

## Projective Content and the Tagalog Reportative

Gregory Kierstead  
gwk@ling.osu.edu

The Tagalog clitic *daw* is used by a speaker when the speaker has reportative evidence for a proposition (Schwager, 2010). Using data from original fieldwork, I show that certain utterances containing *daw* have semantic content that can project, i.e., even when embedded in environments that normally cancel entailments, the entailments survive. However, the behavior of this projective content is unusual: unlike presuppositions (which also project), with *daw* the projective content is often new information. In this way it is like the Conventional Implicatures (CIs) discussed by Potts (2005) and the Cheyenne evidentials analyzed by Murray (2010). However, with *daw*, the possibility of projection is context-dependent, in a way not seen with CIs and Cheyenne evidentials. This raises important questions about how to analyze the class of projective meanings, and whether the class calls for a unified analysis, or whether there are divisions within the class that need to be further explored (see Roberts 2011; Tonhauser et al. 2011 for proposals of finer distinctions of this class). Thus, the data on *daw* has important consequences for the theory of taxonomy of meaning.

Following Simons et al. (2010), I take an implication to project if it is associated with a triggering expression, and the implication still persists even when the trigger is embedded under an entailment canceling operator. The puzzle of projection is why the implication is not affected by embedding operators in the same way that non-projective implications are. For instance, one example of projective content is that of conventional implicatures discussed by Potts (2005), such as the appositive *a chef* in (1). Utterance (1-a) implies (at least) two things: that Emily is a chef, and that she is from Rhode Island. In (1-b), this sentence is embedded under a modal, and the resulting utterance no longer implies that Emily is from Rhode Island, but still implies that she is a chef.

- (1) a. Emily, a chef, is from Rhode Island.
- b. Maybe Emily, a chef, is from Rhode Island.

The question is why the projective implication, that Emily is a chef, behaves differently from the other, non-projective implication, that she is from Rhode Island. The appositive in (1) gives an example of projective content that is non-presuppositional: as use of the appositive is infelicitous when its content is entailed by prior context, it cannot be analyzed as a presupposition. As such, CIs are associated with non-presuppositional projective content.

Tagalog is a language spoken by over 21 million people in the Philippines and is one of the two national languages (the other being English) (Lewis, 2009). It is a predicate-initial language (Kroeger, 1993). *Daw* is a second-position particle, meaning that it appears after a predicate and before the predicate's complements (Schwager, 2010). Thus, in (2), *daw* appears after the predicate *umulan* 'rain':<sup>1</sup>

- (2) Context: Phil, who lives in Ohio, has been inside all of yesterday and today, in his windowless apartment, working. He watches the weather report on the news, which says it rained yesterday. He calls his friend Sam who lives in California. He starts the conversation by saying:  
Umulan **daw** kahapon.  
rain.PERF RPT yesterday  
'It was reported that it rained yesterday.'

Consultants report that use of *daw* in (2) is acceptable. When asked if Phil could use *daw* if he did not see the weather report, but instead learned that it was raining because he either saw it rain, heard it raining, or had someone visit who came in with a wet umbrella, consultants say that Phil should not use *daw* in any of those other contexts. Thus, this shows that utterances with *daw* imply there is a report of the proposition. I call this implication the *reportative implication*.

<sup>1</sup>All Tagalog data reported here is from original fieldwork. I use the following glosses: RPT=reportative evidential, DIR=direct case marker, IND=indirect case marker, AV=agent voice, PV=patient voice, PERF=perfective aspect, IMPERF=imperfective aspect, CONT=contemplative aspect, INF=infinitive aspect, LK=linker particle, PL=plural marker, INCL=inclusive, HON=honorific

Note that the reportative implication is not entailed by prior context in (2): it is specified this is the first utterance of the conversation, and as Phil’s friend lives across the country, he could not have seen the local weather report that Phil did. Thus, the reportative implication can contribute new information to the conversation.

When embedded under an entailment-canceling operator such as the antecedent of a conditional, under the modal *baka* ‘maybe’, or under the propositional attitude verb *akala* ‘falsely believe’, one of three readings is possible, depending on context. Only the data for conditionals will be given here, although the pattern for the other two embedding environments is the same.

Conditionals in Tagalog can be formed using *kung* ‘if’, followed by a sentential clause (marked in brackets with subscript *S*) that is the antecedent, and a second sentential clause that is the consequent:

- (3) [Kung [kumain si Mary ng adobo,]<sub>S</sub> [kumain din siya ng patatas.]<sub>S</sub>]  
 if eat.PERF.AV DIR Mary IND adobo, eat.PERF.AV too 3SG.DIR IND potatoes  
 ‘If Mary ate chicken, she ate potatoes also.’

In (4), we see *daw* in the antecedent of the conditional, and it takes wide scope over the conditional, and it is implied that there was a report of the entire conditional. Thus, use of *daw* in (4) implies that Bill is relaying the superstition about breaking a mirror that has been reported (schematically: DAW(if p then q)):

- (4) Context: John remembers there is some superstition about breaking a mirror, but doesn’t exactly remember what it is. He asks his friend Bill to remind him. Bill says:  
 [Kung [makabasag ka **daw** ng salamin]<sub>S</sub>, [magkakaroon ka ng pito-ng taon-ng bad  
 if break.INF.AV 2SG.DIR RPT IND mirror exist 2SG.DIR IND seven-LK years-LK bad  
 luck]<sub>S</sub>.]<sub>S</sub>  
 luck  
 ‘It is reported that if you break a mirror, you will have seven years bad luck.’

The other scope possibility, where *daw* takes narrow scope with respect to the antecedent of the conditional, is possible in a different context, shown in (5). In this reading, the antecedent concerns the possibility of a report (schematically: if (DAW p) then q):

- (5) Context: I visit my grandmother, who is very forgetful. Sometimes she even forgets what she had for dinner the day before. I ask her how her dinner was yesterday. She says she can’t quite remember what she had, and tells me to ask my grandfather. I ask her if my grandfather is actually reliable, or whether he might forget too. She says I should trust what he says. For instance:  
 [Kung [kumain **daw** ako ng manok]<sub>S</sub>, [kumain ako ng manok]<sub>S</sub>.]<sub>S</sub>  
 if eat.PERF.AV RPT 1SG.DIR IND chicken, eat.PERF.AV 1SG.DIR IND chicken  
 ‘If it was reported that I ate chicken, then I ate chicken.’

A third reading is possible, where the reportative implication of *daw* projects. This is shown in (6-a). Even though *daw* is embedded in the antecedent of the conditional, its associated reportative implication is interpreted in the global context, as seen by the consultant comment that (6-a) implies Sally had talked to John (schematically: DAW p ∧ if p then q).

(6) John believes that with roulette, he can sense what number will come up next with complete certainty. His friends Jenny and Sally decide to use his ability to make money off the casinos. John will sit in a corner waiting for his premonitions. Jenny will sit at the table and play roulette. Sally will go back and forth between the two, both to report John’s premonitions, and just to chat so the casino doesn’t catch on. They won’t talk to anyone outside of their group to not get caught. Jenny is playing roulette, and Sally comes up next to Jenny, just as Jenny puts a bet that a red number will come up next. Sally says:

- a. [Kung [pula **daw** ang susunod,]<sub>S</sub> [matutuwa tuyo]<sub>S</sub>]<sub>S</sub>  
 if red RPT DIR next.one joyful 1PL.INCL.DIR  
 ‘If the next one is red, as was reported, we’ll be happy.’  
*Consultant comment:* Then [Sally] had to have talked to John.

By comparison, when consultants are given a parallel example to (6-a) where *daw* is not used, they do not report that Sally must have talked to John. As use of *daw* implies the existence of a report in the global context, the reportative implication projects.

In sum, the data above shows that depending on context, the reportative implication of *daw* can project, or take scope with respect to the embedding operator. That is, in utterances where *daw* is embedded in the antecedent of a conditional three readings were possible: *daw* could take wide scope with respect to the embedding operator, *daw* could take narrow scope with respect to the embedding operator, or the reportative implication of *daw* could project. This raises the question of why the reportative implication of *daw* is able to survive when *daw* is embedded under an entailment canceling operator, unlike regular entailments that do not survive.

One possible solution to this puzzle is given by Schwager (2010). She proposes an analysis of *daw* as a presupposition trigger. It gives rise to the presupposition “of the form ‘some *x* said *p*’ ” (Schwager, 2010, 23). She goes on to specify that, essentially, this is an anaphoric presupposition, requiring as antecedent an event *e* where *x* is the agent and the event is *x* making an utterance with content *p*. As use of *daw* would place a constraint on prior context, requiring some agent to have previously uttered *p*, this would be in the common ground, and so it would not be affected by embedding operators.

However, as discussed, the reportative implication associated with *daw* can contribute new information, and thus have no antecedent event in prior context. In order to capture such data while still assuming a presuppositional analysis, we would need to assume that the presupposition triggered by *daw* could be accommodated (Lewis, 1979; van der Sandt, 1992).

Simons et al. (2010) take issue with this kind of analysis of a projective meaning that is analyzed as a presupposition which is often accommodated. They point out that there is “evidence that true common ground constraints are in fact not amenable to accommodation” (Simons et al., 2010, 4), giving as paradigm examples *too* and pronouns:

- (7) If she didn’t sleep in the hammock, I don’t know where she slept. (Simons et al., 2010, 5)

Use of *she* is felicitous only if there is a unique woman salient in the common ground. If no such woman exists, a listener cannot accommodate the fact that this woman exists; the utterance is just infelicitous. Simons et al. (2010) thus conclude that it is “conceptually problematic to treat accommodation of common ground constraints as the norm” for these sorts of projective meaning triggers (Simons et al., 2010, 5). Given this, I propose that the reportative implication is not a presupposition, and *daw* is not a presupposition trigger. It is rather a case of non-presuppositional projective meaning.

While *daw* does not give the first evidence of non-presuppositional projective content, it differs from the CIs and Cheyenne evidentials in its context-dependent behavior, and thus broadens our view of the space of such meanings. It has been shown CIs need not project: they can take narrow scope when embedded under a propositional attitude verb, depending on whether the CI is taken to be anchored to the speaker, or matrix subject of the propositional attitude verb (Amaral et al., 2007; Harris and Potts, 2009). So, while CIs are somewhat context-dependent, this is restricted to a small set of contexts. Recall however, that the data with

*daw* showed multiple readings also when embedded under a modal or in the antecedent of a conditional, and this context-dependency was independent of any notion of speaker-orientation. Thus, the reportative implication of *daw* exhibits behavior not previously seen of non-presuppositional projective meaning. The study of *daw* gives new insight into the theory of this class of meaning, and the taxonomy of meaning more generally.

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