Social identity, precision and charity: when less precise speakers are held to stricter standards.

Andrea Beltrama
University of Pennsylvania

Florian Schwarz
University of Pennsylvania

Abstract Recent work showed that social constructs such as the persona embodied by the speaker play a crucial role in pragmatic reasoning – and in particular, on comprehenders’ inferences of what possible facts a given description might be taken to represent in the context. These findings, in turn, raise the question of whether similar effects obtain for the reverse inference – that is, on comprehenders’ assessment of whether a given description can be taken to appropriately represent a known, already established fact. We explore this question by testing the impact of speaker identity on T(ruth)-V(alue) J(udgment)s based on the interpretation of imprecise numerical descriptions. We find that imprecise statements from speakers socially expected to be less precise – i.e. “Chill” ones – are rejected at a higher rate, and thus held to more stringent evaluation standards, than those from speakers socially expected to speak more precisely – i.e. “Nerdy” ones. We explain the finding by appealing to the idea that, by virtue of generally being perceived to be more precise, Nerdy speakers are granted higher epistemic credibility than Chill ones. This suggests that TVJ assessments are affected by social considerations in a different way from other experimental tasks, unveiling a nuanced interplay between social information and different types of pragmatic inferences.

Keywords: imprecision, social identity, numerals, truth-value judgments, personae, charity

1 Introduction

Much work in sociolinguistics and psycholinguistics has highlighted the central role of social information in language processing. In particular, research across different domains of speech perception and production – e.g., sound categorization and recognition; convergence; imitation – illuminated how comprehenders promptly
utilize information about different properties of speaker. This information spans different layers of identity categories, including speakers’ location of origin, gender, or race (Strand 1999; Niedzielski 1999; Hay, Warren & Drager 2006; Hay 2009; Babel 2012; Drager 2015; Staum Casasanto 2008; Sumner, Kim, King & McGowan 2014; Wade 2022), as well as the more idiosyncratic, specific “types” of person, or personae, that they embody.¹ For example, comprehenders primed with social types such as “Valley Girl” displayed different perceptions of vowel boundaries than listeners primed with other types (D’Onofrio 2015, 2018); similar effects of persona have been unveiled in connection with other aspects of speech processing, e.g., judgments of foreign accentedness (D’Onofrio 2019) or syntactic parsing (Choe, Sloggett, Yoshida & D’Onofrio 2019).

In a similar vein, a growing amount of work has been shedding light on the impact of social information on the processes involved when interlocutors resolve, and ultimately exchange, meaning in conversation. On an empirical level, it’s been shown that pragmatic reasoning is impacted by a range of different social factors – e.g., politeness considerations (Bonnefon, Feeney & Villejoubert 2009; Yoon, Tessler, Goodman & Frank 2020; Mazzarella, Trouche, Mercier & Noveck 2018); affect (Kao, Wu, Bergen & Goodman 2014; Bergen 2016); speaker-specific properties such as linguistic nativeness (Fairchild & Papafragou 2018) and political orientation (Mahler 2020), and broader personae and identity categories (Beltrama & Schwarz 2021; see §2 for further details). Conversely, it has also been shown that comprehenders promptly infer identity and personality features of a speaker from the semantic and pragmatic properties of their utterances (Acton & Potts 2014; Beltrama & Staum Casasanto 2017, 2021; Acton 2019; Glass 2015; Karawani & Waldon 2017; Jeong 2021; Thomas 2021; Hunt & Acton 2022; see Beltrama 2020 for an overview). In parallel with these empirical advances, general frameworks aiming to capture pragmatic inferences have been expanded in a variety of directions, reflecting a shift towards a more comprehensive approach to the study of the interpretation of linguistics utterances: for example, work within the Rational Speech Act framework has developed a system to model the interpretation of nonliteral meaning as an instance of social cognition more broadly – i.e., of rational action in which interlocutors aim at maximizing their utility in light of the goals that they are pursuing, similar to what happens in other domains of human behavior (Frank & Goodman 2012; Goodman & Stuhlmüller 2013; Kao et al. 2014; Lassiter & Goodman 2017; Goodman & Frank 2016). In a similar vein, recent developments of Gricean and game-theoretic models of communication productively relied on the formal tools utilized in modeling

¹ The category of persona has received extensive attention in sociolinguistics and linguistic anthropology, independent of its implications on language processing. See Irvine (2001); Kiesling (2001); Bucholtz (2001); Zhang (2005); Agha (2005); Eckert (2008); Podesva (2011); King (2021) for foundational work in the area.
meaning-related inferences to capture the processes of interlocutors signaling and negotiating social identity (Burnett 2017, 2019; Henderson & McCready 2019).

Taken together, these endeavors have led to a considerable expansion of the scope of semantics and pragmatics, highlighting novel questions around the dynamics whereby comprehenders recruit contextual information when interpreting meaning. Especially relevant, in this respect, is the issue of how considerations about speakers identity and personality shape comprehenders’ pragmatic reasoning with respect to processes that had long been investigated, but whose sensitivity to the wealth of social information available in the context has been explored only tangentially. In this paper, we take a step towards illuminating this issue by focusing on a process that is central to the study of meaning: how do the distinctive identity features of a speaker impacts comprehenders’ determination of whether, given a known fact, a certain linguistic description appropriately represents this fact? Besides representing a task that interlocutors need to routinely navigate in everyday communicative situations, this type of assessment also plays a central methodological role in experimental semantics and pragmatics, as it stands at the core of the standard Truth Value Judgement (TVJ) task (henceforth, TVJ; Crain & McKee 1985; Crain 1998) – a paradigm which has been extensively used for studying comprehenders’ interpretation processes (Noveck 2001; Papafragou & Musolino 2003; Bott & Noveck 2004 i.a.). In particular, even though recent work has begun to explore how respondents reason about the discourse situation and their relation to it to make these assessments (Sikos, Kim & Grodner 2019; Waldon & Degen 2020; Scontras & Pearl 2021), the role of social information in determining the outcome of these assessments remains largely uncharted, opening up an intriguing question that could have important theoretical and methodological ramifications for the study of pragmatic reasoning.

As our case study, we focus on imprecision resolution in the interpretation of numerical expressions – a pragmatic phenomenon whose sensitivity to persona-based information in comprehension has already been demonstrated, thus providing a suitable jumping off point to explore our question of interest. Specifically, we set out to test how the persona embodied by a speaker – that of a Nerdy vs. a Chill person – shapes the way in which comprehenders judge the correctness of the imprecise statements uttered by this speaker – e.g., “The price is $200” when the price is in fact $207. In a nutshell, our findings indicate that imprecise descriptions uttered by Chill speakers, who are socially expected to characterize facts less precisely (see §2), are rejected at a higher rate than imprecise descriptions uttered by Nerdy speakers, who are instead expected to characterize facts more precisely. We take this result to support two conclusions. First, when making assessments in a TVJ paradigm, comprehenders do indeed track information about the speaker’ social identity; second, the way in which they reason about this information in this task paradigm differs from the way they do in other paradigms – e.g., in a setup in which
comprehenders are asked to infer what facts could be taken to go along with an utterance, drawing an inference that goes in the opposite direction to the one tested in a TVJ setup (see Beltrama & Schwarz 2021 and §2 for further details). All in all, we believe these results highlight a novel aspect in which interpretive judgments are influenced by social information, and thus contribute to shedding further light on the context sensitivity of a task that remains very much central in semantics and pragmatics and, more broadly, on the intricate interaction between social information and pragmatic reasoning in interpretation.

The paper proceeds as follows. §2 introduces (im)precision and the relevant prior research on the phenomenon; §3 reports on an experiment that we carried out to investigate our question; §4 presents a general discussion; §5 concludes.

2 Imprecision: a case study

Numerical expressions, such as those in (1), are known for having context-sensitive meanings.

(1) a. It’s 6 o’clock.
   b. The ticket costs $300.

While times and prices can be intuitively be seen as denoting precise values, they are often used in a looser way: for instance, one could use (1-a) to describe a time of 5:57; or (1-b) to describe a price of $295. This phenomenon, known as imprecision, has been extensively investigated across philosophy and linguistics (Austin 1962; Lewis 1979; Pinkal 1995; Lasersohn 1999; Syrett, Kennedy & Lidz 2009; Kennedy 2007; Morzycki 2011; Solt 2014; Cummins, Sauerland & Solt 2012; Kao et al. 2014; Klecha 2018; Aparicio 2017; Beltrama & Hanink 2019; Beltrama 2021): central to this work is the idea that it is indeed possible for speakers to use numerical expressions in a way that isn’t fully adherent to the facts being described – i.e., by producing statements that are literally false, but “close enough” to being true (Lasersohn 1999).²

Two distinctive properties of imprecision make this phenomenon suitable for our purposes. One is that the possibility of speaking imprecisely introduces a space of indeterminacy in the interpretation of numerals, which requires listeners to engage in inferential work: because the appropriate amount of imprecision that can be applied in a communicative scenario is not encoded in the lexical meaning of a numeral, comprehenders need to reason about a variety of contextual cues to ultimately determine what this threshold is, and adjust their interpretive behavior on a case by case basis (see Van Der Henst, Carles & Sperber. 2002; Cummins et al. 2012; Solt,

² See Solt (2014) and Sauerland & Stateva (2011) for a different take.
The other distinctive property of (im)precision is that the way in which comprehenders’ reason about it is closely connected to their perception of the speaker’s distinctive identity and personality features, as shown by work focused on two angles of this process. On the one hand, it has been shown that listeners reason rely on precision as a cue to draw social inferences about speaker. For example, speakers using sharp numbers (e.g., “207”) – normally taken to signal a high level of precision (Krifka 2007) – are associated with a cluster of social qualities that can be traced back to two core dimensions of social evaluation: high intellectual status – e.g., as articulate, educated, intelligent; and low sociability – e.g., as annoying, pedantic, obsessive (Beltrama 2018; Beltrama, Solt & Burnett 2022). Similarly, speakers using numerals in an explicitly imprecise fashion (i.e., “around 200”) are perceived as embodying opposite sets of qualities – e.g., as friendlier and more laid-back, but less intelligent and educated (Beltrama et al. 2022). On the other hand, and more centrally for our purposes, it’s been shown that the social information available in the context affects the computation of the level of precision with which a numeral is interpreted. In particular, Beltrama & Schwarz (2021) provide evidence that comprehenders reason about the persona embodied by the speaker in inferring the range of facts compatible with a numeral description. Evidence supporting this claim is based on participants’ indirect judgments about whether a certain fact is a likely candidate for being the one the numeral utterance was aiming to describe. Specifically, in a picture selection paradigm called the COVERED SCREEN TASK, participants were presented with a conversation between one of two sets of characters, manipulated between subjects: the Nerdy characters, who embody the social features generally associated with precise speech (i.e., high intellectual status, low sociability); or the Chill characters, who instead embody the social features generally associated with less precise speech (i.e., lower intellectual status, higher sociability). The two sets of characters, which had been previously normed to ensure that they would be perceived as socially different, and indeed associated with different expectations in terms of how precisely they speak, are shown in Figure 1.
In the experimental task, participants would see one of these two sets of characters engaging in a conversation, which always concluded with one character uttering a numeral description (e.g., “It’s $200”). In the critical condition, they were then shown a picture of a screen showing a slightly mismatching number (“$207”; VISIBLE choice), and were instructed to select this picture if they thought it fit the content of the utterance, indicating an imprecise interpretation; as an alternative, they could select a screen turned face down (COVERED choice), indicating a rejection of the mismatching number, and thus a more precise interpretation. The experimental set-up is shown below, with the Nerdy condition for the Persona manipulation.

**Figure 1**  Nerdy (left) vs. Chill (right) characters

**Figure 2**  Display before making the choice (Persona Condition: Nerdy)
As predicted, respondents adopted a more precise interpretation of the numeral when the speaker embodied the Nerdy, as opposed to the Chill person – i.e., they selected the COVERED option to a higher rate for numerals uttered by the former type of speaker than for those uttered by the latter; this suggests that comprehenders reason about the social identity of the speaker when determining the margin of imprecision that can be associated with a numeral in a given context – and thus adjust the pragmatic extension of the numeral accordingly.

But these findings also raise the question of how the interplay between social information and the relevant pragmatic reasoning plays out in the reverse interpretation task: that is, does the perception of speaker persona similarly affect numeral interpretation when comprehenders are directly asked to determine whether an utterance correctly describes a given fact? Put it differently: given an imprecise statement, can the speaker’s description still be accepted as being close-enough to the facts, or should it instead be deemed a mischaracterization? Besides allowing for a more comprehensive understanding of how (im)precision is resolved, addressing this question affords, on a broader level, the possibility of exploring a novel aspect of a type of inference – the one behind the Truth Value Judgment paradigm – that has been extensively utilized in the study of meaning, but whose sensitivity to social considerations remains largely unexplored.

As for the nature of this effect, we predict that speaker persona could affect these assessments in one of two possible ways. One possibility is that, parallel what was observed for the COVERED SCREEN task in Beltrama & Schwarz (2021), comprehenders assess the acceptability of an imprecise numeral by reasoning about the extension of the numeral – i.e., the range of values that the numeral could plausibly be mapped onto in the context. If this is the case, imprecise descriptions produced by Nerdy speakers, which previous work showed to be associated with a more narrow range of values, should be rejected as mischaracterizations more often than imprecise descriptions produced by Chill speakers. We refer to this possibility as Hypothesis 1. But an alternative possibility also exists: comprehenders might determine whether they intend to accept or reject an imprecise statement by recruiting social information to reason on the epistemic level, rather than the descriptive one – that is, by leveraging social information to assess the amount of credibility that they are willing to ascribe to a speaker producing an imprecise statement. Accordingly, comprehenders could posit that, because Nerdy speakers are generally more accurate in their descriptions, they likely have some valid reason to be imprecise in the specific context; as a result, they are more deserving to being given the benefit of the doubt in the case of an imprecise statement than speakers embodying the qualities linked to lower precision. This should lead to the opposite pattern to the one outlined above: imprecise descriptions produced by Nerdy speakers should be rejected less often – i.e., accepted as close enough to being true more often – than imprecise descriptions.
produced by approximate speakers. We refer to this possibility as **Hypothesis 2**.

To test these hypotheses, we implement a TVJ version of the **Covered Screen** paradigm, creating a task in which respondents are presented with both a description and an established body of facts, and are asked to assess the appropriateness of the former to represent the latter. We now proceed to discuss this study in §3.

### 3 The experiment

We implemented this setup by leaving the design of Beltrama & Schwarz (2021)’s **Covered Screen** task described above unchanged except for one crucial modification: following the conversation between the Nerdy or Chill characters, participants were only shown the picture of one phone, with a number visible on the screen. They were told that that phone was the one that the speaker was indeed looking at, and asked to indicate whether the character’s response was **Right** or **Wrong**, with the former response taken to represent an acceptance of the utterance, and the latter a rejection thereof.

#### 3.1 Methods & Design

Our stimuli utilized visually displayed dialogues, like those Beltrama & Schwarz (2021), with variants resulting from manipulations that crossed two factors in a $2 \times 3$ design.

Our first manipulation, implemented between-subjects, varied the persona embodied by the displayed characters (Nerdy: Arthur and Rachel vs. Chill: Alex and Eva). Each set of characters was framed in a conversation prefaced by a brief context sentence; in the dialogue, the female character and the male character would respond based on information they accessed by looking at their phone, uttering a quantity expression in the form of a round number. The presentation was identical to the cartoons in Figure 1, with the question and the response provided as text in the speech bubble.

The second manipulation was a within-subjects factor. After seeing the dialogue between the characters, participants were asked the question “Which phone is Arthur/Alex looking at" and were shown the picture of one phone, with a number visible on the screen. They were told that that phone was the one that the character was indeed looking at, and asked to indicate whether the character’s response was **Right** or **Wrong** in light of the displayed number. The number displayed on the phone was manipulated depending on its relation to the one uttered by the character, with three possible levels: **Match** with identical displayed and uttered numbers; **Mismatch**, with a large divergence between the two; and the critical **Imprecise** level, with only a slight divergence between the uttered and the displayed number. An
example from the three Screen Fit levels for a given item is provided in Figure 3.

![Figure 3](image)

Figure 3  Screen Fit Manipulation

The full display of a item is shown in Figure 4, with Nerdy as the level for the Persona manipulation, and Imprecise for the Screen Fit condition.

### 3.2 Materials

24 experimental items were created, each varied across 6 different conditions resulting from the $2 \times 3$ manipulation of the factors described above. The Persona manipulation was administered between-subjects: a given participant was either assigned to dialogues between the Nerdy characters or between the Chill characters. The Screen Fit manipulation was administered within-subjects: each participant saw 6 items in the Match and the Mismatch conditions and 12 items in the Imprecise condition, with item-condition pairings counterbalanced in a Latin Square Design. 8 items contained utterances describing prices, expressed in dollars (as in Figure 3-4); 8 items contained utterances describing distances, expressed in miles; and 8 items contained items describing times, expressed in hours and minutes. Across the three types of numerals, the range of deviation in the Imprecise condition was always comprised between $5\%$ and $18\%$: cost and distance diverged from the uttered value by $5, 6, 8, 9, 12, 14, 16, \text{or} 18$; and time diverged by $1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 9, 11, \text{or} 13$. The ranges of divergence for times were smaller since proportionally, a minute
makes up a greater proportion of an hour (1/60th) than 1 mile or dollar makes of a 100 miles/dollars, and quarter hour intervals intuitively constitute a salient degree of coarseness.

The experiment also included 24 filler items, which featured a dialogue between two separate characters called Becky and Tyler. The dialogue was also prefaced by a brief context sentence and was concluded by Tyler uttering a description with the quantifier *some*. In 8 filler items the visible screen would report a list of items which would make the description true; in 8 filler items it would report a list of items that would make the description false; and in 8 filler items, it would make the description under-informative, in that an ‘all’ statement would also have been true, thus yielding a condition where acceptance of the visible picture would correspond to adopting a literal ‘some and possibly all’ meaning of ‘some’, parallel to standard studies on scalar implicatures. An example of a filler item is shown below.
The fillers were alternated with the experimental items, so that participants would never see two consecutive occurrences of a filler or an experimental item.

3.3 Procedure

The study was implemented and administered online on the PCIbex platform\(^6\) (see Schwarz & Zehr 2021 for details). For each item, the context sentence was introduced first on the top left of the screen. After a 4-second pause to provide time to read this, images of the two characters would appear; after another 3-second pause to allow time to look at these characters (and the critical visual cues on their persona), the question asked by the first character was shown in the form of a speech bubble; following another 3 second pause, the answer from the other character was displayed to complete the dialogue. Finally, the question reminding the participant of the experimental task as well as the picture of the phone appeared on the right-hand side of the screen. Participants entered their responses by pressing the key matching the letter displayed under the picture on the keyboard. The experimental items were preceded by three practice filler items in which the response would involve the use of a quantifier, and the content of the visible screen would be either a perfect match

\(^6\) [https://www.pcibex.net](https://www.pcibex.net)
or an obvious mismatch. Feedback was provided on the practice items, so as to help the participants familiarize themselves with the task.\textsuperscript{7}

3.4 Participants

190 participants were recruited on Prolific and compensated $2 for participating (Age range: 18-66; Age Mean: 24; female = 132; male = 53; other = 5). The median duration of the study was 15 minutes ($8/hour).

3.5 Results

As can be seen in Figure 6, rejections (=WRONG responses) were at ceiling and at floor in the Mismatch and Match condition respectively, with intermediate, mid-range rejection rates in the Imprecise condition, as in Experiment 1. The differences between the Imprecise condition and the controls was highly significant in mixed effect logistic regression models (Match: $\beta$=10.06; SE=0.73; $z$ = 13.72, $p < 0.001$); Mismatch: $\beta$=6.68; SE=0.44; $z$ = 15.03, $p < 0.001$). To assess the effect of Persona in the critical, Imprecise condition, we fit a mixed-effects logistic regression with Persona as fixed effect, and by-Subject and by-Item random intercepts.\textsuperscript{8} The rejection rates for the two Persona levels differed significantly from each other, with higher rejection rates for Chill speakers than for Nerdy speakers ($\beta$=1.13; SE=0.52; $z$ = 2.18, $p < 0.05$).

\textsuperscript{7} Following the last trial, all participants, regardless of whether they had been assigned to the Nerdy or the Chill condition, were asked to complete the two question exit questionnaire shown below:

(i) a. I’d describe myself as: 1=not chill at all; . . . . 10=very chill
b. I’d describe myself as: 1=not nerdy at all; . . . . 10=very nerdy

The aim of the questionnaire was to assessing the degree to which they saw themselves as sharing key qualities of the speakers in the experiment. For reasons of space we will not be discussing these data.

\textsuperscript{8} Again, this model constituted the maximally complex random effect structure that would converge.
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4 Discussion

The findings from our study indicate that speakers’ social identity affects comprehenders’ assessments of imprecise statements: the same numerical descriptions are rejected – i.e. judged as WRONG – at a higher rate when produced by Chill speakers than by Nerdy ones. Combined with those from prior work, these results provide further evidence that comprehenders recruit social information about the speaker when engaging in pragmatic reasoning – and do so across different tasks and situations. At the same time, the specific impact of a speaker’s identity and personality features on the interpretation of what they say appears to crucially depend on the specific type of interpretive judgment, and the corresponding pragmatic reasoning, involved in a given task. Specifically, when comprehenders have to decide whether a candidate fact is part of the range described by a numeral in context, they take numerals uttered by Nerdy speakers to have a more narrow extension than numerals uttered by Chill speakers – effectively applying stricter standards of precision for the former than the latter (see results from Beltrama & Schwarz 2021). But when comprehenders have to assess an imprecise numeral statement relative to a fixed, given fact, as in the current study, they are more likely to accept imprecise statements by Nerdy speakers than by Chill ones – effectively being more lenient towards the former than the latter. This suggests that when it comes to assessing the suitability of a description, comprehenders recruit social information to reason on the epistemic level, as opposed to the referential one – that is, to calibrate the amount of credibility.
that they are willing to ascribe to the speaker. More specifically, we suggest that comprehenders reasoned about the fact that, even though the numerals uttered by Nerdy speakers are associated with a stricter range of possible values as referents, Nerdy speakers are generally seen as more accurate in their descriptive endeavors than Chill ones. As a result, they are treated by comprehenders as more authoritative in situations presenting a discrepancy between a description and a fact, leading to a higher rate of RIGHT responses, in line with Hypothesis 2 outlined in §2.

Taken together, these results suggest that considerations about the persona embodied by the speaker shape how comprehenders’ form an assessment of the appropriateness of a given description to represent a particular fact – and thus affect the outcome of the response behavior in a Truth Value Judgment task. Before considering the broader implications of these findings, however, it is important to first address an obvious question that is raised by the results from the experiment: why was this particular pattern observed, as opposed to the alternative one outlined in Hypothesis 1 (see §2) – i.e., that Nerdy speakers’ descriptions, by virtue of being associated with a more narrow extension, should actually be rejected more often? We propose that this result can be illuminated by considering the distinct epistemic implications linked to rejecting a description across the two paradigms. In Beltrama & Schwarz’s COVERED SCREEN Task, rejecting the imprecise display and selecting the COVERED option does not amount to an evaluative judgment of the speaker’s performance: it simply indicates that comprehenders believed that the utterance had been made in the presence of a more closely fitting state of affairs than the one shown in the VISIBLE display – a determination still compatible with taking the speaker to be cooperative, truthful, and overall conversationally competent. By contrast, a rejection in a TVJ task is crucially prejudicial: it commits the comprehender to holding the speaker blameworthy for not abiding to the norms of conversation – at the very least, on account of describing things inaccurately, and thus using language untruthfully. We suggest that it is precisely the prejudicial nature of a rejection in the current experiment that tipped the scales against the response pattern predicted by Hypothesis 1, and in favor of the one we actually observe. Because Nerdy speakers are generally (perceived to be) more accurate in their descriptions, they are presumably taken to be less likely to violate the relevant conversational norms than Chill ones. Accordingly, higher WRONG response rates for Chill speakers can be explained by positing that their stereotypical representation as imprecise language users made them more prone than Nerds to being seen as guilty of violating relevant conversational norms. This reconciles the seemingly conflicting results from the two studies: the expectation of higher accuracy for Nerdy speakers indeed goes hand in hand with a higher level of credibility assigned to them, leading to a more charitable disposition towards these speakers when it comes to assessing their statements in light of a given fact.
All in all, these results enrich our understanding of how social information shapes processes of meaning interpretation and meaning ascription. As summarized in §1, a growing number of studies have illuminated this issue (see Beltrama 2020 for an overview). This work provided important contributions both at the level of empirically demonstrating the interaction between social considerations and pragmatic reasoning (Bonnefon & Villejoubert (2006); Bonnefon et al. (2009); Acton & Potts (2014); Beltrama & Staum Casasanto (2021); Mazzarella et al. (2018); Fairchild & Papafragou (2018); Mahler (2020), and of incorporating social information in broader communicative frameworks (Goodman & Frank 2016; Kao et al. 2014; Bergen 2016; Burnett 2017, 2019; Henderson & McCready 2019; Acton 2019). Our findings broaden the scope of such endeavors by highlighting personae as a source of contextual information shaping how comprehenders determine whether a particular description adequately represents a state of affairs – a crucial evaluation that interlocutors must make whenever interpreting a meaning of a sentence. We take this conclusion to carry two important implications for the study of meaning.

One is that the reasoning behind the interpretation of numerals turns out to share a common denominator with other, seemingly distinct domains of reasoning – both within and beyond the linguistic domain. Looking at language processing, it has been long known that different realms of speech perception are heavily influenced by the available social information about the speaker, both at the level of a speaker’s demographic profile (Strand 1999; Niedzielski 1999; Hay et al. 2006; Hay 2009; Babel 2012; Drager 2015; Staum Casasanto 2008; Sumner et al. 2014; Wade 2022), and at the level of the more holistic constructs salient in the context, such as the stereotypical persona embodied by conversational participants. While sociolinguistic theory has long highlighted these constructs as central to how identity is signaled and perceived in interaction (Irvine 2001; Kiesling 2001; Bucholtz 2001; Zhang 2005; Agha 2005; Eckert 2008; Podesva 2011; King 2021), it is not until recently that persona-level information has also been shown to play a central role to processes of language comprehension and perception (D’Onofrio 2015, 2019; Choe et al. 2019; see D’Onofrio 2020 for an overview). Combined with our results from prior work, the findings from this study crucially suggest that parallel effects of persona-based information are also observed in processes of linguistic interpretation: in particular, they pinpoint comprehenders’ social perception of speakers as shaping the inference-drawing mechanisms whereby the literal content of an utterance is enriched with contextual information; and they highlight this process as one that, similar to other domains of language processing, crucially hinges on comprehenders tracking the identity and personality features of the conversational agents involved in the exchange.

The other important implication of our findings is a methodological one. In particular, we have provided novel evidence that comprehenders’ social perception of
the speaker shapes the outcome of judgments of descriptive appropriateness in a TVJ task – a behavioral measure widely utilized in the experimental study of meaning, and commonly seen as a window into the outcome of semantic interpretation (Noveck 2001; Papafragou & Musolino 2003; Bott & Noveck 2004; see §1). In recent years, a growing body of work called for a critical re-assessment of the nature and significance of these judgments, highlighting how they are often affected by factors – and thus sources of variability – that go beyond the sheer linguistic properties of a given utterance. These include, among others, the discourse context (Sikos et al. 2019; Scontras & Pearl 2021); the probability with which respondents see themselves as producing the utterance (Waldon & Degen 2020); or properties inherent to the demographic background of the speaker, such as their linguistic nativeness (Fairchild & Papafragou 2018; Fairchild, Mathis & Papafragou 2020). Our results open a novel perspective on the context-sensitivity of this behavioral measure, suggesting two takeaways. First, when making these assessments, comprehenders track an array of contextual factors that extend beyond those traditionally investigated in pragmatics, and include highly specific social constructs such as the speaker persona. Second, the way in which these factors impact comprehenders’ determination of the correctness of an utterance in a TVJ task does not align with the way in which the same factors affect other interpretation tasks on the same phenomenon – e.g., the COVERED SCREEN picture selection task. Especially noteworthy, here, is the observation that, in a TVJ setup, the perceived appropriateness of an imprecise description is inversely correlated with the expectation that a speaker uses this description imprecisely; and that, more broadly, the interplay between social reasoning and TVJ assessments cannot be fully understood without considering the interplay between a speaker’s social identity and the prejudicial implications entailed by rejecting their utterance – and in particular, the ascription of conversational blameworthiness that goes hand in hand with deeming an utterance inappropriate. We see this interaction as one that remains crucially underexplored in semantic and pragmatic work, calling for a more extensive consideration of how TVJ assessments, and other experimental measures deployed in the study of meaning, are affected by information about both the identity of who produces a particular utterance, and the social implications entailed by choosing a particular response choice as opposed to another.

Looking at the broader picture, it is important to consider how the effects of persona on meaning interpretation observed in our study relates to how social information shapes reasoning and action outside the linguistic domain proper. In particular, work on testimonial injustice in philosophy has suggested that people recruit social information about their interlocutors to determine the degree of authority and knowledge that they are willing to ascribe to them on a given matter; and that this reasoning often results in prejudicial practices such as a credibility deficit (Fricker 2007) – observed, for example, when someone is treated as lacking authority on a
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matter by virtue of being a woman; or credibility excess (Davis 2016) – observed for instance when someone asks an Asian-American seated nearby to help them with their math problem, relying on the flawed assumption that everyone embodying this social identity is proficient in the discipline. In this respect, our findings highlight a parallel dynamics with respect to assessing imprecise descriptions: when faced with the task of determining the correctness of an imprecise statement, comprehenders ultimately grant more credibility to Nerdy speakers than to Chill ones, suggesting that, similar to the cases discussed in the testimonial injustice literature, comprehenders recruit social information to make decisions that can be highly impactful on the degree of authority, credibility or trustworthiness a particular conversational agent is ascribed in the context. Framed in the broader picture of how social stereotypes shape people’s behavior, our results thus suggest that interpretation processes are not just subject to the effect of social information, but are also likely to be subject to, and simultaneously reproduce, similar patterns of bias and prejudice to those observed in other domains of human action. We see this as opening up yet another uncharted dimension for the study of linguistic interpretation: similar mechanisms linking social identity, meaning computation and the ascription of credibility are likely to be at play – and presumably in a more impactful way – when more socially prejudicial dimensions of identity than Nerdy or Chill are involved – e.g., race, gender socioeconomic status – in line with what has been suggested in work on linguistic discrimination and social inequality more broadly (see Lippi-Green 2011; Rickford & King 2016; Alim, Rickford & Ball 2016; Rosa & Flores 2017; Jones, Kalbfeld, Hancock & Clark 2019 among many others). This, in turn, highlights the importance of engaging in further work aimed at unpacking the link between processes of meaning comprehension and the perception and evaluation of social identity, so as to better understand the interplay of these two domains of reasoning in people’s communicative behavior.

5 Conclusion

We presented evidence showing that the social persona embodied by the speaker impacts the process whereby comprehenders assess the appropriateness of imprecise descriptions to represent a given fact. These results advance our understanding of the contextual factors that underlie meaning interpretation; and thus contribute to enriching semantics and pragmatics with insights from the study of how speakers’ signal, negotiate and reason about social identity in communication, an integration that highlights exciting, largely uncharted opportunities for future research.
References


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Andrea Beltrama  
3401-C Walnut Street  
Suite 300, C Wing  
University of Pennsylvania  
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6228  
beltrama@sas.upenn.edu

Florian Schwarz  
3401-C Walnut Street  
Suite 300, C Wing  
University of Pennsylvania  
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6228  
florians@sas.sas.upenn.edu