Reviewed by András Kertész, University of Debrecen

The problem of understanding other minds has so far been tackled predominantly by the theory of mind approach, which is computational and representational. This volume challenges such an approach by claiming that it is intersubjectivity that bridges the gap between the self and others.

Following Colwyn Trevarthen’s foreword ‘Shared minds and the science of fiction: Why theories will differ’, the editors contrast the theory of mind approach with the leading idea of the volume in their introductory chapter ‘Intersubjectivity: What makes us human’.

Part 1 of the volume is devoted to ontogenetic development. Shaun Gallagher and Daniel D. Hutto, in ‘Understanding others through primary interaction and narrative practice’, hypothesize that children understand actions in terms of reasons through narratives of a distinct kind. In ‘The neuroscience of social understanding’, John Barresi and Chris Moore discuss evidence for the claim that autistic children are not able to combine proprioceptive and sensorimotor information about the self with exteroceptive information about others. Peter Hobson and Jessica A. Hobson, in ‘Engaging, sharing, knowing: Some lessons from research in autism’, argue that intersubjectivity is pivotal for understanding autism. In ‘Coming to agreement: Object use by infants and adults’, Cintia Rodríguez and Christiane Moro explain the way children reach agreement with adults on the use of objects by means of diverse semiotic systems in contexts of joint communicative action. Ingar Brick’s chapter ‘The role of intersubjectivity in the development of intentional communication’ accounts for the role of intersubjectivity in the development of nonverbal intentional communication in human infants. Noah Susswein and Timothy P. Racine, in ‘Sharing mental states: Causal and definitional issues in intersubjectivity’, introduce a taxonomic concept of intersubjectivity.

Part 2 of the volume bears the title ‘Evolution’. Simone Pika answers the question ‘What is the nature of the gestural communication of great apes?’ by claiming that great apes seem to be capable of intersubjectivity; however, there are differences between human and ape gestures rooted in an innate bias for human cultural learning. In ‘The heterotronic origins of explicit reference’, David A. Leavens, William D. Hopkins, and Kim A. Bard argue for the opposite thesis, i.e. for the lack of such an innate bias. Jordan Zlatev’s chapter ‘The co-evolution of intersubjectivity and bodily mimesis’ suggests that intersubjectivity is closely interwoven with the use of the body for the purposes of representation and communication. In ‘First communions: Mimetic sharing without theory of mind’, Daniel D. Hutto explains the sophisticated social engagements of the hominids by growing recreative imaginative abilities.

Lastly, Part 3 focuses on ‘Language’. In ‘The central role of normativity in language and linguistics’, Esa Itkonen shows, among other things, that normativity implies common knowledge that is a particular form of intersubjectivity. Arie Verhagen’s chapter ‘Intersubjectivity and the architecture of the language system’ discusses the inherently argumentative nature of linguistic communication. In ‘Intersubjectivity in interpreted interactions: The interpreter’s role in co-constructing meaning’, Terry Janzen and Barbara Shaffer claim that the interpreter influences the interchange through her assumptions about the interlocutors’ knowledge states. In the final chapter, ‘Language and the signifying object: From convention to imagination’, Chris Sinha and Cintia Rodriguez outline a multi-faceted definition of intersubjectivity. The book concludes with a subject and an author index.

The central idea of the volume as well as the individual chapters are thought provoking and highly original, thus raising new problems and shedding fresh light on old ones.