there help.them
pine maixa iriro hanta, pine? Ari onxanta maixa
 you.see now him there you.see indeed it.will.happen now
pijatajirixa jara ixanti totata nonxamosotaxitirira,
 when.you.go.back will.not he.say wait! I.will.visit.him.over.there
ainyoxa otomi pine ainyoxa maixa isijajigata
 there.is.perhaps her.son you.see there.is.perhaps now they.have.diarrhea
ainyoxa tyaxa ixantaxa janta imantsigajigax itomi.
 there.is.perhaps whatever happened there they.are.sick his.son
Tya ixan? Jara ixant!
 what he.says will.not he.say

"You see, now he remains {in Maranxejari}, the health worker stays there for their benefit there, he helps them there, you see? Indeed, it will happen when you leave that he will not say, "Hold on! I am going to visit him over there, perhaps there is, perhaps there is a child, perhaps they [children] have diarrhea, perhaps, there is something going on there, sick children." What does he say? He will not say [that]!"

What most speakers of European languages would describe as an attitude, a disposition, or perhaps an absence of a disposition—namely, disinterest on the part of the health worker to care for sick people in Montetoni—is instead rendered by Manoero as an absence of an utterance. Recall also Tejotoro's discussion above, in which he expresses several opinions, evaluative judgments, and attitudes exclusively through reported speech. In that discussion, he even frames evaluative positions he is enunciating at that very moment as speech, thus concurrently reporting the speech he is producing.

Now consider a final example, in which Manoero describes the circumstances under which he came to visit his sick brother, who is the leader of the nearby Nanti community of Maranxejari. This reported exchange begins with the report by Manoero's brother-in-law that Manoero's brother is sick.

- (6) M: *Ixanti pirenti imantsigat. Irota nojatasita*
 he.said your.brother he.is.sick it.agree I.went.purpose
noxamosotaxisitirira, noxa atsi nonxamosotaxite, je.
 I.visit.him.there.over.there I.said all.right I.will.visit.over.there yes

'He said, "Your brother is sick." For that reason I went to visit him over there. I said, "All right, I will visit over there, yes."

In this sequence, Manoero relates what a European language speaker would probably describe as his *decision* to visit his sick brother. As this example shows, however, Manoero does not characterize this process as "decision-making", but rather uses DSR to report on his utterance announcing his departure.

3. SRPs and the Discursive Model of the Person

A pattern can be discerned among the preceding examples. Nanti speakers employ DSR to communicate about illocutionary forces, their own evaluative judgments or those of others, and expressions of agency arising in communicative interaction. From a communicative-functional perspective, then, DSR is a discursive practice which is used to communicate about individuals as perceiving and agentive social subjects,⁴ and which is used to express in discourse the subjective orientations of these subjects towards social circumstances.

This use of DSR forms part of a broader pattern in Nanti discursive practice, in which the behavior of individuals is discussed in terms of the utterances they produce and the physical actions they perform. My detailed examinations of recordings of Nanti discourse have not yet revealed cases of speculation about what someone thought, what someone intended, what they meant, or what they decided.⁵ Instead, I have found minute discussions of what people *said* and equally careful discussions of what people *did not* say, which frequently appears to be as relevant as what people *did* say. Thus, not only is DSR employed to discursively represent the subjectivity and agency of individuals, but, apart from descriptions of physical actions, DSR is the *principal* (if not exclusive) means for doing so.

As indicated above, the *internal states* of individuals are not frequent or central topics of discourse, nor are internal states a significant explanatory or analytic modality in discourse for assessing or understanding the behavior of individuals. Nanti individuals thus appear to organize their communication about agency and

⁴ The perceptive reader will have noted that not all occurrences of DSR in the data correspond to the uses just outlined. Another important aspect of the use of DSR, not discussed in this paper for reasons of space, relates to Nanti epistemology and issues of evidentiality and representations of experience in Nanti discourse. Nanti speakers tend to be circumspect in their knowledge claims, and typically prefer to relate by means of reported speech knowledge that they have acquired solely through talk (Michael 2001).

⁵ This does not, of course, rule out the possibility of such speculation or discussion in Nanti discourse. It does point, however, to its rarity—either because of the lack of salience of such a viewpoint on agency and subjectivity, or because of its sensitivity (cf. Besnier 1993).

subjectivity by employing a model of the person in which the locus of subjectivity and agency is speech, rather than, say, mental or intentional states.

We can characterize the model of the person operative in Nanti discourse as a *monistic* model. Crucially, a monistic model of the person takes speech and the meaningful states and activity of the social subject to be inseparably fused. Consonant with such a model is the notion that speech is not a 'mere' conduit for the projection of basic internal states, but rather that the utterance is the basis of meaning. This contrasts with a Cartesian, or dualistic, conception of the person, in which meaning arises from mental states (Vendler 1972).

It should be noted that I am making a claim about the *discursive model* of the person employed by Nanti speakers, a model of the person that Nanti speakers use to organize their *talk* about the behavior of individuals. How one talks about a topic and how one might otherwise relate to that topic are logically distinct, and I am leaving open for the moment the question of whether this model of the person further penetrates other areas of Nanti activity and society.

Further evidence for the use of a monistic discursive model of the person by Nanti speakers comes from the observed exclusive use of DSR to report speech. As Alan Rumsey has pointed out, indirect speech reporting practices depend critically on the distinction between utterance and meaning (Rumsey 1990:347). This distinction, Rumsey argues, is based on a linguistic ideology that takes utterances to encoding pre-existent 'mental meanings'. In terms of this ideology, ISR 'extracts' meaning from the original utterance, thereby allowing the speaker to efficiently strip the 'content' from the 'code'.

If, however, speakers employ a monistic discursive model of the person, the utterance/meaning distinction is problematic. Specifically, a monistic model excludes the possibility of pre-existent internal meanings that are subsequently encoded in messages, since a monistic model makes no place for the existence of meanings as distinct from utterances. Consequently, the notion of extracting meaning from an utterance, which is basic to ISR, is incompatible with a monistic model of the person. We would therefore expect that speakers employing a monistic model of the person would report speech directly, rather than indirectly, since DSR does not require the splitting apart of 'meaning' and utterance. This is, of course, precisely the situation I have observed among Nanti speakers.

Thus, by positing that a monistic model of the person underlies Nanti speaking practices, it is possible to account for both the exclusive use of DSR for the reporting of speech, and for the use of DSR for communicating about the agency and subjectivity of individuals. The preceding analysis therefore suggests that DSR-dominant speaking practices are a coherent set practices of representation of the social subject, and that the coherence of these speaking practices is not coincidental, but stems from their grounding in a monistic discursive model of the person.

4. Comparative Evidence

Evidence from other societies in lowland Latin America and elsewhere suggests that the characteristics and patterning of Nanti SRPs are not an isolated phenomenon.

Ellen Basso's areally related work on narrative and biography among the Kalapalo, an indigenous group of the Xingu River area of central Brazil, suggests that Kalapalo speakers employ reported speech in a manner similar to that found in Nanti society. Basso remarks that speech is normally directly reported by Kalapalo speakers, and that, in addition, when Kalapalo speakers relate personal and historical narratives, they reveal the motives, emotions, and the subjective interpretations of reality of the characters in these narratives through reported speech, rather than through a description of mental or emotional states (Basso 1995:295-296).

Likewise, Joel Sherzer, describing the speaking practices of the Kuna of Panama, indicates that DSR is frequently used in place of representations of thought introduced by mental activity verbs, and that the meaning/utterance distinction described above is considerably less salient in Kuna society than in Euro-American society (Sherzer 1983). As is the case with Nanti society, Sherzer reports that the direct, rather than indirect, reporting of speech is the dominant means for reporting the utterances of others.

Shifting away from indigenous Latin America, Alan Rumsey, in his work on the language ideological dimensions of reported speech in Ungarinyin, a language spoken in northwestern Australia, indicates that no distinction is drawn between indirect and direct speech in Ungarinyin discourse (Rumsey 1990:347). At the same time, Rumsey argues, Ungarinyin speakers do not appear to find salient the distinction between 'meaning' and 'wording' (ibid.:354), a distinction already noted to be basic to the dualistic model of the person.

At present, the sparseness of ethnographic data focusing on the communicative-functional character of SRPs unfortunately leaves many important questions unanswered. For example, the cultural and geographic distribution of monistic models of the person, the ways in which monistic models of the person are implicated in the organization of speaking practices in particular societies, and the variations in the constitution of these models remain unknown.

There is tantalizing evidence that suggests that the use of a monistic model of the person in discourse, indicated by the co-occurrence of DSR-dominant SRPs and use of DSR to represent agency and subjectivity in discourse, is a widespread areal discourse trait in lowland Latin America (Waltz 1976, Witte 1976). Similarly, Rumsey indicates that the linguistic ideology he described among the Ngarinyin is shared by other Australian Aboriginal groups (Rumsey 1990:352-345). Answers to these questions of distribution and variation must, however, await further ethnographic research.

Despite the current paucity of comparative evidence, we see indications that particular speaking practices co-occur with particular models of the person. On the one hand, we find European societies exhibiting ISR-centered SRPs and a

Cartesian model of the person in which dualist understandings of mind and body, talk and thought, and speech and meaning hold sway, while on the other hand we have Nanti, and probably Kalapalo, Kuna, and Ungarinyin as well, displaying DSR-centered SRPs and a model of the person in which the dualisms that constitute the Cartesian subject are either much less salient, or absent entirely.⁶

5. SRPs and Forms of Subjectivity

These observations cast an interesting light on recent work on the relationship between speaking practices and formulations of subjectivity. In particular, the observed features of SRPs in Nanti society (and possibly other indigenous societies in Latin America and Australia) provides complementary evidence for the claims of Benjamin Lee that the particular Western form of subjectivity known as Cartesian dualism is based on grammatical analogies between speaking and thinking inherent in European speaking practices, especially SRPs (Lee 1997).

Lee develops his argument by showing that the grammatical properties of indirect speech and its interpretation, and the gradation of subjective expressiveness in performative verbs and verbs of thinking, form the semiotic basis for a 'subjective realm' that leads, by metaphorical transference, to notions of an internal 'mental' realm, and of 'mental meaning', which are further reified in the system of performative verbs and mental state and activity verbs found in European languages (ibid.:202-221).

While Lee's subtle and well-supported argument is compelling in many respects, it is based entirely on the internal structures of European languages and speaking practices, and brings no comparative data to bear on the issue of the relationship between SRPs and subjectivities. The possibility arises, then, that the co-occurrence in European societies of a Cartesian model of subjectivity and ISR-dominant speaking practices is simply coincidental, despite the apparent semiotic analogies between the organization of speaking practices and models of the speaking subject.

However, the evidence from Nanti society suggests that SRPs and forms of subjectivity are meaningfully related to one another. Lee argues that Cartesian subjectivity is grounded in the use of performatives, mental activity verbs, and ISR practices found in European societies. On the basis of this, we would expect that in a society in which these speaking practices are absent, we would find a rather different formulation of subjectivity. In particular, we would expect the absence of a dualistic formulation of subjectivity.

⁶ It is probably the case that in any system of discursive practice, elements of both discursive models that I have described are present to some degree. After all, even in American English communicative settings, disavowal of racist *intent* in producing an utterance that someone finds racist goes only so far in mitigating the effect of the utterance. Similarly, arguing that a promise one gave did not constitute actually a promise, because of a lack, when uttering the promise, of a concomitant intent to fulfill the promise (a violation of the felicity conditions for the speech act, cf. Austin 1962), is hardly compelling.

This, plausibly, is what we find in Nanti society. Nanti speaking practices eschew performatives; mental activity verbs are rare or absent;⁷ and DSR is the exclusive form of speech reporting. At the same time, the model of the person upon which Nanti speaking practices are based is a non-dualistic, monistic one, in which meaning/utterance, thought/action, and mind/body dualisms are not salient.

In short, the evidence from Nanti speaking practices provides comparative support for Lee's claims that Cartesian subjectivity is grounded in particular speaking practices. At the same time, Lee's work on the discursive basis of Cartesian subjectivity provides a theoretical basis for understanding the interdependence of speaking practices and forms of subjectivity.

It should be noted, though, that in my arguments above I am making a more modest claim than that advanced by Lee. While Lee relates speaking practices to *forms of subjectivity*, I am relating speaking practices to discursive models of the person—that is, to a system of *representations of subjectivity* in discourse.

Whether the monistic model of the person that I claim is employed by Nanti speakers is solely a discursive model that they use to organize speaking, or whether it penetrates into other realms of action, cognition, and interaction, is just one of several open questions that remain. While the widespread nature of Cartesian subjectivity in Western societies is amply attested, whether the monistic model of the person that appears to be operative in the organization of Nanti speaking practices is an extension of more general Nanti conceptions of the person and the social subject, or whether it is a model that serves solely to organize discursive practices, remains an open question.⁸ It is conceivable, for example, that while reference to 'internal' states or actions is rigorously avoided in Nanti discourse, Nanti individuals otherwise do employ a dualistic model of the person in understanding the behavior of individuals.⁹ No doubt methodologies developed by cognitive and developmental psychologists concerned with theories of mind could be profitably adapted to explore these issues.

Part of the difficulty in determining the extent of the use of this monistic model in the ideological and cognitive organization of Nanti society arises, I feel,

⁷ Nominal forms corresponding to the mentalistic terms found in European languages such as "knowledge", "opinion", or "belief" appear to be absent in Nanti. A small number of verb stems may admit dualistic or mentalistic interpretations, but monistic interpretations of these stems centering on speech and action, rather than on 'internal' processes, are equally compelling.

⁸ A prosaic example of a model employed in Euro-American discourse that does not extend fully into the cognitive realm is the ANGER IS HEAT metaphor (Lakoff 1986:382-387). This metaphor is employed in a highly productive manner in talking about anger, yet Americans do not believe that dumping cold water on an angry person, or putting such a person in a refrigerator, is an effective means for diminishing their anger. The ANGER IS HEAT metaphor is certainly a discursive model, but it only partially penetrates the American cultural etiology of anger.

⁹ Such a situation is described by Niko Besnier in his study of reported speech and affect on Nukulaelae (Besnier 1993). Besnier indicates that Nukulaelae islanders consider speculation or inference about the internal states or thoughts of others to be "irresponsible" and "demented", although such activity is attributed to "children, adolescents, and irresponsible gossipers" (ibid.:166).

from difficulty in conceiving of what a monistic conception of the person might constitute. How, in short, do we theorize a conception of the subject that does not incorporate either mental meaning or mental activity as separate from speech and action? Alessandro Duranti's work on Samoan ethnopragmatics suggests some directions, but much work remains to be done if we are to develop an analytically robust notion of the monistic subject (Duranti 1992).¹⁰

6. Conclusions

This paper is intended to contribute to our ethnographic understanding of reported speech. In particular, I have attempted to account for the communicative-functional properties of reported speech in Nanti society, and for the exclusive use of DSR to report speech, by appealing to the notion that Nanti speakers organize their representations of subjectivity and agency in discourse in terms of a specific model of the person. I have characterized this model as a *monistic* model of the person, in which meaning and utterance are taken to be fused, and which concomitantly does not recognize dualistic distinctions between mind and body, and thought and action. Whether this model is solely employed to organize talk, or if it also organizes other aspects of cognition and behavior remains a question for future work.

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¹⁰ This stands in sharp contrast with dualistic models of the person, which are well-developed in both their folk-theoretic forms and as formal models derived from folk-theoretic forms. The dualistic model of the person employs a vessel metaphor for the person (cf. Lakoff 1987:381-388), in which the body serves as a container for a medium (mind) in which meaning is produced, sustained, and consumed. Meaning is transferred from the interior of one vessel (person) to another through words, which serve as a conduit for the meaning (thoughts) contained in the mind of the speaker (Reddy 1979).

In the context of this familiar model, indirect speech reporting is understood to be the process of extracting and representing the meaning contained in speech, which originates in the internal, mental realm of the speaker. Speech acts are distinguishable from the utterances themselves which a speaker produces when performing them by the felicity condition that the speaker hold particular mental states in order that the utterance count as a particular speech act (Austin 1962:8-11). Similarly, mental activity takes place in the inner medium of the mind and manifests itself as acts of agency and subjective perceptions of the surrounding physical and social world.

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Lexical Tone and Markedness in Standard Thai

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1. Data

Every first-year linguistics student knows the five different ways to say *naa* in Thai. He or she also knows that an autosegmental representation, with primitives high (H) and low (L), represents the contrasts between the mid, high, low, falling and rising tones both simply and elegantly, as shown in (1). A closer look at the distribution of these five tones, however, reveals that the system is not so simple after all.

(1)	<u>mid</u>	<u>high</u>	<u>low</u>	<u>falling</u>	<u>rising</u>
	σ	H σ	L σ	H L σ	L H σ
	[na:]	[ná:]	[nà:]	[nâ:]	[nǎ:]
	'rice field'	'custard apple'	'aunt'	'face'	'thick'

First, there is an interaction of tone with stress. Tone is realized only on stressed syllables: in unstressed syllables all tones reduce to mid.¹ So, for example, in the reduplicated form [sawsǎ:w] 'young girls' the underlying rising tone on /sǎ:w/ is realized only on the stressed final syllable, while the initial syllable is pronounced with a mid tone. This interaction, we will argue, is a straightforward example of positional faithfulness.

Other restrictions are more complex and puzzling. Not all stressed syllables can bear all tones. Only open syllables with long vowels (CVV), or any syllable closed by a sonorant, regardless of vowel length (CVS and CVVS), can bear all five tones. Examples are given in (2).

¹ There are counterexamples to this claim, but we follow Yip's (1982:88) suggestion that these seem to involve morphology and secondary stress effects that we will not address here.